ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against an order passed by the Board of Revenue dated 19-3-76 accepting the reference made by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, and after setting aside an order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Chail, Allahabad dated 30-1-74, directing the issue of a parvana amal daramad under R. 109A of the Rules framed under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act for the implementation of an order passed by the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 9-1-1969. 2. These are the relevant facts. The opposite-parties Nos. 2 and 3 moved an application purporting to be under Sections 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act for Amal daramad (proceeding for execution) of their names in the annual register in respect of the land in dispute on the basis of an order dated 9-1-69 said to have been passed by the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in course of consolidation operations conducted in the village where the land in dispute is situate. On this application, a report appears to have been called for by the Sub Divisional Officer from the Tahsildar, Chail Allahabad who recommended that aural daramad he triads in accordance with the aforesaid order passed by the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation). 3. On the basis of the above report, the Sub Divisional officer passed an order on 30- 12-72 directing that amal daramad be made as prayed for by the opposite-parties Nos. 2 and 3. Thereupon, the petitioner, a minor at that time, made an application through his next friend to the Sub Divisional Officer for the setting aside of the order dated 30-12-72 on the ground that the said order had been passed against him without gave notice and without geeing him any opportunity. This application was intailly rejected on a technical ground, Some defect was pointed out as regards the date of the order sought to be set aside. The petitioner, thereafter. filed another application on 12-7-73 giving the correct date of the order and also praying therein that the delay in moving the application be condoned under S. S of the Limitation Act. 4. The Sub-Divisional Officer allowed the aforesaid application by the order dated 30-1-74 condoning the delay. He however observed that the appropriate course for the opposite-parties Nos. filed another application on 12-7-73 giving the correct date of the order and also praying therein that the delay in moving the application be condoned under S. S of the Limitation Act. 4. The Sub-Divisional Officer allowed the aforesaid application by the order dated 30-1-74 condoning the delay. He however observed that the appropriate course for the opposite-parties Nos. 2 and 3 was to file a regular suit for establishing their title, as the dispute was not one which could properly be disposed of in a summary manner. 5. Against the aforesaid order dated 30-1-74, the opposite-parties Nos. 2 and 3 filed a revision before the Additional Commissioner under Sections 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, treating the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer as one under these revisions. The Additional Commissioner took the view that as the consolidation( operations were over the application filed by the opposite-parties Nos. 2 and 1 though described and headed as one under Sections 33/39 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, was really one under R. 109A of the Rules framed under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Additional Commissioner further took the view that the revision filed by the opposite- parties Nos. 2 and 3 ought to he treated as one under S. 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. After making these observations, the Additional Commissioner went into the merits of the dispute and held that on the facts of the present case, the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. There did not exist, in the opinion of the Additional Commissioner, sufficient ground for condoning the delay. In conclusion, the Additional Commissioner held that the Sub-Divisional Officer committed an error in refusing to issue a parvana amal daramad under R. 109A of the Rules framed under the U.P. Consolidation Holdings Act in pursuance of the order passed by the Additional Settlement officer 'Consolidation) dated 9-1-69. With this finding, the Additional Commissioner made a recommendation to the Board of Revenue that the revision be allowed and the Sub Divisional Officer he directed to issue a parvana amal daramad under R. 109A of the Rules framed under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in consonance with the order passed by the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 9-1-69. 6. With this finding, the Additional Commissioner made a recommendation to the Board of Revenue that the revision be allowed and the Sub Divisional Officer he directed to issue a parvana amal daramad under R. 109A of the Rules framed under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in consonance with the order passed by the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 9-1-69. 6. The Board of Revenue accepted the aforesaid recommendation agreeing with the Additional Commissioner that as the consolidation operations were over and the village had been denotified under S. 52 of the Act, the application of the opposite-parties Nos. 2 and 3 ought to have been treated as one under R. 109A. It-consequently set aside the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and directed the issue of parvana amal daramad under R. 109A of the Rules implementing the order passed by the Additional Settlement Officer Consolidation) dated 9-1-69. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted, firstly, that both the Board of Revenue as well as the Additional Commissioner fell into a patent error of law in applying R. 109A of the Rules framed under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to the present case. The second submission was that both these authorities totally failed to comprehend the true scope of the controversy which arose for consideration by them. The third submission was that under the relevant provisions of the Revenue Court Manual, the revision filed by the opposite-parties Nos. 2 and 3 could have been disposed of only by the Lucknow Bench of the Board of Revenue. The other submission was that the Board of Revenue exceeded its jurisdiction in going into the validity of the compromise dated 31-10-1962 referred to in its order. 8. Learned counsel for the opposite- parties Nos. 2 and 3 on the other hand, supported the impugned orders and submitted that they were perfectly legal and proper and called for no interference. He further argued that no objection having been 'taken on behalf of the petitioners as to the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue, Allahabad to hear and decide the revision before the court had passed the order, such an objection ought not to be remitted to be raised for the first time. He further argued that no objection having been 'taken on behalf of the petitioners as to the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue, Allahabad to hear and decide the revision before the court had passed the order, such an objection ought not to be remitted to be raised for the first time. Yet, another objection taken by the learned counsel was that the established view of this Court has been not to interfere with the orders passed by the Board of Revenue in cases in which the only question at issue is whether the name of the petitioner should be entered in the record of rights. Lastly, it was urged that in view of the fact that the petitioner had made attempt to change the date on which the certified copy of the order passed by the Board of Revenue was applied for with a view to explaining the delay in filing the petition, this Court ought not to grant any discretionary relief to the petitioner. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length, I am clearly of the view that this petition is entitled to succeed on the first ground mentioned above. I am further of the opinion that there does not exist any ground for refusing the relief to the petitioner. 10. In my opinion both the Additional Commissioner as well as the Board of Revenue committed a patent error of law in applying R. 109A of the aforesaid Rules to the present case. R. 109A reads as follows :- 109-A. S. 52(2) - Orders passed in cases covered by sub-sec. (2) of S. 52 shall be given effect to by the consolidation authorities, authorised in this behalf under sub-sec. (2) of S. 42 of the Act by the Collector of the district in his capacity as a District Deputy Director, if such authorities are functioning in any part of the district at the time. In case there be no such authority the Assistant Collector, in charge of the sub-division, the Tahsildar, the Naib-Tahsildar, the Supervisor Kanungo, and the Lekhpal of the area to which the case relates shall respectively, perform the functions and discharge the duties of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officer, the Assistant Consolidation Officer, the Consolidator and the Consolidation Lekhpal respectively for the purpose of giving effect to the orders aforesaid. (2) If for the purpose of giving effect to any order referred to in sub-rule (1) it becomes necessary to reallocate affected chaks, necessary orders may be passed by the Consolidation Officer, or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the parties, concerned. (3) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer, or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, may, within 13 days of the order passed under sub,rule (2), file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, or the Assistant Collector incharge of the sub-division, as the case may be, who shall decide the appeal after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned, and pass orders which shall be final. (4) In case of possession becomes necessary as a result of orders passed under sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3), as the case may be, the provisions of Rules 55 and 56 shall mutatis mutandis, be followed." 11. For the application of the aforesaid Rule, sine qua non is the order sought to be mutated must be one which was passed under S. 52(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. S. 52(2) of the Act provides that if any case or proceeding was pending under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on the date of issue of the notification under sub-sec. (1) of S. 52 of the Act, then the orders passed therein shall be given effect to by such authorities as might be prescribed, and for that purpose the consolidation operations shall not he deemed to have been closed. It was not disputed by the opposite- parties Nos. 2 and 3 that no case or proceeding was pending on the date of issue of Notification under S. 52(1) of the Act in respect of the land in dispute. Consequently. S. 52(2) of the Act could not have any application whatsoever to the facts of the present case. That being so, it must follow inevitably that R. 109A could not he invoked in the present case. Indeed, if R. 109A had any application, neither the Additional Commissioner, nor the Board of Revenue would have had any jurisdiction to entertain the revision or to pass any orders therein in view of the provisions of sub-r. (3) of R. 109A. 12. Indeed, if R. 109A had any application, neither the Additional Commissioner, nor the Board of Revenue would have had any jurisdiction to entertain the revision or to pass any orders therein in view of the provisions of sub-r. (3) of R. 109A. 12. In view of what has been stated above it is clear that both the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue committed a patent error of jurisdiction in treating the proceedings as one under R. 109A. Indeed, confronted with this 16. Having given the matter a careful situation, learned counsel for the respondents consideration, I find no substance in this Nos. 2 and 3 rightly did not attempt to support objection. In both these decisions, this Court the impugned orders on that ground. He was has held that a petitioner, who challenges compelled to take an alternative stand. He purely mutation proceedings has an submitted that the impugned orders though alternative remedy by way of a regular suit they purport to have been made in under S. 40-A of U. P. Land Revenue Act: proceedings under R. 109A of the Rules, The ratio of these cases is that mutation should be deemed to have been passed under proceedings do not in themselves create or Sections 33/39 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. I result in any substantive rights, and that the shall deal with this submission of the learned order passed therein are always subject to a counsel for the opposite-parties later in this regular suit, whereby the aggrieved party can judgment. But so far as the main basis of the establish his right or title. impugned order is concerned, the same is clearly unsustainable in law. 13. For the reasons stated above, I hold that the Board of Revenue as well as the Additional Commissioner both completely misconceived the true nature of the proceedings by treating the same as one under R. 109A of the Rules. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to succeed on this ground alone. 14. The Additional Commissioner committed another serious error in holding that the revision filed by the opposite-parties Nos. 2 and 3 could be treated as one under S. 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. S. 333 of the Act could not have the remotest application to the facts of the present case. 14. The Additional Commissioner committed another serious error in holding that the revision filed by the opposite-parties Nos. 2 and 3 could be treated as one under S. 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. S. 333 of the Act could not have the remotest application to the facts of the present case. The order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as having been passed under any provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. The Additional Commissioner thus committed another patent mistake as regards the nature of the proceeding which he was called upon to decide. 15. The question that next arises is whether the petitioner should be refused the relief on any of the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the opposite-parties. The first ground advanced by the learned counsel for the opposite-parties was that this court has been consistently refusing to entertain petitions which are directed against orders passed in proceedings under Sections 33/39 of the Land Revenue Act. In support, learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions of this Court, namely. 1. Jaipal v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1957 All 205 ; 2. Lekhraj v. Board of Revenue, 1981 Rev. Dec. 18.: 1980 All L J 905. 16. Having given the matter a careful consideration, I find no substance in this objection. In both these decisions, this Court has held that petitioner, who challenges purely mutation proceedings has an alternative remedy by way of a regular suit under S. 40-A of U.P. Land Revenue Act proceedings do not in themselves create or result in any substantive rights, and that the order passed therein are always subject to a regular suit, whereby the aggrieved party can establish his right or title. 17. The situation in the present is materially different. Here we find that the Board of Revenue has issued a direction under R. 109A asking the Sub Divisional Officer to issue a parvana amal daramad for the implementation of the order passed by the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 9-1-1969. Orders or directions under R. 109A have entirely different legal incidence and effect from those passed in proceedings merely for mutation or correction of papers. This is plain from a perusal of the various provisions of R. 109A of the Rules. Orders or directions under R. 109A have entirely different legal incidence and effect from those passed in proceedings merely for mutation or correction of papers. This is plain from a perusal of the various provisions of R. 109A of the Rules. The party in whose favour a direction is issued under R. 109-A can straightway apply for re-allocation of chaks under R. 109-A(2). The implication so an order under R. 109A of the Rules are thus much more serious than orders passed under S. 33/39 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, which are subject to the result of a regular suit. Orders passed under R. 109A of the Rules cannot be called in question in a regular suit. Even though, therefore, R. 109A did no apply to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as by the impugned order a definite direction has been issued to the Sub Divisional Officer purporting to be under R. 109A, the petitioner will suffer serious prejudice if the impugned orders are left undisturbed, and this Court refuses to interfere on the ground suggested by the learned counsel for the opposite-parties Nos. 2 and 3. On the peculiar facts of this case, therefore, this Court would not be justified in refusing the relief to the petitioner. 18. Coming to the objection of the learned counsel for the opposite-parties, as regards the alleged attempt to change the date on which the application for certified copy of the order passed by the Board of Revenue was made from `9-9-76' to 9-4-76', while I find that it may be possible to say that in the certified copy filed with the petition the date of the application was originally `9-9-76' which appears to have been changed into 9-4-76' by rubbing off or erasing a part of the digit `9' so that the date now reads`9-4-76', the petitioner himself does not appear to have been responsible for any such attempt. The petitioner has filed a counter-affidavit of one Vidya Dhar Pandey in reply to the application filed by the opposite-parites Nos. 2 and 3 in this Court for taking action against the petitioner under S. 471 I.P.C. In this counter-affidavit, the deponent has asserted that the petitioner had engaged Sri S.K. Subedar, an Advocate in April 1976. He had also verified an affidavit in support of the petition in April 1976 itself. 2 and 3 in this Court for taking action against the petitioner under S. 471 I.P.C. In this counter-affidavit, the deponent has asserted that the petitioner had engaged Sri S.K. Subedar, an Advocate in April 1976. He had also verified an affidavit in support of the petition in April 1976 itself. It is further stated in para 3 of the counter-affidavit that the petitioner does not know the reason why Sri S. K. Subedar did not file the petition in April 1976 itself. In paragraph 6 of this counter-affidavit, again, it is asserted that the petitioner did not apply for the certified copy. It was applied for by some Kishore Yadav, whom the petitioner does not know. It does not seem to me that the petitioner was directly or indirectly responsible either for the delay in filing the petition or even for the supposed attempt to change the date in the certified copy of the order passed by the Board of Revenue. Furthermore, there was no such undue delay in filing the petition which may have induced the petitioner to resort to any unfair means. On the facts of the present case, therefore, I am not satisfied that this court should refuse the reliefs prayed for in this petition on the ground urged on behalf of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3. 19. In the view which I have taken on the first point urged in support of the petition, it does not seem necessary to consider the other submissions raised on behalf of the petitioner in support of this petition. However, if the Board of Revenue comes to the conclusion that the case ought to be heard by its Lucknow Bench, it may transfer the reference to that Bench. 20. In the result. the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue dated 19-3-1976 is quashed. The Board of Revenue shall dispose of the reference according to law having regard to the observations made in this judgment. 21. The parties shall bear their own costs of this petition.