PADMANABHA BHAT v. STATE OF KERALA — 1981 DIGILAW 88 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. This is a petition under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the judgment of the Division Bench of the Taluk Land Board, Kasaragod, in C.C. No. 9 of 1977 convicting the petitioner under S 118-A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964 (for short the Act) for failure to file a statement of land owned or held by him under S.85-A of the Act and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-and in default to undergo S.I. for a period of one week. 2. S 85-A of the Act requires every family owning or holding more than 12 acres in extent of land and every adult unmarried person and family consisting of a sole surviving member owning or holding more than six acres in extent of land and every other person (other than a Bank) owning or holding more than 12 acres in extent of land to file a statement before the Land Board giving the particulars of the land etc. within forty-five days from the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972. The amending Act came into force on 2-11-1972. By the amending Act 11 of 1973, 45 days was replaced by 75 days. The case against the petitioner is that he is a person obliged to file a statement and did not file it. He contended before the Land Board that he is not a person obliged to file a statement under S.85-A of the Act. Prosecution was initiated on a complaint filed by the competent authority, namely, the Tahsildar, Kasaragod. After trial, the Taluk Land Board held the petitioner guilty and convicted and sentenced him as stated above 3. The petitioner has raised various contentions in the petition challenging the judgment. Prosecution was initiated on a complaint filed by the competent authority, namely, the Tahsildar, Kasaragod. After trial, the Taluk Land Board held the petitioner guilty and convicted and sentenced him as stated above 3. The petitioner has raised various contentions in the petition challenging the judgment. The main contention urged is that the statement under S.85-A of the Act has to be filed within 75 days from 2-11-1972 and since the maximum punishment leviable under S.118-A of the Act is sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend upto one year, prosecution has to be initiated within a period of one year under S.468 (2) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code), and the period of limitation has to be computed from the date of offence under S.469 of the Code and because the prosecution in this case was admittedly initiated after the expiry of one year from the date of the offence, namely, the expiry of 75 days contemplated under S 85-A of the Act, the prosecution is barred by limitation, and the judgment does not show that the Taluk Land Board condoned the delay or that there were any materials placed before the Taluk Land Board on the basis of which delay can be said to have been properly explained. For this position, reliance is placed on an order by Poti J. in Crl. M.P. Nos. 1103, 1106, 1179 and 1208 of 1977. In this decision it has been held that S.468 of the Code applies to prosecution under S.118-A of the Act. It was found on the facts of the case that the prosecution was initiated beyond the time limit stipulated in S 468 of the Code and there was no material to condone the delay. Consequently the complaint was quashed. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor did not argue on the merits of this contention. He contended that against the conviction and sentence entered by the Taluk Land Board in its capacity as a Bench of I Class Magistrates, an appeal lies to the Sessions Judge under S.374 (3) of the Code and when such an appeal lies, this court cannot in exercise of its inherent powers quash the conviction and sentence. There can be no doubt that if such an appeal lies, this petition under S.482 of the Code cannot stand. There can be no doubt that if such an appeal lies, this petition under S.482 of the Code cannot stand. Learned counsel for the petitioner however contended that the Act does not confer a right of appeal on a person convicted for an offence under S.118-A of the Act, that only the provisions of Chap.20 of the Code apply to such a prosecution and the provisions regarding appeal under Chap.29 of the Code do not apply and therefore an appeal does not lie. 5. S.118-A of the Act prescribes a penalty of imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or a fine which may extend to Rs. 2000/-or with both for failure to file a statement under S.85-A of the Act within 75 days from 2-11-1972 by a person bound to file a statement. S.123-A states that notwithstanding anything contained in S.123 of the Act or in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (originally the Section referred to the 1898 Code and this was altered as Act 2 of 1974 by the Amending Act 15 of 1976), an offence under S.118-A shall be tried by the Taluk Land Board of the Taluk in which the person bound to file the statement under S.85-A of the Act ordinarily resides. Clause (2) of the Section states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, every member of a Taluk Land Board shall for the purpose of sub-section (1) be deemed to be a Judicial Magistrate of the I Class Sub-section (3) states that subject to such rules as may be made by the Government under Sub-section (5), the Taluk Land Board shall in trying an offence punishable under S.118-A follow the procedure prescribed under the Code for the trial of Summons cases by Judicial Magistrates. Clause (4) states that the Taluk Land Board shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under S.118-A except on complaint in writing made by an officer authorised by the Government in this behalf. Clause (5) contemplates the Government making rules in regard to the constitution of Benches of the Taluk Land Board and the time and places of sitting and the mode of setting differences of opinion which may arise between the members of the Bench Rules regarding these matters have been framed in the Kerala Land Reforms (Trial of Offences by the Taluk Land Board) Rules, 1976 6. Besides S.118-A of the Act, there are certain other provisions in the Act stipulating for penalty for infringement of some of the directions in the Act; for example, S.118 contemplates penalty for failure to furnish a return or information under the Act, S.119 provides for penalty for furnishing false return or information under the Act. S.120 (2) contemplates penalty for making false declaration under S 120(1) of the Act. S.121 contemplates penalty for contravention of any lawful order passed under the Act. S 122 contemplates penalty for cutting trees or for removing machinery etc S.122-A deals with the offences by companies. S 123 states that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act except on complaint made in writing by an officer authorised by the Government in that behalf. It also lays down that an offence under S.117-A shall be cognizable. Clause (2) states that no court inferior to that of a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence punishable under this Act. It has to be noted that S 123-A dealing with presentation and punishment of offence under S.118-A of the Act is something in the nature of an exception to the general provision in S.123 (2) of the Act. 7. There is no dispute that when there is a conviction under S.118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 122-A and 123 of the Act, in appealable cases as provided under Chap.29 of the Code, an appeal will lie to the Sessions Judge But the dispute is whether such an appeal will lie against conviction for an offence under S.118-A of the Act, if otherwise it is an appealable conviction under Chap.29 of the Code. It is true that the Act itself does not specifically provide for an appeal. 8. The Act mentions that every member of the Taluk Land Board shall be deemed to be a Judicial Magistrate of the I Class. In other words, for the purpose of taking cognizance, holding trial and imposing punishment, the members of the Taluk Land Board are in the same position as Judicial Magistrates of the I Class When law deems them to be Judicial Magistrates of the I Class, they have to be taken to be the Judicial Magistrates of the I Class. In other words, for the purpose of taking cognizance, holding trial and imposing punishment, the members of the Taluk Land Board are in the same position as Judicial Magistrates of the I Class When law deems them to be Judicial Magistrates of the I Class, they have to be taken to be the Judicial Magistrates of the I Class. S.374 (3) of the Code states inter alia, that save as otherwise provided in subsection (2), any person convicted on a trial held by a Magistrate of the I Class or of the Second Class may appeal to the Sessions Judge This provision is of course subject to limitations provided in S.375 and 376 of the Code. S.375 and S.376 of the Code do not apply to the instant case. When the Taluk Land Board consisting of members who are in the eyes of law Judicial Magistrates of the I Class enters a conviction and sentence against a person, obviously it is a conviction as contemplated under S.374 (3) (a) of the Code and an appeal will lie to the Court of Session. 9. S.123-A clause (3) of the Act states that the Taluk Land Board shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of Summons cases by the Judicial Magistrates. Chap.20 of the Code contains provisions relating to trial of Summons cases by Magistrates. It is true that Chap.20 of the Code does not refer to right to file an appeal against conviction. Hence it is argued that appeal will not lie against conviction entered by Taluk Land Board. Chap.20 of the , Code cannot stand in isolation from the other connected and allied Chapters of the Code. Chap.20 explains how a Magistrate has to try a Summons case. It also refers to acquittal or conviction etc. But Chap.20 is not a self-contained one. It has to be read with other provisions in other Chapters of the Code; for example, Chap.22 dealing with attendance of persons confined or detained in prisons. Chap.23 dealing with evidence in inquiries and trials, Chap.24 dealing with general provisions as to enquiries and trials, Chap.25 dealing with provisions as to accused persons of unsound mind, Chap.27 dealing with judgment, Chap.38 dealing with provisions as to bails and bonds, Chap.35 dealing with irregular proceedings, Chap.36 dealing with limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences etc. Chap.23 dealing with evidence in inquiries and trials, Chap.24 dealing with general provisions as to enquiries and trials, Chap.25 dealing with provisions as to accused persons of unsound mind, Chap.27 dealing with judgment, Chap.38 dealing with provisions as to bails and bonds, Chap.35 dealing with irregular proceedings, Chap.36 dealing with limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences etc. Though in one sense trial of Summons case ends with acquittal or conviction and sentence, in another sense, it does not end there, since an appeal is normally a continuation of the case itself. In the case of conviction and sentence entered in a summons case by a competent Magistrate, an appeal will certainly lie under Chap.29 of the Code, if an appeal is not otherwise barred under the provisions of that Chapter. If Chap.20 alone of the Code is treated as applicable to these cases tried by Taluk Land Board, it cannot be said that Chap.36 of the Code relating to "limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences" will apply to such cases. That Chap.36 of the Code applies to those cases tried by the Taluk Land Board is clear from the decision of this Court in Crl. M. P. Nos. 1103, 1106, 1179 and 1208 of 1977. Therefore it cannot be said that Chap.20 of the Code alone is to govern these cases. The other Chapters of the Code in so far as they are applicable to such cases will necessarily apply. Chap.29 relating to appeals will also apply. The Taluk Land Board discharging its duty as a Judicial Magistrate's Court is also an inferior criminal court for the purpose of revision under S.397 of the Code. 10. Legislature contemplated sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year under S.118-A of the Act. It is most unlikely that the legislature intended to lay down that the convictions by the Taluk Land Board are not to be appealable under the Code. This is evident from the absence of any provision in the Act stating that no appeal shall lie against the conviction and sentence entered by the Taluk Land Board. There is no such express bar. Nor can such a bar be implied from any of the provisions of the Act. This is evident from the absence of any provision in the Act stating that no appeal shall lie against the conviction and sentence entered by the Taluk Land Board. There is no such express bar. Nor can such a bar be implied from any of the provisions of the Act. I hold that a conviction and sentence entered by the Taluk Land Board under S.123-A of the Act for an offence contemplated under S.118-A of the Act is appealable under Chap.29 of the Code, if it is otherwise, appealable under the provisions of the Chapter. Hence inherent power cannot be exercised in this case. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in the unreported decision referred to above, this Court exercised inherent power under S.482 of the Code under similar circumstances. Bat that was a case where when the prosecution was launched, the accused approached this Court to quash the proceedings In this case, however, no such attempt has been made and after the trial ended and conviction and sentence has been entered, the petitioner has come to this court. At such a stage, his remedy is by way of an appeal and not by way of petition under S.482 of the Code. 12. It is of course open to the petitioner to file an appeal before the competent Sessions Judge against the judgment of the Taluk Land Board, and also file a petition to condone the delay in filing the appeal on appropriate grounds. In case such a petition is filed for condoning the delay, I am sure the Sessions Judge will dispose of the same on merits. With this observation, the petition is dismissed.