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1981 DIGILAW 921 (ALL)

Hargovind Mishra v. State of U. P

1981-10-13

K.N.MISRA

body1981
ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The applicant has by this revision challenged the order dated 19th Sept. 1981 passed by Sri S. D. Paliwal, 1st Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Lucknow, by which he has rejected the application of the revisionist. The allegations of the petitioner was that the A. P. P. had demanded certain illegal gratification from the complainant applicant and he has threatened that if that amount will not be paid to him he will spoil the case of complainant. The complainant had engaged a private counsel and this application was moved through a private counsel. The applicant in this application, which is contained in Annexure 4, prayed that R. D. Gupta, A.P.P., who is said to have demanded illegal gratification from him, be directed to produce case diary in Court and the case diary be ordered to be given to the present counsel to assist the prosecution to lead the evidence in Court. It was further prayed that R. D. Gupta A.P.P., be seperated from the case and action be taken against him. The learned Munsif Magistrate rejected this application and observed that the case diary is a privileged document which cannot be given to any other person and the private counsel can act under the A.P.O. he can assist the A.P.O. and he cannot be allowed to conduct the case. This order has been impugned in this petition. 2. Without expressing any opinion with regard to the submission whether the case diary is a privileged document or not, I find that by the impugned order the trial Court has rightly directed that the complainant's counsel may act under A.P.O. and do not find any infirmity in this part of the order. The private counsel can be engaged by the complainant under the provisions of section 302 Cr. P. C. sub-cl. (2) of section 302 provides that any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader. The complainant, therefore, could engage a private counsel for conducting the case. The trial Magistrate has not rejected the prayer of the complainant so far as engaging a private counsel in the case is concerned. This provision of section 302 Cr. (2) of section 302 provides that any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader. The complainant, therefore, could engage a private counsel for conducting the case. The trial Magistrate has not rejected the prayer of the complainant so far as engaging a private counsel in the case is concerned. This provision of section 302 Cr. P. C. does not say that when a private counsel is engaged by a complainant the case diary is to be handed over to him by the A.P.O. or by the State sub-section (2) of S. 302 further provides that any person may conduct the prosecution personally. If the argument of the learned counsel for the revisionist is accepted then it would mean that any complainant may move any application saying that he would conduct the prosecution personally and, therefore, the case diary be directed to be handed over to him so that he may conduct the case with the assistance of the case diary. I think this cannot be permitted to be done. Under provisions of S. 302 sub-section (2) the complainant or his counsel can certainly conduct the prosecution. In State case the A.P.O. or the state counsel is entrusted with the work of conducting the case on behalf of the complainant. The private counsel, if engaged by the complainant, has therefore, to act under guidance of the A.P.O. He may instruct the A.P.O. in the matter but the case diary cannot be directed to be handed over to the private counsel or to the complainant. 3. The impugned order is in the nature of an interlocutary order, and, therefore, in view of the provisions contained in S. 397, sub-cl. (2), Cr. P. C. the revision is not maintainable against the impugned order. An interlocutory order is one which is passed at some intermediate stage in furtherance of the proceedings for final determination of the case. The framing of charge is a procedural step in the case bringing it to the notice of the accused the charge for which he is being prosecuted. In this view of the matter refusing to frame a particular charge is merely an interlocutory order. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that the impugned order is not an interlocutory order. The framing of charge is a procedural step in the case bringing it to the notice of the accused the charge for which he is being prosecuted. In this view of the matter refusing to frame a particular charge is merely an interlocutory order. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner says that the impugned order is not an interlocutory order. He has argued that because by this order the learned trial Magistrate has refused to amend the charge and, therefore, it is not an interlocutory order. I do not find any substance in this argument. 5. The trial Magistrate has observed that the investigating officer has not recorded statement of the lady and merely on the statement of her husband recorded under section 161 Cr. P. C. he found that no charge under section 363/498 I.P.C. can be framed. There appears to be no error in the impugned order. The charge can be suitably amended by the trial Magistrate if on recording evidence he finds that prima facie case is established for framing charge against the accused for the offence under any other section of the Indian Penal Code and the impugned order refusing to alter the charge or to frame additional charge will not operate as a bar in making alteration in charge, if after recording evidence a prima facie case is found to be established. 6. The order refusing to amend the charge at this stage of the case does not amount to a decision in the case itself. It is merely in the nature of an interlocutory order. It can be challenged after conclusion of the case in appeal or revision against the order of acquittal or conviction. Whether the charge should or should not have been amended cannot be looked by this Court at this stage merely with reference to case diary, specially when no evidence has been recorded. The trial Magistrate does not appear to have acted arbitrarily in refusing to frame charge under sections 363/498 I.P.C. He has recorded reasons in refusing to frame charge under the aforesaid sections and I do not find any infirmity in the order. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the A.P.O. is keeping the case diary with him at his house and he be directed to deposit in court so that his counsel may have access to it and prepare the case. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the A.P.O. is keeping the case diary with him at his house and he be directed to deposit in court so that his counsel may have access to it and prepare the case. I do not find any substance in this argument. The case diary cannot be deposited in Court. Counsel for the complainant may approach the A.P.O. and peruse the case diary if he finds that it will be of some assistance to him in preparing the case. If the A.P.O. refuses to assist him in the matter he can approach the higher authorities, i.e. the District Magistrate or the Senior Superintendent of Police in this behalf. No relief on this point can be granted in the present revision. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the case may be transferred to some other Court. I do not find any substance in this submission. No allegations are made to the effect that the trial Magistrate is in any way prejudiced with the complainant or he is aiding with the accused. In the absence of any such averment I do not think that it will be in the interest of justice to transfer the case to some other Court. 9. No other point is pressed. 10. I find no substance in this revision. It is accordingly rejected.