JUDGMENT D.S. Misra, Member. - This is a second appeal filed on behalf of Smt. Dropadi against the judgment and decree dated 19-3-1974 passed by Additional Commissioner, Faizabad. 2. The preliminary objection was taken by the learned counsel for the respondent that no second appeal lay from the order passed, Order 41, Rule 20 of the Civil Procedure Code. An application was presented on behalf of the appellant seeking an amendment that in place of second appeal, first appeal may kingly be ordered to be noted. The application was allowed. 3. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that Smt. Dropadi filed a suit under Section 229-B/209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act on the ground that she was daughter of last male tenure holder, Lakhpal Singh and therefore she be declared to be the sirdar of the land in suit. She also alleged that the defendants 1 and 2 had no concern with the land in suit but they got their names mutated and thereafter sold the land to Keshari, defendant no. 3 and therefore Keshari be ejectment from the land in suit. Defendants no. 1, 2 and 3 contested the suit. Defendant no. 1 and 2 claimed themselves to be the sister's son of Lakhpal Singh and further said that plaintiff was not the daughter of Lakhpat Singh. She was the daughter of Chedi. It was was not disputed that the land in suit was transferred to Keshari by means of executing a sale deed therefor. Necessary issues were framed and after hearing the parties the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on 10-8-71 holding that she was not the daughter of Lakhpat Singh the last male tenure holder and also held that defendants no. 1 and 2 were the sister's son of Lakhpat Singh and were his legal heirs. Smt. Dropadi preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court. During the pendency of the appeal Baleshwar died who was respondent no. 3 On 16-3-1976 an application was moved on behalf of the appellant that some two months back Baleshwar died and his sons Matai and Ghirrau being legal heirs to Baleshwar be substituted in his place. The respondents filed objections against it saying that Baleshwar died one year back and the appeal was liable to be dismissed as legal heirs of Baleshwar were not brought on the record. The respondents filed objections against it saying that Baleshwar died one year back and the appeal was liable to be dismissed as legal heirs of Baleshwar were not brought on the record. On 21-11-1973 another application supported with an affidavit was moved on behalf if of the appellant praying for condonation of delay and for setting aside the abatement. The Additional Commissioner rejected this application and abated the appeal holding that Baleshwar had died a year back and no substitution application was brought within time. It was against this order that the present appeal has been filed. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent took another preliminary objection that the appeal should be dismissed as incompetent as it was filed against a dead person namely, Baleshwar. 5. I have heard both the parties on this point but I am of the view that the appellant had no option but to array Baleshwar as one of the respondents. He had moved an application before Additional Commissioner for the substitution of his sons in his place which was rejected by the Additional Commissioner and the name of Baleshwar continued and therefore he had no option but to array him as one of the respondents. Though I find that he had also taken precaution to move an application before the Board for substitution the names of the sons of Baleshwar in his place. In the particular circumstances of this case therefore this objection does not prevail. On merits of the appeal I have heard the learned counsels of both the parties. It is an admitted case of the parties that Baleshwar had executed a sale deed of the land in suit in favour of Keshari and therefore naturally no interest of his was left in the land in suit. The contest was between the appellant and the Keshari respondent, transferee. In view of this I feel that the position of Baleshwar was reduced to that of proforma respondent only because he was nothing to gain or to loose by the decision of the appeal. It was Keshari who was to be affected by the decision of the appeal and he was already contesting it and so in fact he was the only contesting respondent. It was Keshari who was to be affected by the decision of the appeal and he was already contesting it and so in fact he was the only contesting respondent. My attention was drawn to Order 22, Rule 1 of C.P.C. which reads as follows:- "Order 22 Rule 1 - The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to abate if the right to sue survives". The plain meaning of this rule evidently is that a suit shall not abate if right to sue survives. Similarly rule 2 of the said order which reads as follows: "Order 22 Rule 2 - Where there are move plaintiffs or defendants that one, and any of them dies, and where the right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, the Court shall cause an entry to that effect to the made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants". shows that suit will not abate if right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff or defendant. Rule 11 of the said order which reads as follows: "Order 22 Rule 11. - In the application of this order to appeals, so far as may be, the word "plaintiff" shall be held to include an appellant, the word "defendant" a "respondent", and the word "suit" an appeal. shows that the same would be applicable to appeals also and the appellant would stand for the plaintiff and the respondent would stand for the defendant in case of appeal Rule 4 of the said order which reads as follows: "Order 22, Rule 4. - Where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the decreased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. shows that in eventualities when one of the plaintiffs die but the right to sue survives the suit shall not be abated. shows that in eventualities when one of the plaintiffs die but the right to sue survives the suit shall not be abated. Substituting in case of appeal this would mean that the appeal would not abate if the rights to sue survives by the death of some of the appellants. In this particular case what I find that it was real contest between the appellant and the respondent Keshari and therefore, the right to sue survived and even if Baleshwar died who had no interest left in the land in suit, the appeal should not have been abated even if his legal representatives were not brought on the record within the time stipulated therefore. 6. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that as a matter of fact Matai and Ghirrau sons of Baleshwar were not legal representatives of Baleshwar so far as this appeal was concerned because all the interest that Baleshwar had in the land in suit was transferred to Keshari and Keshari had thus become the legal representative of Baleshwar. He argued that on doubt Matai and Ghirrau were the sons of Baleshwar and they could have been his legal representatives in respect of other land in which his interest subsisted but not regarding the land in suit. My attention was drawn to Section 171 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act which runs as follows: (Editors note-Section 171 has not been reproduced.) From the plain reading of the section it is very clear that the interest of bhumidhar or asami in his holding devolves upon his legal heirs but since no interest of Baleshwar was left in the land in suit this could not devolve upon his legal heirs and therefore the legal heirs of Baleshwar were not his legal representatives so far as the land in suit was concerned. In other words to make it more clear the sons of Baleshwar could be his legal representative for the holding in which the interest of Baleshwar subsisted but since his interest did not subsist in the land in suit, the legal heir could not be termed as legal representatives of Baleshwar as far as this appeal was concerned. Order 22 speaks for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased not the legal heirs and therefore in view of it even this substitution applications becomes unnecessary. 7. Order 22 speaks for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased not the legal heirs and therefore in view of it even this substitution applications becomes unnecessary. 7. The term legal representative has been defined in sub-section 11 of Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code which runs as follows:- Sub-section 11 of Section 2:- "Legal representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a decreased person, and includes any person who inter-meddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. From the plain reading of this section it is clear that a legal representative in a person who under represents the estate of a dead person and so I find that here the estate if any of deceased Baleshwar was represented by Keshari as his interest was transferred to Keshari and not to his two sons Matai a Ghirrua. Thus it is crystal clear that Matai and Ghirrua were not the legal representatives of the deceased Baleshwar and the appeal could not abate even if the sons Matai and Ghirrau were not substituted in his place. It was sufficient that Keshari was arrayed as respondent who was the sole contestant and in these circumstances the learned Additional Commissioner committed on illegality in abating the appeal for not bringing the substitution application with in time. 8. It is also a conspicuous which could no be ignored that appellant Smt. Dropadi was a widow was also blind and was residing three miles away from the place where Baleshwar resided this has been borne out from the affidavit filed by her. One of these three grounds in itself was sufficient to condone the delay for filing the substitution application and the learned Additional Commissioner, in my opinion was wrong in rejecting the application by holding that it was too much belated. After all she is not the resident of the place where of Baleshwar was residing. Besides she is a blind lady. Under these circumstances her application for condonation of delay ought to have been accepted. After all she is not the resident of the place where of Baleshwar was residing. Besides she is a blind lady. Under these circumstances her application for condonation of delay ought to have been accepted. As already observed earlier the position of Baleshwar was that of a proforma respondent only because no interest of his was left in the land in suit as admittedly he had transferred it to Keshari respondent No. 4 and therefore even if he died during the pendency of the appeal, the appeal could not be ordered to be abated. This view finds support from the two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 51 of 1961: Mangal Singh and others v. Smt. Ratno, A.I.R. 1967 SC at page 1786 and in Appeal No. 1943 of 1966, Smt. Rani and another v. Smt. Santa Bala Deonath and another, A.I.R. 1971 SC page 1028, in which the similar view was held. 9. On the ground given above the order of the Additional Commissioner is set aside and the appeal is remanded back to him for deciding it on merit.