ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This is a tenant's application in revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff opposite party for the eviction of the defendant from a portion of premises 10/465 Khalasi Lines, Kanpur, as well as for recovery of some arrears of rent as well as for recovery of Rs. 900/- as damages for use and occupation. A decree for pendente lite and future damages was also claimed at the rate of Rs. 15/- per day. The court below has decreed the suit. It may be mentioned that under the relevant local law, the suit was tried as a small cause by learned I Additional District Judge, Kanpur, who was invested with the powers of Small Cause Court. 2. Shortly stated the plaint case was that the plaintiff was the owner of the accommodation in question. The accommodation was given to the defendant as a licencee to fabricate tents for the plaintiff which was engaged in the business of supplying tents to the Government and others. The defendant used to pay Rs. 200/- as licence fee for the use and occupation of the premises. The licence was terminable at will. After the plaintiff made his own arrangements for the fabrication of tents, it terminated the licence of the defendants and required him to vacate the same. The defendant, however, failed to vacate. Thereafter, with a view to avoiding any controversy, the plaintiff served a notice dated 8-11-1973 on the defendant stating that though the defendant was not its tenant, in order to put an end to the dispute, the plaintiff was treating the defendant as a tenant to whom the premises were given for manufacturing purposes. The notice further stated that the plaintiff did not wish to continue the defendant as a tenant by means of this note the defendant was called upon to vacate the accommodation within six months after paying all the dues. The said notice was duly served on the defendant on 6-12-1973 but the defendant failed to comply with the same. The accommodation was used and was intended to be used a factory within the meaning of the Factories Act for industrial purposes namely for manufacturing and processing tents. The defendant did not pay any rent after 1-6-1973. The said notice was duly served on the defendant on 6-12-1973 but the defendant failed to comply with the same. The accommodation was used and was intended to be used a factory within the meaning of the Factories Act for industrial purposes namely for manufacturing and processing tents. The defendant did not pay any rent after 1-6-1973. Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled both to a decree for eviction as well as for recovery of arrears of rent from 1-6-1973 to 6-6-1974 and for damages at the rate of Rs. 15/- per day from 7-6-1974 onwards. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants on a variety of grounds which it is not necessary to set out in detail in view of the discussion which follows. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the court below framed a number of issues. One of the controversies raised before the court below was whether a valid notice of demand such as contemplated under S. 20(2)(a), U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, had been given to the plaintiff. The court below construed the notice dated 8-11-1973 and held that in its opinion, the said notice was a valid notice of demand under S. 20(2)(a) of the said Act. On a further finding that the defendant-applicant had not paid the arrears of rent from 1-6-1973 within one month of the service of the notice dated 8-11-1973, the defendant must be deemed to have committed default thereby rendering himself liable for eviction. The net result of the various findings recorded by the trial court was that the suit of the plaintiff- opposite party was decreed both for eviction as well as for arrears of rent and damages. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant raised two points for my consideration, in support of this revision :- 1. The suit of the plaintiff-opposite party could not be tried as a small cause as it was not a suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building simpliciter. It was a suit for the eviction of a tenant from a factory which consisted of machineries fixed in the earth in regard to which a court exercising powers of Judge Small Cause Court could not take cognizance of. Such a suit could be tried only on the regular side. 2. It was a suit for the eviction of a tenant from a factory which consisted of machineries fixed in the earth in regard to which a court exercising powers of Judge Small Cause Court could not take cognizance of. Such a suit could be tried only on the regular side. 2. The notice dated 8-11-1973 was not a notice of demand as required under S. 20(2)(a) of the aforesaid Act and consequently the defendant could not be held to have committed any default. The view of the court below to the contrary is manifestly unsustainable in law. 6. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party on the other hand supported the decision of the court below on the validity of the notice of demand and urged that the same fulfilled all the requirements of a valid notice under S. 20(2)(a). 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am clearly of the view that this revision is entitled to succeed on the second point urged by the learned counsel for the defendant-applicant. In the view which I am taking on the second point urged by the learned counsel for the applicant, I do not consider it necessary to go into the first point urged by him. 8. In order to appreciate the controversy it will be useful to set out the substance of the notice dated 8-11-1973 which has been the main subject of debate at the bar. In this notice which was given by the plaintiffs lawyer, there is first an assertion that the premises were given to the defendant only as a licencee for the purpose of fabricating tents for the plaintiff. The licence fee was Rs. 200/-. The notice recites in para 3 thereof that the defendant used to pay Rs. 200/- as fee. He paid Rs. 200/- per month for the period 1-1-1969 to 31-5-1973. The next recital is that after the plaintiff had made their own arrangements for fabrication of the tents they terminated the licence and required the defendant to vacate the premises but the defendant failed to vacate the same. Still further, it was asserted in the notice that as the defendant was wrongfully asserting that he was a tenant, the plaintiff had decided to treat the defendant as a tenant with a view to putting an end to the controversy and for cutting short the matter. There is then para 9. Still further, it was asserted in the notice that as the defendant was wrongfully asserting that he was a tenant, the plaintiff had decided to treat the defendant as a tenant with a view to putting an end to the controversy and for cutting short the matter. There is then para 9. the crucial portion of the notice which may be reproduced in extenso : "9. That my clients now do not want to continue your tenancy any more. They hereby terminate your tenancy by this notice of six months. Your tenancy shall stand determined upon expiry of six months from the date of receipt of this notice and you are hereby called upon to vacate the accommodation in question on the said date after paying all the rent due by then." 9. In the end there is that usual threat that if the defendant did not comply with the said notice, the lawyer had instructions to file a suit for ejectment of the accommodation as well as for recovery of arrears of rent and damages. 10. At this point, it would be useful to have the relevant statutory provision namely, S. 20(2)(a) of the aforesaid Act extracted here : "20(2)(a). That the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand." 11. Having perused the notice dated 8-11-1973, 1 have no manner that it is a plain and simple notice under S. 106, T. P. Act. It was clearly intended to be nothing more than a notice of determining the lease. In my opinion, whether para 9 of the notice is read in isolation or in conjunction with the rest of the notice, including para 3, upon which the learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party placed considerable stress, it cannot, by any stretch, be regarded as a notice of demand as required under S. 20(2)(a). For, however, liberally and broadly we may construe S. 20(2)(a) the landlord who seeks to rely on default as a ground for eviction must give a clear notice of demand to the tenant calling upon him to pay the arrears of rent within one month of the service of notice. The demand must be clear and unequivocal. For, however, liberally and broadly we may construe S. 20(2)(a) the landlord who seeks to rely on default as a ground for eviction must give a clear notice of demand to the tenant calling upon him to pay the arrears of rent within one month of the service of notice. The demand must be clear and unequivocal. It must, in any case, be a demand calling upon the tenant to pay the arrears of rent. A notice which primarily purports to be one under S. 106. T. P. Act and in that context requires the tenants to pay all sums of money which might be due from the tenant up to the date of the expiry of the period of notice control in my opinion, take the place of a notice of demand under S. 20(2)(a). It is true that according to the decided cases the landlord may combine the two notices, namely, for termination of the tenancy and demand. But the requirements of both the notices ought to be fulfilled keeping the two things separate and distinct so as not to leave the tenant guessing or in doubt. 12. In the present case I find that the notice dated 8-11-1973 is perfectly capable of being construed as a notice simpliciter under S. 100. T. P. Act. The demand therein that the tenant should vacate the accommodation on the expiry of six months after paying all the rent due by then is perfectly consistent with the demand which is made in the usual course while determining the tenancy under S. 106, T. P. Act. The notice in question thus stops only at that. 13. Learned counsel for the plaintiff- opposite party, however, contended that in pars 3 of the notice dated 8-11-1973 it was clearly asserted that the rent had been paid up to 31-5-1973. The notice was given on 8-11-1973. It must follow as contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party, as a necessary corollary, that the defendant was in arrears of rent from 1st of June 1973 till the date of the service of the notice which would make the defendant in arrears for more than four months. The notice was given on 8-11-1973. It must follow as contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party, as a necessary corollary, that the defendant was in arrears of rent from 1st of June 1973 till the date of the service of the notice which would make the defendant in arrears for more than four months. That being so, it was urged, when the plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate after paying of the rent due by that date it must inevitably lead to the conclusion that the defendant was in arrears of more than four months and that he was called upon to pay the same within six months of the date of the receipt of the notice. 14. I cannot accept the above contention. While it may be argued by stretching the language of the notice that the plaintiff had conveyed to the defendant that he was in arrears of rent for the period subsequent to 31-5-1973, 1 find it difficult to hold that there was also a clear demand for the payment of the said amount within one month of the receipt of the notice. In my opinion, the recitals in para 9 of the notice cannot be treated as a demand for the arrears of rent within the meaning of S. 20(2)(a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. As already observed, the notice in question purports to be nothing more than a simple notice of termination of tenancy under S. 106. T. P. Act. 15. I therefore, hold that the notice dated M-11-1973 was intended only to be a notice terminating the tenancy of the defendant calling upon him to vacate the premises and to pay the arrears of rent which might be outstanding by the date on which the period of notice expired. I do not agree with the construction placed by the court below on the notice in question. 16. Learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party cited the following decisions of this court namely those reported in 1967 All L J 746 (?), AIR 1967 All 40 in support of his contention that for the validity of a notice of demand it is not essential to mention the precise amount which might be due from a tenant. 16. Learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party cited the following decisions of this court namely those reported in 1967 All L J 746 (?), AIR 1967 All 40 in support of his contention that for the validity of a notice of demand it is not essential to mention the precise amount which might be due from a tenant. It is sufficient that a demand is made from the tenant and the tenant fails to pay the arrears of rent due from him which should be for more than four months. 17. I do not find either of these cases of much assistance. The defect in the notice under consideration is not that it does not mention the precise amount of arrears of rent. The invalidity of the notice lies in the fact that there is really no unequivocal demand of the arrears of rent as contemplated by S. 20(2)(a). In both these cases cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party there was a clear demand for the arrears of rent. In the present case, in my opinion, there is no such demand. 18. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this revision succeeds and is allowed, The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court are set aside in so far as the decree for ejectment is concerned. The suit for ejectment filed by the plaintiff-opposite party is hereby dismissed. The suit for damages is also dismissed. The decree passed by the courts below for the arrears of rent is, however, affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs both of this court as well as of the court below. Any amount which the defendant-applicant may have deposited towards the decretal amount shall he liable to be adjusted.