Hansaria, J.:- The petitioner is an elected representative of the people. Hs is (or was before he was suspended) the Chief Executive Councillor (C.E.C.) of the Gauhati Mahlrnma. His suspension on 27.3.81 has brought him to the court with the grievance that this has been done without the authority of law and in violation of the principles of natural justice. As we are dealing with a body which is a part and parcel of the panchayati Raj, which was assured to the people of lade by its national Sitters, I am reminded that this court owes on obligation under Articles 37 of the Constitution of India to so interpret the provisions of the concerned statute, which may further and not hinder the goals set out in the Directive Prin­ciples. It was staled in U.P. State Electricity Board vs. Hari-shankar, AIR 1979 SC 65 , that Article 37 addressed to the court means that whiles courts are not free to direct the making of legislation, they are bound to affirm and adopt principles of interpretation in the light of Directive Principles. Article 40 of our Constitution does require the State to organise village panchayats and to endow them with powers to enable them to function as units of self-government. It is axiomatic that the persons in-charge of Panchayats should also be allowed reasonable amount of autonomy. Of course, it cannot be permitted to run riot. 2. Shri Baruah, who has addressed the court on behalf of the petitioner, has advanced many contentions. Some of these I would regard as fringe submissions; two are nearer to the core and one lies at the heart of the matter. To appreciate these contentions, we have to read the order in full : "No. PDA. 83/83/108-Govt. 2. Shri Baruah, who has addressed the court on behalf of the petitioner, has advanced many contentions. Some of these I would regard as fringe submissions; two are nearer to the core and one lies at the heart of the matter. To appreciate these contentions, we have to read the order in full : "No. PDA. 83/83/108-Govt. having received allegations against Shri Bisanta Kumar Biishya, Chief Executive Coun­cillor, Gjuhati Mohkuma Parishad regarding various serious irregularities, misuse and wastage of public fund and misuse of his powers and having held an enquiry by the Joint Director of Panchayat and C. D. into the allega­tions, and after having considered the said enquiry report and the reply furnished by Shri B.K. Baishya, Chief Exe­cutive Councillor on the points of allegations mentioned in the said enquiry report and having further considered the report of the inspection conducted by the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup and the report of the Director, Panchayat, Assam and on being satisfied about the said facts, it is found that Shri B. K Baishya, C.E.C. Gauhati M.P. is guilty of (i) anomalies in the purchase of materials of the Mohkuma-Parishad, (ii) disregarding financial rules on the discharge of his responsibilities, (iii) violation of statutory directions in the use of M.P. vehicles, (iv) dis­regarding the statutory provision of the A.P R. Act in settlement of the Hats of the Mohkuma Pan-had and (v) causing wilful loss of revenue to the M.P. and wastage of public fund, (vi) wilful neglect in the discharging of his duties. Govt. therefore on consideration of the above facts and circumstances consider his continuance in office inadvisa­ble and that he is liable to be removed from his office in accordance with the provision of section 25 (3) of the A.P.R. Act, 1972 and orders drawing of proceedings accordingly with a view to his removal. Pending his removal from office as above, the Governor of Assam is pleased to suspend Shri B. K. Baishya, C.EC. Gauhati from his office with immediate effect in exercise of the authority conferred by section 25 (4) of the A.P.R, Act, 1972." 2A. The relevant provisions of the Assam Panchayati Raj Act, 1972 (for short, the Act) may also be read at this stage : 25. Gauhati from his office with immediate effect in exercise of the authority conferred by section 25 (4) of the A.P.R, Act, 1972." 2A. The relevant provisions of the Assam Panchayati Raj Act, 1972 (for short, the Act) may also be read at this stage : 25. Removal of Chairman or Chief Executive Coun­cillor or Councillor of a Mohkuma Parishad, President, Vice-President or Member of a Gaon Panchayat.- (1) * (2) * (3) (a) A Chairman or Chief Executive Councillor or Deputy Chief Executive Councillor or President of Standing Comm the of a Mohkuma Parishad, a President or Vice-President of a Gaon Panchayat may be disqualified from holding office by the State Government, if- (i) he refuses to discharge his duty as assigned under the provision of the Act or becomes incapable of acting ; or * * (ii) he is guilty of misconduct or wilful neglect in discharge of his duties ; or (iii) his continuance in office is dangerous to the public peace or is likely to bring the adminis­tration of a Mohkuma Parishad or a Gaon Panchayat into contempt. (b) The State Government may after ascertaining the facts if any, under the preceding clause (a) and giving a reasonable opportunity of showing cause and of being heard against the action proposed to be taken against such person give an order to him to vacate his office forthwith. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the sub­sections (1) and (3) the State Government may, at any time suspend a Chairman, or Chief Executive Councillor or Deputy Chief Executive Councillor or the President of Standing Committee of Mohkuma Parishad or Presi­dent or Vice-President of a Gaon Panchayat, pending his removal if his continuance in office is considered inadvisable on any of the grounds for which he may be removed under sub-sections (1) and (3). (5) * * * 3. The fringe submissions may be taken up first. It is urged that the power which has been conferred by section 25(3) of the Act is to pass an order to say that the con­cerned person is to "vacate his office forthwith". As against this, power of suspension is available pending removal of the parsons named in sub-section (4). Thus, the grounds on which a person could be ordered to vacate his office under sub­section (3) are not the same when action under sub-section (4) is taken, which speaks of removal. As against this, power of suspension is available pending removal of the parsons named in sub-section (4). Thus, the grounds on which a person could be ordered to vacate his office under sub­section (3) are not the same when action under sub-section (4) is taken, which speaks of removal. By referring to the predecessor Act (The Assam Panchayat Act, 1959), it is urged that section 27(2) of that Act had specifically given power of removal, whereas the terminology in the Act is different. The learned counsel here is merely playing on words. To say that asking to vacate is different from ordering removal would make the power of suspension given by sub-section (4) com­pletely otiose, as the Act has not conferred this power of removal by any other provision. On the other hand, section 25(4) of the Act itself makes it clear that the grounds men­tioned in sub-section (3) are relatable to removal of the per­son concerned. This is apparent from the concluding portion of sub-section (4). When a person is ordered to vacate his office, he is definitely removed from that office. As I do not entertain any doubt on this score, I have not thought it fit to either examine the dictionary meaning of the words "vacate" and "removal", or to refer to case law whether marginal note of a section can be used as a guide to find out the meaning of a provision. 4. Some grievance was also made, and rightly, that the petitioner has already been found "guilty" of the allegations mentioned in the impugned order. Though the order says so, but if it is read as a whole, as it has to be there is nothing to doubt that was only a tentative conclusion reached by the Government, which is apparent from the fact that the impug­ned order specks of drawing of proceeding as well with a view to removal of the petitioner. If the Government would have been really satisfied about the guileful would not have ordered for drawing of proceedings, but would have straightaway remo­ved the petitioner, may be wrongly. So, we have to read the words "guilty of" in the order with some reservation. 5. If the Government would have been really satisfied about the guileful would not have ordered for drawing of proceedings, but would have straightaway remo­ved the petitioner, may be wrongly. So, we have to read the words "guilty of" in the order with some reservation. 5. Something was also said by the learned counsel that the officers on the basis of whose reports suspension was ordered, are -not those who have been empowered to act as watch-dogs on the functioning of the Mohkuma Parishad. Reference is made to section 129 of the Act. As to these persons, the Director of Panchayat cannot be said to be an outsider. The grievance is about the report of the Joint Director, a copy of which is at Annexure. 6. According to the State, the inspection was conducted by the Joint Director on behalf of the Director. Shri Baruah would say that a person empowered under section 129 of the Act cannot delegate his functions further, or to anybody else. I do not propose to enter into this as a perusal of the records makes it clear that whit had set be ball rolling was really the inspection note of the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, dated 26.12.1980, where after the Director of Panchayat addressed a communication to the Government on 6.1.81 by referring to the inspection note of the Deputy Commissioner high lighting certain aspects. The Deputy Commissioner is in thick and thin with the Panchayats. Sections 21, 24, 33, 61 and above all 145, are some of the provisions of the Act which would bear this. So, it cannot be said that the Govern­ment took the action of suspension on the basis of reports of outsiders. The fourth fringe submission is that the action is actuated by malice in law. This would be so, as per Venkata-raman vs. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 49 , if some extrane­ous or non-existing materials are taken into consideration. From what would be stated later, it would be clear that this is not so in the case at hand. So, I do not read any malics in law in the present case. 7. Let us travel nearer to the core. On way, we meet two hurdles. From what would be stated later, it would be clear that this is not so in the case at hand. So, I do not read any malics in law in the present case. 7. Let us travel nearer to the core. On way, we meet two hurdles. These are : (1) that the reports on the basis of which the impugned order was passed have no nexus at all with the "grounds" on which the petitioner could have been removed under section 25(3) ; and (2) that the order is in violation of the rule of audi alteram partem. To satisfy me on the first count, Shri Baruah refers to Annexure-2 and slates that much of what has been stated in this report relates either to the Mahkuma Parishad as a whole or to matters which had taken place before the petitioner had come to occupy the high position of Chief Executive Councillor on 10.3.79. It has however to be borne in mind that the Joint Director's report is one of the materials taken into con­sideration while passing the impugned order. As already, stated, it was the Deputy Commissioner's inspection note followed by the letter of the Director of Panchayat, which prepared the ground. The petitioner having not been furnished with these documents, he might not be aware of the contents of the same. A perusal of the Director's letter which is on record would clearly show that according to the Director, the petiti­oner being the Chief Executive Councillor was responsible for some of the anomalies. The Government took action after the letter of the Director was received. Though that commu­nication is of 6.1.81, the little delay in passing the impugned order seems to have occured because it was perhaps thought fit to have a discussion with the Chief Minister, which took place around 26.3.81, in the wake of which the impugned order was passed on 27.3.81. It may be that all the allegations in the reports cannot be laid at the door of the petitioner, but on a perusal of the same it cannot be said that the petitioner is in no way responsible for the irregularities in question. It cannot be forgotten that under section 23(2) of the Act, the executive powers of the Mahkuma Parishad are exercised by the Chief Executive Councillor, though with the assistance of the Secretary of the Parishad. It cannot be forgotten that under section 23(2) of the Act, the executive powers of the Mahkuma Parishad are exercised by the Chief Executive Councillor, though with the assistance of the Secretary of the Parishad. It cannot there­fore be held that there were no materials before the Govern­ment to come to the satisfaction in question. Another facet of this submission is that the impugned order could have been passed only on the basis of the 'grounds' for which the petitioner could be removed, as stated in section 25(4) itself. It is urged that what has been mentioned in the impugned order are not grounds, but mere allegations. Now, when sub-section (4) has spoken about the grounds, these have to be understood inter alia as those which have been detail-led under sub-section (3) (a)-these being three, whose crux is (i) refusal to discharge duty or becoming incapable of doing so, (ii) guilty of misconduct or wilful negligence in discharge of duty, or (iii) continuance in office being dangerous to public peace or likely to bring the administration into con­tempt. Of the six allegations mentioned in the impugned order, the last one is "wilful neglect in discharge of his duties". This is one of the grounds on which a person like the petitioner could be removed. Other allegations men­tioned in the impugned order could be instances of "mis­conduct". So, the impugned order cannot be said to be passed on no "grounds". 7. To the violation of natural justice now. Shri Baruah reminded me of the expanding horizon of this concept. He refers to para 63 of Maneka Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC 597 , where it has been observed : "The audi alteram partem rule is a highly effective tool devised by the courts to enable a statutory authority to arrive at a just decision and it is calculated to act as healthy check on abuse or misuse of power and hence its reach should not be narrowed and it applicability circumscribed". There can be no quarrel with this observation. It is equ­ally true that pre-hearing may have to yield to post-decisional hearing in urgent cases, Maneka Gandhi itself is the starting point of such a thinking in this country. There can be no quarrel with this observation. It is equ­ally true that pre-hearing may have to yield to post-decisional hearing in urgent cases, Maneka Gandhi itself is the starting point of such a thinking in this country. To speak in the lan­guage of Mohinder Singh, AIR 1978 SC 851 , there may not be exceptions to the rules of natural justice, which was stated to be a "misnomer" or a short-hand form of expressing the idea that in the exclusionary cases nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording opportunity to present or meeting a case. No decision has been brought to my notice by Shri Baruah which has held that even while ordering suspension pending depart­mental inquiry, the affected person has to be heard before passing of the order. As against this, it was held in Gurcharan Singh vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1979 PAH 61, a Full Bench decision that the requirement of principle of natural justice in such a situation may defeat the very purpose of suspension, which is in the nature of an emergent provision. This decision bad come up for consideration before another Full Bench decision of that High Court in Kashmiri Lal vs. Deputy Commissioner, AIR 1980 P&H 209 , which is referred by Shri Baruah himself. The matter had been examined there in the context of section 102(1) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952. The unlamented section had visualised the suspension of a panch "during the course of an enquiry" in which a Panch could be removed. The section was however amended and the power of suspension came to be invoked in two situations : 1. Where a case against a Panch in respect of a Criminal offence is under investigation, enquiry or trial if the charge is likely to embrass the incumbent, or involves moral turpitude or defect of character; and (2) "during the course of an enquiry" for any of the reasons for which a Panch could be removed. The Full Bench held that the amendment had a purpose behind it and the same was that suspension in cases where there is enquiry should not be automatic or mechanical. It was therefore held that where suspension was to be under the amended section 102 (1) an opportunity of hearing or notice has to be afforded to the Panch. The Full Bench held that the amendment had a purpose behind it and the same was that suspension in cases where there is enquiry should not be automatic or mechanical. It was therefore held that where suspension was to be under the amended section 102 (1) an opportunity of hearing or notice has to be afforded to the Panch. As to section 102 (1A) (suspension in the course of an enquiry), no such requirement was deemed necessary. Thus, it cannot be held that in every case of suspension a prior opportunity of being heard has to be given, especially when a departmental enquiry has to follow the order of suspension. The justification for this is that (1) suspension is dictated by the urgency of the situation; and (2) the incumbent gets a post-decisional opportunity to defend himself. So, that battle cannot be fought in the area of natural justice. 8. This takes us to the heart of the matter, which is whether the petitioner could have been suspended before drawing up of a formal departmental proceeding against him. The answer to this lies in understanding the purport of the words "pending his removal" as finding place in section 25 (4) of the Act. The precise question is whether these words permit susp­ension only in the course of an enquiry, or contemplation itself would be sufficient. In the present case apparently the order had been passed without drawing a formal proceeding, though drawing of the same was also ordered by the same order. That a formal departmental proceeding begins on service of charges cannot be disputed. This was so held in para 14 of Managing Director, U. P. Warehousing Corporation vs. Vijoy Narayan AIR 1980 SC 810 According to Shri Baruah, section 25 (4) permits suspension only after proceeding for removal has been initiated and not earlier, whereas according to the learned Advocate General, Assam, this requirement cannot be read in the sub-section. 9. Shri Baruab has relied on two Division Bench decisions of this Court Nagendra Nath vs. of B. K. Bhuyan, ALR 1969 A&N 1, and Bani Kanta vs. State of Assam, AIR 1972 A & N 19. In Nagendra Nath this matter had not come up for examination directly. 9. Shri Baruab has relied on two Division Bench decisions of this Court Nagendra Nath vs. of B. K. Bhuyan, ALR 1969 A&N 1, and Bani Kanta vs. State of Assam, AIR 1972 A & N 19. In Nagendra Nath this matter had not come up for examination directly. There the suspension order was set aside mainly on the ground that the Court was not satisfied if the conclusion as to inadvisability of the petitioner's continuing in office was on any of the grounds set out in relevant section, or on the ground of public interest. It was also stated : “It is not clear whether any proceeding? at all had been started against the petitioner to remove him from the office. It is obvious that the step that is provided to be taken by way of suspension is only precursor to the final action that is proposed to be taken against the petitioner, of which there is no indication in this case." 10. As the relevant section of the old Panchayat Act had also provided for suspension pending removal of the person concerned, Shri Baruah has urged on the basis of this decision that unless proceeding for removal is actually drawn up, it could not be said that suspension is by way of "precursor to the final action". It may however be noted that this court had also said about "indication'' of removal in the above passage, which may take within its fold contemplation to remove". 11. Banikanta vs. State of Assam, AIR 1972 A & N19, was a case where suspension was on 18.4.70, long before which formal charges had been drawn on 22.3.69. As such, that decision does not help us on the point under consideration. Nonetheless, both sides have placed reliance on the following observations in para 6 : "All that is necessary on which the Government has to arrive at its satisfaction for the purpose of suspending pending removal is that there are grounds on which action could be taken for disqualification. This power reserved to the Government is undoubtedly extra-ordinary power and the only limitation that Government's satisfaction is to be based on the grounds mentioned in the second proviso. This power reserved to the Government is undoubtedly extra-ordinary power and the only limitation that Government's satisfaction is to be based on the grounds mentioned in the second proviso. If, however, Government does decide to suspend a President pending removal and the grounds in sub-section (2) exist, the exercise of the power by the Government under the second proviso is not open to question". 12. As it has already been held that the satisfaction of the Government cannot be said to be based on no materials, nor also that the satisfaction was not based on the “grounds'' on which the petitioner could be removed, Banikanta cannot assist the petitioner. 13. Before proceeding further, it may be stated that though the learned Advocate General places reliance on Govt. of India vs. Tarak Nath, AIR 1971 SC 823 , to contend that disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner can b: said to have started as the Government had come to a prima facie decision that a case had been made out against the petitioner for framing of charges, this decision was overruled in P.R. Nayak vs. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 554 , to which my attention is drawn by Shri Baruah. In the latter case, the view adopted in Tarak Nath that the phrases "the initiation of disciplinary proceedings" and the "starting of such proceedings", indicate the satisfaction "that a prima facie case has been made out for the framing of charges", was not accepted. It was made clear in para 15 of P.R. Nayak that the phrases like above have to be restricted to those cases where proceedings have in fact commenced, and not merely when they are contemplated. 14. We have therefore to see whether the phrase "pend­ing his removal" in section 25(4) of the Act permits suspen­sion only after a proceeding has been drawn in the sense that formal charges have been framed and served, or whether the power could be invoked even where a proceeding is in contemplation. Decision in P. R. Nayak is not helpful to decide this controversy, as the concerned rule of suspension in that case had given this power to the Government which had initiated the disciplinary proceeding. So, initiation of the proceeding in the sense explained in the decision was a pre-condition. Section 25(4), however, speaks of suspension pending removal. Decision in P. R. Nayak is not helpful to decide this controversy, as the concerned rule of suspension in that case had given this power to the Government which had initiated the disciplinary proceeding. So, initiation of the proceeding in the sense explained in the decision was a pre-condition. Section 25(4), however, speaks of suspension pending removal. One thing which is abundantly clear is that the authority suspending a person under the provision in question must have come to some positive decision relat­ing to the removal of the person in question, i. e., removal must be in active contemplation. Question is whether any­thing more can be reasonably read in the requirement of section 25(4) ? As the power under this sub-section is hedged by another requirement that the Government must come to the conclusion as to the undesirability of the continuance in office of the incumbent on any of grounds for which he may be removed, and as the materials relating to it must find place in the order of suspension, and as the same must have nexus with the grounds in question, I do not read the further requirement of actual drawing of proceeding before suspend­ing persons mentioned In sub-section (4), all of whom occupy a position of some importance in a Mobkuma Parishad or Oaon Panchayat, as their suspension may become necessary in some urgent cases before formal drawing of proceedings. It is known that before formal charges are drawn and served on an incumbent, of preparations are needed by way of proper scanning of the materials, finding out of the docu­ments which will establish the charges and the names of witnesses who would support the charges. This delay may not be in the interest of the organization in some cases, at least relating to those who, like the petitioner, occupy a very important position. 15. In coming to this conclusion, I have not forgotten the mandate of Article 40 of the Constitution. But at the same time it has not been possible for me to ignore the state of affairs in public life prevailing presently in the country. Honesty and service to the real cause are becoming rare and rare. In such a situation insistence on formal drawing of proceedings before invoking the power of suspension may really cause harm to the cause embodied in Article 40 of the Con­stitution. 16. Honesty and service to the real cause are becoming rare and rare. In such a situation insistence on formal drawing of proceedings before invoking the power of suspension may really cause harm to the cause embodied in Article 40 of the Con­stitution. 16. The result is that the suspension of the petitioner in the present case cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity to merit interference by this court in exercise of its extra­ordinary powers. Let it however be added that as I have come to the conclusion that the power of suspension could be exercised even where removal is in active contemplation, the proceeding itself cannot be delayed beyond a reasonable period, as otherwise suspension could be used as an engine of oppression. In the present case itself though the petitioner was suspended on 27.3.81, formal proceedings are yet to be drawn. The learned Advocate General states that the delay has occurred because records had been submitted to this court. It may be so. Any further delay would however be objecti­onable. Let therefore formal charges be drawn and served on the petitioner within two weeks from today and let the rem­aining part of the proceedings be also completed with due dispatch, so that, the petitioner may not nurse a grievance that even if he were to be found not guilty in the enquiry, the result would not be available before the expiry of his term of office in March, 1983. 17. The petition is dismissed with these observations. Let the records be sent back immediately. Parties would bear their own costs.