ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - This petition under Article 226, Constitution is directed against the order dated 14th July, 1980 passed by the joint Director of Consolidation allowing the revision and remanding the case of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) directing him to decide the appeal on merits. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this petition are that the disputed khata No. 40 situate in village Chak Tal Pareva district Varanasi was recorded in the basic year khatauni in the name of the petitioner and opposite party No. 4 Smt. Mokali. An objection was filed within limitation under S. 9-A (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereinafter to be referred as the Act, by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 claiming co-tenancy rights in the land in dispute to the extent of 5/9th share in the holding. The objection was contested by the petitioner and opposite party No. 4 asserting that they are the sole tenure holders. This objection was dismissed in default on 20th July, 1977 as none appeared on behalf of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 at the time the case was called for hearing and the basic year entry in the names of the petitioner and opposite party No. 4 was maintained and directed to continue. An application for restoration was filed by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 on 7th Sept. 1977. They alleged that they had no knowledge about the date fixed for hearing the objection. An application under S. 5, Limitation Act was also filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the restoration application wherein it was mentioned that they reside in village Delhi Ka pura, district Mirzapur, and the summonses which were issued against them with regard to the date of hearing in the case were wrongly got served through affixation made in village Chak Tal Pareva and on coming to know of the dismissal of their case in default the application for restoration is presented. This application was opposed by the petitioner and the Consolidation Officer vide order dated 9th Nov, 1977 dismissed the application for restoration by holding that the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 are not entitled to get the benefit of S. 5, Limitation Act as no sufficient cause has been shown for extending the benefit of S. 5, Limitation Act. Aggrieved by the said order the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 are not entitled to get the benefit of S. 5, Limitation Act as no sufficient cause has been shown for extending the benefit of S. 5, Limitation Act. Aggrieved by the said order the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 filed an appeal which was allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on 1st Sept. 1978 setting aside the orders dated 20th July 1977 and 9th Nov. 1977 and the case was remanded to the Consolidation Officer for decision on merits. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioner filed a revision which was allowed by opposite-party No. 1 vide order dated 6th June 1979 on the sole ground that Smt. Sukhia opposite-party No. 4 was not impleaded in the appeal hence the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was directed to decide the appeal on merits after impleading Smt. Sukhia. After remand Smt. Sukhia was impleaded in the appeal which was ultimately heard and dismissed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by his order dated 7th Nov. 1979 on the sole ground that the appeal was not maintainable against the aforesaid order dated 9th Nov. 1977 passed by the Consolidation Officer and revision lies against that order. Opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 thereupon filed a revision against the said order dated 9th Sept. 1979 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). This revision was heard and allowed by opposite party No. 1 vide order dated 14th July 1980 holding that : re appeal was maintainable against the said order and he remanded it to the Settlement Officer consolidation) for deciding it on merits. The petitioner has challenged this order in this petition. 3. The main question which crops up for consideration in this petition is whether an appeal could be filed against the aforesaid order dated 9th Nov., 1977 or a revision lay, against it. It is not disputed in the present case that opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 had filed the objection under S. 9-A of the Act claiming co-tenancy rights in the holding in dispute and this objection was filed within the prescribed period of limitation. The said objection was dismissed in default by order dated 20th July, 1977 passed by the Consolidation Officer. Two remedies were available to the objectors, opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3, against this order. The said objection was dismissed in default by order dated 20th July, 1977 passed by the Consolidation Officer. Two remedies were available to the objectors, opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3, against this order. They could file an appeal under S. 11 of the Act as the said order dismissing their objection was an order under S. 9-A of the Act as held by this Court in Mst. Isharaji v. Commr. Varanasi Division Varanasi, 1968 Rev Dec 123: (1968 All L J 205). Opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 could also file an application for restoration as was provided under S. 201 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act and they in fact moved an application for restoration of their objection on 7th Sept. 1977 along with an application seeking condonation of delay. The Consolidation Officer dismissed the application for restoration on 9th Nov. 1977 and thus the order dated 20th July 1977 dismissing the objection under S. 9-A of the Act was maintained. The Consolidation Officer has passed the aforesaid two orders in exercise of his powers under S. 9-A of the Act. The proceedings for seeking restoration of the objection dismissed in default were in relation to the objection under S. 9-A of the Act which was dismissed in default. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that an order dismissing the objection in default was not appealable in view of the specific bar contained in S. 201 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act which is made applicable to the present proceedings. In Mst. Isharaji's case (supra) Satish Chandra. J. (as he then was) held that: "A decision of the objections results in an order which has been made appealable under S. 11 without any distinction. Disposal of an objection ex parte or by default would also be an order under S. 10 and would hence be appealable under S. 11. The provisions of S. 41 read with S. 201, Land Revenue Act will hence not be attracted. Section I1 is not subject to S. 41 of the U.P.C.H. Act." 5. In this view of the matter it cannot be accepted that the order dated 20th July, 1977 dismissing the objection in default was not an appealable order as the said order was passed in proceedings arising out of an order under S. 9-A of the Act itself. 6. In this view of the matter it cannot be accepted that the order dated 20th July, 1977 dismissing the objection in default was not an appealable order as the said order was passed in proceedings arising out of an order under S. 9-A of the Act itself. 6. The next question for consideration in this context is whether the order dated 7th' Sept., 1977 passed by the Consolidation Officer dismissing the application for restoration would be appealable or a revision will lie against it. The provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U. P. Land Revenue Act have been made applicable to all proceedings including appeals and applications under the Act unless otherwise expressly provided by or under the Act, viz. U.P.C.H. Act. Under S. 11 of the Act there is no categorisation of the kind of orders which alone are appealable. All orders of the Consolidation Officer are appealable. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the application for restoration filed by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 seeking restoration of the objection under S. 9-A of the Act would be taken to be one under S. 201 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act as there is no separate provision providing filing of the application for the restoration of the case dismissed in default or for setting aside an ex parte order passed in the objection under S. 9-A or under other provisions of the Act or in appeal or revisions arising therefrom. He thus contended that the order which would be passed by the Consolidation Officer on the said application would not be an order passed by him under section 9-A of the Act hence it would not be appealable under S. 11 of the Act wherein only orders under S. 9-A of the Act are made appealable. I am unable to agree with this contention. 7. If an objection under the provisions of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is dismissed in default or is decided ex parte an application for restoration of it or for setting aside the ex parte order would be maintainable in view of the provisions contained under S. 41 of the Act but such an application would in fact be an application seeking revival of the objection itself. It cannot be treated to be a separate proceedings under S. 201 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act detached from the objection under S. 9A of the Act itself. If the application is allowed condoning the delay in moving an application for restoration, the objection under S. 9A of the Act would be revived but if it is dismissed the proceedings under S. 9A of the Act would not review and the objection would not be treated to be pending before the Consolidation Officer. The order dismissing the application for restoration would be an order passed by the Consolidation Officer and would be treated to be confirming the order passed by him dismissing the objection in default or on merits ex parte. In Mst. Isharaji's case, (1968 All L J 205) (supra) it has been held that S. 11 provides an appeal against the order of Consolidation Officer within 21 days of the date of the order. Under S. 11 there is no categorisation of the kind of order which alone is appealable. All orders of the Consolidation Officer are appealable. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Consolidation Officer refusing to restore the case would be a final order passed in relation to the proceedings under S. 9A of the Act itself hence it would be appealable under S. 11 of the Act. In taking this view I am fortified by the decision of this Court in Sahab Singh v. Rameshwar, 1971 All W R (H.C.) 755, wherein R.B. Misra, J., (as he then was) held that where an objection under S. 9(a) of the Act along with an application under S. 5. Limitation Act for condonation of delay was dismissed on two grounds (1) that the objection was filed much after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an objection and (2) also on the ground that there is no merit in the objection, such an order would be an order falling within the purview of S. 9A (2) of the Act, and an appeal against such an order has been provided under S. 11 of the Act. 8. 8. Placing reliance on the under noted authorities learned counsel contended that the order passed by the Consolidation Officer on the application for restoration would be open to revision and not to an appeal, (1) Sita Ram Singh v. State of U.P., 1970 All L J 1324, (2) Gaon Sabha Rakshaha Ghazipur v. D. D. C. 1980 All W C 547 : (1980 All L J 941), and (3) Samharoo v. State,1967 All W R (H C) 220: (1967 All L J 463). In the aforesaid cases it has been held that the order condoning the delay on an application under S. 5. Limitation Act in filing the objection under S. 9A of the Act is not an order under that section of the Act. If delay is condoned in filing the objection under S. 9A of the Act the objection remains pending before the Consolidation Officer and hence the order condoning the delay in filing the objection itself cannot be treated to be an order under S. 9A of the Act and as such it would not be appealable. In this view of the matter it was held that no appeal was maintainable against the said order condoning the delay and such an order would be open to revision under S. 48 of the Act. These cases, therefore, do not apply to the present case. It is not disputed that the objection filed by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 under S. 9A of the Act was within limitation and was also registered as such. The order dismissing the objection in default was appealable as it was an order under S. 9A of the Act. The proceedings in the objection did not revive as the application for restoration was dismissed being time barred and benefit of S. 5, Limitation Act was refused. Thus, in the present case no objection remains pending under S. 9A of the Act before the Consolidation Officer. The orders passed by the Consolidation Officer dismissing the objection under S. 9A of the Act and refusing to restore it would be deemed to be orders passed under the aforesaid section itself as he exercised jurisdiction to entertain and decide objections in the matters with regard to title etc. raised in proceedings under S. 9A of the Act under that provision alone. raised in proceedings under S. 9A of the Act under that provision alone. The application for restoration or for setting aside the ex parte decree passed on such objections is maintainable in view of the provisions contained in S. 41 of the Act in that regard. Even if the application for restoration of the case be treated to be separate proceeding under S. 201 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, the Consolidation Officer would be deciding it in exercise of powers under the provisions of the Act itself. Sub-clause (3) of S. 3 of the Act provides that : "Consolidation Officer' means a person appointed as such by the State Government to exercise the powers and perform the duties of a Consolidation Officer under this Act or the rules made thereunder and shall include a Rectangulation Officer." 9. Thus the Consolidation Officer exercises powers under the provisions of the Act itself. The provisions contained in S. 41 of the Act only makes the provisions of S. 201, L. R. Act applicable in the case, for seeking restoration of the objections dismissed in default or for setting aside the order passed ex parte thereon. The Consolidation Officer while passing the order either allowing or dismissing such an application exercises powers under the Act itself and, therefore, such orders would be deemed to be passed by him under the provisions of S. 9A (2) of the Act and would he appealable under S. 11 of the Act because there is no categorisation of any kind of order which alone is appealable under S. 11 of the Act. All orders passed by the Consolidation Officer in proceedings arising out of S. 9.A (2) of the Act will be appealable under S. 11 of the Act. An application for restoration moved against the order dismissing the objection for default would be a proceeding arising out of the order passed under S. 9A of the Act. Hence the order passed by the Consolidation Officer thereon would be appealable under section 11 of the Act. Even if the application for restoration be treated to be a separate proceeding under section 201 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act it will be a proceeding arising out of an objection under S. 9A of the Act and an appeal would lie under section 11 of the Act against the order dismissing the application for restoration. 10. Even if the application for restoration be treated to be a separate proceeding under section 201 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act it will be a proceeding arising out of an objection under S. 9A of the Act and an appeal would lie under section 11 of the Act against the order dismissing the application for restoration. 10. Even in proceeding under the U. P. Land Revenue Act itself, the orders passed dismissing a restoration application under S. 201 of the Act are appealable under S. 210 of the said Act. Thus, in this view of the matter also the order passed by the Consolidation Officer dismissing the application for restoration even if it be treated to have been passed in separate proceedings under S. 201 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, would be appealable. It cannot be urged that against the order refusing to condone the delay passed by the Consolidation Officer an appeal would lie under S. 201 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act before the authorities enumerated therein. The appeal as a matter of fact will lie under the provisions of the U. P. C. H. Act itself and not under the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act against the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer. The provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, have been made applicable in the proceedings under the U. P. C. H. Act by virtue of S. 41 of the Act, which reads as follows. "Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions-of Chapters I and X of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, shall apply to all proceedings including appeal and applications under this Act." (Underlined by me.) 11. The words `unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act' in S. 41 leave no room for doubt that an order passed by the Consolidation Officer dismissing an application for restoration and refusing to restore the objection under S. 9A of the Act will be appealable under the provisions of the U. P. C. H. Act, where in a provision for filing appeal has been provided under S. I l of the said Act. In this view of the matter also, I am of the opinion that the order dated 9th Nov. In this view of the matter also, I am of the opinion that the order dated 9th Nov. 1977 passed by the Consolidation Officer was appealable and the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation does not suffer from any error of law or jurisdiction. 12. In the result the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances I. however, make no order as to costs.