JUDGMENT 1. THE plaintiff appellant has filed a suit against the defendant respondent in the City Civil court at Calcutta, inter-alia, for a declaration that he is a tenant under the latter in respect of Flat No. 18, Premises No. 26, Chowringhee Road and for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from executing the order for possession passed under Section 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 in Case No. 2408 of 1975 and from disturbing the plaintiff's possession in the said flat. After contested hearing the trial court has dismissed the plaintiff's application for granting temporary injunction in the above terms. Thereafter, the plaintiff appellant has preferred the instant appeal. 2. UNDISPUTEDLY, the defendant respondent is a tenant in respect of the disputed flat under the Official Trustee of West Bengal. It is also not very much disputed that since the year 1962 the plaintiff has been occupying the said that The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant had inducted him as a subtenant under him subject to certain terms and conditions. The defendant has denied that the plaintiff was ever a tenant under him and his case is that the plaintiff was a licencee under him and that the said licence had been since determined. The defendant has claimed that, therefore he is entitled to recover possession of the flat in question. It has also transpired from the materials produced before the trial court that the Official Trustee, West bengal, had instituted in the City Civil court at Calcutta, Ejectment Suit No. 1152 of 1974 against the present defendant, interalia, on the allegation that the defendant was a tenant in respect of Flat No. 18. He was allegedly a defaulter in payment of rent and that he had illegally and unlawfully sublet the premises without the consent of his landlord. The defendant contested the said suit denying that he was a defaulter and claimed that he had paid advance rent of Rs. 5000/- adjustable from the monthly rent. He also denied that he had sublet the premises. The defendant further denied the receipt of any notice of ejectment. 3. IN the meantime, the present defendant, Kalyan Kumar Roy, filed in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, an application under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act for recovery of possession of the disputed flat from the present appellant. The defendant further denied the receipt of any notice of ejectment. 3. IN the meantime, the present defendant, Kalyan Kumar Roy, filed in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, an application under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act for recovery of possession of the disputed flat from the present appellant. He alleged that the present appellant was a licencee under him and the permission granted to him had been terminated. Thereupon, the present appellant had filed an application for adding him as a defendant in Ejectment buit No. 1152 or 1974 Drought by the Official Trustee of West Bengal against the present defendant, Kalyan Kumar Roy. After the said application was allowed, he had filed a Written Statement in the said suit claiming that he was a sub-tenant under the defendant No. 1. On his application under section 10 of the Code of civil Procedure the aforesaid proceeding under section 41 of the Presidency, small Cause Courts Act had remained stayed. The defendant No. 1 had filed an additional written statement denying that the defendant No. 2 (The plaintiff herein) was a sub-tenant under him and he claimed that the defendant No. 2 was given permission to live with his family in the suit premises. 4. ON 22nd February, 1979 the learned Judge, 3rd Bench City Civil court at Calcutta dismissed Ejectment suit No. 1152 of 1974. The learned Judge, inter-alia, found that the plaintiff, official Trustee of West Bengal, had failed to prove that any notice under section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act was served upon the defendant, Kalyan Kumar Roy, and therefore the ejectment suit was not maintainable. The learned Judge also dealt with the other issues assuming that the uit was maintainable. The learned Judge recorded that the arrear rent having been paid by the defendant, there was no scope for holding that the defendant was a defaulter. The learned Judge further held that the plaintiff, Official Trustee had failed to prove that the suit premises had been sub-let without his consent in writing and he further held that the defendant no. 2 was not a sub-tenant under the defendant No. 1. The learned Judge further found that the arrear rent having been paid, the plaintiff was not enfiled to decree for arrears of rent. 2 was not a sub-tenant under the defendant No. 1. The learned Judge further found that the arrear rent having been paid, the plaintiff was not enfiled to decree for arrears of rent. Alter the disposal of the said ejectment suit a learned Judge of the Court of small Causes, Calcutta, took up the hearing of the aforesaid proceeding under section 41 of the Presidency Small cause Courts Act filed by the defendant, Kalyan Kumar Roy, against the plaintiff, Debabrata Mukherjee. On 24. 3. 1980 the learned Judge, 6th Bench, court of Small Causes, Calcutta, allowed the said application of the defendant and passed an order for possession on in his favour. Thereafter, the plaintiff appellant has instituted in the City Civil the court the instant suit for declaration of his tenancy right under the defendant respondent and for permanent injunction. Section 49 of the Presidency Small cause Courts Act provides that the recovery of possession of any immovable property under Chapter-VII of the said act shall be no bar to the institution of a suit in the High Court for trying the title thereto. It is also not contested that such a suit for declaration of title and for consequential reliefs under section 49 is maintainable in the City Civil court at Calcutta. The learned Judge has dismissed the plaintiff appellant's application for temporary injunction on the ground that the status of the plaintiff had been conclusively decided in the aforesaid ejectment suit brought by the Official Trustee in the City Civil court against the defendant and to which plaintiff on his own initiative was added as a party defendant. According to the learned Judge of the Court below, the plaintiff how cannot be permitted to raise any claim of having any tenancy right in the suit premises. Therefore, the plaintiff has no prima facie case and he cannot be favoured with an order of temporary injunction restraining toe defendant From executing the order passed in the Small Causes court proceeding under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. 5. THUS, the learned Judge of the court below in substance found that the decision in the ejectment suit in which the present appellant and the defendant were co-defendants operated as resjudicate and therefore, the plaintiff in the present suit cannot be heard to say that he was a sub-tenant under the defendant. 5. THUS, the learned Judge of the court below in substance found that the decision in the ejectment suit in which the present appellant and the defendant were co-defendants operated as resjudicate and therefore, the plaintiff in the present suit cannot be heard to say that he was a sub-tenant under the defendant. We do not however, propose to decide the said question of resjudicata. The suit out of which this appeal arises is yet to be decided. We understand that the defendant respondent has not yet filed his written statement and the trial court has not framed the issues. Only after the suit becomes ready upon examination of the pleadings and the previous judgment on record, the,court may decide whether in fact the decision in the previous ejectment suit operates as resjudicata. Therefore, upon incomplete and insufficient materials now on record, at this, interlocutory stage, we are not prepared to prejudge the cause, even if, we express our prima facie views on the issues of resjudicata, the same may prejudice a fair disposal of the, suit by the trial court. We hold for the same reason, that the trial court was also not justified in dismissing the plaintiff's application for temporary injunction practically only on the ground that the suit brought by him was barred by resjudicata. We do not propose to rest our decision in this appeal on the issue of resjudicata. 6. THE learned advocates for both parties made elaborate submissions before us as to whether the findings made by the learned Judge, 3rd Bench, City civil Court in Ejectment Suit No. 1152 of 1974 to the effect that Kalyan Kumar roy did not sub-let the present plaintiff was not a sub-tenant now operate as resjudicata. Although we have already indicated that we do not propose to decide the said point of resjudicata, in fairness, we may notice some of the decisions cited at the bar and also the principles laid down therein. On the authority of the decision in Mt. Munni Bibi and another vs. Triloki Nath 58 LA. 158-A. I. R. 1931 p. C. 114, the learned advocate for the respondent submitted that in the previous suit there was a conflict of interest between the appellant and the respondent both of whom were defendants therein. On the authority of the decision in Mt. Munni Bibi and another vs. Triloki Nath 58 LA. 158-A. I. R. 1931 p. C. 114, the learned advocate for the respondent submitted that in the previous suit there was a conflict of interest between the appellant and the respondent both of whom were defendants therein. It was necessary to decide the said conflict in order to give the plaintiff in the ejectment suit the relief claimed. Thirdly, the said question between the defendants had been finally decided in the ejectment suit. The learned advocate for the respondent also relied upon the decision in Ishar singh v. Sarwan Singh A. I. R. 1965 s. C. 948. It may be, however, noted that their Lordships in paragraphs (3)and (8) of their judgment in Ishar singh's case (supra), observed that the question of resjudicata has to be decided, (a) on the pleadings in the former case, (b) issues struck therein and (c) the decision in the suit. Further, it depends upon whether a decision on such a issue will materially affect the decision in the suit. We have already observed that it is now premature to make final pronouncements on the issue of resjudicata. 7. THE learned advocate for the appellant or the other hand has submitted that the learned Judge who dismissed the ejectment suit brought by the official Trusty found that in the absence of service of notice under section 13 (6)of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act, the suit was not maintainable and according to the learned advocates, for the appellant, the determination of the cither issues were not at all necessary. He placed reliance upon the observations of the Special Bench, of this Court in Gurudus Biswas v. Charu Panna seal A. I. R. 1977 Cal. 110, regarding the scope and effect of section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Our attention was also drawn to the obsesrvations of the Privy Council in bhagchand Dagdusa Gujrathi v. Secretary of State for India A. I. R. 1927 P. C. 176 lhat the consequences of non service of a notice under section 80 of the code would be as if the suit had never been brought. It was unsustainable in limini. But the Judicial Committee in bhagchand Dagdusa Gujrathi's case (supra), had no occasion to consider the question of resjudicata. 8. It was unsustainable in limini. But the Judicial Committee in bhagchand Dagdusa Gujrathi's case (supra), had no occasion to consider the question of resjudicata. 8. THE learned advocate for the respondent, on the other hand, had strongly relied upon the pronouncements of the supreme Court in Gangappa Gurupadappa gudwad v. Rachawwa A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 442, to the effect that there in a earlier suit the court decided after elaborately going into the question that the defendant had acquired absolute right in the property left under the will and also that the suit was prematurely filed, the said decision operates as resjudicate between the parties in any subsequent suit. The finding that the suit was pre-mafurely filed did not make it a decision on a preliminary issue so as to render the finding on the other issue mere obiter or surplusage. G. K. Mitter, J. who delivered the judgment in Gangappa Gurupadappa gudwad's case (supra), explained the decision of the Privy Council in a. I. R 1950 P. C. 80 Shankarilal v. Hiralal and relied upon the decision in A. I. R, 1963 S. C. 38s Vithal v. Shikandar. It may be noted that neither in A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 385 nor in A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 442, the decision on the preliminary issue related to the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. The learned advocate for the respondent also submitted before us that the, present appellant in his application under section 10 of the Code filed in the proceeding under section 41 of the Presidency small Cause Courts Act had himself claimed that the matters in issue in the said proceeding and in the ejectment suit filed by the Official Trustee were directly and substantially same and the present appellant himself prayed for adding him as a defendant in the ejectment suit. The learned advocate for the respondent has further submitted that even if the ejectment suit was dismissed against both the present appellant and the respondent, the findings therein operated as resjudicata. According to the said learned advocate, the test of appealability of a decision is not relevant for deciding whether a particular determination by a competent court of law would operate as resjudicata. According to the said learned advocate, the test of appealability of a decision is not relevant for deciding whether a particular determination by a competent court of law would operate as resjudicata. According to the learned advocate for the respondent an appeal could have been filed by the present appellant against the adverse findings made against him in the ejectment suit. In support of the said proposition he relied upon the division Bench decision in Hara Chandra Das v. Bhola Nath das 39. C. W. N. 567. We however, find that the Supreme Court in their decision in Ganga Bai v. Vijay kumar A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1126, noticed the decision in Hara Chandra Das's case (supra), and held that an appeal against a mere finding recorded by the trial court was not maintainable. The provisions of sections 96, 100,104 (1) and 105 read with order 43 Rule 1 of the Code show that an appeal lies only against a decree or an order passed under the rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed. No appeal can lie against a mere finding for the simple reason that the Code does not provide for such an appeal. 9. WE have already observed that we do not propose to decide at this stage the point of resjudicata. Therefore, we need not lengthen our judgment by referring to other reported decisions on the point. As already observed, at the appropriate stage the court may have to consider the issue of resjudicata in the light of law laid down by these judicial precedents. 10. THERE is, however, another aspect of the matter which is very relevant for deciding this temporary injunction matter. The learned Judge of the trial court has himself observed that the plaintiff with his family had been residing in the suit premises for a long time and that he would be in great trouble if he was thrown out of the suit premises. But in view of the decision in the aforesaid ejectment suit, the learned judge held that the plaintiff has no prima facie case and cannot be favoured with an order of temporary injunction. But in view of the decision in the aforesaid ejectment suit, the learned judge held that the plaintiff has no prima facie case and cannot be favoured with an order of temporary injunction. Secondly, it is settled principle governing grant of interlocutory injunction that the court ought to see that there is a bonafide contention between the parties and then on which side, in the event of success, will lie the balance of convenience if the injunction does not issue. At the interlocutory stage the court may also consider whether triable issues have been raised by the plaintiff and whether there were substantial questions to be investigated. We have already observed that the question of resjudicata ought to be determined at the time of the final hearing and not at the interlocutory stage of the suit. Therefore, to decide the application for temporary injunction the balance of convenience ought to be the main criterion. Since 1962, the plaintiff with his family had been residing in the suit premises. Whether his exclusive occupation was as a licensee or as a tenant may be hereinafter decided in accordance with law. The defendant who had been residing elsewhere is not in physical occupation of the flat. In case, even before his suit is decided the plaintiff dispossessed he is likely to suffer serious inconvenience and difficulty. On the other hand, in case the defendant is not temporarily allowed to recover possession, he may be given pecuniary compensation. We hold that the status-quo about the possession ought to be preserved till final disposal of the suit. But, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to occupy the suit premises unconditionally. It is only fair and equitable that he should be directed to deposit charges for use and occupation of the premises which on his own admission he had not paid since the year 1973. He ought to be also restrained from transferring the possession of the flat in favour of any third party. The plaintiff-appellant has alleged that in August, 1962 the defendant respondent who was a tenant under the Official trustee West Bengal had sub-let to him the entire suit premises. The plaintiff does not claim that the alleged sub-letting was with the previous consent in writing of the landlord. The plaintiff-appellant has alleged that in August, 1962 the defendant respondent who was a tenant under the Official trustee West Bengal had sub-let to him the entire suit premises. The plaintiff does not claim that the alleged sub-letting was with the previous consent in writing of the landlord. Accordingly, the learned advocate for the respondent has urged in this court that the alleged contract of subletting pleaded by the plaintiff-appellant would be unlawful and, therefore, in any view of the matter he cannot claim to be a sub-tenant under the defendant respondent. According to the learned advocate for the respondent after the commencement of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act a subletting by a tenant without the previous consent in writing of the landlord would be totally null and void. Therefore, no order of temporary injunction ought to be granted in his favour. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the true scope and effect of restriction under section 14 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act on sub-letting after the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 11. HAVING given our anxious consideration to the question, at present advised, we are unable to accept the submission that there could be no legal relationship as between a tenant and the person to whom the former might have sublet after the commencement of 1956 Act without consent in writing of his landlord. 12. BEFORE we examine the provisions of section 14 (1) of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, it would be necessary to briefly refer to the position under the general law of landlord and tenant and the effect of Rent Control Legislation restricting the right of sub-letting. Under section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in the absence of a contract or legal usage to the contrary the lessee could transfer absolutely or sub-lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property. But the lessee by reason only of such transfer did not cease to be subject to any of the liabilities attaching to his lease (vide clause (j)of section 108 of the Transfer of Property act ). Therefore, in the absunce of, a contract or legal usage to the contrary a tenant could create sub-tenancies. But even after the said transfer the liability of the lessee towards his lessor continued to subsist. Therefore, in the absunce of, a contract or legal usage to the contrary a tenant could create sub-tenancies. But even after the said transfer the liability of the lessee towards his lessor continued to subsist. Further when there was a covenant not to assign or sublet an assignment, or sub-letting in breach of the same would be valid because the said condition against assignment or sub-letting has been generally construed as making the lease voidable at the lessor's option ; and untill the lessor exercises his right of re-entry, the assignment or sub-letting stands. Mulla on Transfer or Property Act (6th Edition) at page 712 has observed that it has been suggested that the lessor could treat the assignment as a nullity and has referred to cases where the said point was raised but not decided. Mulla at page 713 of the same book has observed that a transfer by the lessee of his right in contravention of the terms of the lease is not wholly void but voidable at the instance of the landlord, The sub-section (2) of section 11 of the West Bengal Premises Rent control Act, 1948 laid down : "notwithstanding, anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, it shall not be lawful after the commencement of this Act, for a tenant inferior to a tenant of the first degree to let in whole or in part the premises let to him except with the consent of the landlord and of the tenants of a superior degree above him. " this court with reference to the said provision of the 1948 Rent Control act held that when a sub-letting was without the landlord's consent the sub-tenant had no protection as against the landlord P. B. Mukherji, J. in monoranjan Bhattacharjee v. Satya charan Law 85 C. L. J. 81, upon an analysis -of different provisions of Section 11 held that the right to sublet either under the common Law or under the transfer of Property Act still remained lawful and was in no way affected or modified by the Act. Section 11 (1) (b) (i) or (ii) of the Rent Act, 1948 did not make sub-letting illegal but was only a penal provision preventing the person who committed breach of such f provisions from claiming the protection of the benefits conferred under section 11 of the Act of 1948 and disabled such a tenant who had sub-let from resisting a decree for possession by his landlord. 13. SECTION 13 (1) of the West bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 which also provided that sublease will not be binding upon the landlord in certain cases was somewhat differently phrased. The sub-section (1) of section 13 provide that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act of 1950 or in any other law a sub-tenancy created by a tenant inferior to the tenant of the first degree shall not be binding on non-consenting landlord or on non-consenting tenant. But a tenant of the first degree without the consent of his landlord and also a tanant inferior to the tenant of the first degree with the consent of the landlord could create sub-tenancy binding upon the superior landlord. The supreme Court in Indra Kumar karnani v. Atul Chandra Patitundi a. I. R. 1966 S. C. 186, with reference to section 13 of the West Bengal Premises rent Control (Temporary Provisions)Act, 1950 distinguished the legal position of a sub-tenant under the tenant of the first degree and a sub-tenant under a tenant of the inferior degree, A tenant of the first degree without the consent of the landlord could create sub-tenancies. The Supreme Court also pointed out the differences between the provisions of section 13 of the West Bengal premises Rent Control (Temporary provisions) Act, 1950 and section 11 (3)of the Rent Control Act, 1948. 14. THE West Bengal Premises: tenancy Act, 1956 brought about several changes in the legal position of the sub-tenants. Section 14 imposed the following restrictions on sub-letting. Sub-section (1) of section 14 laid down that after the commencement of the 1956 Act, no tenant shall without the previous consent in writting of the landlord : (a) sublet the whole or any part of the premises. (b) transfer or assign his rights in the tenancy or any part thereof. Landlords under section 14 (2) were prohibited from claiming, demanding or receiving any premium or other considerations for giving his consent to the sub-letting. (b) transfer or assign his rights in the tenancy or any part thereof. Landlords under section 14 (2) were prohibited from claiming, demanding or receiving any premium or other considerations for giving his consent to the sub-letting. It is noted that these provisions are nearly similar to those of section (2) of section 11 of the West bengal Premises (Rent Control) Act, 1948. I have already referred to the decision of P. B. Mukherjee, J. in Monoranjan Bhaitacharya v. Satya Charan law (supra) which held that the said provision did not make sub-letting illegal but only a penal,provision preventing the person who had committed breach by such provisions from claiming the protection of the benefits conferred under section 11 of the Rent control Act, 1940. In my view, similar interpretation should be put upon section 14 (1) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act. Section 14 (1) has not expressly laid down that a sub-letting in violation of section 14 (1) shall create no legal relationship as between him and his subtenant. The effect of section 14 (1) is that a sub-letting after the commencement of the Act without previous consent in writing of the landlord is not binding upon the superior landlord. The superior landlord has a right under section 13 (1) (a) to recover possession by evicting his tenant who has sub-let, transferred or assigned in whole or any part of the premises held by him. The sub-section (3) of section 13 has further laid down that except as provided in sub-section (2) and (4) a decree or order for delivery of possession of the premisses shall be binding on every sub-tenant. Under section 13 (2) only those sub-tenants who have given notices under section 16 are required to be made parties to any suit or proceeding for recovery of possession by the landlord. When a sub-tenancy is created after the commencement of the 1956 Act without prior consent of the landlord, the landlord is not required to make such a sub-tenant a defendant in a suit for recovery of possession filed against his tenant and an ejectment decree passed against the tenant of the first degree would be binding such a sub-tenant. In other words, such a subtenant has no independent legal status and is not entitled to the benefits of protection against eviction. In other words, such a subtenant has no independent legal status and is not entitled to the benefits of protection against eviction. A tenant who sublets in violation of section 14 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is also liable to be punished with fine under section 30 (3)of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act. In our view, section 23 of the contract Act is not applicable to sub-lettings after the commencement of the 1956 Act made without prior consent in writing of the landlord. A consideration for a contract of sub-letting between the tenant of the first degree and his sub-tenant does not come within the categories enumerated in section 23 of the Contract Act. Section 14 (1) does not really forbid sub-letting by a tenant of the first degree but it makes authorised sub-letting not binding upon the landlord and also entitles the landlord to evict a tenant who has sub-let after the commencement of the Act without his consent. The creation of unauthorised sub-letting would not defeat provisions of any law. Subletting under the general law was not unlawful and in the absence of a contract to the contrary a tenant could sublet. Under Rent Control legislation, some classes of subtenants have been given protection from eviction. The legal position of those sub-tenants who do not enjoy the benefits of Rent Control legislation appears to be the same as that under the general law. In the absence of any privity of contract, the unauthorised sub-tenancies are not binding upon the superior landlord who can evict such sub-tenants in execution of eviction decrees obtained against the tenant of the first degree. But the mere fact that an unauthorised sub-tenant has been denied the benefits of protection under the Rent Control legislation does not necessarily mean that a subletting by a tenant is now totally forbidden or that such sub letting if permitted would defeat provisions of any law. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy act has provided that a sub-letting shall have not effect as against the superior landlord and expresses no intention to prohibit the act of sub-letting merely because the tenant, who sublets unauthorisedly, may incur punishment it does not necessarily mean that sub-letting is forbidden by law. 15. OUR attention has been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in, Wapman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. 15. OUR attention has been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in, Wapman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. A. I. R. 1959 s. C. 689, which inter-alia interpreted section 15 of the Bombay. Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates control Act, 1947 which prohibited sub-letting, assignment and transfer by a tenant governed by the said Act (vide paragraph 7 ). In our view, the said decision in Woman Shriniwas Kini's case (supra), is distinguishable. In a suit for ejectment brought by the landlord against his tenant the latter had pleaded that he had sublet in pursuance of an agreement with the landlord. Therefore, he was not liable to be ejected under section 13 (1) (e) of the said Bombay rents etc. Act, 1947. The Supreme court, inter-alia, pronounced that the said agreement between the landlord and the tenant was forbidden by section 15 and, therefore, illegal. The plea of the tenant of waiver by the landlord was not available. The tenant could not also plead pari delicto against his landlord. The Supreme Court in Woman Shriniwas Kini's case (supra), had no occasion to either examine the question whether any legal relationship would arise between a tenant and his sub-tenant whom he had inducted without prior consent in writing of his landlord. 16. THE learned advocate for the appellant has submitted that the alleged agreement of tenancy between the defendant and the appellant was perfectly valid and binding inter se between the parties. In support of his submission, the learned advocate for the appellant, has relied upon the recent Full Bench decision of the Andhra pradesh High Court in (13) Shankerlal gupta v. Jayadishwar Rao, A. I. E. . 1980 a. P. 181. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh, inter-alia, held that agreement of lease entered into Between the landlord and the tenant in contravention of section 3 (3) of Hyderabad Rent control Act or section 3 (3) of the Andhra Pradesh rent Control Act will not be illegal and void inter se between, the parties. These provisions required the landlord to notify the vacancy and any formation of agreement of lease contravening these provisions would be illegal and void against the Controller but the said agreement of lease is not illegal or void inter se between the landlord and the tenant. These provisions required the landlord to notify the vacancy and any formation of agreement of lease contravening these provisions would be illegal and void against the Controller but the said agreement of lease is not illegal or void inter se between the landlord and the tenant. The aforesaid sections of the Hyderabad Rent Control act and of the Andhra Pradesh Rent control Act are not pari meteria with section 14 of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act. Nonetheless, these decisions are of some assistance because they indicate in what manner the applicability of section 23 of the Contract act ought to be considered. In deciding the effect of section 14 of the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the court ought to examine the different provisions of the Act rjfeting to post-Act subletting and effect of unauthorised subletting by a tenant. The court should also consider the object for enacting section 14 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The West bengal Premises Tenancy Act has provided that a subletting by a tenant after the commencement of the said Act without the consent of his landlord will not be binding and shall be void so far as the landlord is concerned. The landlord will be also entitled to eject his tenant who after the commencement of the 1956 Act has sublet without his prior consent in writing. But the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act has nowhere provided that the contract between the tenant and his sub-tenant would be null and void and not binding even upon the tenant who has sublet. The Full bench of the Andhra Pradesh High court in Shankarlal Gupta's case (supra), had considered the Supreme Court decision in Waman Shriniwas Kini's case (supra), under section 15 of the bombay Rents Act, 1948, but rightly pointed out that the Supreme Court in the said case did not address itself to the question as to what would be the effect of the contract inter se between the parties. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid case had really applied the law laid down by the Supreme Court in murlidhar Aggarwal v. Ram Agyan singh A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1924, under sections 3 and 7 of the U. P. (Temporary)Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid case had really applied the law laid down by the Supreme Court in murlidhar Aggarwal v. Ram Agyan singh A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1924, under sections 3 and 7 of the U. P. (Temporary)Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. Mathew, J. in Murlidhar Aggarwal's case (supra), pointed out that the expression "public policy" has entirely a different meaning from the policy of the law and public policy does not remain static in any given community. The Judges have, inter-alia, to consider the welfare of the community at any given time. By applying this standard, we may say that the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act which is a social legislation primarily for the welfare of the tenants do not express any intention that a sub-tenant who is inducted without the consent of the superior landlord shall have no right as against the person who had inducted him. Similarly, in case it is held that such a subletting is totally null and void, the person inducting him would be unable to recover rent or to recover possession even when grounds for eviction exist. Therefore, the court should avoid an iterpretati on of section 14 which would result in such undesirable consequences. We, therefore, conclude, that even when a subletting is without the prior consent of the superior landlord, there would be a legal relationship as between the tenant and his sub-tenant. We, however, add that we have not decided at this stage whether in fact the plaintiff-appellant was a tenant as claimed by him or a licencee as claimed by the defendant-respondent. The said question may be hereinafter decided on evidence in accordance with law. We may also add that triable issues have been raised and the rights of the parties should be kept intact till the decision of the suit. 17. IN the premises, we propose to allow this appeal subject to the terms indicated below : the plaintiff-appellant has himself admitted that he has neither paid nor deposited rent in respect of the tenancy claimed by him. Even before it is decided whether he is a temant or not, he ought to deposit sum equivalent to rent/damages for the entire period for which rents/damages remains due. We understand that calculated at the rate asserted by the plaintiff-appellant nearly a sum of Rs. Even before it is decided whether he is a temant or not, he ought to deposit sum equivalent to rent/damages for the entire period for which rents/damages remains due. We understand that calculated at the rate asserted by the plaintiff-appellant nearly a sum of Rs. 15,000/-would be due as use and occupation of the premises. The appellant ought to deposit the said amount in the court below as a condition for granting an order of temporary injunction in his favour. We further add that in the facts of this case an order of temporary injunction for indefinite period ought to be made. Therefore, we propose to limit the period during which the order of temporary injunction would operate in favour of the plaintiff-appellant together with the direction that the trial court would dispose of the suit itself within the said period. 18. WE, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the order complained of. We direct that an unconditional order of temporary injunction in plaintiff's favour will remain in force for two months. In case, the appellant deposits in the trial court a sum of Rs. 15000/- within the said period, the order of temporary injunction would continue to remain in force till 31st january, 1982 or till the disposal of the suit whichever is earlier. The petitioner must also go on depositing in the trial court a sum of Rs, 159/- per month within the 15th day of each succeeding month according to English calendar and first such deposit shall be made on or before 15th of april, 1981. In the event of appellant's failure to deposit the said sum for any one month, the order of temporary injunction shall stand vacated. If the above sums be deposited, the defendant respondent will be entitled to withdraw the same without prejudice, without security and irrespective of the results of the suit. The trial court would try to dispose of the suit within 31st january, 1982. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the court below by a special Messenger at the cost of the appellant. There will be no order as to costs. No decree need be drawn up. Appeal allowed. No costs.