JUDGMENT - Puranik J.-This petition on behalf of Homoeopathic Education Society, seeks a writ from this Court for quashing order dated 28–8-1980 passed by the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Revision (ULPN) Sc. 67/80 and the consequential restoration of the order dated 9–6-1980 passed by Labour Court, Akola, in ULPA No, 213/79. 2. The question raised before us in this petition is regarding the inter- pretation of the phrase “within one month from to-day” as used in a judicial order. 3. The facts giving rise to this petition lie in a narrow compass. They are also not disputed. The relevant facts may be stated as follows. The petitioner is a registered Society and runs Homoeopathic hospital, Maternity home and out-patient department in Homoeopathic medicine at Akola. It appears that the respondent Dr. P. A. Kelkar, was employed with the College of the said petitioner Society and on his alleged termination, the res-pondent preferred an application before the Labour Court at Akola com-plaining of an unfair labour practice inflicted upon him by the petitioner society. The said case was registered as case No. ULPA 178/78. The respondent had claimed reinstatement end back wages. The Labour Court granted the said relief to the respondent vide its order dated 1,4–9-1979. The petitioner as well as the respondent both went up in Revision to the Indus-trial Court at Nagpur, against the said order where the revision of the Society came to be dismissed while the revision filed by the respondent was allowed by the order of the Industrial Court on 28–11–1979. Thereafter, the Society.filed Writ Petition No. 3184/79 in the High Court and the same was allowedly this Court by its order dated 5–8-T980. The High Court directed that the case be tried afresh before the Labour Court at Akola with a further direction that the petitioner Society should deposit 50% of the alleged arrears of salary in the Labour Court within one month from the date of its order. 4. On 3–4-1980, the petitioner drew a cheque for the sum of Rs. 14000 for-depositing the amount before the Labour Court at Akola in compliance with the High Court's order. But it appears that it could not be deposited before closing of the court hours on that day. The next day i. e. 4–4-1980 was a holiday on account of Good Friday and the Labour Court was closed. 14000 for-depositing the amount before the Labour Court at Akola in compliance with the High Court's order. But it appears that it could not be deposited before closing of the court hours on that day. The next day i. e. 4–4-1980 was a holiday on account of Good Friday and the Labour Court was closed. The petitioner Society, therefore, deposited the cheque in the Court on 5–4-1980. 5. In the meantime on 3–4-1980 itself, the “respondent filed an appli- cation before the Labour Court alleging inter-alia that the petitioner society has committed a default in complying with the High Court's order and in pursuance of the said order the defence of the petitioner society was liable to be struck off. 6. On 7–4-1980, the Labour Court issued a notice to the petitioner society and after hearing both the parties the Labour Court by its order dated 9–4-1980 rejected the respondent's allegation that there* has been any default committed by the petitioner society and directed the proceedings to continue. It appears that the respondent also withdrew the amount of Rs. 14,000 which was so deposited by the petitioner society on 3–7-1980. 7. The respondent, however, preferred a revision against this order of the Labour Court and the same was taken up before the Industrial Court at Nagpur after giving due notice to the petitioner society. After hearing both the parties the Industrial Court by its order dated 28–8-1980 quashed the order of the Labour Court and further held«that the petitioner society has committed a default in complying with the High Court's order and that in pursuance of the condition imposed upon by the High Court in the earlier Writ Petition No. 3184/79 the defence of the petitioner society was liable to be struck off. It is against this order that the petitioner society has preferred this writ petition. The petition was admitted on 30–8-1980. 8. The petition was admitted and the stay was granted at 1–30 P. M. However, in pursuance of the order of the Industrial Court which was communicated to the Labour Court at Akola while camping at Amravati the defence of the petitioner society was struck off at 3–30 P. M. by its order. 9. The petition was admitted on 30–8-1980. 8. The petition was admitted and the stay was granted at 1–30 P. M. However, in pursuance of the order of the Industrial Court which was communicated to the Labour Court at Akola while camping at Amravati the defence of the petitioner society was struck off at 3–30 P. M. by its order. 9. For proper appreciation of the phrase used in the order dated 5–3-1980 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3184/79, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant portion; “We, therefore, feel that in the interest of justice, the petitioner No. 1 society should deposit in court within one month from to-day 50% of the salary allegedly due to the respondent No. 1 from 7–8-1977 (alleged date of his appointment) till 28–11–1979 (date of order of Industrial Court) without prejudice to its conclusions. Respondent No. 1 would be entitled to withdraw that amount only on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Labour Court. If the amount is not deposited by the society within one month, the Labour Court shall strike the defence of the society and shall proceed to pass further orders in the matter”, (emphasis added). 10. As already stated above, the petitioner society complied with the above order by depositing a cheque in the Trial Court at Akola on 5–4-1980. It is the contention of the petitioner society that the amount so deposited was within one month from the date of the High Court's order dated 5–3-1980 and as such the defence of the petitioner society was not liable to be struck off. By the impugned order dated 28–8-1980, the Industrial Court, Nagpur took the view that while using the phrase “within one month from to-day”, the High Court intended that the period of one month shall be computed from the date of order itself i. e. from 5–3-1980 and the Industrial Court further held that since a month means a period of 30 days, then reckoned accor- dingly the last day within which the order was to be complied with was 3–4-1980 and the petitioner society having defaulted in depositing the amount by that date was liable to suffer the striking off of its defence. In an elaborate order passed by the Industrial Court, reference has also been made to the various cases relied upon by the petitioner society and in particular the case reported in Markanda Sahu v. Lal Sadananda Singh1. It is this interpretation arrived at by'the Industrial Court, Nagpur of the phrase “within one month from to-day” which is under challenge in this petition. The question, therefore, is as to the meaning and interpretation of the phrase “within one month from to-day” as used in the judicial order. 11. Shri K. B. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioner con- tended that various High Courts have decided the question of interpretation of such phrases and words appearing in judicial orders. He mainly relied on the case of Ramchandra v. Laxman2. In the said case, Civil Court had passed an order on 23–1-1936 directing the defendant to deposit Rs. 200 in the Court within 15 days from that day. The defendant deposited the amount on 7–2-1936, but the trial Court held that the deposit was not made within 15 days as directed but was made on the 16th day and that therefore it was not made in time and the default had occasioned on behalf of the defendant. The matter came up before this Court and it was held on the basis of section 9 of General Clauses Act of 1897 that it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time to use the words “from” and for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word “to”. This Court further held that no doubt it is true that the General Clauses Act in terms would not apply to the phrases used in judicial order, but it would always be desirable for the sake of uniformity that the same interpretation should be given to an expression occurring in a judicial order as would be given to the one in a statute. 12. Similar is the authority relied upon by the petitioner in Vasantlal Ranchhoddas v. Union of India5. In the said Division Bench ruling of this Court, the question was of interpretation of the expression “within six months of the seizure of the goods”. 12. Similar is the authority relied upon by the petitioner in Vasantlal Ranchhoddas v. Union of India5. In the said Division Bench ruling of this Court, the question was of interpretation of the expression “within six months of the seizure of the goods”. The Court held that the principle underlying section 9 of the General Clauses Act has been applied even in the case of judicial orders passed by the Courts even though in terms the section is not applicable. The case of Ramchandra v. Laxman, cited supra, was also relied upon in the said ruling. Reliance was also placed on the law as laid down in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition Volume 37, page 95, wherein it is stated : “The general rule in cases in which a period is fixed within which a person must act or take the consequences is that the day of the act or event from which the period runs should not be counted against him. This general rule applies irrespective of whether the limitation of time is imposed by the Act of a party or a Statute: Thus where a period is fixed within which criminal prosecution or a civil action may be commenced, the day on which the offence is committed or the cause of action arises is excluded from computation”. 13. It is no longer debatable that when a judicial order is passed on a particular day directing certain action to be complied with within a parti- cular period, then the date of the order has to be excluded from computing the period of time granted by the Court. In the instant case, when the High Court directed the petitioner to deposit a certain amount “within one month from to-day” and the order was passed on 5–3-1980, the computation of the period of one month shall start after excluding the date of the order i.e. 5–3-1980. Thus, the period of one month has to fee computed from 6–3-1980 onwards. 14. The next question is for the complete interpretation of the said phrase, what is the meaning of the word “month”. For this purpose, we may firstly refer to the law as stated in Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 86 published in 1954. At page 837 it is stated: “A month is a measure of time and is one of the twelve portions into which the year is divided. For this purpose, we may firstly refer to the law as stated in Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 86 published in 1954. At page 837 it is stated: “A month is a measure of time and is one of the twelve portions into which the year is divided. Modern authorities recognize two sorts of months, lunar and calendar, and, unless an intention to the contrary is indicated, the word “month”, in whatever connection used, generally signifies a calendar month”. At page 838 it further lays down that: “Where the word “month”, as employed in a statute, judicial pro-ceeding, or contract, means calendar month, a period of a month or of months is to be computed not by counting days, but by looking at the calendar, and if runs from a given day in one month to a day of the corresponding one of the next or specified succeeding month, except where the last month has not so many days, in which event it expires on the last day of mat month”. 15. So also is the law stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 37 at paragraph 143. For the purpose of computation of the period of one month, it states : “When the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period starts; save that, if theperiod starts at the end of a calendar month which contains more days than the next succeeding month, the period may run to the end of the latter month.” 16. Thus, the plain meaning of the word “month” is a calendar month and it may not necessarily be of 30 days or 31 days, but it will always depend upon a particular date on which the word is used in a judicial order. It is not synonymous with 30 days and when the word “month” is employed in a statute or judicial proceeding or contract, it only means a calendar month. It is not synonymous with 30 days and when the word “month” is employed in a statute or judicial proceeding or contract, it only means a calendar month. In the present case, therefore, when the order was passed on 5–3-1980 and the compliance was to be done within one month from that day, a computa- tion for the period of one month will begin from 6–3-1980 and the month or the period granted will end on 5–4-1980 as per law of computation and interpretation discussed above. Thus, the deposit made by the petitioner society on 5–4-1980 was within time and their defence was not liable to be struck off. 17. Shri K. B. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon several other rulings of the High Courts of Delhi, Mysore and other Courts, but they all hold the same interpretation as above and need not be discussed here. 18. We, however, feel it necessary to make a special reference to the case Markanda Sahu v. Lal Sadananda Singh which was relied upon by the Industrial Court in its impugned order. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court observed : “ that this controversy is set at rest in Markanda Sahu v, Lal Sadananda Singh wherein it is held that a month should always be taken as of thirty days. This case appears to have been cited in the lower Court, but the learned lower Court did not properly appreciate the point and wrongly held in favour of the non-applicant in excluding the first day from counting”. 19. We have carefully gone through the reported ruling of the Orissa High Court and we feel that the observations of the Industrial Court referred to above are wholly incorrect. It appears that the learned Judge of Industrial Court has misinterpreted the ratio of the Orissa decision. In fact the said case also supports the contention of the petitioner. 20. The brief facts of that particular case were that the trial Court after being satisfied that there was sufficient cause for inability of the plain- tiff to proceed with the suit, passed an order on October 25 1948 allowing restoration of the suit on the condition that the plaintiff deposit a sum of Rs. 100 towards costs of the defendant within one month from this date. 100 towards costs of the defendant within one month from this date. The petitioner in that case applied for extension of time to deposit the cost on November 25, 1948. The Trial Court rejected the application on 25th November on the ground that the period allowed for making deposit had expired on 24th November itself. The Orissa High Court in that matter held that by the words “within a month” the subordinate Judge in his order dated 25th October had meant that the sum of Rs. 100 should be deposited before November 26th i. e. before the expiry of the Court hours of Novem- ber-25, 1948 It is, therefore, evident that even the facts as well as the law as laid down in the said case support the contention of the petitioner and not of the respondent. 21. In our view, therefore, there was no default on the part of the petitioner Society in the instant case when they deposited the amount as directed by the High Court on 5th April 1980. 22. On behalf of the respondent, the contentions challenging this petition were two-fold. One, as regards the interpretation of the phrase “within one month from to-day” and the other regarding the maintainability of this petition. 23. As regards the first contention, we need not go again into the question of interpretation, since we have already discussed in detail the ratio of the decisions, as regards the interpretation of the phrase “within one month from to-day” and we have held that there was no default on the part of the petitioner Society when they deposited the ordered amount on 5–4-1980 in compliance with High Court's order. 24. As regards the second contention of the respondent, reference will have to be made to the cases cited by him in this Court. He urged relying upon a decision in Workmen of (Dodsal Pvt. Ltd. v. Dodsal Pvt. Ltd. and another)4 that the High Court, would not have been justified in reappraising the material and in seeking to give its own interpretation of the award as if the High Court was exercising appellate power over the Industrial Court. He urged relying upon a decision in Workmen of (Dodsal Pvt. Ltd. v. Dodsal Pvt. Ltd. and another)4 that the High Court, would not have been justified in reappraising the material and in seeking to give its own interpretation of the award as if the High Court was exercising appellate power over the Industrial Court. In the said citation, the Supreme Court had ruled that the interpretation of the earlier award being within the competence of the Industrial Tribunal, it would not be proper for the High Court to seek to displace that inter- pretation merely because another interpretation was also possible. However, in the present case which we are dealing, we do not find that the said case is applicable to the present case, inasmuch as it is not a question of the inference or interpretation of a particular set of facts drawn by the Industrial Court in the present case, but on the other hand it is a question of judicial interpretation of the phrase normally used in a judicial order. In the instant case, it was necessary to interpret it correctly because by an errone- ous and perverse interpretation of the said phrase, the petitioner Society was denied an opportunity to defend its case. It would amount to gross mis- carriage of justice if for such erroneous interpretation the petitioner's defence is struck off and it gets no adequate opportunity to put its case before the Labour Court. 25. The respondent also relied on a catena of cases which we only note here for purpose of record. .They are: Official Trustee, (West Bengal Ors. v. Sachindra Nath)5, (Ajay Rasia v. Khalid Mujib)6, (Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narayan Ors).7, (Gujarat State Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. P. B. Mankad and another)8, (Pandurang and another v. Saraswatibai and another)9, (Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu)10, (Rashidkhan v. Maltibai)11, (S. B. Noronah v. Prem Kumari)12 and (Superintendence Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Krishna Murari)13. 26. The respondent drew our attention to the above cited cases and persuaded us to go through those rulings and the relevant paragraphs. They all relate to the question as to whether the society is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and whether such petitions are maintainable. In our view, all the cases cited above are not applicable to the present case. They all relate to the question as to whether the society is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and whether such petitions are maintainable. In our view, all the cases cited above are not applicable to the present case. Suffice it to say that the petitioner, a registered society, is seeking a relief against a judicial Tribunal by suitable writ and since there is no other remedy available to correct the gross injustice occasioned by the said erroneous order of the judicial Tribunal. In our view, therefore, this petition is maintainable. 27. On the question of interpretation of the word “from to-day”, therespondent urged that a distinction can be made in the words “from to-day” and “from this day”. He stated that the eases relied upon by the petitioner referred to the phrases like “from this day” or “within six months of” etc. But they do not refer to the phrase “from to-day”. We do not find any difficulty in holding that the words “this day” and “to-day” are synonymous and refer only to the day the order is passed. 28. It was further contended by the respondent vide his Civil Applica- tion No. 2459/80 presented in this case that he is entitled to costs irrespec- tive of the decision of the petition inasmuch as the petitioner society had not complied with the Rules of the High Court framed on the Original and Appellate Side. He urged that the amendment to the petition was ordered Jo be effected by this Court and that was not complied with by the petitioner society within the prescribed period as per the Rules. He further urged that the stay order was issued by this Court depriving the respondent from pro- ceeding with his case in respect of reinstatement and back wages and he is, therefore, entitled to such reasonable costs as this Court deems fit. We do not find any force in this contention for the simple reason that the delay in the matter of effecting amendment, if any, was duly condoned by this Court and secondly the stay order that was issued after the admission of the peti- tion was perfectly justified and was not issued merely at gratis. The respon- dent is therefore not entitled to any costs on these counts. 29. The respon- dent is therefore not entitled to any costs on these counts. 29. The net result of the above discussion therefore is that the impugs-ed order of the Industrial Court 28–8-1980 is passed on erroneous and per- verse interpretation of the phrase “within one month from to-day” and has thereby resulted in the denial of right to the petitioner Society to defend its case before the Labour Court and has thus resulted in miscarriage of justice. We feel, therefore, that the same can be rectified by allowing this petition and quashing the impugned order. 30. Accordingly, the petitioner succeeds and the petition is allowed. We hereby order that the impugned order dated 28–8-1980 passed by the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Nagpur in Revision (ULPN) No. 87/80 is hereby quashed and set aside and consequently the order of the Judge, Labour Court, Akola passed on 9–6-1980 in U.L.P.A. No. 218/80 is restored. It is further directed that the parties shall appear before the Labour Court at Akola on Monday the 6th April 1981 and the Labour Court shall restore the defence pleadings of the petitioner society on record and proceed with the case according to law. 31. As regards costs, it is directed that the respondent shall bear his own costs as also those of the petitioner society. No orders as to costs of the intervener. 32. No orders are necessary in Civil Application No. 2459/80. Petition allowed. -----