JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal at the instance of the tenant arises out of a suit for eviction under section 13 (1) (a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The Court of first instance decreed the suit on the ground of default but dismissed it under section 13 (1) (a) of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act. The appeal being preferred by the tenant-defendant's legal representative, the Appellate Court decreed the suit under section 13 (1) (a) of the Act but on the ground of default, however, held against the landlord. 2. THE plaintiffs case is that the defendant was a monthly tenant under the plaintiff in respect of premises no, 81/1, benoy Bose Road, hereinafter referred to as the suit premises, at a monthly rental of rs. 72. 50 paise according to the English calendar month. It is alleged that in contravention of the provisions of law and without the previous ponsent in writing of the plaintiff, the defendant has transferred assigned the suit premises or sublet the suit premises in whole. The case of the defendant- tenant, birendra Kumar Mitra. since deceased, was that he was a Karta of the joint Hindu family and used to reside in the suit premises from 1942 with his brother and widowed sister with her two minor sons and according to the appellant, still she is a member of the family and the assignment does not arise. It must be remembered that in 1962 Birendra Kumar Mitra constructed a two storied house at Gariahaat road and he shifted only with his own family consisting of his children to the said house. His brother also shifted to the said house but the widowed sister with her sons continued to reside in the suit premises. This is the admitted fact and there is no dispute on this matter. 3. ON behalf of the appellant it was contended that the widowed sister was part of the family of Birendrs and therefore the eviction on the ground under section 13 (1) (a) is not. attracted and the judgment of the Court below cannot be sustained. The word "family" has not been defined in the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act 1956 4. MR. attracted and the judgment of the Court below cannot be sustained. The word "family" has not been defined in the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act 1956 4. MR. Arun Kumar Dutt relied upon the three English cases, 1950 (1) All England law Reports, 71 (Jones v. (Whitehill where it has been held that the word "family" included the neice of the wife also. It has been held that the meaning of the "family" not having been defined it will depend on the facts and circumstancss of the case. In the case reported in 1951 (1)All England Reports, 582 (Moodie v. Hose-good) at 586 it was held by the House of lords that the widow of a tenant was entitled to remain in possession by virtue of the protection afforded by the Rent restrictions Act. In a case reported in 1949 (1)All England Law Reports, 715 (Brock v. Woilams) at 717 it was held, inter alia, that the primary meaning of the word 'family' is "children". If, however, the word "family" is interpreted in a flexible and wide way, it seems to me that in the ordinary, popular sense of the word the defendant would be considered the child of the man with whom she had lived, except for three years of her married life, ever since she was five years of age. That, I think, is all that there is to be said on the matter, except, perhaps, in regard to the question of the policy which underlies section 12 (1) (g) of the Act of 1920. if the policy is similar to that which deals with alternative accommodation and is to protect a member of the family who has been residing with the tenant for six months or more before his death, I think that the defendant clearly comes within the meaning to be given to the word "family". In a case reported in 1976 (2) ILR (Cal.),' 247 (Radha Gobinda Chandra -v- Nritya Gopal karmakar) it has been held by the Division bench of this Court that the plaintiff's brother, even though they undoubtedly had independent sources of income, would be regarded as members of his family within the meaning of the expression his own occupation', more particularly as the mother was still living. The mere fact that the two-there had independent incomes or that they were co-sharers in the ancestral dwelling house, would not be sufficient for coming to the conclusion that their requirement could not be included within the plaintiff's requirement or that they would not form part of the plaintiff's family. From the aforesaid judgments it is quite clear' that though the word "family" has not been defined in consideration of the facts and circumstances, it is to be considered whether a particular person is a member of the family or not. Applying this principle to the facts and circumstances for the purpose of definition of the word "family" it appears to me that in the facts and circumstances of the case it must be held that the sister and her sons are not the members of the family of the tenant. In the year 1962 the tenant left the suit premises with his brother to live in the house he himself constructed. It appears from the evidence of his brother dhirendra that the deceased defendant has let out the ground floor of the said house of which he was the owner but he left the premises at the charge of the widowed sister and her two sons. The sister's two sons are now earning member of the family. In the facts and circumstances of this case, i have no hesitation to hold that the sister's family does not come within the definition of the word "family" of the brother who has left long ago to stay in the own house constructed by the tenant. 5. THE next argument on which Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee relied is that the tenant is defaulter in payment of rent since december, 1962. It appears that after the death of the landlord though the tenant knew that there are number of heirs apart from the widow they went on depositing the rent in the name of the widow alone. Reliance, was placed by Mr. Mukherjee on the case reported in 82 CWN 684 (Prabhabati Das -v- R. R, Joneja) at 687. In the said case it appears that on the death of the original landlord the deposits were made in the name of the widow leaving out the other heirs and legal representatives. Reliance, was placed by Mr. Mukherjee on the case reported in 82 CWN 684 (Prabhabati Das -v- R. R, Joneja) at 687. In the said case it appears that on the death of the original landlord the deposits were made in the name of the widow leaving out the other heirs and legal representatives. After dealing with this fact His Lordship came to a finding that even so person in such a situation is entitled to receive rent on behalf of landlords in such capacity and not in his personal name or capacity. Such capacity of a person to receive rent as landlord must be disclosed in the application, for deposit of rent and the deposit is to be made accordingly to the credit of the person in such capacity and cannot be made in the personal name of such person. Accordingly there is no escape from the position that the defendant must be deemed to be a defaulter in payment of rent upto June 1966 up to which date the deposits were made in the name of Provabati as the sole landlady in her personal name and not in any other capacity". The same principle may be followed in this case. It appears from the evidence that the defendant knew that there are number of co-sharers after the death of the sole landlord but they only deposited in the name of the mother so it was not deposited in accordance with Rule 21 of the Act. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the respondent is also entitled to a decree on the ground of default. I have already held that the sister not being a member of the family of the tenant he is entitled to a decree under section T3 (1) (a)of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act for assignment of the tenancy. 6. IN the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal, is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 7. LEAVE under Clause 15 of the letters Patent, as prayed for is refused. 8. ON the prayer of Mr. Dutt I give appellants time to vacate the premises upto 31st of January, 1982 provided they must file an undertaking before the Court within one month from today to this effect that the appellants will deliver vacant and peaceful possession to the respondents on or before 31st January, 1982. 8. ON the prayer of Mr. Dutt I give appellants time to vacate the premises upto 31st of January, 1982 provided they must file an undertaking before the Court within one month from today to this effect that the appellants will deliver vacant and peaceful possession to the respondents on or before 31st January, 1982. The appellants must go on paying rent every month according to english Calendar month in advance till they stay in the premises upto 31st january, 1982, and the first of such payment must be made on 7th of April, 11981 for the month of April, 1981 and thereafter by 7th Of each succeeding month. In default of filng the undertaking and in default of any of the payments within the period as aforesaid the respondents will be entitled to execute the decree at once. Appeal dismissed. No order as to costs.