ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts, in brief are these. One liar Prasaii was the tenure-holder to whom the nut ice raider S. 10(2) of the Act was issued. The objections were filed and they were decided by the Prescribed Authority. It seems that there was a gift deed dated 5-9-1974 which had been executed by the said tenure-holder Har Prasad in favour of the petitioner. On the basis of this gift-teed, it seems that a contention was raised that the land covered by the said gift deed could not be included in the holding of the said tenure-holder Har Prasad. It is stated in the order of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court that the petitioner herself had appeared before the Prescribed Authority and she based her claim in respect of the land in dispute on the said gift-deed. She contended that she was in possession of the land in question and that her name had ben recorded in the revenue papers and that separate Chaks had been carved Out during consolidation proceedings. However, this contention was not accepted and the gift deed was held (.) he liable to be ignored under the provisions of the ceiling Law. It seems that the matter was taken before the appellate court and again this contention was pressed that the land covered by the gift-deed Could not be included in the holding of the tenure-holler, Har Prasad. However, the appellate court also dismissed the said contention and then the matter was brought to this court in a writ petition. However the writ petition also was dismissed. It seems that' on 25-10-1977 the legal representative of Har Prasad who had died in the meanwhile) moved an application giving the land in dispute in choice as surplus land. This application was allowed on 30-6-1978. On 19-1-1979, the petitioner moved application before the appellate court praying that the aforesaid order dated 30-6- 1978 should be set aside and tine land in question should not be allowed to be given in choice as surplus land. The said application of the petition dated 19-1-1979 was rejected by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 5-11-1979 and a true copy of the same is Annexure 1 to the petition. Thereafter. The said application of the petition dated 19-1-1979 was rejected by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 5-11-1979 and a true copy of the same is Annexure 1 to the petition. Thereafter. the petitioner filed an appeal but the same was dismissed by the appellate court by its impugned judgment dated 21-1-1980. it true copy whereof has been annexed to the petition. A certified copy of the said judgment is also on the record. 3. Feeling aggrieved, now the petitioner has come up in the instant writ petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri H.P. Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition the learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. 4. Sri Dubey made the following points: 1. Cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12A of the Act was breached in this case. The said provision is as under: - "(d) Where an person holds land in excess of the ceiling area including land which is the subject of any transfer or partition referred to in sub-section (6) or sub-section (7) of Section 5, the surplus land determined shall, as far as possible be land other than land which is the subject of such transfer or partition, and if the surplus land includes any land which is the subject of such transfer or partition, the transfer or partition shall, in so far as it relates to the land included in the surplus land, be deemed to be and always to have been void.'' It is therefore, contended that it was not open to the tenure-holder or his legal representative to give land covered by the gift-deed in choice as surplus land and the Prescribed Authority was wrong in accepting deceased tenure-holder to include the said land (the subject matter of the gift-deed) in the surplus land of the said deceased tenure- holder. I-A. S. 5(8) of the Act which declares certain transfer deeds to be void, is prospective and not retrospective. 2. A reference was made to S. 14(3) of the Act. 3. It was contended that there could be no question of exercising choice under S. 12-A of the Act after possession of the disputed plot was claimed by the Slate to have been obtained in the proceedings under S. 14 of the Act. 5. 2. A reference was made to S. 14(3) of the Act. 3. It was contended that there could be no question of exercising choice under S. 12-A of the Act after possession of the disputed plot was claimed by the Slate to have been obtained in the proceedings under S. 14 of the Act. 5. In this connection, a reference was made to the State's stand taken in this Court that the possession over the land in dispute had been obtained on 19-12-1976. This is clear from paras 6 and 10 of the counter-affidavit of Kamla Prasad Srivastava, Naib Tahsildar (Ceiling), District Allahabad who filed the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State. The learned counsel in this connection placed reliance on Uttam Narain Singh v. State, (1980 All L J 858). 6. The learned counsel cited the made applicable to the deeds of transfer following case law : - which have been disregarded under S. 5(6) of 1. Mahanand Singh v. State of U. P. (1978 the Act. ALL L J 1012). 2. Smt. Kunwar Rani Sushila Devi v. State necessary to consiucr the second submission (1978 All L J 1099). of the learned counsel which he deveioped at 3. 1978 All L R (SOC) 66: (AIR 1978 NOC 140. 4. 1979 All L J 189, Mahendra Singh v. State of U.P. 5. 1979 All L J 646, Hukum Singh v. State of U. P. 6. 1980 All L J (NOC) 71, Rajendra Singh v. State of U. P. 7. 1980 All L J 358, Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corpn. v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee. 8. 1980 All L J 123, Raudan Singh v. State of U. P. 9. AIR 1976 S C 1471, Sri Jayalakshmi Rice Mill ,. State of Andhra Pradesh. 10. AIR 1970 S C 1636 (1639), Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of Bihar. 11. AIR 1953 Burn 183, Syedna Taher Saifuddin v. Tyebbhai Moosaji. 12. AIR 1946 P C no (71) Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh. 13. (1978) 3 A C 583, James Gardner v. Edward A. Lucas. (590, 597, 598, 603). 7. So far as the first contention of the learned counsel is concerned, namely, that there was a breach of cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12A of the Act, it should be seen that the said clause will not be applicable to the facts of the instant case. (590, 597, 598, 603). 7. So far as the first contention of the learned counsel is concerned, namely, that there was a breach of cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12A of the Act, it should be seen that the said clause will not be applicable to the facts of the instant case. The gift-deed in question was admittedly executed after 8-6-1973, which is the material date for determining the ceiling area and the surplus land of a tenure-holder under S. (5) of the Act. A transfer-deed executed after the said date has to be disregarded because the document is of a date subsequent to the relevant date for the determination of the ceiling area and the surplus land of a tenure-holder under section 5(1) of the Act. The document is disregarded under section 5(1) of the Act. The document is not disregarded wider S. 5(6) of the Act which is confined to such documents of transfer as were executed between 24-1-1971 and 8-6-1973. This has been so laid down by this Court in Kunwar Rani Sushila Devi v. State, (1978 All L J 1099) (supra). In this view of the matter, cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12A did not apply to the facts of the instant case because the said provision has been explicitly made applicable to the deeds of transfer which have been disregarded under S. 5(6) of the Act. 8. In the said view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider the second submission of the learned counsel which he developed at great length, namely, that the gift feed in question could not be treated to be a void document under S. 5(8) of Act because, according to the learned counsel, the said provision of law was placed on the Statute Book of the U. P. Amending Act U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976) and the date of commencement of the said Amending Act was laid down retrospectively as with effect from 10-10-1975, and, therefore, S. 5(8) of the Act could not be held applicable to the deeds of transfer which were executed before 10-10-1975. The learned counsel cited a few cases in support of his aforesaid contention. Such cases have been detailed in the aforesaid list of cases relied upon at the Bar. It is not necessary to notice them in detail. 9. The learned counsel cited a few cases in support of his aforesaid contention. Such cases have been detailed in the aforesaid list of cases relied upon at the Bar. It is not necessary to notice them in detail. 9. It is not necessary to advert to the said contention because, in my view, even if for the sake of arguments, it be accepted that S. 5(8) of the Act did not apply and the document, therefore, could not be treated as void under the said provision, still, the petitioner could not be granted any relief because in view of S. 12A of the Act, the choice of the tenure-holder was bound to be accepted by the Prescribed Authority as far as possible and since cl. (d) of S. 12A of the Act was not applicable to the document in question (the same being disregarded not under S. 5(6) of the Act, but under S. 5(1) of the Act), therefore, the petitioner could not have any locus-standi in the choice proceedings. She could have a locus standi in the said proceedings only on the basis of the applicability of cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12A of the Act and not otherwise. Therefore, Hukum Singh v. State of U. P. (1979 All L J 646) (supra) is distinguishable on the said ground. In the said case the transferee was held to have a locus standi on the basis of cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12A of the Act. As I have held above on the authority of Kr. Kunwar Rani Sushila Devi v. State (1978 All L J 1099) (supra), the said clause did not stand attracted to the case of the petitioner, and, therefore, the Prescribed Authority was justified in accepting the choice given by the deceased tenure-holders' legal representatives giving the land of the gift- deed in the surplus land of the deceased - tenure-holder. 10. Kunwar Rani Sushila Devi v. State (1978 All L J 1099) (supra), the said clause did not stand attracted to the case of the petitioner, and, therefore, the Prescribed Authority was justified in accepting the choice given by the deceased tenure-holders' legal representatives giving the land of the gift- deed in the surplus land of the deceased - tenure-holder. 10. So far as the reference to S. 14 (3) of the Act is concerned, it has to be seen that the said provision, as it exists today, is as follows :- "Where the Collector has taken possession of any surplus land or ungathered crops or fruits of trees under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), such land, crops or fruits of trees shall, with effect from the date of his taking possession, stand transferred to and vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances, and all rights, title and interests of all persons in such land shall, with effect from such date, stand extinguished." Provided that the encumbrances if any, shall attach to the amount payable under S. 17 in substitution for the surplus land." 11. The learned counsel has referred to me the decision in Uttam Narain Singh v. State of U. P. (1980 All L J 858). In the said case I observed as follows (at p. 861) :- "In view of the law laid down by a learned single Judge in Bharat Singh v. State of U.P. (1977 All W C407). which stands affirmed by the Division Bench pronouncement in Mehraban Singh v. S. D. M.(1978 All L R (SOC) 92), I think the petitioner's prayer should be accepted subject to the qualification that if the petitioner has not lost his rights in the surplus land in any of the proceedings under S. 14 of the Act, the Prescribed Authority will allow him to express his choice and such choice as far as possible will be accepted in accordance with the provisions of S. 12A of the Act. It has been repeatedly emphasised by the Court that the clear legislative intention is that a conscientious effort be made to accept the choice of the tenure-holder and I direct accordingly." 12. I think the said observation in the instant case does not support the petitioner. If the tenure-holder lost his rights in certain land declared as surplus then such rights came to vest in the State. I think the said observation in the instant case does not support the petitioner. If the tenure-holder lost his rights in certain land declared as surplus then such rights came to vest in the State. If the tenure- holder's rights subsist then his choice, as far as possible, is bound to be accepted under S. 12A of the Act. Therefore, if S. 14 (3) was applicable to the land in dispute then the petitioner did not have any locus standi because exhypothesi the land in question would stand vested in the State. However, if the rights of the tenure-holder did not stand extinguished under S. 14 of the Act, then in view of the case law of this Court, I hold that the tenure-holder continues to have the right to exercise his choice under S. 12A of the Act. I shall deal with this aspect of the matter in some more detail hereafter. 13. So far as the learned counsel's contention that there was no question of exercise of choice after the possession of the surplus land had been taken by the State in Dec., 1976, it has to be seen that there is dispute as to whether the possession of the land in question was or was not taken by the State. Throughout, the writ petition it has been asserted that the land in question is still in possession of the petitioner. She has not accepted the State's case that the possession of the land in question was taken by the State in the proceedings under S. 14 of the Act. It is not necessary in this petition to decide as to which version is correct,. namely, whether the possession of the land in question was or was not taken. If the possession of the land was not taken by the State then undoubtedly it was open to the legal representatives of the deceased tenure-holder to give in choice, the land in question in view of the law laid down by this Court in the aforementioned case in Bharat Singh v. State of U. P. (1977 All L J 375) (supra), which was affirmed by the Division Bench in Meharban Singh v. S.D.M. (1978 All L R (SOC) 92). It is open to the tenure-holder to exercise his choice till his rights are lost in the proceedings under S. 14 of the Act. It is open to the tenure-holder to exercise his choice till his rights are lost in the proceedings under S. 14 of the Act. S. 14 (3) of the act lays down that such rights are lost when the Collector takes the possession of the land. If the petitioner's contention is correct that she continued to be in possession and that the State had not taken over the possession of the land in question, then undoubtedly the tenure-holder's legal representatives were entitled to give this land in choice and the Prescribed Authority was justified in accepting this choice on 30-6-1978. 14. However, if the State's case be correct, that possession of the land in question was obtained in Dec., 1976 then obviously, the petitioner did not have any locus standi to move an application on 17-1-1979 contending that the land in question should not have been allowed to be given in surplus by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 30-6-1978, because, in that case, the land would have been vesting in the State on the date when the said application dated 17-1-1979 was given by the petitioner. 15. I wish to emphasise the petitioner had already failed in the ceiling proceeding which were taken against the tenure-holder concerned, namely, Har Prasad. She had pressed her objection in the said ceiling proceedings claiming to be the real tenure- holder of the land in question on the basis of the gift deed dated 5-9-1974. Her claim was based on the said gift-deed coupled with the plea that in the consolidation proceedings a separate Chak had been carved out in her favour. However, in the said ceiling proceedings the petitioner failed and it was held that the land in dispute remained in the holding of the said tenure-holder, namely, Har Prasad. In this view of the matter, it was not open to the petitioner to seek a second innings by asserting her title over the land in dispute in the subsequent proceedings (arising out of the choice given by the legal representatives of the deceased tenure-holder by their application dated 15-10-1977). Her claim of title was barred by the principle of res judicata. However, she might be having some claim in the said subsequent proceedings if she could show that her case was covered by cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12-A of the Act. Her claim of title was barred by the principle of res judicata. However, she might be having some claim in the said subsequent proceedings if she could show that her case was covered by cl. (d) of the proviso to S. 12-A of the Act. However, I have already held above that the said provision did not apply to her case. 16. Therefore, in either case-whether the possession of the land in dispute was taken by the State in the proceedings under S. 14 of the Act or whether such possession was not taken by the State, the petitioner had no locus standi to question the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 30-7-1978 accepting the choice as given by the legal representatives of the deceased tenure-holder by their application dated 25-10-1977. 17. This petition fails and is hereby dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.