Judgment :- 1. The two accused in C C. No. 180/ 79 now pending before the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Wadakkancherry, are the petitioners herein and they seek to invoke the inherent powers of this Court to quash the entire proceedings in the said criminal complaint. Both the petitioners are sisters, the first petitioner is said to be aged 52 and the second petitioner 40. The case against them is that they, on April 9, 1979. obstructed witnesses 1 and 2 in the charge-sheet who are respectively the Taluk Surveyor and the Revenue Inspector, from entering the compound in which the petitioners are residing by closing their gate and thus prevented and obstructed the above officers from discharging their official duties. It is alleged that it was for surveying property comprised in Sy. No. 399 of Enkakad Village as per orders of the Tahsildar that these officers went there. On these allegations, a complaint was filed by the Taluk Surveyor before the Wadakkancherry Police Station, on the basis of which a case was registered against the petitioners under S.341, and 353 read with S.34 IPC. On competition of investigation, a charge-sheet under the above said sections was filed against the petitioners. When the petitioners appeared before Court, they denied having committed any offence and the case was subsequently posted for trial. 2. The charge-sheet filed against the petitioners and the subsequent criminal proceedings against them are sought to be quashed on more than one ground. The learned advocate appearing for them submitted that this is a clear case of abuse of process of court, as the charge-sheet, the first information statement and all the relevant records supplied to the petitioners and sought to be relied on by the prosecution do not disclose any offence punishable under S.353 IPC. The counsel also contended that this is an illustrious case where the prosecution deliberately wanted to evade the salutary provisions of S.195 (1) (a) Cr. P.C. by changing the label of the offence as one punishable under S.353 IPC. 3. It is not disputed before me that the petitioners are residing alone in a house in the compound which the Taluk Surveyor and the Revenue Inspector wanted to survey. P.C. by changing the label of the offence as one punishable under S.353 IPC. 3. It is not disputed before me that the petitioners are residing alone in a house in the compound which the Taluk Surveyor and the Revenue Inspector wanted to survey. The counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor took me through the first information statement, charge-sheet and all the relevant documents which the prosecution wants to rely on in support of its case against the petitioners. Admittedly there is no allegation or averment either in the first information statement or the statements recorded under S.161 Cr. P.C. or in the charge-sheet that the petitioners assaulted witness Nos. 1 and 2 or used any criminal force against them. It is also not disputed that the only overt act attributed to the petitioners is that they closed the gate of the compound thereby obstructing witness Nos. I and 2 from entering the property. But the learned Public Prosecutor relying on the definition of force in S.349 IPC. strongly contended that force need not be used against any person to attract S.353 IPC. but it is enough if force is used against any substance as contemplated under S.349 IPC. The argument advanced is that by closing the gate, witness Nos. 1 and 2 had to go back without entering the compound for surveying the property and therefore there was cessation of motion as contemplated under S.349 IPC. The learned Public Prosecutor appears to have forgotten the fact that assault or use of criminal force to any person is an essential ingredient of an offence punishable under S.353 IPC. and that there is a clear distinction between 'force' defined under S.349 and 'criminal force' defined under S 350 IPC. We are here in this case only concerned with the ingredients of an offence punishable under S.353 IPC. Even the definition of 'force' under S 349 will not apply to the facts of this case. It was relying on the second part of the definition of 'force' under S.349 IPC.; namely, "if a person causes to any substance such motion or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other's body" that the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that force has been used in this case by the petitioners by closing the gate. The prosecution has no case that by locking or closing the gate, any part of the gate came into contact with the body of witness Nos. I or 2. The cessation of motion contemplated under the section is not that of the person but that of the substance. As stated earlier, the records in the case do not disclose that the petitioners have committed any assault on or used criminal force as defined under S.350 IPC. against witness Nos. 1 and 2 or any other public servant. No doubt the records produced in this case and relied on by the prosecution primarily and essentially disclose an offence punishable under S.186 IPC. for which a complaint as contemplated under S.195 (1) (a) Cr. PC. is necessary. The bar contemplated under S. !95 (1) (a) is one affecting the jurisdiction which goes to the very root of the matter. No complaint in writing as contemplated under S.195 (I) (a) Cr.P.C, has been filed in this case and there is considerable force in the contention of the petitioners that this is a clear attempt to get over the bar under S.195 (1) (a) Cr. P.C. by giving the label of S.353 IPC. to the facts of the case. The counsel pointed out that such practice has been deprecated by decisions of High Courts and also of the Supreme Court. 4. The wording of S.353 IPC. makes it clear that assault or use of criminal force to a public servant while he was doing his duty as such is a necessary ingredient of that offence. Under S.349 IPC., a person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or if be causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with any part of that other's body, etc. What is contemplated under S.353 IPC. is not merely use of force but use of criminal force to any person mentioned therein. Even under S.349 IPC., cessation of motion contemplated was that of the substance which was caused to move. This again indicates that what was mainly intended under the section was use of force to any person. What is contemplated under S.353 IPC. is not merely use of force but use of criminal force to any person mentioned therein. Even under S.349 IPC., cessation of motion contemplated was that of the substance which was caused to move. This again indicates that what was mainly intended under the section was use of force to any person. To attract the definition of 'criminal force' under S.350 IPC., there must be intentional use of force to any person, without that person's consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used. In other words, the criminal force contemplated under this section is intended to mean criminal force as applied to a person and not as applied to an inanimate object or substance. There is an essential distinction between the offences punishable under S.353 and 186 IPC. The ingredients of the two offences are distinct and different. While the former is a cognizable offence, the latter is not. A mere obstruction or resistance unaccompanied by criminal force or assault will not constitute an offence under S.353 IPC. Where an accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his duties, S.186 IPC. is attracted. But under S.353, there must be in addition to the obstruction use of criminal force or assault to the public servant while he was discharging bis duty. It may also be noted that the quality of the two offences is also different. While S.186 occurs in Chapter X dealing with contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, S.353 appears in Chapter XVI which deals with offences affecting the human body. This is also a clear indication that use of criminal force contemplated under S.353 IPC. is against a person and not against any inanimate object. There is considerable force in the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that the offence really disclosed from the records is only one punishable under S.186 IPC. and that by giving a label of S.353 IPC. the prosecution wanted to circumvent the salutary provisions in S.195 (1) (a) Cr. P. C. In support of his contention, the counsel relied on the decision in Durgacharan v. State of Orissa (AIR. and that by giving a label of S.353 IPC. the prosecution wanted to circumvent the salutary provisions in S.195 (1) (a) Cr. P. C. In support of his contention, the counsel relied on the decision in Durgacharan v. State of Orissa (AIR. 1966 SC 1775), where the Supreme Court held that the provisions of S.195 cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, on the ground that the latter offence is a minor one of the same character, or by describing the offence as one punishable under some other section of the Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of the offences mentioned in S.195. This is a clear instance where the prosecution wanted to evade the provisions in S.195 by charging the petitioners under S.353 IPC. In Dr. S. Dutt v. State of U. P. (AIR. 1966 SC. 523= 1966 (1) S. C. R.493) while dealing with a similar question, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible for the prosecution to drop a serious charge and select one which does not require the procedure under S.195 Cr. P. C.; and that if the offence was under S.186 IPC , a complaint in writing was necessary Admittedly in the instant case there is no complaint in writing of the public servant made to the court as contemplated under S.195 (1) (a) Cr. P. C. In the absence of a complaint as contemplated under S.195 (1), although an offence under S.186 IPC. is disclosed from the records, prosecution against the petitioners cannot be continued, as there is a specific prohibition to take cognizance of the offence punishable under S.186 IPC., except upon a complaint in writing under S.195 (1) (a) Cr. P. C. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is allowed and the entire proceedings in C. C. No. 180/ 79 now pending against the petitioners before the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Wadakkancherry, are hereby quashed.