Kali Charan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gyanpur, Varanasi
1981-09-21
K.N.MISRA
body1981
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment K.N. Misra, J. 1. THIS writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 8-5-73 passed by the Dy. Director of Consolidation in the revision arising out of the proceedings under Sec. 12 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). 2. BRIEFLY stated the facts of the case are : that Ram Lotan, Opp. Party No. 4 was bhumidhar of his chak No. 246 and he was recorded as such. He applied for permission on 12-5-70 to sell his land. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation), vide order dated 12-5-1970, granted permission to opp. party no. 4 under Sec. 5 (1) (c) (ii) to sell his land comprised in chak No. 246. In the order, however, it was mentioned that this permission will remain operative for a period of three months. Opp. party no. 4 thereafter executed as many as seven sale deeds. Four sale deeds were executed on 13-5-1970 in favour of petitioner nos. 1 to 4 and 5th sale deed was executed on 11-6-70 in favour of Budhai, petitioner no. 5. Subsequently, on 29-10-1970 another sale deed was executed in favour of petitioner no. 1, Kali Charan. All the aforesaid sale deeds were in respect of the portion of his aforesaid chak no. 246 and by these six sale deeds the entire chak stood transferred to petitioner Nos. 1 to 5. Later on, opp. party no. 4 executed another sale deed on 12-5-1971 in favour of his wife Smt. "Chamela Devi, opp. party no. 6 for the entire aforesaid chak No. 246. The petitioners applied for mutation of their names, under Sec. 12 of the Act, on the basis of the aforesaid sale deeds. Opp. party No. 4, Ram Lotan contested the case, inter alia, on the ground that he had not applied for any permission nor any permission was granted to him for making transfer of his chak land in question. He further asserted that he was minor on the date when he is said to have executed the aforesaid sale deeds and that the sale deed in question being violative of provisions contained in Section 5(1) (c) (ii) of the Act, were void and mutation cannot be ordered to be made in the names of the petitioners on the basis of those sale deeds.
The Consolidation Officer, after recording the evidence of the parties, dismissed the mutation application filed by the petitioner holding that although the permission was obtained by opp. party no. 4 for making transfer but since the permission was granted for transferring the whole of the chak, hence the sale deeds in question, which were in respect of certain portions of it, were void. With regard to the sale deed executed by opp. party no. 4 in favour of his wife Smt. Chamela Devi, the Consolidation Officer observed that the sale deed, said to have been executed by opp. party no. 4 in her favour, has not been brought on record and as such no order can be passed in her favour and with these findings he rejected the mutation application filed by the petitioner. 3. THE petitioners aggrieved by the said order, filed an appeal which was partly allowed by the Asstt. Settlement Officer (C) vide order dt. 11-12-1972 and the mutation was ordered to be effected in the names of the petitioner nos. 1 to 5 on the basis of the sale deeds which were executed within a period of three months from the date of grant of permission dated 12-5-1970. THE mutation application of petitioner no. 1, which relates to the land covered by the sale deed dated 29-10-1970 was rejected as it was executed after the expiry of the period of three months as no permission, under Sec. 5 (c) (ii), was subsisting on that date. Aggrieved by the said order petitioner no. 1 preferred a revision and the opp. party no. 4 also filed revision. Both these revisions were heard together by opp. party no. 1 and the revision, filed by opp. party no. 4 was allowed ; while that of opp. party no. 1 was dismissed by holding that since the sale deeds in question executed by opp. party no. 4 were in respect of only a part of the land ; hence the same were void and the petitioners acquired no title on the basis of even those five sale deeds which were executed within a period of three months from the date of grant of permission. THE petitioners have challenged this order passed by the opp. party no. 1, in this writ petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the orders passed by the consolidation authorities.
THE petitioners have challenged this order passed by the opp. party no. 1, in this writ petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the orders passed by the consolidation authorities. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that since the permission was obtained by opposite party no. 4 for making transfer of his land of chak no. 246 hence he could execute the sale deeds in question which were in respect of the portions of the said chak land. The Deputy director of Consolidation has erred in holding that since the permission was granted to opposite party no. 4, to transfer the entire chak land hence the sale deeds could not be executed by him in respect of the portions thereof. The learned counsel for the opposite party no. 4 supported the orders passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on the reasonings stated therein. He further contended that in the permission granted to opposite party no. 4 it is not mentioned that he could transfer the land in small portions and, as such, the sale deeds in question are viod and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has rightly refused to order mutation in favour of the petitioners. I find substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners. In Banwart Lal v. Asstt. Director of Consolidation, Civil Misc. Writ no. 6057 of 1974 decided on 6th August, 1981, I had an occasion to consider the aforesaid point and I have held that: "If permission has been granted for making transfer of whole, the same would enure for making transfer of a part thereof, unless expressly forbidden to do so under the law or by any such condition mentioned in the order itself, to the effect that the entire holding can be transferred and not any part thereof. But no such condition exists in the present case. There also exists no such bar in the statute nor the provision contained in Sec. 5 (c) (ii) of the Act can be interpreted as such. If permission to sell entire holding or entire share in the holding consisting of several plosts or chaks in one tenure has been granted, the prohibition in making transfer would stand removed and any one or more of plots or chaks or entire share therein belonging to transferor can be validly transferred.
If permission to sell entire holding or entire share in the holding consisting of several plosts or chaks in one tenure has been granted, the prohibition in making transfer would stand removed and any one or more of plots or chaks or entire share therein belonging to transferor can be validly transferred. The Board of Revenue in the aforesaid case of Pooran Singh (supra) has wrongly referred to the provision of Section 168-A of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which applies to transfers after the close of consolidation operations in the unit and it will not govern transfers made during continuance of consolidation operations in the unit. The decision of the Board of Revenue being based on consideration of the provisions of Section 168-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is, therefore, altogether erroneous. The transfer of part of land after obtaining permission to transfer whole cannot be said to defeat the purpose of the Act nor it will invalidate the sale so effected." 5. I have fully considered the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the opposite parties but I do not find any good reason to depart from the view that has been taken by me in the aforesaid case. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion, that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has wrongly held that the sale deeds, which were executed by opposite party No. 4 in favour of petitioners Nos. 1 to 5 on the dates between 13th May 1970 to 11th June 1978 were invalid simply on the ground that those were in respect of part of the chak land in question although permission was granted by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) to opposite party No. 4 to transfer the said entire land. The sale deeds dated 13-5-70 in favour of petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 and sale deed dated 11-6-70 in favour of Budhai, petitioner No. 5 were, in my opinion perfectly valid and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had rightly ordered mutation in favour of petitioners Nos. 1 to 5 in respect of the land covered by the aforesaid five sale deeds. 6. THE learned counsel next contended that the Settlement Officer (C) has erred in not ordering mutation in favour of petitioner No. 1, Kali Charan on the basis of the sale deed dated 29-10-1970.
1 to 5 in respect of the land covered by the aforesaid five sale deeds. 6. THE learned counsel next contended that the Settlement Officer (C) has erred in not ordering mutation in favour of petitioner No. 1, Kali Charan on the basis of the sale deed dated 29-10-1970. He contended that the conditions mentioned in the permission for making transfer within a period of three months was invalid as under the provisions of Sec. 5 (c) (ii) he could not impose such condition while granting permission and, as such, the sale deed dated 29-10-1970 executed by opposite party No. 4 was perfectly valid and his name deserves to be mutated on the land covered by the sale deed. I do not find any substance in this argument. There is no such prohibition contained in Sec. 5 (c) (ii), as was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the absence of any prohibition contained in the aforesaid provision, the Settlement Officer (C) could direct that the order granting permission to make transfer would be operative only for a limited period and, as such, the condition imposed cannot be said to be illegal, unjust or improper specially in view of the fact that the consolidation proceedings are to be conducted and concluded expeditiously. If a transfer is executed after getting permission, certain proceedings are to be taken under Sec. 12 of the Act for mutating the name of the transferee and some time will be taken in concluding those proceedings. Keeping in view of these facts the Settlement Officer (C) could require the transfer to be made within the specified period so as to avoid delay in preparing records. In this view of the matter I am, therefore, of the opinion that the condition which is prescribed in the order granting permission, cannot be said to be unreasonable, illegal or void in any manner whatsoever. THE order, granting permission automatically lapsed after the expiry of the period of three months within which the opposite party No. 4 was permitted to make transfer of the land. As such, when the sale deed was executed on 29-10-70 there was no subsisting permission granted by the Settlement Officer (C) under Sec. 5 (c) (ii) of the Act. THE Settlement Officer (C) in my opinion, was therefore, perfectly justified in refusing mutation on the basis of the sale deed dated 29-10-70.
As such, when the sale deed was executed on 29-10-70 there was no subsisting permission granted by the Settlement Officer (C) under Sec. 5 (c) (ii) of the Act. THE Settlement Officer (C) in my opinion, was therefore, perfectly justified in refusing mutation on the basis of the sale deed dated 29-10-70. No other point is pressed before me. In the result the writ petition succeeds partly. The order dated 8-5-1973 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in so far as it relates to four sale deeds dated 13-5-70 and fifth sale deed dated 11-6-1970 executed by opposite party No. 4 in favour of petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 is quashed and the Deputy Director of Consolidation is directed to order mutation in favour of petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 on the land which is covered by the aforesaid five sale deeds. The order of the Settlement Officer (C) as well as the Deputy Director of Consolidation in so far as those relate to the sale deed dated 29-10-1970, are maintained and call for no interference by this court. I, however, make no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.