JUDGMENT R.S. Verma, Member. - This second appeal which has, at one remove, stemmed from the judgment and decree dated 21-1-1972 passed by Shri K. P. Srivastava, learned Assistant Collector, Ist Class, Fatehgarh, raised an intricate question of law as to whether a voidable sale can be avoided only through a suit for cancellation or also by the conduct of the person entitled to avoid it. The learned trial court, as well as the learned fist appellate court held that the repudiation of the sale can be done by conduct also. 2. Against the concurrent finding, the plaintiff-appellant have brought this second appeal, and have raised the above mentioned question of law. Before we come to grips with this substantial question of law, we will have to deal with a preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondent. It has been urged that the appeal is barred by time because, though the appeal itself was filed within the prescribed period of limitation, the copy of the judgment and decree of the trial court was filed beyond time. The learned counsel for the respondent cited 1980, U.P. Revenue judgment, 329, in which it had been held by this Board that "The Register can only allow such period of grace of filing copies as will be within the period of limitation from the date of the judgment of the lower appellate court. In other words Register has no jurisdiction or discretion to allow time for filing the necessary copies exceeding the period of limitation". This ruling has not deal with section 5, Indian Limitation Act. In the case before us there is an application under Section 5, Limitation Act for condonation delay in filing the copy of the judgment and decree of the trial court. This ruling has not deal with section 5, Indian Limitation Act. In the case before us there is an application under Section 5, Limitation Act for condonation delay in filing the copy of the judgment and decree of the trial court. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it has been alleged that the appellant applied for copies of all the necessary documents in the court of the Additional Commissioner but he was given only the copes of the judgments and decrees of the first appellate court, the judgment and decrees of the trial court was not given on the ground that the trial court file had been transmitted to the trial court from where the copies could be obtained, that the counsel for the appellant informed him about this new position and there after he took the copies of trial court's judgment and decree and sent it to his counsel who filed it after the period of limitation. This application is supported by an affidavit, against which no counter-affidavit has been filed. So the facts alleged in the above-mentioned application can be presumed to be correct. The said allegation appears to me correct, and hence I am satisfied that there was a sufficient cause for not filing the copy of trial court's judgment and decree within time. In a case where the applicant had applied for copies of decree in the first appellate court but could obtain only the copies of judgment and decree of the first appellate court and filed the appeal within time and filed the copy of the trial court after the period of limitation because that file had been transmitted from the first appellate court to the trial court where he had to apply for copies the delay will be condoned under Section 5, Limitation Act because it was caused by factors which were not under the control of the appellant. Section 5 of the Limitation Act given the courts a discretion which should be applied on live-understood principles which guide the exercise of judicial power. The words 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. Section 5 of the Limitation Act given the courts a discretion which should be applied on live-understood principles which guide the exercise of judicial power. The words 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. In the instant case, we are satisfied that there is no want of bona fides and that the delay was caused due to unavoidable factors which were not under the control of the appellant. Existence of sufficient cause is a question of fact in each case. In this case, we think that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the copies of judgment and decree of the trial Account. Hence, we condone the said delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 3. Thus we are led to the determination of the question of law regarding mode of the avoidance of a regarding mode of avoidance of a voidable sale. Here it would be relevant to set out briefly the facts of this case so that the question may become intelligible. There were several co-tenure-holders of the plot in suit, and those included three minors, viz Shree Krishna, Bhikhari and Ram Bux. All the co-tenants executed a sale-deed on 13.6.1963 in favour of the plaintiffs of this case. The three minors mentioned above, attained majority before the filing of this suit on 7-10-1970. The names of the plaintiffs had been mutated in the papers as co-bhumidhare only because the name of the minors Shree Krishna, Bhikhari and Ram Bux had not been on punged on the ground that they were minors in 1963 and that their share could not have been transferred by their natural and de-facto guardian without obtaining the permission of the District Judge. On 26-8-1968 Bhakhari, Shree Krishna and Ram Bux who had attained majority, executed a sale-deed of their share in favour of defendant Tukman Singh. The plaintiffs filed this suit for declaration that the earlier sale-deed in their favour, not having cancelled by the Civil Court, stood intact and that Bhikhari and Ram Bux, Shree Krishna, could not execute another sale-deed of the property, because the had already transferred it earlier in favour of the plaintiff. 4. The plaintiffs filed this suit for declaration that the earlier sale-deed in their favour, not having cancelled by the Civil Court, stood intact and that Bhikhari and Ram Bux, Shree Krishna, could not execute another sale-deed of the property, because the had already transferred it earlier in favour of the plaintiff. 4. The courts below had held that Shree Krishna defendant No. 4 had not brought a suit for cancellation of the earlier sale-deed within three years of his attaining majority, and hence the sale-deed dated 13-6-1963 in favour of the plaintiff has become final as far as the share of Shree Krishna is concerned. The defendants have not appealed against that order and hence it has become final. 5. During the course of argument Shir R.S. Dubey, learned counsel for the appellants, concerned that the appeal in respect of the shares of Ram Bux defendant no. 6 and Smt. Sarbatta, defendant no. 7, must fail. The reason is that the sale-deed dated 13-6-1963 in favour of the plaintiffs had been executed on behalf of Ram Bux (minor) by his brother Dulare, who was not his natural guardian. Section 11 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act lays down that "no person shall be entitled to dispose of, deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor". The prohibition is absolute and hence the sale-deed would be void. Dulare,brother of Ram Bux, had also sold the share of his brother Siya Ram (deceased), claiming that he was heir of Siya Ram. It is admitted now that the their of Siya Ram deceased was his mother Smt. Sarbata and hence Dulare had no right to transfer the share of Smt. Sarbatha. 6. The only dispute which survives is about the share of defendant no. 5 Bhikhari. It is admitted now that the their of Siya Ram deceased was his mother Smt. Sarbata and hence Dulare had no right to transfer the share of Smt. Sarbatha. 6. The only dispute which survives is about the share of defendant no. 5 Bhikhari. There is a finding of fact that at the time of the sale in favour of the plaintiffs Bhikhari was a minor, that the said sale was executed on his behalf of his natural guardian, that is, his mother Smt. Dulari that according to Section 8(2)(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act a natural guardian, shall not, without the permission of the court, sell, mortgage, gift or exchange any part of the immovable property of the minor that Smt. Dulari (the natural guardian of Bhikhari) had not obtained any permission of the court to sell the interest of Bhikhari that according to section 8(3) Hindu Minority Guardianship Act such a transfer is voidable and that Bhikhari defendant No. 5, within three years of his attaining majority, had repudiated the earlier sale in favour of the plaintiff by executing another sale-deed on 26-3-1963 in favour of defendant no. 3, Tukman Singh. 7. The fist sale of Bhikhari's share was voidable. The question is how to avoid such a transaction. Whether the transaction can be avoided only by filing a civil suit or whether it can be avoided by conduct also? Void means empty, vacant, unsubstantial unoccupied, wanting having no binding force or without legal effect. Voidable means that which can be voided, what should be done to make a voidable transaction, void? There is no dispute that one of the method is to get the transaction nullified with the aid of the Civil court. The dispute is whether that is the only method. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that a voidance transaction can only be avoided by getting a decree from a civil court and until it is done the transaction will remain valid. He has cited 1976 R.D. 221 in support of his view. In this ruling a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that: "Both void and voidable instruments do not stand at par with reference to Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The void documents and were invalidated were liable to be disregarded by the consolidation authorities. In this ruling a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that: "Both void and voidable instruments do not stand at par with reference to Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The void documents and were invalidated were liable to be disregarded by the consolidation authorities. So far as the other class of documents, viz., the voidable documents are concerned, their legal effect can be taken away only by their being cancelled or set aside and that the documents could be cancelled only by a court having power to cancel them and that the documents remain binding as long as they were not cancelled. The consolidation authorities had not power to cancel such documents." The learned counsel for the appellant has also cited A.I.R. 1973, S.C. 2451, in which the Supreme Court has held that: "......but where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside, or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it". These rulings of the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court had not held that there was no other mode of avoiding a transaction. They were dealing with Section 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and the point before them was whether a suit for cancellation of a deed, pending in the civil court, was liable to abatement. The answer was obvious that such a suit could not be abated by reason of the fact that such a jurisdiction is vested only in civil court and not in any other court, including consolidation court. These ruling are not helpful in the instant case. While dealing with cases, courts of law act like experts. It is habit of experts to generalise. But it is also a fact that generalisation, however, wide it may be, cannot cover all the myriad aspects of life, and therefore, it is a rule of caution, as well as of practice, that a generalisation made in a particular case will be taken to apply to the facts of that case and to similar facts only. But it is also a fact that generalisation, however, wide it may be, cannot cover all the myriad aspects of life, and therefore, it is a rule of caution, as well as of practice, that a generalisation made in a particular case will be taken to apply to the facts of that case and to similar facts only. There can be no surer source of fallacy than to life the generalisations of a particular case and circumstance and fit it in quite a different case and circumstances. No principle of law is completely intelligible save in the context in which it is evolved. 8. To pick the thread of our discussion, is it not possible that a voidable, transaction be avoided without having recourse to civil courts Cannot a transaction be repudiated by categorical conduct of a party ? Here we are not traversing on virgin ground. There are a number of authorities of the highest order, which say that a voidable transaction can be avoided by conduct also. 9. Travellyan in his hook no Minors has stated at page 202, 5th Edition that: "A transaction which is voidable at the instance of the minor may be repudiated by any act or omission of the late minor by which he intends to communicate the repudiation, or which has the effect of repudiating it, for instance, a transfer of land by him avoids a transfer of the same land made by his guardian before he attained the age of the majority. It is not necessary that he should bring a suit, but a suit to set aside the act of his guardian during his minority amounts to recourse to an express repudiation". Mulla in his Hindu Law, 12th Edition, page 276 has stated. "An alienation made by a Hindu widow......without legal necessity and without the consent of the next reversioner is....... voidable at their option. They may affirm it or treat it as a nullity without the intervention of a court......". In (1905) I.L.R. 28, Allahabad, 30, it was held that a minor who had sold the property, which his Guardian had leased out to the defendant, validly repudiated by his act, the earlier transfer made by his guardian. It was further held that it was not necessary that a suit should have been instituted to set aside the lease executed by his guardian when he was minor. It was further held that it was not necessary that a suit should have been instituted to set aside the lease executed by his guardian when he was minor. In A.I.R. 1940 Madras 113, it was held that:- "He (minor) was not bound under the substantive law by which he is governed, to sue from declaration or cancellation." In A.I.R. 1962 Kerala 164 (F.B.) Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair stated:- "It is not always necessary that a party entitled to avoid a transaction not binding on him should sue for its rescission. He can himself avoid it by an unequivocal act repudiating it." In A.I.R. 1972 Kerala, 71, Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer (as he then was) stated:- ".....When a minor is entitled to avoid a transfer effected by his guardian on the ground of absence of permission of the court, it becomes a nullity on his unilateral act. He can merely avoid it by his conduct and there is no need to file a suit for avoiding the transfer". 10. A discussion of authorities, mentioned above, show that 1976 R.D. 21 (High Court) Full Bench and A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 2451 were not dealing with the question of existence of any other manner of avoiding a voidable transaction than institution of a civil suit. Those rulings are silent on the point which is before this court. The other authorities, cited above, lay down that a voidable transaction can be avoided by (i) means of a civil suit or (ii) by a categorical repudiation by conduct. However, the facts of each case will be material for correct determination of this question. In the instant case we may state, after applying the principle of law discussed in the preceding paragraphs, that Bhikhari defendant categorically repudiated and thereby avoided the sale die his share made by his natural guardian during the period of his minority, and this repudiation was done by just transferring his share to defendant no. 3, Tukan Singh, within three years of his attaining majority. So Bhikhari's interest did not pass to the plaintiffs. 11. The learned courts below correctly applied the law to the circumstances of this case. There is no force in this appeal. Hence the appeal is dismissed with costs and Rs. 50/- as counsel's fees.