Judgment Sia Saran Sinha, J. 1. This is a plaintiffs second appeal against a judgment of affirmance. 2. Undisputedly, plot No. 2930, Khata No. 439 of village Dumri in Manjhi police station of the district of Saran belonged to one Raj Kumar Rai. This plot has a small area, namely, 1 Katha 2 Dhurs. Raj Kumar had four sons namely, Ram Jatan, Sheo Jatan, the two plaintiffs, and Sheo Balak and Sheo Bahadur. It is undisputed that they were born of one Kumari alias Sheo Kumari. This Sheo Kumari undisputedly was a concubine of Raj Kumar, though the defendant alleged that subsequently she was taken by Raj Kumar as his wife. Raj Kumar died sometime in the year 1942. Prior to that, on 11th June, 1931, he gifted all his properties including the disputed plot to the two plaintiffs under a registered deed of gift (exhibit 2). The execution of this deed of gift is not in dispute but the defendants alleged that really Raj Kumar Rai wanted to execute a deed of gift not only in favour of Ram Jatan and Sheo Jatan but also in favour of Sheo Kumari, the case of the defendants further being that by practicing fraud, the two plaintiffs got omitted the name of Sheo Kumari from the deed of gift and got the deed executed only in their own names. This deed of gift was a registered document and as the plaintiffs alleged, it was valid and operative. The plaintiff claimed to have come in possession over the disputed land along with the other gifted properties by virtue of exhibit 2 and they claimed, in addition, a title to the suit plot by adverse possession as well. 3. The defendants alleged, inter alia that after the death of Raj Kumar Rai, there was a partition between Sheo Kumari and her sons in which partition the plot in suit fell into her exclusive share and she came in possession. This Sheo Kumari sold the suit plot to the defendants under a registered sale deed dated 27.01.1954. The defendants came in possession thereof, got their names mutated and they further claimed to have acquired title to the disputed land by adverse possession. 4. Both the two Courts below found that the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation and that the defendants had acquired title to the suit plot by adverse possession. The defendants came in possession thereof, got their names mutated and they further claimed to have acquired title to the disputed land by adverse possession. 4. Both the two Courts below found that the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation and that the defendants had acquired title to the suit plot by adverse possession. There were other findings as well, one of the concurrent findings further being that the gift executed in favour of the plaintiffs was invalid and not acted upon. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs, suit and the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs not the same fate leading the plaintiffs to come to this Court in the instant second appeal. 5. Three substantial questions of law which were formulated by the learned Single Judge of this Court at the time of admission of this appeal may be seen in order No. 4 dated 21st September, 1979. One of them is "Whether in view of the nature of the suit property, the findings on the question of adverse possession is valid in law." The submission of Shri R.K. Verma, learned Counsel for the appellants, was that in case this point is decided against the appellants, they would be out of Court and it would not be necessary to determine the other substantial questions of law formulated in order No 4 dated 21.09.1979. 6. Both the two. Courts below, on a due consideration of the evidence on record and the circumstances flowing there from arrived at a concurrent finding of fact that the defendants, by being in continuous peaceful and open possession since their purchase on 27.01.1954, the suit having been instituted on 23.11.1971, had perfected their title the suit land by adverse possession. I have been taken through the findings of the two Courts below and I see absolutely no reason to interfere with that finding of fact. 7. The disputed land has been described in the plaint as Dih Basgit Sahan. It is not in dispute that both the plaintiffs and the defendants are residents of the same village and that the disputed land is close to their residential houses. Several specific over acts of possession were asserted by the defendants in the written statement. They were, fixing of Nad and Khuta for the cattle of the defendants and the planting of various kinds of trees, such as, plaintain, Sareefa, Papita, guava, jack fruit etc. Several specific over acts of possession were asserted by the defendants in the written statement. They were, fixing of Nad and Khuta for the cattle of the defendants and the planting of various kinds of trees, such as, plaintain, Sareefa, Papita, guava, jack fruit etc. As the trial Court has stated in paragraph 9 of its judgment, the evidence showed that this land was used as a Balkan by the defendants after it was sold. 8. Immediately after the purchase, the defendants got their names mutated in the sarista of the then landlord and obtained rent receipts. After the abolition of the Zamindari, they got their names mutated in the sarista of the State of Bihar as well and have been obtaining rent receipts regularly which have been filed. It is also not in dispute that after the execution of the sale deed in favour of the defendants, there was dispute between the parties as to possession. In spite of all these we find the two plaintiffs coming to the Civil Court as late as in the year 1971. This delay was somewhat unusual and the plaintiffs would have been confronted with the same. The two plaintiffs, however, kept themselves out of Court and did not choose to examine themselves before the trial Court. 9. The submission of Shri R.K. Varma was that considering the nature and the area of the suit land, the evidence of possession, which the learned Counsel has described to be of flimsy character, no finding of adverse possession can legitimately be based and in support of his question he has relied on two decisions, namely, (i) Pramji Curnetji V/s. Gocul Das Madhowji, 16 ILR(Bom) 338. and Kaladhari Singh V/s. Jibachh Mishra and athers, AIR 1939 Pat 399. The facts of the two cases are distinguished from the facts of the instant case. In the case reported in XVI I. L. R. (Bombay) 333, the small piece of land in suit was of no present use to the owner, it being convenient in many ways to his neighbour who made use of it in various ways without objection for more than twelve years. A privy and sheds for cows, goats, fowls etc., all structures of a flimsy and purely temporary character, were said to have been constructed and maintained for many years on the said piece of land. A privy and sheds for cows, goats, fowls etc., all structures of a flimsy and purely temporary character, were said to have been constructed and maintained for many years on the said piece of land. It was held that such user was insufficient to give a title to the land by adverse possession. In Kaladhari Singh V/s. Jibachh Mishra and Ors. (supra) the plaintiff was got a resident of that locality where the land was situated. His Lordship observe that in deciding question of adverse possession, the nature of the rights exercised by the parties and the relationship between them will have to be looked into in order to see whether the acts were permissible or so trivial and not to be noticed. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law nor any such contention was advanced by Shri Varma that there can be no acquisition of title by adverse possession on a small piece of land. What is a flimsy nature of possession or otherwise is to be considered in the facts and circumstances of a given case in the context of various other relevant factors. As observed by the Supreme Court in Kshitish Chandra Base` Commissioner of Ramchi -- , relied upon by learned Counsel for the respondents, all that the law requires is that possession must be open and without any attempt at concealment; it is not necessary that the possession must be so effective so as to bring to the specific knowledge of the owner. The suit land was near the house of the defendants. They purchased it in the year 1954. There is satisfactory and convincing evidence on behalf of the defendants that after the purchase they planted trees on the suit land of various types and have been keeping their cattle thereon by constructing Nad and Khuta. As stated above, the house of the plaintiffs is also close thereto and it cannot be said that the acts of the defendants were such as they could not, in ordinary course, be noticeable to them. There is an admission in the plaint that the defendants have been interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs and in fact, as an alternative relief, the plaintiffs have prayed for recovery of possession as well. The defendants got their names mutated after the purchase and have been paying rent continuously. There is an admission in the plaint that the defendants have been interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs and in fact, as an alternative relief, the plaintiffs have prayed for recovery of possession as well. The defendants got their names mutated after the purchase and have been paying rent continuously. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the two decisions relied upon by learned Counsel by the appellants cannot come to their rescue, rather the irresistible conclusion would be that the cancurrent finding of fact recorded by the two Courts below about the defendants acquiring title over the suit land by adverse possession is a correct one and there is absolutely no ground for interference with that concurrent finding of fact in this second appeal. If the plaintiffs suit is barred by limitation, as found by the Courts below, and the defendants have acquired title to the suit land by adverse possession, the plaintiffs are bound to be non-suited without any other finding and it may not be necessary to determine the other substantial questions of law formulated for decision in this second appeal, 10. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are hereby affirmed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, the parties are directed to bear their own costs for this second appeal.