JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - This is a reference dated January 29, 1975 by the learned Additional Commissioner Gorakhpur recommending that the order of learned Trial Court dated October 20, 1974 be set aside. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have perused the record. 3. The learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the order of Trial Court setting aside the decree dated October 1971 was without jurisdiction as the suit under Section 229-B had been decided on merits, it was not an ex parte decree as the D.G.C. represented the State as well as Gaon Sabha, the Trial Court wrongly deemed the Pradhan as defendant colluding with the plaintiff as the Pradhan was simply a witness of plaintiff who spoke the truth, and that there was no condonation of delay. He also argued that an application under Section 151 C.P.C. was not maintainable. 4. The learned D.G.C.(R.) has argued on behalf of the Gaon Sabha that indeed no appearance had been put, in on behalf of Gaon Sabha. The Gaon Sabha remained unrepresented which is established from the fact that no written statement on behalf of the Gaon Sabha had been filed although the D.G.C. had filed a written statement on behalf of the State. The learned counsel for applicant argued that Pradhan Gaon Sabha was present and so the order of October 4, 1971 cannot be deemed to have been passed ex parte. However, it is the admitted case of plaintiff that Pradhan was his witness. P.W. 3 Mohammad Bashir deposed for the plaintiff that the land in suit was not Gaon Sabha property and he being Pradhan Gaon Sabha, was obviously in collusion with the plaintiff. Neither his admission could be given any credence for want of permission of S.D.O., nor can it be argued that he spoke the truth and truth being against Gaon Sabha, he did not contest the suit. Even for withdrawal of Gaon Sabha from the suit permission of S.D.O. was needed, otherwise the Gaon Sabha was to contest, after the matter being put to L.M.C. for a resolution on this litigation. These provisions are contained in paras 128-129 of the Gaon Sabha and L.M.C. Manual and Rule 110-A(2) of Z.A and L.R. Rules. Even for withdrawal of Gaon Sabha from the suit permission of S.D.O. was needed, otherwise the Gaon Sabha was to contest, after the matter being put to L.M.C. for a resolution on this litigation. These provisions are contained in paras 128-129 of the Gaon Sabha and L.M.C. Manual and Rule 110-A(2) of Z.A and L.R. Rules. The conduct of the Gaon Sabha litigation does not depend on the discretion of the Pradhan but is a matter of resolution of L.M.C. The Pradhan, in case he wanted to depose against the Gaon Sabha, should have put up the matter to L.M.C. which body was competent to decide if to contest the suit or not, in the former case L.M.C. would empower a member of L.M.C. by a resolution under Rule 110-A(1) of the Z.A. and L.R. Rules and in the latter case permission of S.D.O. would be obtained under Rule 110-A(2) of the Rules. In the instant case, since matter was not brought to the notice of L.M.C., Gaon Sabha cannot be deemed to be present throughout the hearing and the decision must be deemed to be an ex parte decision. 5. The learned counsel for applicant has argued that on July 7, 1970 the D.G.C. had filed his note of appearance in the Trial Court, saying that he appeared for State, and Gaon Sabha. There is no doubt that he had no instructions from Gaon Sabha, there is no proof to the contrary. The learned. D.G.C.(R.) has argued that there was no mistake of the Gaon Sabha if the D.G.C.(R.) filed that incorrect note on July 7, 1970. He has cited a ruling reported in 1981 A.I.R. SC 1400 in support of his contention that no party should suffer for default of counsel. This ruling applies fully to the instant case in which the misrepresentation by D.G.C. was more harmful to the Gaon Sabha than his default would have been. 6. Coming to the restoration application dated February 1, 1973, it may be observed that it was filed under Order IX, Rule 13. C.P.C. as well as under Section 151 C.P.C. There is little doubt that it is maintainable under the former provision. 6. Coming to the restoration application dated February 1, 1973, it may be observed that it was filed under Order IX, Rule 13. C.P.C. as well as under Section 151 C.P.C. There is little doubt that it is maintainable under the former provision. It was accompanied with resolution of L.M.C. dated January 22, 1373 and an affidavit of new Pradhan Baliraj explaining the delay and that for the first time they came to know of the ex parte decree dated October 4, 1971 on January 21, 1973. There was no counter affidavit from the opposite party who are revisionist here. In the circumstances, the affidavit was rightly relied upon. The limitation courts from the date of communication or knowledge and in view of the affidavit, question of condonation did not arise. I find no error in the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Trial Court in setting aside the ex parte order dated October 4, 1971 and restoring the case; but he should have done this under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. as Section 151 would he needed only when the decree dated October 4, 1971 was not found to be ex parte against Gaon Sabha. As regards fraud on the court, it may not be so, but a fraud on the Gaon Sabha only, but the Trial Court could have realised the collusion, knowing the provisions of Rule 110-A of the Rules. I would prefer to say no more on the matter. 7. In the result, the conclusions of the learned Additional Commissioner are found, wholly misdirected and order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. being applicable, the revision applicable is without force. The reference/re-commendation are rejected along with the revision accordingly.