Judgment K.M. Dayal, J. 1. THIS is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for declaration that the demand regarding the Projection Fee levied by the defendant, 'Nagar Palika' was invalid and a prohibitory injunction was sought restraining it from realising the same. The brief facts of the case are that Projection Fee was levied by the Nagar Palika under the bye-laws dated 13-3-1962 framed under Section 297 of the Municipalities Act. 2. THE learned counsel for the appellant firstly argued that the bye-laws have not been legally confirmed by the State Government as required by Section 301 of the Municipalities Act. THE bye-laws were sought to be framed under Section 297 of the Municipalities Act. They were required to be confirmed by the State Government under Section 301. According to the learned counsel for the appellant there was no confirmation. THE defendant relied upon confirmation by the Commissioner of the Division. According to the learned counsel, the State Government could not delegate that power as it was prohibited by Section 327 of the Municipalities Act. THE Courts below have held that the State Government delegated the powers under Section 301 sub-sections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) to the Divisional Commissioners in respect of the municipalities falling in their respective divisions. The learned counsel for the respondent has produced the Municipal Manual. On page 336 of Part II therein, it is mentioned that the powers of the State Government had been delegated to the Commissioners of the Divisions under Section 327 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. That also mentioned the power under sub-section (2) of Section 301 to confirm the bye-laws made by the Boards of the Municipalities 'within their respective Divisions.' Under the circumstances it cannot be said that there was no delegation of the power under Section 301 of the Municipalities Act. The powers for which there is a prohibition against delegation are mentioned in Schedule VII of the Act. Sections 297 and 301 do not find place in the Schedule VII. Under the circumstances there was no bar and the State Government had a right to delegate its powers to the Commissioner. 3. The powers for which there is a prohibition against delegation are mentioned in Schedule VII of the Act. Sections 297 and 301 do not find place in the Schedule VII. Under the circumstances there was no bar and the State Government had a right to delegate its powers to the Commissioner. 3. THE learned counsel for the appellant, however argued that the delegation under Section 227 could be made only in respect of 'any specified municipality or municipalities.' THE learned counsel argued that the municipalities which were to be governed by the delegation should have been specified in the order. According to him the word 'specified' governs both the words 'Municipality' and 'Municipalities'. For convenience of discussion Section 327 is reproduced below : "THE State Government may, by notification, delegate to the Prescribed Authority in respect of any specified municipality or municipalities within its jurisdiction to any one or more of the power vested in it by the Act, with the exception of the powers detailed in Schedule VII." 4. ACCORDING to the learned counsel municipalities have not been specified in the order. The delegation would be invalid and will not be under Section 327. I am unable to uphold that view. From the wordings of the 'notification' it appears that the municipalities for which the powers have been delegated are specified in it. It reads : "The power to confirm under sub-section (2) of Section 301 of the said Act, bye-laws made by the Boards of the Municipalities within their respective divisions". This delegation is in favour of the Commissioners of the Division. From this notification it is clear that the delegation is in respect of the Municipalities which specifically fall within the Divisions of the Commissioners. The Municipalities are thus specified and it is also clear that the Commissioner of a particular Division will have jurisdiction only in respect of the municipalities specified in the notification, i. e. those falling within his Division. He cannot exercise the powers in respect of any Municipality outside his Division. 5. I, therefore, hold that the municipalities have been specified in the notification and the notification cannot be invalid on the ground that the names of Municipal Boards have not been mentioned. 6. ONE thing is to be kept in view. He cannot exercise the powers in respect of any Municipality outside his Division. 5. I, therefore, hold that the municipalities have been specified in the notification and the notification cannot be invalid on the ground that the names of Municipal Boards have not been mentioned. 6. ONE thing is to be kept in view. The Municipal Boards come into being, as smaller towns develop and local authorities are conferred with the powers under the Municipalities Act. It would, therefore, not have been feasible to specify the Municipal Boards by their names. They have been specified as Municipalities falling in particular territories. Under the circumstances the best specification that could be made would be the powers granted in respect of the municipalities falling within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular authority. The specification is clear and unambiguous. The learned counsel lastly argued that the bye-laws framed could not affect the projections that existed before the framing of the bye-laws concerned. I am unable to accept that contention. The bye-law is in the nature of a fee to be charged in respect of projection made in the buildings. The fee is charged for the reason that the projection covers a portion of the municipal land. As such the fee could be charged in respect of the buildings from the date of commencement of the bye-laws till the projection exists. Once the projection is demolished or becomes non-existent, no fee will be chargeable. Similarly when there was no bye-law to the effect, no fee could be charged. Such fee can be validly charged in respect of projections which continue to cover the municipal land after the enforcement of the bye-laws. The levy is in the nature of rent for covering the municipal land. It cannot be said that when the municipal land was covered no rent/fee was charged, it could not be charged at any time in future. If there was no provision for charging [any rent/fee at a particular time, it may not be charged for that period but once there was a provision, it will apply to the projections which continue after the provision was made. Under the circumstances the Nagar Palika was entitled to charge the Projection Fee after the enforcement of bye-laws in question. 7. IN the result, the present appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.