ORDER V. K. Mehrotra, J. - By its Award dated October, 10, 1979 in a dispute between the petitioner M/s. Omrao Industrial Corporation Private Limited and its workmen, Industrial Tribunal (III) U. P. at Kanpur directed that all the workmen who had received lay off compensation for the months of November and December 1976 shall be paid lay off compensation from January 1, 1977 to December 10, 1977 and from December 12, 1977 onwards for all working days in every month except for such weekly holidays as may have intervened. The employer, it appears did not implement the Award so that the workmen made an application dated March 22, 1980 to the Secretary to Government, U. P. in Labour (A) Department in the prescribed form under Section 6-H(l) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act read with Rule 33 of the Rules framed thereunder. In this application it was prayed that recovery be ordered from the petitioner employer of the amount mentioned against the name of each of the workmen contained in an annexure to that application. The recovery was prayed for to be made under the provisions of Section 6-H(l) of the Act. 2. The Additional Labour Commissioner U. P. of the Kanpur Region, as delegate of the State Government addressed a communication dated April 22, 1980 to the employers through Sri Anil Kumar Sharma intimating him that the employers should appear either themselves or through an authorised representative, along with the relevant records on May 19,1980 at 11 A.M for verification of the claim made by the workmen failing which the entire amount claimed in the application would be treated to be due from the employers and directed to be recovered by (from?) Sri Anil Kumar Sharma, who was one of the Directors of the petitioner. A written objection dated July 25, 1980 was then sent to the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Kanpur (Sri K. P. Srivastava), under whose signatures the earlier communication dated April 22, 1980 had been sent to the petitioner. In this objection it was, inter alia pleaded that the claim which was made by the workmen was not in accordance with the Award and that the amount had been calculated for a continuous period without deducting the weekly holidays so that it could not be accepted to be payable. In this objection it was, inter alia pleaded that the claim which was made by the workmen was not in accordance with the Award and that the amount had been calculated for a continuous period without deducting the weekly holidays so that it could not be accepted to be payable. It was also pointed out that the names of the workmen mentioned in the annexure were not accepted to be correct and that the registers of the employers were with the Income Tax Department and if time was granted to them they will be in a position to prove that the names and the amounts mentioned in the annexure were not correct. The objection was sent by the petitioner under the signatures of one Sri O. P. Gaur who had also prayed, in a separate application, that it be taken on record and heard and decided in the presence of the representatives of the parties. On August 28, 1980 another communication was addressed by the Additional Labour Commissioner, U. P. Kanpur to Sri Anil Kumar Sharma by which he was informed that the matter will be heard and decided by the Additional Labour Commissioner, Kanpur at 11 A.M. on September 8, 1980 and that he should, if he so liked present himself along with the necessary papers before him that day failing which the claim made by the workmen would be treated to be correct and ex parte order would be passed. This communication was admittedly received by Sri Sharma who made a request through his letter dated September 6, 1980 for fixing a date after 25th September, 1980 in the matter for he was to be out of Kanpur on the date fixed, namely September 8, 1980. It was also mentioned in this letter by Sri Sharma that he was only one of the Directors of the petitioner and that the liability lay against the Company and not against him. This letter was addressed by Sri Sharma for M/s. Umrao Industrial Corporation (P) Limited, the petitioner. 3. On October 10, 1980, an ex parte order was passed by the Additional Labour Commissioner U. P. Kanpur directing recovery of the amount claimed by the workmen as arrears of land revenue and for payment thereof to the persons mentioned in the annexure. This letter was addressed by Sri Sharma for M/s. Umrao Industrial Corporation (P) Limited, the petitioner. 3. On October 10, 1980, an ex parte order was passed by the Additional Labour Commissioner U. P. Kanpur directing recovery of the amount claimed by the workmen as arrears of land revenue and for payment thereof to the persons mentioned in the annexure. Following this order the properties of the petitioner were placed under attachment Then the petitioner approached this Court in the present writ petition. 4. The petitioner has prayed that the order passed by the Additional Labour Commissioner on October 10, 1980 be quashed and so also the consequential recovery proceedings. It has also prayed that the first respondent namely, the Additional Labour Commissioner U. P. Kanpur be directed to dispose of the objection filed by the petitioner after hearing it. 5. Sri K. L. Grover has appeared on behalf of the petitioner. His first submission, is that the respondents, particularly the first respondent, was in error in treating Sri Anil Kumar Sharma to be a representative of the petitioner for purpose of the proceedings under S. 6-H of the Act. Says the learned counsel, Anil Kumar Sharma was only one of the Directors and was not bound to represent the petitioner in these proceedings. This submission can in the circumstances of the instant case not be accepted. The first communication which was addressed to the petitioner was, in fact, addressed by the Additional Labour Commissioner, U. P. to Sri Anil Kumar Sharma. That communication (annexure `3' to the writ petition) was admittedly treated by the petitioner to be a communication to itself and an objection (annexure `4' to the writ petition) was filed by the petitioner in pursuance thereof under the signatures of one Sri O. P. Gaur. This was on July 25, 1980. The subsequent communication which emanated from the Additional Labour Commissioner, U. P. to the petitioner was again addressed to Sri Anil Kumar Sharma. That was on August 28, 1980 and of that a copy has been appended as annexure `6' to the writ petition. Shri Sharma replied to this communication through his letter dated September 6, 1980 (annexure `7' to the writ petition) and in it he described himself as having appeared for M/s. Umrao Industrial Corporation (P) Limited. That was on August 28, 1980 and of that a copy has been appended as annexure `6' to the writ petition. Shri Sharma replied to this communication through his letter dated September 6, 1980 (annexure `7' to the writ petition) and in it he described himself as having appeared for M/s. Umrao Industrial Corporation (P) Limited. The objection, in the body of this communication addressed by Sri Sharma, was only to the effect that the liability was not of the Director but of the petitioner. In the totality of circumstances, the conclusion which is inevitable in this case is that Sri Sharma was always treating himself to be the representative of the petitioner and that the petitioner was being represented by him in these proceedings. 6. The next submission of Sri Grover may now be noticed. He has urged that even on the assumption that the petitioner was being represented by Sri Anil Kumar Sharma, it is clear from the facts of the present case that the petitioner did not get an opportunity of presenting its view point before the issuance of the recovery certificate in pursuance of the order dated October 10, 1980. The argument further is that in fairness, the petitioner was entitled to bring before the first respondent necessary facts to establish that the amounts which were being claimed by the various workmen and of which recovery had been directed were not in accordance with the Award and further that some of the persons named in the annexure to the application of the workmen under Section 6-H (1) of the Act were not the workmen who were entitled to receive any lay off compensation under the Award. The submission has been countered by Sri K. P. Agrawal, appearing for the workmen, who has argued that the first respondent had actually offered an opportunity to the petitioner to appear before him on September 8, 1980 through the communication dated August 28, 1980 and that it was the petitioner itself which had failed to avail of that opportunity. As such, it is urged, the petitioner was not entitled to make a grievance in this regard in this Court. 7. In Kays Construction Co. As such, it is urged, the petitioner was not entitled to make a grievance in this regard in this Court. 7. In Kays Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1965 SC 1488 ), it was observed that the nature of proceedings under S. 6-H (1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, was nothing more than that of an enquiry for verification of the claim to money and no determination of benefit in terms of money available to the workmen was involved in it which formed the subject matter of determination under S. 6-H (2) of the Act. The Supreme Court was of the view that the ambit of enquiry under subsec. (1) was limited in relation to the one which was envisaged by the second subsection. Relying on this decision, it was urged for the workmen that the petitioner could not claim, as a matter of right, any opportunity to be associated, in proceedings before the first respondent in the sense that it should have been offered an opportunity by the first respondent to have its say before him. The argument also is that, in any case, the first respondent had actually intimated the petitioner the date on which he would take up the matter and that it was for the petitioner thereafter to have appeared before the first respondent on that date or else, if it wanted adjournment to a future date, it could have found out the next date fixed by the first respondent on the application made by the petitioner. There was no obligation, says the learned counsel, upon the first respondent, as it were, to seek the petitioner and inform it about the order passed by him on the application made by the petitioner. Reliance for this part of his submission was placed by the learned counsel for the workmen upon the decision by a Bench of this Court in M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. Renukot, Mirzapur v. Sri Murari Singh, ((1978) 36 Fac L R 241) : (1978 Lab I C (NOC) 96) (All). Reliance for this part of his submission was placed by the learned counsel for the workmen upon the decision by a Bench of this Court in M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. Renukot, Mirzapur v. Sri Murari Singh, ((1978) 36 Fac L R 241) : (1978 Lab I C (NOC) 96) (All). In particular, he emphasised the observation made by the Bench (at page 244) to the effect that "there is no dispute between the parties that the Labour Court had fixed 15th November, 1971, for recording evidence and hearing of the dispute at Varanasi in the presence of the employer's representatives and the petitioner fully knew that the Labour Court was to hold its sitting at Varanasi on 15th November, 1971. There is further no dispute that no application for adjournment was made by the employers and no representative of the petitioner Company appeared before the Labour Court on 15th November, 1971 although the workman was present and he produced evidence. In the absence of the employer's representative, the Labour Court was justified in recording evidence produced by the workman and in hearing arguments and passing awards on that date. No party has any right to get the proceedings adjourned. The question of adjournment of proceedings depends on the discretion of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. In the instant case, the Management of the petitioner company sent a telegram to the Labour Court at its Gorakhpur address on 9th November, 1971 seeking adjournment of the proceedings which were fixed for hearing on 15th November, 1971 at Varanasi. The Labour Court had already left Gorakhpur before the telegram could reach Gorakhpur. The petitioner's telegram could not be placed before the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court on 15th November, 1971. In the absence of any application or telegram made on behalf of the petitioner-company the Labour Court was justified in proceeding ex parte against the petitioner-company on 15th November, 1971. It was the duty of the employers to have ascertained as to what orders were passed on their telegram for adjournment of the hearing. The employers slept over the matter after sending the telegram for adjournment of the hearing. The Labour Court on its return to headquarters at Gorakhpur received the employer's telegram dated 9th November, 1971, for the adjournment of the hearing. The employers slept over the matter after sending the telegram for adjournment of the hearing. The Labour Court on its return to headquarters at Gorakhpur received the employer's telegram dated 9th November, 1971, for the adjournment of the hearing. Thereupon the Labour Court by its letter dated 18th November 1971 informed the employers that award had been pronounced on 15th November, 1971, at Varanasi " 8. From the facts noticed earlier in this judgment, it is clear that in the present case, the first respondent felt the necessity of associating the petitioner in the proceedings before directing recovery of money under S. 6-H (1) of the Act from it. The first respondent indicated the date fixed by it to the petitioner through its communications dated April 22, 1980 and August 28, 1980. Proceeding to do so, the first respondent acted in consonance with the principles of fair play and natural justice. It is true that the scope of proceedings in sub-sec. (1) of S. 6-H of the Act is very limited and is confined to the verification of the claim made by the workmen in their application made under that section. The verification obviously involves determination of the question about the correctness or otherwise of the amount claimed by the workmen as also about the identity of the persons who are making the claim. If a person is not covered by the Award under which the amount is sought to be recovered or the amount which is attempted to be recovered by recourse to S. 6-H (1) of the Act, is in excess of that due to the workmen entitled to it, the employer is undoubtedly affected in case the claim put forward by the workmen is mechanically implemented. There is, thus, a clear necessity for the authority acting under S. 6-H (1) of the Act to have the view point of the employer before directing recovery of the amount claimed by the workmen under the provision in respect at least of these matters. Such enquiry necessitates the presence of the employer before the authority. A mechanical direction for recovery of the amount claimed by the workmen is not contemplated by the provision. The first respondent was aware of this position when he directed notice to issue to the petitioner. 9. Such enquiry necessitates the presence of the employer before the authority. A mechanical direction for recovery of the amount claimed by the workmen is not contemplated by the provision. The first respondent was aware of this position when he directed notice to issue to the petitioner. 9. The question that remains to be considered is whether the mere indication of the date for consideration of the matter by the first respondent was enough to satisfy the requirement of permitting the employer to have his say in the matter. Prima facie, it appears to be sufficient compliance with the provisions of natural justice. However, in the facts of a particular case, the mere indication of the date and place fixed by the authority, which is considering the matter under S. 6-H (1) of the Act, may not be sufficient fulfilment of the obligation to associate the employer with the determination of the question by the authority. The present is an illustrative case where it cannot be held that the mere fact that by the communication dated August 28, 1980, the petitioner was informed that the matter will be considered by the first respondent on September 8, 1980 at 11A.M. may be treated to be sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to have its say. The intimation dated August 28, 1980 was sent to Sri Anil Kumar Sharma by registered post. Sri Sharma acknowledged its receipt and prayed, through his letter to the first respondent dated September 6, 1980 that since he was to remain out of Kanpur on September 8, 1980 (the date fixed) the proceedings may be adjourned to a future date, preferably after the 25th of the month. There is nothing on the record to show that this communication was not received by the first respondent in due time. Nothing has been brought on record on behalf of the respondents to establish that the prayer made by the petitioner for adjournment was refused by the first respondent. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that the communication praying for an adjournment of the proceedings to a date beyond September 8, 1980 was duly received by the first respondent and that the said respondent, without refusing the request, proceeded to decide the matter in absence of the petitioner by its order dated October 10, 1980. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that the communication praying for an adjournment of the proceedings to a date beyond September 8, 1980 was duly received by the first respondent and that the said respondent, without refusing the request, proceeded to decide the matter in absence of the petitioner by its order dated October 10, 1980. Once having decided to associate the petitioner in the process of verification of the correctness of the claim made by the workmen in their application under S. 6-H(l) of the Act, it was incumbent upon the first respondent to have given an effective opportunity to the petitioner for participating in the proceedings before it. It is clear from the material on the record of the writ petition that such effective opportunity was not given to the petitioner. The first respondent appears to have mechanically accepted the claim made by the workmen for recovery of the amount mentioned against the names of the various persons mentioned in the annexure to the application made by the workmen. 10. The argument that it was the duty of the petitioner to have found out for itself whether its prayer for adjournment of the proceedings was granted or not and to have taken steps for its representative to be present before the first respondent on the date fixed cannot be of help to the respondents in the instant case. It has been averred in paragraph 22 of the petition that the petitioner's representative Sri O. P. Gaur had to appear before the Payment of Wages Authority, Lucknow on July 25, 1980, the date fixed earlier by the first respondent for the disposal of the proceedings before it so that an application for adjournment was got filed before the first respondent by the petitioner. The averment is not disputed. The first respondent took notice of the request for adjournment made on behalf of the petitioner even though neither the petitioner's representative nor its Director, Sri Sharma had actually appeared before him on 25th July, 1980 and fixed another date for proceedings before himself of which intimation was given to the petitioner by sending a notice through post. It is obvious that the first respondent was not insisting upon the personal presence of the representative of the petitioner before it before granting the request for adjournment made on behalf of the petitioner. It is obvious that the first respondent was not insisting upon the personal presence of the representative of the petitioner before it before granting the request for adjournment made on behalf of the petitioner. The first respondent himself sent the intimation about the next date fixed for the proceedings before himself through post to the petitioner by addressing it to Sri Anil Kumar Sharma. Clearly enough, the first respondent was taking recourse to the postal agency for delivery of communications to the petitioner. In this situation, the request for adjournment sent by the petitioner through post on September 6, 1980 which, in the normal course, should have been delivered to the first respondent in the City of Kanpur itself by the date fixed by him, namely, September 8, 1980 should have been considered and either accepted or rejected, with' intimation to the petitioner. This admittedly has not been done in the instant case. 11. The circumstances in which the Division Bench made the observations extracted above in the case of M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation (1978) 36 Fac LR 241 : (1978 Lab IC NOC 96 (All)) were clearly different as would appear from the observations themselves. There, the telegram sent to the Labour Court at its Gorakhpur addressed seeking adjournment was received at Gorakhpur after the Labour Court had already left the place. The Labour Court could obviously not be attributed with any knowledge that a prayer for adjournment had been made by the petitioner-Company to it through a telegram. It proceeded to decide the case ex parte against the petitioner in the circumstances. In the present case, the situation is materially different for, in the circumstances appearing from the affidavits filed in the case, it is apparent that the first respondent would have received the communication dated September 6, 1980 seeking the adjournment of proceedings to a date other than September 8, 1980 fixed by him. In any case, there is nothing on the record of the writ petition to suggest that it was not so received. 12. Requirements of natural justice or of fair play cannot be fitted in any straight jacket. They have to vary from case to case having regard to the circumstances obtaining therein. In any case, there is nothing on the record of the writ petition to suggest that it was not so received. 12. Requirements of natural justice or of fair play cannot be fitted in any straight jacket. They have to vary from case to case having regard to the circumstances obtaining therein. In the present case, the irresistible conclusion from the circumstances brought before this Court is that the petitioner was deprived of opportunity of participating in the verification proceedings before the first respondent and that the order dated October 10, 1980 upon which followed the impugned recovery certificate, was passed by the first respondent without affording the petitioner an effective opportunity of participating in those proceedings, which was contrary to the minimum basic requirements of fair play and equity. Its order dated October 10,1980 can, therefore, not be sustained. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the first respondent dated October 10,1980 (annexure `8' to the petition) as also the proceedings, following it are quashed. The first respondent is directed to consider the matter afresh after giving opportunity to the petitioner to have its say in regard to the verification of the correctness of the claim made by the workmen in their application under S. 6-H(l) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. This, the first respondent shall do within four months. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the petitioner would not unreasonably impede the first respondent in concluding the proceedings within the aforesaid period. In the circumstances of the case, however, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.