JUDGMENT K.G. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition was filed on 22-5-1981 seeking a Writ of Prohibition directing the Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi, not to proceed with the notice dated May 5, 1981, and to quash the same. 2. The brief facts are these. There is an Intermediate College at Adhawar in district Mirzapur, which is known as Sarvodaya Intermediate College, Adhawar. This institution has been recognised under the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and is run in accordance with the Scheme of Administration framed under S. 16-A of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act (hereinafter referred to as `the Act'). Clause 7 of the aforesaid Scheme lays down the term of office-bearers of the Committee of Management as three years. 3. According to the petitioners, the last election of the Committee of Management was held on June 3, 1979, in which Ram Raksha Singh was elected as President and Kamal Singh as Manager. Immediately after the elections were over, an intimation was sent to the District Inspector of Schools along with the papers for approval and attestation of the signatures of Kamal Singh, the Manager. Dr. Jawahar Singh, Respondent 3, made a representation to the District Inspector of Schools challenging that the petitioner 2 Kamal Singh had not, been elected on the aforesaid date as the Manager, and that he was not entitled to the attestation of his signatures. On July 9, 1979, the District Inspector of Schools attested the signatures of Kamal Singh recognising him as the Manager. 4. Aggrieved by the attestation. Dr. Jawahar Singh filed suit No. 210 of 1979 and also applied for injunction restraining the defendant (petitioner 2 Kamal Singh) from managing the Sarvodaya Intermediate College. An interim injunction was granted in favour of Respondent 3 but, on appeal being taken by Kamal Singh, the then District Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction issued against the petitioners off 21st July. 1979. 5. Having lost the battle in the suit. Jawahar Singh successfully persuaded the Deputy Director of Education to pass an order on Oct. 30, 1979, for appointment of an authorised controller under S. 6 (3) of U. P. High School and Intermediate Colleges Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971. 1979. 5. Having lost the battle in the suit. Jawahar Singh successfully persuaded the Deputy Director of Education to pass an order on Oct. 30, 1979, for appointment of an authorised controller under S. 6 (3) of U. P. High School and Intermediate Colleges Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971. On this date, the petitioners were called upon to show cause which was submitted, but still on 1-4-1980 no authorised controller was appointed under S. 6 (3) of the said Act. Against the said order, an appeal was filed by the petitioners to the Director of Education under S. 7 along with an application for stay. Stay order was granted, but against the granting of stay a man of the camp of Dr. Jawahar Singh filed Writ Petition No. 4723 of 1980 challenging the order of the Director of Education. This Writ was, however, subsequently dismissed on 24-7-1980. 6. On 8-8-1980, the Director of Education directed Respondents 1 and 2 to remove some of the defects in the management of the College, and further called upon them to intimate to the petitioners about the deficiency which was required to be made good by the petitioners. Respondents 1 and 2 did not act in accordance with the directions of the Director of Education and, in the mean- time, a writ petition was filed on 8-12-1980 in which a stay order was also obtained. On 15-1-1981, the appeal preferred under S. 7 by petitioner 2 was allowed and the authorised controller was directed to hand over charge to petitioner 2. This information was sent by the Director of Education to the Deputy Director of Education and the District Inspector of Schools on 15-1-1981. In pursuance of the said order, the charge was given to petitioner 2 on 24-1-1981. 7. However, before the order dated 15-1-1981 had been passed, Respondent 3 started claiming the right of management on the basis of fresh elections alleged to have been held on 3-3-1980. On that basis, Respondent 3 also applied to the District Inspector of Schools for approval of the said elections. On 15-12-1980, the District Inspector of School passed an order on the representation of Dr. On that basis, Respondent 3 also applied to the District Inspector of Schools for approval of the said elections. On 15-12-1980, the District Inspector of School passed an order on the representation of Dr. Jawahar Singh, respondent 3, rejecting the same holding that as the petitioner 2 Kamal Singh had already been recognised as the Manager, it was not open to him to recognise respondent 3 on the basis of the election alleged to have been held on 3-3- 1980. The District Inspector of Schools opined that respondent 3 could approach the court of law for the remedy. A copy of this order has been filed as Annexure `2' to the writ petition. 8. Against the aforesaid order dated 15-12-1980, refusing to recognise respondent 3, and the order of the Director of Education dated 15-1-1981 whereby the Director of Education had passed the order quashing the appointment of the authorised controller, Dr. Jawahar Singh, respondent 3, filed two writ petitions 1813 of 1981 and 1858 of 1981. These petitions were dismissed by a Bench on 12th March, 1981, on the ground that since respondent 3 had concealed or suppressed the fact of having filed a civil suit, the said respondent was not entitled to any relief. 9. After the charge was taken over by petitioner 2, on 24-1-1981, respondent 3 withdrew his suit 210 of 1979. In the mean- time, on 5-5-1981, upon the insertion of S. 16A(7) in the Act, respondent 3 again approached the Deputy Director of Education Vth Region, Varanasi, who issued notice on the same, calling upon petitioner 2 to appear before him for finding as to whether new elections were held on 3-3-1980 in which Dr. Jawahar Singh, respondent 3, was elected as the Manager. The petitioner, thereafter, filed the present writ petition seeking prohibition directing the Deputy Director of Education not to proceed in pursuance of the notice issued under S. 16A(7) on 5-5-1981. 10. On 22-5-1981; the writ was listed before the Bench of Hon. M.N. Shukla, J., and Hon. N. N. Mittal, J. The Bench directed the writ to be listed for orders after a month. 10. On 22-5-1981; the writ was listed before the Bench of Hon. M.N. Shukla, J., and Hon. N. N. Mittal, J. The Bench directed the writ to be listed for orders after a month. However, the Court passed the following order on the application for stay : "Further proceedings before the Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi, in this case shall remain stayed but the Deputy Director of Education is directed to decide within a month of the communication of this order the preliminary question as to whether really any dispute attracting his jurisdiction under S. 16A of U. P. Act No. 1 of 1981 has arisen or not on the facts of the case." 11. In pursuance of the aforesaid order of the High Court, the preliminary question was decided by the Deputy Director of Education on 23-6-1981. By this order, the Deputy Director of Education held that a dispute existed between the parties and he had jurisdiction to decide the same under S. 16A(7). 12. Subsequently, the writ petition was admitted on 12-8-1981 and counter and rejoinder affidavits were exchanged. The petitioners thereafter filed an application for amendment of the writ petition seeking to challenge the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated 23-6-1981 on the ground that the said order was illegal and without jurisdiction. The amendment application was not opposed and was thus allowed by us at the time of hearing of the writ petition. 13. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent 3, the allegations made mainly were that no election was held in 1979 in which petitioner 2 alleged himself to have been elected as the Manager. Respondent 3 claims that the last general elections were held on Mar. 3, 1980, whereas the earlier election was held in 1978. Respondent 3 asserted that he remained the Manager throughout this period. The allegation of petitioner 2 that respondent 3 had made a representation to the District Inspector of Schools about the recognition of himself as the Manager on the basis of the election alleged to have been held on 3-3-1980, had not been accepted. Respondent 3, however, claims that the finding arrived at by the District Inspector of Schools in the order dated 15-12-80 was erroneous. Respondent 3, however, claims that the finding arrived at by the District Inspector of Schools in the order dated 15-12-80 was erroneous. According to him, the order was not, in fact, an order adjudicating upon the dispute with respect to the management of the College or validity of the two elections, viz., the one alleged by petitioner 2 to have been held on 3-6-79 and the other alleged by respondent 3 to have been held on 3-3-1980. Respondent 3 claims that a dispute with regard to management still exists and needs decision under S. 16A(7). 14. Sri A. K. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, urged that the validity of the elections set up by the petitioners held on 3-6-1979 had been upheld by the District Inspector of Schools on two occasions and there was no dispute left about its validity requiring any further decision under S. 16A(7). In that connection, counsel also urged that as the election of 3-6-1979 was valid and it was found by the District Inspector of Schools while approving the same that petitioner 2 was elected as the Manager, respondent 2 could not either hold any election on 3-3-1980, nor it had actually taken place. 15. For the purpose of recognition and approval of the election held on 3-6-1979, the petitioner's counsel referred to the two orders of the District Inspector of Schools, one which was passed on 9-7-1979 and the other which had been made on 15-12-1980. The earlier order had been passed after affording opportunity to both the parties. By that order, the District Inspector of Schools had found that Kamal Singh, petitioner 2, had been elected as the Manager on 3-6-1979. He had further directed that respondent 3 could seek his relief by invoking the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Respondent 3, in fact, went to the civil court and applied for an interim stay order, but on failing to get the same in the appeal. the said respondent withdrew the same. From these facts, it is clear that in between petitioner 2 and respondent 3, the dispute relating to the election held on 3-6-1979 had been decided by the District Inspector of Schools. This question again had been attempted to be raised by asserting that respondent 3 had been elected on 3-3-1980 by means of a representation, which was rejected on 15-12-1980. 16. This question again had been attempted to be raised by asserting that respondent 3 had been elected on 3-3-1980 by means of a representation, which was rejected on 15-12-1980. 16. Counsel for respondent 3 urged that whereas the earlier order passed by the District Inspector of Schools on 9-7-1979 was in respect of the election set up by petitioner 2, by the said order the validity of the election pleaded by respondent 3 held on 3-3-1980 could not be decided. This election raised a dispute which had not been the subject matter of the earlier decision. It is true that on 9-7-1979, the validity of the election dated 3-3-1980 could not be gone into as the election set up by respondent 3 is alleged to have taken place on 3-3-1980 but the fact remains that respondent 3 could not hold the election on 3-3-1980, when the elections had taken place on 3-6-1979. The claim of respondent 3 was that after 1975 the election in which he was elected as the Manager was held on 3-3-1980, and no election in between the two dates were held. This would show that the decision about the holding of the election by respondent 3 could not be decided on its own without holding that the election of 3-6-1979 had not taken place. The two matters were interlinked. About the first election, there was a finding of the District Inspector of Schools given on 9-7-1979. This very finding was reiterated by him on 15-12-1980. In this view of the matter, respondent 3 was not right in saying that the election held on 3-3-1980 had nothing to do with the earlier election dated 3-6-1979 and was required to be independently enquired into. In fact, after the earlier order passed on 9-9-1979 by the District Inspector of Schools, a suit was also filed but was subsequently withdrawn. The suit would have decided the controversy about the validity of the elections pleaded by petitioner 2. Respondent 3 having withdrawn the suit has to suffer the consequences of the some. 17. In fact, after the earlier order passed on 9-9-1979 by the District Inspector of Schools, a suit was also filed but was subsequently withdrawn. The suit would have decided the controversy about the validity of the elections pleaded by petitioner 2. Respondent 3 having withdrawn the suit has to suffer the consequences of the some. 17. Assuming that the election held on 3-3-1980 was an independent transaction, which was required to be decided without being mixed up with that of the election of 3-6-1979, by the rejection of the prayer made by respondent 3 for his recognition on the basis of that election by the District Inspector of Schools on 15-12-1980, the dispute in regard to the same should be deemed to have been adjudicated upon in so far as the District Inspector of Schools was concerned. 18. In Jaswant Singh v. District Inspector of Schools, (Civil Appeal No. 206 of 1980 decided on 28-1-1980), the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the desirability of investigation of such a question by the District Inspector of Schools. It held : "The District Inspector of Schools could not have arrogated to himself the jurisdiction of the civil court, and that such a matter could be appropriately gone into only by civil courts." 19. The question that now arises is about the validity of the notice issued by the District Inspector of Schools on 5-5-1981 and about the correctness of the order passed on the preliminary question on 23-6-1981. To us, it appears that the forum now provided by S. 16A(7) is only a substitute for that what was being decided by the District Inspector of Schools under S. 5 of the Payment of Wages Act. Our High Court has held in several cases that for the purposes of enabling himself to pay the salaries to the teachers on the bills submitted by a Manager it was necessary for the District Inspector of Schools to recognise him and to decide the dispute relating to his right without challenge. Such a decision was, of course. summary in nature and was subject to the decision of a civil court. As there were serious doubts about the desirability of the District Inspector of Schools being conferred such a power, by U. P. Act I of 1981 a new forum was created. Such a decision was, of course. summary in nature and was subject to the decision of a civil court. As there were serious doubts about the desirability of the District Inspector of Schools being conferred such a power, by U. P. Act I of 1981 a new forum was created. By S. 16A(7), the Deputy Director of Education was conferred the power to decide the dispute. This only brings about the change of forum. The Deputy Director of Education is not an appellate authority over the District Inspector of Schools in respect of the cases earlier decided by the District Inspector of Schools. The power of the Deputy Director 41 Education is the same as used to be exercised by the District Inspector of Schools. Section 16A(7) is not a substitute for the civil court. The decision given by the Deputy Director of Education would also be of a summary nature, subject to the decision of the civil court. In our opinion, therefore, the matters which had been adjudicated upon by the District Inspector of Schools before the insertion of S. 16A(7) could not be reopened and brought before the Deputy Director of Education on the pretext of a new forum having been provided for the said purpose. 20. In the instant case, the District Inspector of Schools had on two occasions found that petitioner 2 was the Manager who was entitled to function and had directed respondent 3 to file a civil suit for vindication of his rights. To direct a party to file a civil suit in a matter like the present is also a decision which will be final between the parties and cannot be raked up again and again. The District Inspector of Schools had jurisdiction to decide the question as to who was entitled to function as the Manager. He had the jurisdiction to decide the same rightly or wrongly. Merely because he is an authority inferior to the Deputy Director of Education, that would not entitle the parties before him to ignore the decision given against (either). The plea of res judicata on general principles can be successfully taken not only in respect of courts of exclusive jurisdiction, like the revenue courts and land acquisition courts, but administrative courts as well (See Smt. Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 S C 33). 21. The plea of res judicata on general principles can be successfully taken not only in respect of courts of exclusive jurisdiction, like the revenue courts and land acquisition courts, but administrative courts as well (See Smt. Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 S C 33). 21. The principle of res judicata is concealed in larger public interest which requires that all matters must, sooner than later, come to an end. This principle applies to judicial as well as quasi judicial proceedings. To permit a party to raise the same question over and again would not be in public interest. The District Inspector of Schools had rightly or wrongly recognised petitioner 2 as the Manager on the basis of the election held on 3-6-1979. That order of the District Inspector of Schools was subject to the decision of a civil court. Respondent 3 could not get over the said order by simply pleading the election of a later date. However, as already stated above, even with regard to this election, there is an implied, if not express, finding by the District Inspector of Schools given on 15-12-1980. It is not correct to say that directing a party to file a civil suit in a matter brought before a court does not amount to a decision so as to debar the same party from bringing another litigation before that very court or authority. It is one thing to say that such a decision being not on merits would not operate as res judicata, it will be another that a second application can still be filed and will he maintainable. 22. In Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust (AIR 1978 S C 1283), the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter while dealing with the maintainability of a second writ petition. It observed (at p. 1288) : "If the writ petition is dismissed by a speaking order, either at the threshold or after contest, say, only on the ground of lathes or the availability of an alternative remedy, then another remedy open in law either by way of suit or any other proceeding obviously will not be barred on the principle of res judicata. Of course, a second writ on the same cause of action either filed in the same High Court or in another will not be maintainable because the dismissal of one petition will operate as a bar in the entertainment of another writ petition." 23. The above proposition of law applies on all fours to the facts of the present case. When an earlier application for the same matter had been decided, the second application under S. 16A(17) was not maintainable. 24. At this place, it may also be worthwhile mentioning that against the order dated 15-12-1980, respondent 3 had filed a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed on 12-3-1981. It is in respect of this very matter that another attempt has been made by respondent 3 to raise (the dispute) by filing an application under S. 16A(7). We have already held above that there is no difference between the two proceedings. The only difference is that of the officer deciding it which, to our mind, is immaterial. 25. Counsel for respondent 3, however, pointed out that on a review application being filed, the order dismissing the writ petition was modified and respondent 3 was permitted to raise this question afresh. Hence, the application filed before the Deputy Director of Education could not be rejected on that ground. The argument is devoid of merit. While rejecting the review application on 19-5-1981, the Court observed : "If the petitioners are aggrieved by the District Inspector of Schools, they should get their right declared by the civil courts. No relief can be granted in this jurisdiction." 26. These observations made by the learned Judges dismissing the review application does not improve the position of respondent 3. By these observations, respondent 3 had only been permitted to file the civil suit if the same was maintainable. These observations in no way can be taken to justify the filing of the application under S. 16A(7) before the Deputy Director of Education. In fact, the Deputy Director of Education also fell into a fallacy when he relied upon the said order while deciding the preliminary question on 23-6-1980. To our mind, there was no dispute which was left undecided and could be raised under S. 16A(7). The dispute can only be decided by a civil court. In fact, the Deputy Director of Education also fell into a fallacy when he relied upon the said order while deciding the preliminary question on 23-6-1980. To our mind, there was no dispute which was left undecided and could be raised under S. 16A(7). The dispute can only be decided by a civil court. Hence, the Deputy Director of Education had neither any jurisdiction to issue the notice nor was right in holding that a dispute existed between the parties. 27. Learned counsel for respondent 3 cited before us some authorities for the proposition that against the show cause notice no Writ of prohibition could be issued. Since in the instant case, the decision had been given on merits, these authorities do not apply. As observed by Smith in his Book "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", Third Edition, at page 337, "The orders of certiorari and prohibition have so many characteristics in common that they can well be discussed together. Prohibition will not lie unless something remains to be done that a court can prohibit, certiorari will not lie unless something has been done that a court can quash." 28. In the instant case, we are required to judge the validity of the order dated 23-6-1981. Since we find that the said order is erroneous and wrong on the face of it, we quash the same. The necessary result would be that the Deputy Director of Education would have no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. 29. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Deputy Director of Education dated 23-6-1981 is quashed, and the Deputy Director of Education is directed not to proceed with the dispute in question. We make no order as to costs.