Judgment Deoki Nandan, J. 1. BY this application for review of my judgment dated 11th April, 1980 in the above Second Appeal, the plaintiff, who was the respondent in the appeal and is the applicant for review, contends that the judgment suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The error, as pointed out by Mr. Radha Krishna, learned counsel for the applicant for review, is that, while holding that the suit was barred by limitation, I had omitted to consider the provisions of Article 64 of Schedule I to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 which is in the following terms :- "64. For money payable to the plaintiff for money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them-Three years- When the accounts are stated in writing signed by the defendant or his agent duly authorized in this behalf, unless where the debt is, by a simultaneous agreement in writing signed as aforesaid, made payable at a future time, and then when that time arrives." The suit having been filed in the year 1963, it is the Act of 1908 which applies to the present case and not the Limitation Act, 1963, nevertheless, it may be stated that the corresponding Article in the Schedule to the 1963 Act is Article 26, the terms of which are identical with those of Article 64 of the 1908 Act. 2. THE argument was that the accounts were stated by the writing dated the 31st March, 1960 and the sum of Rs. 4,075/- was found due from the defendant to the plaintiff vide-Ext. I. According to learned counsel Ext. 2, the agreement dated 21st May, 1960, which has been treated to be an acknowledgement of liability extending the period of limitation, by allowing the computation of a fresh period of three years from its date, may be said not to contain any promise by the defendant to pay the amount at any future date and in that sense it may be that the accrual of the cause of action for the suit when filed on the basis of the agreement was not postponed by it. But the fact remained that the terms of the agreement did make the amount, which was again acknowledged by the defendant thereby to be due from him, payable at a future time, that future time being the 22nd April, 1963 before which date a suit for its recovery could not be filed in accordance with those terms. Therefore, learned counsel argued that, under Article 64 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 the limitation of three years for the suit had to be computed from the date by which the amount was made payable, and that date being the 22nd April, 1963, the limitation of three years had to be computed from that date. Having heard Mr. Radha Krishna for the plaintiff-respondent applicant and Mr. Rajeshwari Prasad for the defdt. appellant-opposite-party on this review application, I find that there is force in the aforesaid contention raised by Mr. Radha Krishna and my judgment dated 11th April, 1980 does suffer from an error of law apparent on the face of the record. 3. THE agreement dated 21st May, 1960 does not contain any promise by the defendant to pay the amount on any future date but it does entitle the defendant to pay the amount of Rs. 4,075/-, acknowledged by him to be due, by means of instalments or by lump sum as he considers expedient upto 22nd April, 1963 and the plaintiff agreed not to file any suit for recovery of the amount up to that date. THE plaintiff further agreed not to charge any interest from the defendant if the amount was paid on or before the 22nd April, 1963. It is, therefore, clear that if Article 64 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 applied, the amount of the debt acknowledged by the defendant to be due by the agreement could be said to have been simultaneously made payable at a future time, that is latest by the 22nd April, 1963, and that time, by which the amount of debt was so made payable, could not be said to arrive until the date 22nd April, 1963. THE limitation of three years for the suit had, therefore, to be computed from the 22nd April, 1963, and when so computed the suit filed on 18th September, 1963 was filed well within time. 4. MR. THE limitation of three years for the suit had, therefore, to be computed from the 22nd April, 1963, and when so computed the suit filed on 18th September, 1963 was filed well within time. 4. MR. Radha Krishna also invited my attention in this connection to an observation in the case of Kunjilal Ramgopal v. Dwarka Prasad, ILR 1945 All. 35 which had been cited by MR. Rajeshwari Prasad at the hearing of the appeal and is referred to in my judgment sought to be reviewed. That observation is : "If this letter could be treated as a fresh contract between the parties, then of course there would be a cause of action on the expiry of eight or nine days, but it is nobody's case, that this letter embodied a fresh contract." Mr. Radha Krishna contended that the agreement dated the 21st May, 1960 did constitute a fresh agreement between the parties for the payment of the debt which had been found due from the defendant to the plaintiff. But, as observed in the judgment sought to be reviewed, the agreement did not contain any promise by the defendant to pay the amount at any future date and, therefore, it cannot be said that the accrual of the cause of action was postponed on that account. I do not think that the aforesaid observation relied upon by Mr. Radha Krishna can have any impact on the decision. Even as implying a promise to pay, the agreement could not extend limitation more than three years beyond its date. It is the language of Article 64 which requires the computation of limitation from the date when the time for payment as fixed by the agreement arrives. Mr. Radha Krishna also cited a decision of the Patna High Court in Debi Radha Rani v. Ram Dass, AIR 1941 Patna 282. It was held in that case that forbearing of a wife to sue her husband for maintenance on the husband's agreement to pay her a monthly allowance by way of maintenance is an agreement supported by consideration. It has not been contended before me that the agreement dated the 21st May, 1960 between the parties was not supported by consideration. It was held in that case that forbearing of a wife to sue her husband for maintenance on the husband's agreement to pay her a monthly allowance by way of maintenance is an agreement supported by consideration. It has not been contended before me that the agreement dated the 21st May, 1960 between the parties was not supported by consideration. Indeed it was not disputed that the agreement dated the 21st May, 1960 could be a valid basis of the suit in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Hiralal v. Badkulal, AIR 1953 SC 225 . 5. MR. Rajeshwari Prasad, on the other hand, contended that it was not a suit for money payable to the plaintiff for money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them. He said that the term 'accounts stated' had a technical meaning and there must be reciprocal demands between the parties in the mutual dealings entered in there account books before a suit could be said to be for money found due on accounts stated between the parties. It is not possible to accept this contention of MR. Rajeshwari Prasad. The idea of reciprocal demands between the parties comes in when a suit is for balance due on a mutual open and current account where the start of the period of limitation is the date of the close of the year of accounts in which the last item admitted or proved is entered. In the case of a suit from money found due on accounts stated between the parties, the date of the start of limitation is the date on which the accounts are stated in writing signed by the defendant and the money is found due to the plaintiff. It is not necessary in a suit of this kind that there should have been reciprocal demands between the parties. All that is necessary is that the parties should settle the accounts between them, and the person against whom the balance is found due should acknowledge that it is due, in writing signed by him. My attention was invited to Manoklal Mansukhbhai v. Jwaladutt Pilani, AIR 1947 Bombay 135 and Siqueira v. Noronha, AIR 1934 PC 144 in this connection. These cases do not support the contention of MR. Rajeshwari Prasad. My attention was invited to Manoklal Mansukhbhai v. Jwaladutt Pilani, AIR 1947 Bombay 135 and Siqueira v. Noronha, AIR 1934 PC 144 in this connection. These cases do not support the contention of MR. Rajeshwari Prasad. They rather expound the meaning of the term 'accounts stated' in the sense in which I have understood it. Indeed, I am fully supported in the view which I have taken by the law declared by the Supreme Court in Gordon Woodro ffe and Co. v. Sk. M. A. Majid and Co., AIR 1967 SC 181 , para 15. 6. SINCE the only point raised and decided in the Second Appeal was of limitation and the decision on that point has been found hereinabove to be erroneous it is not necessary to hear this Second Appeal over again and to pass any separate judgment therein. In the result, the review application succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment dated 11th April, 1980 in the Second Appeal is set aside. Instead the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs and the decree under appeal for recovery of Rs. 4,900/ with pendente lite and future interest at 6 per cent per annum against the defendants is maintained with costs throughout. Review allowed.