JUDGMENT K. N. Seth, J. - Munna, respondent No. 3 was employed as a Blacksmith in the workshop of Central Railway, Jhansi. He made an application under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act to the Prescribed Authority claiming wages for the period 12-6-1971 to 20-5-1972. The application was contested and it was pleaded that no wages were due to Munna. The Prescribed Authority by his order dated 28-11-1974 upheld the claim of Munna and directed that a sum of Rs. 2692=36 be paid to Munna as wages for the period noted above. This order was challenged by the petitioner in appeal before the Dist. Judge, Jhansi. The Dist. Judge by his order dated 12-2-1976 dismissed the appeal on the ground that the memorandum of appeal was not accompanied by a certificate as provided in sub-sec. (1-A) of S. 17 of the Payment of Wages Act. The legality of this order has been challenged in the present petition. 2. The case set up by the petitioner was that the amount awarded to respondent No. 3 under the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 28-11-1974 was deposited by a cheque for Rs. 2692=36 dated 19-12-1974. This cheque was sent to the Prescribed Authority under registered cover. The Prescribed Authority however, could not issue a certificate as at that time there was constant law and order problem in the city and the City Magistrate who was the Prescribed Authority was not available for issuing the certificate. Consequently, the appeal was filed on 1-1-1975 without the requisite certificate of the Prescribed Authority. The petitioner however, made an application to the Appellate Court seeking ten day's time to produce the requisite certificate. Time prayed for was granted. The certificate of the Prescribed Authority dated 13-1-1975 was filed before the Appellate Authority on 15-1-1975. The appeal was then admitted by an order dated 16-1-1975. 3. In the counter affidavit it has not been denied that the amount awarded to respondent No. 3 by the Prescribed Authority was deposited before him on 19-12-1974 by a cheque. It was, however, asserted that that cheque could not be encashed and another cheque was issued in the, month of May, 1975. This assertion has been denied in the Rejoinder Affidavit. We see no reason to doubt that a cheque dated 19-12-1974 was deposited by the petitioner as asserted by the petitioner. It was, however, asserted that that cheque could not be encashed and another cheque was issued in the, month of May, 1975. This assertion has been denied in the Rejoinder Affidavit. We see no reason to doubt that a cheque dated 19-12-1974 was deposited by the petitioner as asserted by the petitioner. If a fresh cheque had been issued in May 1975 as asserted by the respondent the certificate would not have been issued on 13-1-1975. We also see no reason to doubt the assertion of the petitioner that the requisite certificate could not be issued by the Prescribed Authority due to the fact that the Prescribed Authority was not available for that purpose due to law and order situation prevailing in the town. The amount had been deposited well within time for filing the appeal. In normal course the certificate should have been issued soon after the receipt of the payment. 4. Sub-sec. (1-A) of S. 17 of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) prescribes that no appeal under cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) shall be unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with it the amount payable under the order appealed against. The learned Dist. Judge took the view that since the requisite certificate did not accompany the memorandum of appeal filed on 1-1-1975 the appeal was not competent. 5. The language of sub-sec. (1-A) of S. 17 does appear to be imperative. In Ohene Moore v. Akesseh Tayee (AIR 1935 P C 5) the relevant provision of the statute provided that leave to appeal from the paramount Chiefs Tribunal shall not be granted unless and until the appellant shall either have paid the costs in such Tribunal or shall have deposited therein or in the Court to which the appeal is being taken a sum of money sufficient to satisfy such costs. 6. The statutory condition upon which alone leave to appeal could be given was not fulfilled inasmuch as the amount of costs in the tribunal had not been paid. 6. The statutory condition upon which alone leave to appeal could be given was not fulfilled inasmuch as the amount of costs in the tribunal had not been paid. On these facts the Privy Council observed that, "It is to be remembered that all appeals in this country and elsewhere exist merely by statute and unless the statutory conditions are fulfilled no jurisdiction is given to any Court of justice to entertain them." It was further observed : "It is quite true that their Lordships, as every other Court, attempt to do substantial justice and to avoid technicalities, but their Lordships like any other Court, are bound by the statute law, and if the statute law says there shall be no jurisdiction in a certain event, and that event has occurred, then it is impossible for their Lordships or for any other Court to have jurisdiction." 7. S. 17(1-A) of the Act came up for consideration before the Gauhati High Court in Sailendra Kumar Dutta v. General Manager, Gauhati Refinery Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (1973 Lab I C 383). In that case it was not clear whether actually the deposit had been made or not. The Court held the appeal to be incompetent but took care to observe that the Bench was not required to consider a case as to what will happen if a certificate is lacking but the deposit has been made. The decision in this case is not of much assistance to the respondent. 8. In M. R. Mishrikoti v. Muktumsab Hassansab Asoti (1973 Lab I C 997), the Mysore High Court had occasion to consider the third proviso to S. 30(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act which provided that no appeal by an employer under cl. (s) shall be unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. In this case the amount had not been deposited at all by the appellant. This decision also cannot be of much assistance in a case where the amount has been deposited in time but the requisite certificate did not accompany the memorandum of appeal. 9. In this case the amount had not been deposited at all by the appellant. This decision also cannot be of much assistance in a case where the amount has been deposited in time but the requisite certificate did not accompany the memorandum of appeal. 9. The Patna High Court in Khetram Manohar Lal v. Shanker Mandal (1975 Lab I C 274) held the appeal under S. 30(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act the memorandum of appeal was not accompanied by a certificate in the prescribed form, although the amount had been deposited and a certificate of the Commissioner, though not in the prescribed form, had been filed along with the memorandum of appeal (sic). This decision does support the stand taken by the respondent. The same view was taken in Sada Ram v. Chhotu Ram (AIR 1957 Him Pra 26). It appears from the judgment that the amount of compensation was actually deposited with the Commissioner after the expiry of the period of limitation for filing an appeal. On fact this case is distinguishable. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the observation of Supreme Court in Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal, ( AIR 1967 SC 1470 ). The question that came up for consideration was whether the appeal was competent since a copy of the decree was not filed along with the memorandum of appeal. The Supreme Court held that the requirement of O. 41, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory and in the absence of a copy of the decree, the filing of the appeal would be incomplete, defective and incompetent. The Supreme Court however, observed that there may be circumstances where an appeal may be competent even though a copy of the decree may not have been filed along with the memorandum of appeal. In Phoolchand's case (Supra) the trial Court did not frame a formal decree when it varied the shares and even when time was granted by the High Court and the Trial court was moved for framing a formal decree it refused to do so. In these circumstances, it was held that the absence of the copy of the decree would not deprive the appellant of his right to appeal. 11. In Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Asst. Commr. In these circumstances, it was held that the absence of the copy of the decree would not deprive the appellant of his right to appeal. 11. In Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Asst. Commr. (Judicial) 1, Sales Tax Kanpur ( AIR 1968 SC 488 ), the proviso appended to S. 9 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act came up for consideration. It was provided that no appeal against an assessment shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due, or such instalments thereof as may have become payable. It is true that the decision in that case turned on the interpretation of the word `entertain' which was interpreted to mean `admit to consideration' and also the requirement of the rule framed under the Act which required that the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by the challan showing payment of tax but the principle that the Supreme Court laid down while in dealing with Rules of procedure is relevant for our purpose. The Supreme Court observed (at p. 493):- "It is to be remembered that all rules of procedure are intended to advance justice and not to defeat it. Here the right of appeal has been made subservient to the payment of the admitted tax. If the admitted tax is paid and there is no proof available that it has been so paid there exists no reason to create a second impediment in the way of appeal. No doubt, rule makes it easy for the assessee to bring satisfactory proof in an uncontestable manner, but the provision of the rule is not to the exclusion of other satisfactory modes of proof." Applying this principle to the facts of the present case we feel that since the amount awarded against the appellant had been deposited within time his right of appeal could not be defeated only on the ground that the memorandum of appeal was not accompanied by a certificate of the Prescribed Authority. The basic requirement of S. 17(1-A) appears to be that the appellant must before he prefers an appeal deposit the amount awarded against him. If no such deposit is made before the filing of the appeal the appeal shall be incompetent. The basic requirement of S. 17(1-A) appears to be that the appellant must before he prefers an appeal deposit the amount awarded against him. If no such deposit is made before the filing of the appeal the appeal shall be incompetent. The requirement regarding' certificate by the Authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against is to provide satisfactory proof in an uncontestable manner of the fact that the requisite amount has been paid. If due to exceptional and unavoidable circumstances the certificate is not filed along with the memorandum of appeal the right of appeal cannot be defeated if the amount payable under the direction appealed against has been deposited within the period of limitation and before the appeal is preferred. In the present case. We find that the amount was deposited before the appeal was preferred within the period of limitation. We also find that the requisite certificate was not prepared and issued by the Prescribed Authority on account of the fact that he was not available for that purpose on account of the law and order situation in the town. If the Prescribed Authority was not available to issue the certificate the appellant could not possibly secure it and file it along with the memorandum of appeal. On the facts and circumstances of the present case we feel that the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that the appeal preferred by the petitioner was incompetent. 12. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 12-2-1976 of the learned Dist. Judge, Jhansi is quashed. The Distt. Judge shall hear the appeal on merits and decide it in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.