Judgment S.Ali Ahmad, J. 1. This appeal under Sec.269H of the Income Tax Act was filed on: 6.11.1980 against an order dated 18.8.1980 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under Sec.269G of the Income Tax Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). According to the Stamp Reporter, the last date of limitation for filing the appeal was 5.11.1980, but since it was filed on 6.11.1980, it was barred by limitation. The office placed the limitation matter for orders, 2. Mr. Rajgarhia, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, namely, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (Acquisition), contended that the stamp report was erroneous and that the appeal was filed well within time. Mr. Shreenath Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the appeal was barred by limitation and, therefore, it should be dismissed as such. During the course of argument, Mr. Rajgarhia filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying to condone the delay of one day in filing the appeal on the grounds mentioned in that application. Mr. Shreenath Singh opposed this application also. In these circumstances, it is, therefore, necessary to consider as to whether the appeal was filed within the period of limitation or not and in case it was filed beyond the period of limitation then as to whether the delay of one day in filing the appeal can be condoned. 3. As I have said above, the appeal is directed against an order dated 18.8.1980. Sec.269H(1) of the Act, inter alia, provides that an appeal may be preferred to the High Court within 60 days of the date on which the appellant is served with a notice of the order under Sec.269G of the Act. Admittedly, the appellate tribunal sent a copy of the order passed by it to the appellant on 6.9.1980. In case 60 days are added to 6th September. 1980, then we get 5.11.1980. The Stamp Reporter on the basis of this calculation has said that the last date of limitation was 5.11.1980 and, as such, the appeal which was filed on 6,11.1980 is barred by limitation. It, however, appears that an application for a certified copy was filed by the appellant on 29th October, 1980 and the same was obtained on 30th October, 1980. Mr. It, however, appears that an application for a certified copy was filed by the appellant on 29th October, 1980 and the same was obtained on 30th October, 1980. Mr. Rajgarhia on that basis contends that two days time should be added as the time requisite for obtaining certified copy of the order to the period of limitation which is 60 days. He contended that in case it was done then the last date of limitation was 7.11.1980and since the appeal was filed on 6.11.1980, it should be held to be well within time. The question, therefore, for determination is as to whether Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act is applicable to an appeal under Sec.269H of the Act. 4. Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act, inter alia, provides that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal by any special or local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) snail apply only in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Incase Sub-section (2) of Sec.29 of the Limitation Act is applicable to appeals under Sec.269H of the Act then it is patent that a period of two days, the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order, has to be added to the period of limitation under Sec.12(2) of the Limitation Act and if that is done, the appeal is within time. Arguments, therefore, have been advanced by the parties about the applicability of Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act. 5. According to Mr. Rajgarhia, the Income Tax Act or Sec.269H of the Act does not expressly exclude the application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act. According to learned Counsel, therefore, Sec.12 and also Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply in full to this appeal. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra -- . In that case, an election petition was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra -- . In that case, an election petition was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Representation of the People Act, 1951. An application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was filed to condone the delay and it was contended before the Supreme Court that since the provisions of the Limitation Act were not "expressly excluded" the delay in filing the election petition could be condoned under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned Judges, on consideration of the matter, held that the scheme of the special law (the Representation of the People Act, 1951) and the nature of remedy provided therein were such which led to the inference that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. They also held that even in cases where the special law did not exclude the provision of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter and scheme of special law exclude their operation. Thereafter on examination of the different provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, it was found that it was a code in itself and its scheme excluded the operation of the Limitation Act. This case, therefore, does not help Mr. Rajgarhia. 6. Mr. Rajgarhia next strongly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. V/s. Madanlal Dass and sons, Bareilly -- . In this case, it appears that the copy of the order served on the assessee was lost. He, therefore, obtained a certified copy and then filed a revision application under Sec.10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The revision application was filed beyond the period of limitation, but if the time taken in obtaining the certified copy was excluded under Sec.12(2) of the Limitation Act then the revisional application was in time. He, therefore, obtained a certified copy and then filed a revision application under Sec.10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The revision application was filed beyond the period of limitation, but if the time taken in obtaining the certified copy was excluded under Sec.12(2) of the Limitation Act then the revisional application was in time. The matter ultimately went to the Supreme Court and the learned Judges held that although it was not necessary to file a certified copy of the impugned order along with the petition of revision yet it was necessary to have a copy of the order as the petitioner or his legal adviser could not have been in a position to decide as to whether the revision petition should be filed against that order and if so what ground should be taken in the revision petition. It also appears that in this case a copy of the order was served on the petitioner but the same was lost and as such, he applied for a certified copy. It was urged before the Supreme Court that in such a situation the time spent in obtaining the certified copy should not be excluded. This argument was repealed by saying that "the loss of that copy necessitated the filing of an application for obtaining another copy of the order of the Assistant Commissioner." Relying on these observations, Mr. Rajgarhia urged that he also has filed the certified copy which he obtained on 30th October, 1980 along with his memorandum of appeal and, as such, the time spent in obtaining that copy should be excluded. I do not think, the ratio of the case is that whenever a certified copy is obtained then the time spent in obtaining the same should be excluded. Paragraph 2 of the judgment indicates that it was argued before the Supreme Court that the U.P. Sales Tax Act constituted a complete code in itself and since the Act prescribes the period of limitation for filing of a revision petition, no time could be extended under Sec.12(2) of the Limitation Act. This contention in the same paragraph was rejected meaning thereby that the U.P. Sales Tax Act was not a complete code in itself and, as such, the provision of Sec.12(2) of the Limitation Act applied, 7. This contention in the same paragraph was rejected meaning thereby that the U.P. Sales Tax Act was not a complete code in itself and, as such, the provision of Sec.12(2) of the Limitation Act applied, 7. On the basis of the two aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it is manifest that Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act will apply to appeals and applications filed under special law if the scheme of the special law does not exclude its application. I, therefore, turn to the provision of the Act to find out as to whether the provisions of the Limitation Act have been excluded under its scheme. Chapter XXA of the Act was .introduced with effect from 15th November, 1972, with the object of acquiring immovable properties in certain cases of transfer to counteract evasion of tax. This chapter, inter alia, provides that if the authorities have reason to believe that any immovable property of a fair market value exceeding twenty five thousand rupees has been transferred by a person to another person for an apparent consideration which is less than the fair market value of the property and that the consideration for such transfer as agreed to between the parties has not been truly stated in the instrument of transfer with the object of inter alia facilitating the concealment of any income or any moneys or other assets which have not been or which ought to be disclosed by the transferee for the purpose of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 or the Act or the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, then the competent authority may initiate proceedings for the acquisition of such properties under this Chapter. Where the proceedings are so initiated, a notice has to be given under Sec.269D of the Act. In case an objection is raised then after hearing the parties, the competent authority may in accordance with the provisions of Sec.269F dispose of the matter. In case, however, he is satisfied that the consideration for the transfer as agreed to between the parties has not been truly stated in the instrument of transfer then he may after obtaining the approval of the Commissioner make an order for the acquisition of the property under this Chapter. In case, however, he is satisfied that the consideration for the transfer as agreed to between the parties has not been truly stated in the instrument of transfer then he may after obtaining the approval of the Commissioner make an order for the acquisition of the property under this Chapter. Sec.269G of the Act enables the person mentioned in the section to file an appeal to the appellate tribunal against the order for acquisition of any immovable property made by the competent authority under Sec.269F within a period of 45 days from the date of such order or a period of 30 days from the date of service of copy of the order on the appellant whichever period expires later and by any other person interested in the immovable property within 45 days of the date of such order. Sub-section (1) of this section further provides that the appellate tribunal may before the expiry of 30 days or 45 days, as the case may be, permit the appeal to be presented within such further period as may be specified therein if the applicant satisfies the appellate tribunal that he has sufficient cause for not being able to present the appeal within the said period of 45 days or, as the case may be, 30 days. Thereafter Sub-section 5 of this section gives the appellate tribunal a power to rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend the order passed by it at any time within 30 days from the date of the order. Sub-section (6) of this section is quite important. It creates an obligation on the appellate tribunal to send a copy of the order passed under this section to the appellant and to the Commissioner. Again Sub-section (8) provides that the appeal shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of every such appeal within 90 days from the date on which it is presented. The provision to dispose of the appeal within 90 days from the date of presentation although directory in nature speaks a lot about the intention of speedy disposal by the legislature and that is quite understandable. The provision to dispose of the appeal within 90 days from the date of presentation although directory in nature speaks a lot about the intention of speedy disposal by the legislature and that is quite understandable. Delay in disposal of revenue matter as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow V/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur -- adversely affects the steady inflow of revenues and the financial stability of the State. The next section in the Chapter is Section 269H which empowers the Commissioner or any person aggrieved by an order of the appellate tribunal under Sec.269G to file an appeal to the High Court within 60 days of the date on which he is served with notice of the order under that section on any question of Law. Proviso to this section is an indicator to the scheme of things. I, therefore, quote it which is as follows: Provided that the High Court may, on an application made in this behalf before the expiry of the said period of sixty days, permit by order, the appeal to be presented within such further period as may be specified therein, if the applicant satisfies the High Court that he has sufficient cause for not being able to present the appeal within the said period of sixty days. A perusal of the proviso shows that the appeal must be filed within a period of 60 days of the date on which copy of the order is served under Sub-section (6) of Sec.269G of the Act. In case, however, the person aggrieved thinks that he will not be able to present the appeal to the High Court within 60 days then he must before the expiry of that period file an application before the High Court praying to extend the period of 60 days and the High Court on being satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown may extend the period by specified time and the appeal must be presented before the expiry of the time, so extended. Reading Sections 269G and 269H together leads me to the conclusion that the provisions in this Chapter XXA of the Act are a code in themselves inasmuch as they provide not only the period of limitation but also excludes the application of Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act. Reading Sections 269G and 269H together leads me to the conclusion that the provisions in this Chapter XXA of the Act are a code in themselves inasmuch as they provide not only the period of limitation but also excludes the application of Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act. As a result of exclusion of Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act, it is obvious that neither the provision of Section 5 nor that of Sec.12(2) of the Limitation Act will apply to appeals filed under Sec.269H of the Act. 8. Mr. Rajgarhia also faintly suggested that the principle of Limitation Act should be imported in Sec.269H of the Act. This argument also cannot be accepted. A similar argument was advanced in the case reported in -- . The learned Judges rejected this argument in the following terms: These provisions of the Limitation Act which the legislature did not, after due application of mind, incorporate in the Sales Tax Act, cannot be imported into it by analogy. An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent of them that made it. Then again the learned Judges observed as follows: If the legislature willfully omits to incorporate some thing of an analogous Jaw in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation by analogy or implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity. To do so would be entrenching upon the preserves of Legislature, the primary function of a Court of law being jus dicere and not jus dare. 9. Mr. Rajgarhia also contended that the appeal under Sec.269H of the Act is a civil appeal and, as such the provisions of Order 41, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. According to Mr. Rajgarhia, therefore, the memorandum of appeal had to be accompanied by a copy of the judgment on which it was founded. Further Mr. Mr. Rajgarhia also contended that the appeal under Sec.269H of the Act is a civil appeal and, as such the provisions of Order 41, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. According to Mr. Rajgarhia, therefore, the memorandum of appeal had to be accompanied by a copy of the judgment on which it was founded. Further Mr. Rajgarhia urged that since the filing of a certified copy of the order was imperative the time taken in obtaining the same must be excluded, I am not inclined to accept this contention also. There is no provision in the Act which even impliedly suggests that the provision of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply to appeals under Sec.269H of the Act. In my view, unless a provision making the Code of Civil Procedure applicable either expressly or impliedly is made, it cannot be said that the appeal under Sec.269H of the Act is civil in character and as such Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to it. In this connection, I may refer to the case of Bokato Ltd. V/s. Kathara Coal Co. Ltd. -- . That was a case where an appeal was filed under Sec.20 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957. The respondent in that case filed a cross-objection. The cross-objection was not maintainable because there was no provision in the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development Act), 1957 analogous to those of Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was said in that case that the determination of compensation has been expressly made appealable under Sec.20 of the Act aforesaid but short of an appeal under and in accordance with Sec.20, it cannot be canvassed in the civil Court. Sec.269G(7) provides that orders passed by the appellate tribunal on appeal shall be final save as provided in Sec.169H of the Act. That means that the order passed by the tribunal on appeal is final but short of an appeal under and in accordance with Sec.259H of the Act, it cannot be canvassed in the civil Court. 1 have already held earlier that the Act is complete in itself and, as such, there is no question of application of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. Mr. 1 have already held earlier that the Act is complete in itself and, as such, there is no question of application of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. Mr. Rajgarhia learned Counsel next urged that a certified copy of the impugned order has to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal and, as such, the time spent in obtaining the certified copy has to be excluded. To support his argument, learned Counsel referred to a number of decisions, but in my view, this argument is not relevant. Even presuming that certified copy of the impugned order has to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal yet the time spent in obtaining the same cannot be excluded as Sec.12(2) of the Limitation Act does not apply to appeal under Section and there is no provision in the Act prescribing exclusion of the time taken in obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order for filing an appeal under Sec.269H of the Act even if it be held that filing of a certified copy along with the memorandum of appeal is necessary. 11. I may also refer to an argument advanced by Mr. Shreenath Singh suggesting that the time spent in obtaining copy of the order appealed from can be excluded if the order is passed by a Court and not by a tribunal. According to learned Counsel, since the tribunal which passed the impugned order, was not a Court, the time taken in obtaining certified copy of the order cannot be excluded for the purpose of limitation. I am not prepared to accept this contention of Mr. Shreenath Singh. Sec.12 is quite wide in its ambit and sweep. Sub-section (2) of Sec.12 provides as to how the period of limitation for an appeal, etc. should be computed. It does not say that the appeal should be against an order passed by a Court only. In my opinion, therefore, Sub-section (2) of Sec.12 of the Limitation Act will apply equally to appeals preferred against the orders and judgments passed by Courts as well as by special tribunal and authorities constituted under different Acts. 12. For all these reasons, I hold that the appeal is barred by limitation. 13. An application has been filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act praying to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 12. For all these reasons, I hold that the appeal is barred by limitation. 13. An application has been filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act praying to condone the delay in filing the appeal. The grounds for condoning the delay as mentioned in the application, inter alia, are that in the opinion of Sri S.K. Saran, Junior Standing Counsel of the Department, a certified copy of the impugned order had to be filed. In his opinion, therefore, a certified copy was obtained and the file was sent to the office of the senior Standing Counsel after 30th October, 1980 along with the certified copy. It is further said that the junior Standing Counsel examined the case and, according to his calculation, the last day for filing the appeal was 7.11 1980 The memorandum of appeal was accordingly drafted and the appeal was presented before the Stamp Reporter on 4.11.1980 at 2.30 P. M. but the Advocates clerk Sri Surendra Pd. Singh felt unwell and left the High Court at 3.30 P. M. on 4.11.1980. It is further said that he got himself examined on 5th November, 1980, by Dr. S.K. Didwania. who prescribed him some medicines also. Further, according to this application, Sri Surendra Pd. Singh came to the High Court on 6.11.1980 and took the memorandum of appeal from the Stamp Reporter and filed the same in Court. On these facts, a prayer has been made that the delay should be condoned, 14. A rejoinder to the application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed by the respondent which re ads as follows: That the statement made in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the limitation petition are not correct and are denied. The appellant is put to strict proof of the alleged illness of Sri Surendra Prasad Sinha. However, the statement that Sri Sinha did not attend the Court on 5.11.1980 or that he took the memo of appeal from the Stamp Reporter on 6.11.1980 are incorrect as is shown by the fact that the memo of appeal was taken back from the Stamp Reporter on 5.11.1980. It may be added that the Stamp Reporter in his report clearly stated that the appeal was in time up to 5.11.1980 still without any cause or reason whatsoever the appeal was not filed on 5.11.1980. 15. Mr. It may be added that the Stamp Reporter in his report clearly stated that the appeal was in time up to 5.11.1980 still without any cause or reason whatsoever the appeal was not filed on 5.11.1980. 15. Mr. Shreenath Singh contended that on an application for information, the High Court office has stated that the copy was actually taken by the Advocates clerk on 5.11.1980 and not on 6.11.1980. He produced before us the information in original given by the office. Mr. Singh also said that a register in this regard is maintained in the office of the High Court and an attempt was made to make an interpolation therein. In view of this serious allegation, we asked Mr. Rajgarhia to consider the matter and tell us whether he relied upon the statement made in the application regarding illness, etc. of his clerk. After considering the matter coolly, Mr. Rajgarhia stated that he did not rely upon the statement made in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the petition. Learned counsel also accepted that the memorandum of appeal had been received by the Advocates clerk, Sri Surendra Prasad Singh from the Stamp Reporter of the High Court on 5.11.1980 and not on 6.11.1980 and that this fact was wrongly stated in the limitation petition. The application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was heard by us on 3.3 1981 and we recorded an order on that day mentioning all these facts. As the order-sheet shows the argument on the limitation matter was over on 3rd March, 1981 and orders were reserved. Mr. S.K. Saran, learned Junior Standing Counsel for the appellant, however, again on 5.3.1981 produced before us the relevant file relating to the resent appeal maintained by the Income Tax Department and has asked us to take note of the fact that on 22nd October, 1980 he had made a note in the said file that the appeal has to be accompanied by a certified copy of the order of the Tribunal which should be obtained and sent to him. The note of the learned junior counsel is at page 13/n of the file. We in presence of counsel for the respondent perused the file which fully corroborates the statement made by Mr. Saran. After having considered the matter from all possible points of view, I am of the view that Mr. The note of the learned junior counsel is at page 13/n of the file. We in presence of counsel for the respondent perused the file which fully corroborates the statement made by Mr. Saran. After having considered the matter from all possible points of view, I am of the view that Mr. Saran genuinely thought that a certified copy of the impugned order had to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal and that the last date for filing the appeal, according to his calculation, was 7.11.1980. The appeal was, accordingly, filed on 6.11.1980. Notwithstanding the false plea regarding the illness, etc. of the clerk, 1 would have condoned one days delay in filing the appeal on the ground that it was occasioned on account of lapses in the office of Mr. Rajgarhia but as I have held earlier, Chapter XXA of the Act is a complete Code in itself and as such Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to appeals filed under Section 269-H of the Act. For these reasons, I have no alternative, but to dismiss this application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 16. Since the appeal has been filed beyond the period of Limitation and the application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act has been dismissed as not maintainable the memorandum of appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation. Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. 17 I agree.