ORDER : B.K. Mehta, J. The petitioners, who are the selectees included in the select list prepared by the Gujarat Public Service Commission for appointment to the posts of Deputy Engineers in the Gujarat Service of Engineers Class II in Irrigation and Building Department, make a grievance against the Communication Department. The aforesaid Gujarat Rules are applicable for recruitment to the posts of Deputy Engineers in both the wings of the Public Works Department. 2. The Gujarat Public Service Commission, for purposes of recruitment to the posts of Gujarat Service of Engineers Class I and Class II, held competitive examination in Jan. 1980 in which the petitioners appeared. All the petitioners have obtained the prescribed number of marks, namely 42% for being eligible for selection in the aforesaid Class II services. The petitioners claim that they obtained a very much higher percentage than prescribed for the selection, and all of them have been placed on the waiting list. It is claimed by the petitioners that in the year 1979, after the Gujarat Rules were framed, 220 vacancies arose in the Irrigation Department, and 45 in the Buildings and Communication Department and all were filled by promotions. The grievance of the petitioners is that out of the aforesaid posts, 142 posts of Deputy Engineers in the Buildings and Communication Department were filled by promotions only during the period between Jan. 1980 and March 31, 1980. Similarly 19 posts of Deputy Engineers in Irrigation Department had been filled by promotion only during the aforesaid period. In spite of the quota rule only 10 direct recruits have been appointed to the posts of Deputy Engineers (Civil) in the Buildings and Communication Department, and only 40 in the Irrigation Department. 3. The Government of Gujarat has issued two circulars of April 20, 1970 and April 4, 1979 laying down the period for which a selection list or a waiting list of the candidates for appointment to the various posts remains in force. According to the circular of 1970, the waiting or selection list would operate only for one year. By the subsequent circular of 1979 this list has been kept alive for two years or till the declaration of the result of the subsequent examination whichever is earlier. 4. According to the circular of 1970, the waiting or selection list would operate only for one year. By the subsequent circular of 1979 this list has been kept alive for two years or till the declaration of the result of the subsequent examination whichever is earlier. 4. The petitioners have learnt that the State Government proposes to promote many more persons from the cadres of Junior Engineers, Supervisors and Overseers to the posts of Deputy Engineers in Class II cadre in spite of the fact that the promotions so far granted have far exceeded the quota earmarked for the promotions. The petitioners believe that the apprehended action of the State Government is under the State Government, which, in violation of the quota rule prescribed under the Bombay Service of Engineers Class I and Class II (Civil) Rules (hereinafter referred to as "the Bombay Rules") appointed on the vacancies in the said service only the service promotees and denied the petitioners the benefit of appointment though they are fully eligible and selected for the said posts. 5. Shortly stated the case of the petitioners is as under : The petitioners are holding Bachelor degree in Civil Engineering. Some of them are also working as Junior Engineers in the services of the State Government while the others are in the employment of private and public agencies. In the relevant recruitment rules framed by the Government of the erstwhile State of Bombay by its resolution of April 29, 1960, i.e. the Bombay Rules, the appointment to the services in Class I and Class II is to be made either by nomination after the competitive examination to be held by the Public Service Commission or by promotion from the lower cadres; provided the ratio of appointment by nomination and promotion was, as far as practicable, 75 : 25. Subsequently, this quota was changed in the year 1966 to 50 : 50. However, in 1979, the Government of the State of Gujarat, in exercise of its power conferred under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, enacted afresh the new rules for recruitment which were called "the Deputy Engineers (Civil) Gujarat Service of Engineers Class II Recruitment Rules, 1979" (hereinafter called "the Gujarat Rules"). The relevant rules were Rr. However, in 1979, the Government of the State of Gujarat, in exercise of its power conferred under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, enacted afresh the new rules for recruitment which were called "the Deputy Engineers (Civil) Gujarat Service of Engineers Class II Recruitment Rules, 1979" (hereinafter called "the Gujarat Rules"). The relevant rules were Rr. 2 and 3 which provided for appointment to the posts of Deputy Engineers in Class II service by direct selection or by promotion of persons of proved merit and efficiency from amongst the persons working in the cadre of Junior Engineers (Civil), Supervisors (Civil) and Overseers (Civil). The ratio prescribed under R. 3 was 1 : 3 that is one by direct selection and three by promotion. The proviso to R. 3, which is the only provision relevant for the purpose of this petition, provided as under : "Provided that if in any year recruitment by direct selection is not made according to the prescribed ratio the short fall of direct recruits shall lapse and shall not be carried forward in the subsequent year." 6. Since about the year 1979, the Public Works Department has been bifurcated into two different departments, namely (i) Irrigation Department and (ii) Building and pressure of the Unions of the Junior Engineers, Supervisors and Overseers in the aforesaid two Wings of the Public Works Department. The quota as prescribed in the Gujarat Rules is mandatory and no departure is permissible as was the case under the Bombay Rules in the exceptional circumstances of non-availability of direct recruits. The petitioners claim that they have a right to be appointed on the posts meant to be manned by the direct recruits according to the quota earmarked for them under the Gujarat Rules and in so far as the State Government is violating the said rule on extraneous consideration, the action would be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and would also result into lapse of quota. The petitioners have, therefore, prayed for a writ of mandamus enjoining the State Government to appoint them to the post of Deputy Engineers in the Public Works Department in the respective wings for which the select lists have been prepared on the basis of the preference expressed by the candidates and for consequential directions to give deemed dates of appointment on the basis of the dates on which they ought to have been so appointed, and also to give them all the benefits to which they are entitled as a result thereof. 7. This petition has been resisted by the State Government by filing affidavits of Shri R. O. Pandya, Joint Secretary to the Government of Gujarat and Shri K. J. Bhatt, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat. The 4th respondent Shri M. V. Patel has also filed his affidavit-in-reply to the petition. Shri R. D. Pandit, who is the petitioner No. 22 has filed affidavit in rejoinder to which Shri K. J. Bhatt, the Deputy Secretary has filed affidavit-in-Sur-rejoinder. This petition has been resisted by the respondent-State that in spite of the requisition was having been sent to the Gujarat Public Service Commission on May 15, 1979 for selection and sending the names of direct recruits for the posts of Deputy Engineers no names were sent by the Commission for the unit of the year 1979 commencing from 1st April 1979 and ending on March 31, 1980 with the result that the quota for direct recruitment for the year 1979-80 had lapsed and the vacancies reserved for the direct recruits were required to be filled in by departmental promotees. As regards the year 1980-81, out of 160 vacancies for the posts of Deputy Engineers arising in all 40 posts were earmarked for direct recruits and the remaining 120 for promotees. The Commission sent 35 names in the month of July, 1980 as against 40 posts. These named persons were appointed accordingly on July 10, 1980. The Commission was again requested on July 8, 1980 to send the remaining five names and one more name on Sept. 5, 1980 since one of the scheduled caste candidates included in the list of the aforesaid 35 candidates failed to accept his appointment. On Sept. 16, 1980, a further request for sending one name was made since the one more candidate out of the aforesaid 35 refused to join duty. 5, 1980 since one of the scheduled caste candidates included in the list of the aforesaid 35 candidates failed to accept his appointment. On Sept. 16, 1980, a further request for sending one name was made since the one more candidate out of the aforesaid 35 refused to join duty. The Commission had sent 5 names from the waiting list who were accordingly appointed. Thus, the quota earmarked for direct recruits has been fulfilled. In the affidavit in reply of Shri K. J. Bhatt, the reason for preferring the financial year to the calendar year as a unit of the period for operation of the quota rule has been stated. It has been explained in the said affidavit that the bifurcation of the Public Works Department into Irrigation department on one hand and Buildings and Communication department on the other was effected from April 1, 1979. The Gujarat Rules came into force with effect from March 29, 1979 providing a ratio of 1:3 for direct recruits and promotees. The requisition was made on the Public Service Commission by the Department by its letter of May 22, 1979 for sending the names of direct recruits so as to fill up the posts which were likely to arise during the year 1979-80. The Commission could not comply with the requisition with the result that the quota for the year 1979-80 lapsed on March 31, 1980 and, therefore, all the posts were required to be filled in by the promotees. As regards the year 1980-81, 96 vacancies arose. Out of these 96 posts, 86 were filled by promotion. But of the aforesaid 86 posts, 16 promotions were on ex-cadre posts and 40 against the short-term posts. Therefore, the quota rule was to be operated for 30 clear vacancies out of which 10 have been filled in by direct recruits whose names were submitted by the Gujarat Public Service Commission on July 4, 1980. The quota earmarked for the direct recruits is thus fulfilled since only 30 posts were to be considered for effective operation of the quota rule. The reasons for preferring financial year to the calendar year has been summed up in the affidavit in-sur-rejoinder as under : "4...... I submit that the State Government has taken the `year' to mean the financial year in applying the ratio prescribed by the Recruitment Rules of 1979. The reasons for preferring financial year to the calendar year has been summed up in the affidavit in-sur-rejoinder as under : "4...... I submit that the State Government has taken the `year' to mean the financial year in applying the ratio prescribed by the Recruitment Rules of 1979. I submit that the decision of the State Government is good for the following reasons :- (i) Because the recruitment Rules came into force with effect from 29-3-1979. (ii) Because the P. W. D. was bifurcated into Buildings and Communication and Irrigation Departments with effect from 1-4-1979. (iii) Because the examinations to be undertaken by the GPSC are normally after the results of the concerned educational institutions are declared in or about the months of May or June. I submit that, therefore, the State Government had adopted financial year as the Unit or the basis for applying the ratio as laid down in the Recruitment Rules of 1979 so far as the posts in question are concerned. I submit that even the definition relied upon by the petitioners and given in section 3 of the General Clauses Act of the word `year' to be considered in the light of section 4 of the General Clauses act itself, I submit that the practice that might be adopted by any other department of the State Government has no relevance in the facts of the present case. I submit that each department can have its own unit for applying the ratio. I submit that, however, the practice that may be followed by one department cannot bind the other department." 8. Mr. N. J. Mehta, appearing for the petitioners raised the following 4 contentions: (1) The operation of the quota rule by the State Government on the basis of the financial year is bad in law, dehors the practice of other departments of the same State Government and not warranted on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. (2) The said basis, assuming it to be legal and valid, has no sanction nor is authorised by the State Government in fact. (3) On the true construction and effect of the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules, it must be confined to such situations only where it is not practicable or feasible to fill in the posts by direct recruitment. (3) On the true construction and effect of the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules, it must be confined to such situations only where it is not practicable or feasible to fill in the posts by direct recruitment. Any other interpretation would permit and enable the authorities to defeat the main enactment as to the quota for each of the sources prescribed in R. 3. (4) The action of the Government in filling up all the vacancies by the service promotees and filling as many as 89 vacancies in the Irrigation Department in the first three months of calendar year 1980 is not only in flagrant violation of the quota rule but is motivated against the direct recruits. 9. Since all the contentions are interrelated, I do not propose to deal with each of them separately. In my opinion, none of the contentions taken singly or jointly has much substance in it. At the outset it must be conceded that for two financial years namely 1979-80 and 1980-81, which have been taken as the basis for operation of the quota rule, only 40 direct recruits have been appointed in the financial year 1980-81 as against 332 vacancies arising in the Public Works Department in the aforesaid two years. It should be noted at this stage that the reply affidavits of the State Government are vague and not precise as to how many vacancies arose in 1979-80 and 1980-81 in each of the wings of the Public Works Department. The petitioners have voiced some grievance about non-compliance by the State Government in disclosing all the relevant material in this behalf in spite of oral directions of this Court (Coram : P. D. Desai, J). I have, however, accepted the averments of the petitioners made in that behalf. However, the grievance of the petitioners would be justified only if their contention can be found acceptable that the action of the State Govt, in preferring the financial year to the calendar year for operation of the quota rule was arbitrary or the term "any year" in the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules is held to be calendar year only. The question, therefore, is as to what meaning should be assigned to the term `year' in the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules. The question, therefore, is as to what meaning should be assigned to the term `year' in the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules. It should be borne in mind that the relevant proviso is to be found in the Gujarat Rules which are enacted in exercise of the power under Article 309 of the Constitution. In other words, the interpretation of the term in the statutory rules enacted in exercise of the Constitutional power is to be made. Article 367 of the Constitution makes S. 20, General Clauses Act applicable for the purposes of interpretation of the Constitution. Article 367 lays down that unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Article 372, apply for the interpretation of the constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India. Article 367, therefore, specifically applies the provisions of the General Clauses Act to the interpretation of all articles of the Constitution. Section 20, General Clauses Act provides as under : "20. Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue any notification, order scheme, rule, form, or bye-law is conferred, then expressions used in the notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, if it is made after the commencement of this Act, shall, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, have the same respective meanings as in the Act or Regulation conferring the power." 10. It is, therefore, urged on behalf of the petitioners that the term `year' as used in the different articles of the Constitution, namely, Articles 311 (2) (a), 290, 273 (1), 275 (1), 170 etc. would mean calendar year as defined in S. 3 (66), General Clauses Act, 1897, and, therefore, the term `year' as used in the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules must also carry the same meaning namely the calendar year. Now, this contention, in my opinion, is entirely misconceived. In the first place, apart from the argument being involved, it overlooks the significant words, namely, "In this Act and in all Central Acts and Regulations" in the definition S. 3 of the General Clauses Act. Now, this contention, in my opinion, is entirely misconceived. In the first place, apart from the argument being involved, it overlooks the significant words, namely, "In this Act and in all Central Acts and Regulations" in the definition S. 3 of the General Clauses Act. The Legislature has provided dictionary of the different terms specified in S. 3 only for the purposes of interpretation of the said term when used in the General Clause Act or in the Central Acts and the Regulations. The argument on behalf of the petitioners runs like this. Since the word `year' is not defined in the Constitution, it should be ascribed the meaning given to the term `year' in S. 3 (66), General Clause Act, as calendar year. Having assigned that meaning to the term `year' in the Constitution, the same meaning must be ascribed to the said expression `year' when used in the Rules enacted under Article 309 of the Constitution, namely, Gujarat Rules in view of the provision contained in S. 20, General Clauses Act. It is really difficult to agree with this involved contention. In the first place, the expression `year' is not defined in Article 366 of the Constitution. Secondly, the term `year' as used in the different Articles of the Constitution cannot have the same meaning as calendar year. As per example, when Article 290-A enjoins a specific sum to be paid out of the consolidated funds of the State of Kerala to Travancore Deveswom Fund or from the consolidated funds of the State of Tamil Nadu to Devaswom Fund for the maintenance of Hindu temples and shrines in the territories transferred to that State on the 1st Nov. 1956 from the State of Travancore-Cochin, it does not and cannot mean calendar year. Similarly the term `year' in Article 275 (1) would not carry the meaning `calendar year' since it provides for grants from consolidated funds in each year to certain States. On the contrary, the term `year' used in the proviso to Article 170 (2) or the third proviso to Article 170 (3) would necessarily mean calendar year. Similarly the term `year' in Article 275 (1) would not carry the meaning `calendar year' since it provides for grants from consolidated funds in each year to certain States. On the contrary, the term `year' used in the proviso to Article 170 (2) or the third proviso to Article 170 (3) would necessarily mean calendar year. Thirdly, assuming that the term `year' in the aforesaid Articles mean calendar year, even then, the expression `any year' in the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules cannot be interpreted on the basis of the meaning that may be required to be assigned to the term `year' used in the other Articles where the context requires that it should mean calendar year. Section 3, General Clauses Act, applies to the Central Acts and the Regulations and not to the Rules. In Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, New Delhi, AIR 1970 SC 494 , a question arose whether on omission of R. 132-A (2) of the Defence of India Rules, a person can be prosecuted for an offence made punishable therein on the application of the principles contained in S. 6, General Clauses Act. The Supreme Court rejecting that contention held that S. 6, General Clauses Act, cannot be invoked when R. 132-A of the Defence of India Rules was omitted for two reasons that S. 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions and it applies when the repeal is of a Central Act or Regulation and not of a Rule. The Supreme Court considered that if S, 6, General Clauses Act, had applied, the complaint against the two accused for offence punishable under S. 132-A would have been instituted even after the repeal of the Rules. It would be necessary to emphasise the significant words in S. 3 which make it applicable only to the Central Acts and the Regulations and not to the Rules. For that reason also the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the term `year' in the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules should be construed as calendar year must be rejected. For that reason also the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the term `year' in the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules should be construed as calendar year must be rejected. The next question which immediately arises is whether the selection of the unit of time for operation of the quota rule by the State Government in the present case, namely, the financial year was arbitrary and without any rational nexus to the provision made in R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules. The grounds assigned for the preference of financial year as a unit of time are, in my opinion, not only rational but just and proper. The Gujarat Rules had come into force with i effect from March 29, 1979. The Public Works Department was divided into two wings, namely Buildings and Communication Department on the one hand and Irrigation Department on the other, with effect from 1st April 1979. The results of the degree or diploma examinations in Engineering institutions concerned in the State are usually declared in the month of May or June every year. If, therefore, having regard to these grounds, particularly first two grounds, the State Government decided to operate the quota rule on the basis of the financial year, I am afraid the petitioners cannot successfully assail it as being arbitrary. On the contrary, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, the operation of the quota rule on the basis of a unit of time other than financial year would have been not only open to criticism but would have created a number of problems in the operation of the rule. If the calendar year had been preferred as urged by the petitioner, the first unit of time namely `any year' after the application of the Gujarat Rules, would have been of a smaller period than 12 months because the calendar year 1979 would have ended on Dec. 31,1979 with the result that the rule would have operated only for a period of nine months. The Gujarat Rules, which came in force on March 29, 1979, could not have been made applicable retrospectively for the period comprising between 1st Jan. to 31st March of the calendar year 1979. 31,1979 with the result that the rule would have operated only for a period of nine months. The Gujarat Rules, which came in force on March 29, 1979, could not have been made applicable retrospectively for the period comprising between 1st Jan. to 31st March of the calendar year 1979. Since the Public Works Department was bifurcated into two wings of (i) Buildings and Communication and (ii) Irrigation with effect from April 1, 1979, the operation of the rule on the basis of financial year would work more harmoniously and effectively in respect of the vacancies arising in the aforesaid two wings than it would have if the quota rule had been operated on the basis of the calendar year. The grievance of the petitioners that in other departments, the unit of time adopted for the quota rule is calendar year does not carry the matter further. It is no doubt true that the State Government by its circular issued in the Revenue Department of Nov. 23, 1977 after the decision of the Supreme Court in N. K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1977 SC 251 directed as under: "As observed by the Supreme Court, the usual practice, sanctioned by the rulings of the Supreme Court is to go by the year as a unit for working out the quota. Here too a calendar year is taken as a basis. Having fixed the quota prescription and having fixed the period of one calendar year as the unit, any appointments in excess of the quota are to be treated as ad hoc or fortuitous leading to the pushing down of such appointees unless it was not practicable to adopt the quota prescription..." I do not think that there is any observation in the decision of the Supreme Court in N. K. Chauhan's case (supra) which enjoined the authorities to prefer calendar year as a unit for working the quota. It is no doubt true that in the Revenue Department the calendar year is taken as the basis. This I do not think would preclude the other departments of the State to adopt another unit of time having regard to their peculiar facts and circumstances. It is equally true that when financial year is intended, the Legislative or the Executive Government expressed the same in clear and unequivocal terms by using precisely the expression `financial year'. This I do not think would preclude the other departments of the State to adopt another unit of time having regard to their peculiar facts and circumstances. It is equally true that when financial year is intended, the Legislative or the Executive Government expressed the same in clear and unequivocal terms by using precisely the expression `financial year'. The absence of that precise expression in the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules does not enjoin the Court to hold that the expression `year' in the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules means either financial year or `calendar year'. Nothing has been pointed out to show that the Public Works Department operated the quota prescribed under the Bombay Rules on the basis other than financial year. The very fact that no such material has been pointed out lends support to the possible view that the practice of the Department was to operate the quota on the basis of financial year even before the Gujarat Rules came in force. If, therefore, the petitioners are not justified to assail this action of the State Government in operation of the quota on the basis of the financial year on any of the two grounds stated above, the prima facie conclusion is that the State Government had operated the quota according to the rule. If the quota is to be operated on the basis of the financial year, the consequence of not complying with the quota at the end of the financial year is provided in the proviso to R. 3 of the Gujarat Rules. The proviso is of widest amplitude and it enjoins that if in any year recruitment by direct selection is not made according to the prescribed ratio, the short-fall of direct recruits shall lapse and shall not be carried forward in the subsequent year. It is urged on behalf of the petitioners that the proviso is to be confined to such situations where the direct recruitment is not feasible and not to the situations where, though direct selection was feasible, it was not made for certain ulterior purposes or not made on account of any inaction or negligence on the part of the authorities. If the proviso is interpreted otherwise, it would permit and enable the authorities to depart from the quota prescribed in the rule. If the proviso is interpreted otherwise, it would permit and enable the authorities to depart from the quota prescribed in the rule. It is accepted principle of interpretation that proviso cannot be construed so as to defeat the main enactment. The proviso would be attracted when the direct recruitment was not possible or could not be made for any valid reason. It cannot be pressed into service where the authorities avoided direct recruitment for mala fide objects or by wilful negligence or for some extraneous reasons. There is no case of mala fide or wilful negligence here. The only ground of the extraneous reason of pressure of Union is not borne out by any reliable evidence. In my opinion the mandate incorporated in the proviso is a wholesome one since it is high time that this fraternal warfare carried on between the direct recruits and promotees comes to an end at some point of time. The well intended provision for carry forward has assumed an obnoxious proportion which not only encourages the never ending conflict between the two wings of the services but has far-reaching repercussions on the careers of the personnel involved in case the Courts find that the quota rule was violative either way. 11. The Supreme Court has recently raised a salutary warning about this disturbing effect of permitting the conflict between the two wings of the services to be carried on without any end. Chief Justice Chandrachud in Kamal Kanti Dutta v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2056 expressed the dangerous consequences of this conflict in the following terms with which I respectfully agree (at p. 1092) : "The disputes between promotees and direct recruits in various departments of the Government seem to have no end. No sooner does one round of litigation come to a decision than is another round started by one party or the other, sometimes alleging, as in these Writ Petitions, that important facts and circumstances were not taken into consideration in the earlier proceedings either because they were suppressed or because though cited, they were overlooked or misunderstood. A virtual review is thus asked for, opening floodgates for fresh litigation. There are few other litigative areas than disputes between members of various services, inter se, where the principle that public policy requires that all litigation must have an end can apply with greater force." 12. A virtual review is thus asked for, opening floodgates for fresh litigation. There are few other litigative areas than disputes between members of various services, inter se, where the principle that public policy requires that all litigation must have an end can apply with greater force." 12. Having regard to the legal position in the present case, I do not think that for the year 1979, it could be urged that the State Government had committed any breach of the quota rule in the Gujarat Rules which came into force with effect from March 29, 1979. On the material furnished and the averments made by the petitioners, for the calendar year 1980, 142 vacancies arose in Buildings and Communication Department (vide Annexure "D"). It appears that the total is not correct. It should be 112 and not 142. Similarly 190 vacancies arose in the same period in the Irrigation Department (vide Annexure "D"). Out of 112 in Building and Communication Department 57 vacancies fell in financial year 1979-80 (i.e. 1-4-79 to 31-3-1980) and 55 in 1980-81. On this basis 14 would be reserved for direct recruits and 10 have been appointed admittedly. Similarly out of 190 vacancies in the Irrigation Department, 89 arose in 1979-80 and 101 in 1980-81. On this basis 25 would be earmarked for direct recruits against which admittedly 40 have been filled in. Thus no serious grievance can be made by the petitioners as to breach of quota rule. I have proceeded on the basis of the material placed by the petitioners and, therefore, the question of non-disclosure of withholding any relevant material by the State Government, if any, would not prejudicially affect the petitioners. 13. In the circumstances, therefore, I am of the opinion that this petition must fail and should be dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. 14. In view of the above, the Civil Applications made in this petition do not survive for orders. 15. Mr. Mehta for the petitioners wants me to continue the interim relief which is granted in this petition so as to enable him to file Letters Patent Appeal against the order dismissing the main petition and obtain appropriate interim relief therein. 14. In view of the above, the Civil Applications made in this petition do not survive for orders. 15. Mr. Mehta for the petitioners wants me to continue the interim relief which is granted in this petition so as to enable him to file Letters Patent Appeal against the order dismissing the main petition and obtain appropriate interim relief therein. I do not think that I will be justified in view of the order which I have made in the main petition to continue the interim relief on the same terms in which it was granted. However, in order to protect the interest of the petitioners, ad interim relief originally granted in this petition will continue subject to the modification that the State Government shall be at liberty to give promotions on the vacancies in the two wings of the Public Works Department, save and except to the extent of 37 substantive vacancies which should be kept open for the petitioners if they ultimately succeed in the Letters Patent Appeal. The State Government shall also be at liberty to give ad hoc promotions on these 37 vacancies on clear understanding that if the petitioners succeed and are to be appointed on these vacancies, the ad hoc promotees will have to be reverted and this clarification will be made in the orders of the respective promotions granted on these 37 vacancies. It is further directed that the Public Service Commission shall not declare the result of the examination which they have held in 1980 for which I am told the list is ready with them for a period of two weeks from today so as to enable the petitioners to obtain appropriate interim relief in this behalf from the Court. Petition dismissed.