JUDGMENT M.P. Mehrotra. J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. A notice under S. 10(2) of the Act was issued to the petitioner Suleman and the same was registered as Case No. 191 of 1978 (this is the number given in the Annexure 8 to the petition, however. in para 11 of the petition it is stated that the number was 199 of 1978). The petitioner filed his objections to the said notice and, inter alia, took certain preliminary objections to the issuance of the said notice under S. 10(2) of the Act. Two preliminary issues were framed by the Prescribed Authority and they were numbered as Nos. 1 and 3. 3. Both the preliminary issues were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 12-9-1978, a true copy of which is Annexure 8 to the petition. Thereafter, an appeal was filed by the petitioner against the said order of the Prescribed Authority and the same was dismissed by the appellate court as not maintainable. The appellate court's judgment is dated 9-12-1978 and a true copy of the same is Annexure 9 to the petition. Thereafter, the proceedings continued before the Prescribed Authority and the order under S. 12 of the Act was passed by the said authority on 6-3-1980, a true copy of which is Annexure 10 to the petition. Thereafter, two cross-appeals were filed against the said order dated 6-3-1980 one was filed by the State and the other by the petitioner. Both the appeals were disposed of by one common judgment dated 14-8-1980, a true copy of which is Annexure 14 to the petition. The State's appeal was allowed and the petitioner's appeal was also partly allowed. While allowing the State's appeal, the appellate court held that two sons of the petitioner Gayoor All and Latif Ali were also minors. The petitioner's appeal, as stated above was partly allowed and the Prescribed Authority was directed to determine whether plots Nos. 714, 322 and 322/1821 were irrigated or not in accordance with the provisions of S. 4-A of the Act. All the other contentions of the petitioner, which he had raised in his appeal, were rejected. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant writ petition and in support thereof. 714, 322 and 322/1821 were irrigated or not in accordance with the provisions of S. 4-A of the Act. All the other contentions of the petitioner, which he had raised in his appeal, were rejected. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant writ petition and in support thereof. I have heard Sri G.N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended before me that issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were wrongly decided by the Prescribed Authority and the notice under S. 10(2) of the Act, which was issued in 1978 to the petitioner, was void and without jurisdiction. He further contended that the orders passed in the earlier ceiling proceedings were binding in the subsequent ceiling proceedings. It should he seen that these contentions were never pressed before the appellate court as is clear from the impugned judgment of the lower appellate court dated 14-8-1980 (Annexure 14). In the said judgment, it has been clearly observed : "No other point has been pressed in the two appeals. The appeals are fit to be decided accordingly". 6. In para 26 of the petition it has been stated : "That respondent 2 has failed to consider that the finding recorded by respondent 3 with regard to issues Nos. 1 and 3 was illegal. The proceedings giving rise to this petition were barred by the principle of res judicata and were not maintainable otherwise too". It will thus be seen that there is no allegation in the petition that before the appellate court, the aforesaid contention was pressed and canvassed. It is true that in the memorandum of petitioner's appeal (Annexure 12 to the petition) ground 4 of the grounds of the appeal did seek to raise the said controversy. However, what is material is that the ground contained in the grounds of appeal is pressed and not merely its existence in the memorandum of appeal vide, Sukhpal Singh v. Kalyan Singh, (AIR 1963 S C 146), wherein it was laid down as follows (at p. 148) :- "The memorandum of appeal does contain the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from, without any argument or narrative as laid down in sub-r. (2) of R. 1, O. XII. Such grounds cannot take the place of the points for determination contemplated by R. 31. ` Not un often certain grounds of objection raised in the memorandum of appeal are not argued or pressed at the hearing and in that case such grounds cannot be taken to be the points for determination and are rightly not discussed in the judgment at all. It is for the appellant to raise the points against the judgment appealed from. He has to submit reasons against its correctness. He cannot just' raise objections in his memorandum of appeal and leave it to the appellate Court to give its decision on those points after going through the record and determining the correctness thereof. It is not for the appellate Court itself to find out what the points for determination can be and then proceed to give a decision on those points'. It should be seen that the controversy raised is not a pure controversy of law but is a mixed question of fact and law and when this controversy was not pressed before the appellate court below, I do not think that the petitioner should be allowed to raise it within the narrow ambit of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Accordingly the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected. 7. The learned counsel next contended that his three sons were major on the relevant date i.e. 8-6-1973 and the lower appellate court erred in holding to the contrary. The appellate court examined the controversy in great detail and held that the evidence led on behalf of the petitioner both documentary and oral, lacked credibility and that much of such evidence had been manufactured for the purposes of the ceiling proceedings. In particular, the extract of the Kutumb Register was criticised on this ground. The expert evidence produced on behalf of the petitioner was also rejected on the ground that the medical practitioner concerned had not carried out the necessary tests which should have been carried out for determining the age of the persons concerned: The appellate court placed reliance on the statement of Ram Swarup, Head Master of Primary School, in which the three sons had studied. He had produced the extracts of the School Register which recorded the dates of birth of the three sons of the petitioner and which established that on the relevant date i.e. 8-6-1973 the said three sons were miners. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, the appellate court could not place reliance on the extract of the School Register and that the statement of Ram Swarup should not have been relied upon as he had no personal knowledge and made his statement on the basis of the entries in the said register. Learned counsel further contended that the' sale deed dated 24-1-1972 in favour of Gayoor Ali should have been considered by the appellate court which clearly established that the said Gayoor Ali was major on 8-6-1973. It was further submitted that the oral evidence led by the petitioner was reliable and should have been believed. 8. Reliance was placed on the following cases : 1. Katwaru Yadav v. Ram Surat Harijan (1964 All L J 1139); 2. Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha (AIR 1965 S C 282): 3. Ram Murti v. State of Haryana (AIR 1970 S C 1029). 9. In Katwaru Yadav's case (supra) Gangeshwar Prasad, J. observed that : "In order that an entry in a public record may be receivable in evidence it is imperative that it should have been made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such record is kept. That is the obvious requirement of S. 35. Evidence Act. under which the entry is relevant. If, therefore, the entry has not been made by a public servant one of the essential ingredients constituting relevancy is lacking in it and the mere fact of its existence in a public record would not impart to it the character of evidence. That is the obvious requirement of S. 35. Evidence Act. under which the entry is relevant. If, therefore, the entry has not been made by a public servant one of the essential ingredients constituting relevancy is lacking in it and the mere fact of its existence in a public record would not impart to it the character of evidence. It is certainly true that if an entry is found in a public record it may be presumed to have been made by the public servant entrusted with the preparation of the record but if it is admitted or clearly proved that the entry is not in the handwriting of the public servant so entrusted, it will have to be established either by evidence or by circumstances that despite the entry not being in his handwriting it was really `made' by him inasmuch as it was at his instance and on his direction that the entry came to find place in the record". 10. In my view, the said decision has no applicability to the facts of the instant case. The ground, on which the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the extracts of the register in question were inadmissible, was that it was not proved in whose handwriting the said register had been maintained. It is correct that Ram Swarup P.W. 3 who had produced the register in the witness-box, clearly admitted that he was not aware of the teacher, who had prepared the same and when the same was prepared. However, this statement cannot be interpreted as an admission that the register had not been prepared in the regular course. The said statement of the witness can only lead to the inference that if the register required proof before it could be read in evidence, then it was not proved in view of the said statement of the said witness. This, however, is a different aspect of the matter and has nothing to do with the proposition which was laid down by Gangeshwar Prasad, J. in the aforesaid case. 11. In Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain, (AIR 1965 S C 282 at p. 286) (supra), it was laid down that : "An entry of birth made in an official record maintained by an illiterate Chowkidar, by somebody else at his request does not come within S. 35, Evidence Act". 12. 11. In Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain, (AIR 1965 S C 282 at p. 286) (supra), it was laid down that : "An entry of birth made in an official record maintained by an illiterate Chowkidar, by somebody else at his request does not come within S. 35, Evidence Act". 12. Again the said proposition has nothing to do with the facts of the instant case. It is not suggested that entry in the School Register was made by some one other than the person who was entrusted with the task of maintaining the register. As I have emphasised above, the learned counsel has contended that the extract of the register could not be relied upon because the witness Ram Swarup had admitted that he had not maintained the register and could not prove the handwriting in which the same had been maintained. 13. In Ram Murti v. State of Haryana, (AIR 1970 S C 1029 at p. 1031) (supra), it was observed : "That Court also took into consideration an unproved and unexhibited school certificate which appears to have been obtained by the Investigating Officer from the Dev Samaj School. According to this certificate the date of Satnam Kaur's birth is stated by the trial Court to be Aug. 5, 1948. We had a look at this document. It is dated Apr. 9, 1965 and purports to certify the date of Satnam Kaur's birth according to the School register to be Nov. 5, 1948 and is signed by some one describing herself as Head Mistress, Dev Samaj Girls' High School. We fail to understand how the Trial Court felt justified in taking his document into consideration and holding the date of birth as entered in this document to be Aug. 5,1948. We, however, need not say anything more about the merits of this document because the counsel for the State in this Court has rightly declined to place any reliance on it". 14. In my view, the facts of the said case were different. A certificate had been issued which purported to certify the date of birth of a student on the basis of the School Register. It was not a case where any extract of the School Register itself was produced or the original register itself was placed before the Court as was done in the instant case. 15. A certificate had been issued which purported to certify the date of birth of a student on the basis of the School Register. It was not a case where any extract of the School Register itself was produced or the original register itself was placed before the Court as was done in the instant case. 15. It may be stated that a few more cases bearing on this aspect of the controversy were cited at the Bar. They are as follows : Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Abnul Wahab, ( AIR 1966 Pat 458 ) where the probative value of a school Admission Register was in question. It was observed (at p. 459) : "Mr. Chaterji has raised some doubt about the admissibility of the entry (Ext. 2) under S. 35, Evidence Act, but it is not necessary for me to decide this question at this stage. Assuming that this is admissible, all that can be deduced from it is that on the basis of someone's statement, it was recorded in the register that the plaintiff was born on 5th Dec. 1900. No one has been examined to prove that he was actually born on that date, nor has any one been examined to prove that he made the statement before the School Authorities at the time of the admission, and that statement made by him was correct. It is, therefore, impossible to say that there is evidence in this case to prove the fact in issue i.e. the fact alleged by the plaintiff that he was born on 5th Dec., 1900". 16. In Gopalan v. Kannan, ( AIR 1959 Ker 12 ), the head note is as follows : - "Entries in Admission Registers kept in private schools cannot be considered as entries made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. Nor can it be said that these registers: are kept in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country within the meaning of S. 35. Evidence Act. The rules in pursuance of which these registers are kept do not show that they have been framed in the exercise of any statutory power by the Government of Madras. In these circumstances, the rules cannot be said to he statutory Rules and thus law within the meaning of S. 35". 17. Evidence Act. The rules in pursuance of which these registers are kept do not show that they have been framed in the exercise of any statutory power by the Government of Madras. In these circumstances, the rules cannot be said to he statutory Rules and thus law within the meaning of S. 35". 17. In Ghanchi Vora Samauddin Isabhai v. State, ( AIR 1970 Guj 178 ), the question again was regarding the probative value of an entry regarding the date of birth as given in it school leading certificate. The controversy was examined with reference to the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949. 18. In Vishnu Maheshwaran Nampoothiri v. Kuruvilla Kuruvilla Kochitty Kurvila. ( AIR 1957 Ker 103 ), a learned Judge of the Kerala High Court laid down as follows (at p. 104) : "The Education Code enjoins upon the Headmaster of each school to prepare and maintain an admission register of the pupils admitted to that particular school, of the several particulars to be entered in such a register, the date of birth of the pupil as stated by the parent or guardian is an important item. Thus there can he no doubt that the admission register is a public record maintained by the Head of the Institution who is in duty bound to maintain such a register containing certain particulars relating to each pupil as required by the Education Code. In making such entries in the admission register, the head of the institution who is a public servant is mereh discharging his official duty. The date of birth as entered in such an official record is a relevant fact as contemplated by S. 35, Evidence Act, and the same can he proved by production of that record. The entry thus made in such an official record by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, has to be presumed to be correct in the absence of other reliable evidence to the contrary." On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel placed reliance on the following cases. 1.In Re. Siram Reddi Simhachalam, (AIR 1960 Andh Pra 253): 2. Ajjarapu Suhbarao v. Pulla Venkata Rama Rao, (AIR 1964 Andh Pra 53); 3. Mohd. Ikram Husain v. State of U. P.. (AIR 1964 S C 1625). 19. 1.In Re. Siram Reddi Simhachalam, (AIR 1960 Andh Pra 253): 2. Ajjarapu Suhbarao v. Pulla Venkata Rama Rao, (AIR 1964 Andh Pra 53); 3. Mohd. Ikram Husain v. State of U. P.. (AIR 1964 S C 1625). 19. In Re Siram Reddi Simhachalam (supra), it was laid down that a register of admissions and withdrawals maintained by a, school in the prescribed form i.e. the form prescribed under the Madras Educational Rules is an official register, and the clerk who maintains such a register is a public servant. The register being an official register, the entries therein are relevant under S. 35. Evidence Act. Seshagiri Rao v. Emperor (1936 Mad W N 111) and Hoak Saing v. Ma E Hla. (AIR 1940 Rang 191), were distinguished on the ground that in the said cases private schools were involved. Reliance was placed on Abheraj Singh v. Gaya Singh, (AIR 1932 Oudh 137), Agajan Khan v. Keshorao. (AIR 1940 Nag 217) and Municipal Board, Aligarh Mumtaz Khan, ( AIR 1948 All 309 ). 20. In Ajjarpu Subharan v. Pulla Venkata Rama Rao, ( AIR 1964 Andh Pra 53) (supra) the Division Bench affirmed the correctness of the preceding decision of the same Court. 21. In Mohd. Ikram Husain v. State of U. P. AIR 1964 S C 1625 at p. 163I (supra) the dispute was about the age of a girl. It was observed : "In the present case Kaniz Fatima was stated to be under age of 18. There were two certified copies from School Registers which showed that on June 20. 1960 she was under 1 years of age. There were also the affidavit of the father stating the date of her birth and the statement of Kaniz Fatima to the police with regard to her own age. These amounted to evidence under the Evidence Act and the entries in the School Registers were made ante item motam . 22. The learned counsel for the petitioner sought to distinguish this case h making it distinction between primary schools and High Schools. The latter are governed by the Intermediate Education Act unlike the former. In my view, this distinction is really not material in the instant case. It is not clear from the record as to in what form the registers were maintained and whether such forms have been prescribed under the Education Code. The latter are governed by the Intermediate Education Act unlike the former. In my view, this distinction is really not material in the instant case. It is not clear from the record as to in what form the registers were maintained and whether such forms have been prescribed under the Education Code. The relevant record is not before me in the instant petition and, therefore, it is not possible to express any opinion on this controversy. However, in my view no interference is called for in the instant petition in respect of the decision of the appellate court on the said controversy. It should be seen that the burden of proof was upon the petitioner who had special means regarding the dates of birth of his children. He led evidence, documentary and oral, and the same was disbelieved. The appellate court has given cogent reasons to establish that the extract of the Kutumbh Register was absolutely unreliable. It was observed by the said Court : "However the entries of this register per se appeared to be forged and concocted and cannot be relied on". In a situation of this kind, it was open to the appellate court to have rejected the claim of the petitioner that his three sons were major on 8-6-73 irrespective of the evidence led on behalf of the State. I do not think that the sale deed dated 24-1-1972 throws any light on the question of the date of birth of Gayur Ali. In the said sale deed nothing has been said about the majority or minority of the vendee. It should further be seen that the date of sale deed is 24-1-1972 i.e. after 24-1-1971 which date has been given a special significance in the ceiling law on account of the fact that on the said date the election manifesto of the Indian National Congress was released on the eve of the mid term Parliamentary poll of 1971 (See the decision (of K.N. Goel, J., in Anurag Kumar v. 4th Addl. District Judge, (Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 2361 of 1977 connected with Writ Petri. No. 2 359 of 1977 and 2360 of 1977 decided on 19-12-1978*). 23. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I do not think that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the three daughters of the petitioner can be accepted. District Judge, (Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 2361 of 1977 connected with Writ Petri. No. 2 359 of 1977 and 2360 of 1977 decided on 19-12-1978*). 23. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I do not think that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the three daughters of the petitioner can be accepted. In my view, the appellate court's finding recorded in the following extract from the judgment of the said court, is unexceptionable : "The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant Suleman is that in his family there are also three minor daughters and the learned prescribed authority has erred in not accepting the same. This contention of the appellant also appears to he false. There is also oral evidence regarding it. In the Kutumb Register filed by the appellant himself, the names of the daughters did not find place, which show that there are no daughters in the family of the appellant. No document regarding them has been produced. The appellant has also not produced any entries of the birth register regarding their birth. In the circumstances. I find that the contention of the appellant that he had three minor daughters is also false." 24. Lastly, it was contended that the plots Nos. 908 and 910 were Abadi and should not have been included in the petitioner's holding. In regard to this controversy the appellate court observed : "In this regard also there is also only oral evidence of the appellant. He has neither produced any Khasra entry to show that these plots are not being ploughed nor has got a commission issued to show the existence of Ahadi at the spot. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a previous notice issued to the appellant which is paper No. 74 in which plot 908 has been shown to he ahadi. Fresh notice under S. 10 (2) was issued to the appellant in supersession of the earlier notice because the earlier notice was defective. Therefore. the contents of this notice cannot he relied on by the appellant. I therefore, find that the appellant is also not able to prove that there is ahadi in plots Nos. 908 and 910". 25. In my view. it is not possible to interfere with the said finding in this writ petition. 26. Therefore. the contents of this notice cannot he relied on by the appellant. I therefore, find that the appellant is also not able to prove that there is ahadi in plots Nos. 908 and 910". 25. In my view. it is not possible to interfere with the said finding in this writ petition. 26. I should like to emphasise here that the jurisdiction which I am exercising in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is dissimilar to the one which is exercised by this Court on its appellate side. See AIR 1964 SC 477 , Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radha Kishanan and AIR 1975 SC 1297 , Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmihai R. Ta1ke). 27. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.