JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal arising out of a suit for declaration that an order passed by the Assistant Engineer, Trunks and Carrier, Varanasi purporting to terminate the services of the plaintiff is null and void. Both the courts below have dismissed the suit. 2. Shortly, the plaint case was that the plaintiff was employed as a workman under the Assistant Engineer, Trunks and Carrier, Varanasi. For various reasons the plaintiff had to be absent from duties for which requisite applications were being made by him to his superiors. The plaintiff had been requesting for leave on medical grounds. His applications were allowed, but at the end of six months he was served with an order dated 21st of Nov. 1966 terminating his services with effect from 7-11-1965. This order was passed by the Assistant Engineer Phones (Trunks) Varanasi. The order was passed without affording any opportunity to the plaintiff at any stage, whether prior or after the passing of the order and it was, therefore, wholly null and void, having been passed in violation of the constitutional guarantee provided to the plaintiff as a Government servant under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 3. The defence of the Union of India was that the plaintiff was appointed as a temporary workman with effect from 27-8-1955. During the period 27-8-1955 to 7-4-1958 he absented himself from duty several times without any intimation or prior sanction. His services were consequently terminated with effect from 8-4-1958. He was, however, reappointed. He again absented himself from duty on various dates, the details of which were mentioned in paragraph 3 of the written statement. Consequently his services were terminated with effect from 7-11-65 on the ground that he had absented himself without pay for six months with effect from 7-5-1965 to 6-11-1965 under R. 14 of Appendix 7-A of F. R. & S. R. Vol. II as no further leave without pay beyond six months could be granted to the plaintiff. As the services of the plaintiff stood terminated automatically in terms of R. 14, there was no question of violation of any Constitutional provision. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, relevant issues were framed by the trial court. II as no further leave without pay beyond six months could be granted to the plaintiff. As the services of the plaintiff stood terminated automatically in terms of R. 14, there was no question of violation of any Constitutional provision. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, relevant issues were framed by the trial court. It held that in view of the provisions of R. 14(c) of the aforesaid Rules, the services of the plaintiff were rightly terminated and as the services of the plaintiff stood automatically terminated under the said Statutory Rule, there was no question of violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The result was that the suit of the plaintiff appellant was dismissed. On appeal, the view taken by the trial court was endorsed by the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court took the view that the plaintiff was a temporary Government servant. His services were, therefore, liable to be terminated in terms of R. 14(c) and as the plaintiff was neither a permanent nor a quasi permanent employee, the termination of his services in terms of that Rule did not imply any punishment or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India warranting the giving of an opportunity to show cause against the proposed termination. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the view taken by the courts below that the discharge of the plaintiffs services on the ground alleged did not imply any punishment within the meaning of Art. all of the Constitution of India is manifestly unsustainable in law. It was submitted that the discharge of a Government servant, even if he is a temporary employee, on the ground that he has over-stayed the leave sanctioned to him clearly attracts the application of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and that the view taken by the courts below is contrary to law. In support of his contention, learned counsel cited several decisions of various High Courts. These are 1971 Lab I C 964 (All), 1970 Lab I C 248 (Manipur), 1969 Lab I C 117 (Mys), 1976 Lab I C 534 (Him. Pra) and AIR 1966 SC 492 . 6. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the plaintiff was a habitual absentee. He had been absenting himself without intimation or prior sanction. Pra) and AIR 1966 SC 492 . 6. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the plaintiff was a habitual absentee. He had been absenting himself without intimation or prior sanction. Consequently on the facts found by the courts below R. 14 mentioned above was applicable in terms to the plaintiff and as the services of the plaintiff, who was a temporary employee, were terminated in terms of that rule, he would be deemed to have resigned his appointment. Under these circumstances Article 311 of the Constitution of India could not have any application to the case. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant are well founded. 8. In order to appreciate the controversy it will be necessary to state a few facts. It was not disputed by the defendants at any stage that the plaintiff was not afforded the opportunity contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. It is undisputed that before serving the notice of termination dated 21st of Nov. 1966, the plaintiff was not called upon to show cause against the proposed discharge of his services. The impugned order reads thus : "Services terminated with effect from 7-11-1965 F/N. after availing six months leave on medical ground without pay from 7-5-1965 to 6-11-1965." 9. From a perusal of the written statement filed on behalf of the Union of India as well as the aforesaid order terminating the services of the plaintiff, it seems to have been established beyond doubt that the services of the plaintiff were terminated simply on the ground that he had overstayed the leave or that he had been absent on leave beyond the period permissible under the applicable service rules. It is thus a plain and simple case of discharge of the plaintiff from service on the ground that he absented himself from work beyond the leave available to him. 10. On these facts, I have no manner of doubt that Article 311 of the Constitution of India clearly became attracted to the case of the plaintiff. In Shiv Shanker v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1966 SC 492 ), their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider a somewhat similar situation. 10. On these facts, I have no manner of doubt that Article 311 of the Constitution of India clearly became attracted to the case of the plaintiff. In Shiv Shanker v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1966 SC 492 ), their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider a somewhat similar situation. There also the services of the concerned employee had been terminated on the ground of his having ever-stayed the leave sanctioned to him. His services were sought to be terminated in terms of a service Regulation which was in pari materia with the one with which I am concerned. The plea taken by the Government in that case was that as the services of the concerned employee had been terminated in accordance with the relevant Statutory' Regulations, Article 311 could have no application. This contention was repelled by the Supreme Court. Their Lordships observed : "The order of the Government terminating the services of the incumbent on the ground of having over-stayed the leave sanctioned to him clearly implied removal from service and it amounted to punishing the incumbent on a specific charge and the fact that there existed a statutory rule entitling the Government to terminate the services of an incumbent did not obviate the necessity of complying with Article 311 of the Constutition of India." 11. This decision of the Supreme Court has been followed in almost all the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. All the various High Courts dealing with an identical controversy have unanimously and consistently taken the view that Rule 14, or statutory provisions analogous thereto, do not relieve the Government of the obligation to comply with the mandate of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 12. In B. N. Tripathi v. State of U. P. reported in 1971 Lab I C 964 this court had occasion to consider an identical statutory provision. The controversy was the same. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Shanker v. State of Rajasthan, ( AIR 1966 SC 492 ) (supra) this Court held that removal of a Government servant from service for over-staying his leave without complying with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India was illegal even though it was sanctioned by the service regulations. This Court also observed that the fact that the Government employee was a temporary Government servant made no difference and that the Government was bound to give the opportunity contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution of India to the concerned Government servant before terminating his services on the ground of over-staying leave. 13. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by this Court in the above decision. I am also in agreement with the view expressed by other courts in the cases cited above. 14. The lower appellate Court has sought to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Shanker ( AIR 1966 SC 492 ) (supra) on the ground that the ratio of that case was not available to a temporary employee. I cannot agree. Article 311 of the Constitution is applicable alike to the permanent Government servant and temporary Government servants. The ratio of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Jai Shanker was that the termination of the services of the Government servant on the ground of over-staying leave is per se punishment or removal from service. Their Lordships observed that the removal is removal and if it is punishment for overstaying one's leave an opportunity must be given to the person against whom such an action is proposed no matter how the regulation describes it. That ratio is equally applicable to temporary Government servants. 15. In my opinion, therefore, the lower appellate Court was wrong in seeking to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Shanker. 16. My conclusion, therefore, is that notwithstanding the provisions of R. 14 (c) the termination of the services of the plaintiff without complying with Article 311 of the Constitution of India was unauthorised and it was liable to be declared as null and void. The Courts below have committed an error in dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's suit. 17. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are set aside. The order dated 25-11-1966 purporting to terminate the services of the plaintiff is declared null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff continues in service as workman under the Assistant Engineer Phones (Trunks) and Carrier, Varanasi. The plaintiff shall be entitled to his costs from the Union of India throughout.