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1981 DIGILAW 96 (GAU)

Debraj Bhumij v. State of Assam

1981-09-02

T.C.DAS

body1981
Das, J.:- The accused-appellant Debraj Bhumij was con­victed on 18.8.75 by the learned Sessions Judge, Jorhat, in Session? Cass No. 86(S-S)/74 under Section 324, I.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year. Originally, the accused-appellant was charged under sections 448/326/324/304 I.P.C. but on scrutiny of the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge found that the above-charges excepting the one under section 324 I.P.C. were not proved and, accordingly, the learned Judge found him not guilty under those charges. 2. The accused-appellant being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction and sentence, has preferred this appeal. 3. To appreciate the various contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant and his criticisms relating to the findings of the learned trial Court, it would be nece­ssary to state briefly the prosecution case at its out set. P.W. 8 Ananta Kumar Gohain, a Head clerk of Atiabari T.E. lodged an ejahar at the Demow Police Out post to the effect that the accused-appellant Debraj Bhumij dealt dao blows on the persons of Kamteswar Baroi and his daughter Rukmini Baroi and also assaulted with dao blows other 4 (four) persons including a child causing grievous injuries to all of them. On receipt of the ejahar at 7 P.M. on 19.12.71 on which date the occurrence took place at about 5.30 P.M. the police started investigation whereupon the appellant was to stand the trial on submission of the charge-sheet by the police. The learned Judicial Magistrate who committed the case to the Court of Sessions framed charges against the accused-appellant under the aforesaid sections of law under sections 448/326/324/304 of the Indian Penal Code. The charge under section 304, I.P.C. was framed due to the subsequent death of the child as a result of the injury sustained by dao blows of the accused appellant. In course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses. According to the prosecution case as narra­ted in course of the trial, the accused run amuck on 19 12.71 and he assaulted one Lulu with a dao blow in the hotel of Sardari, then went to the house of Matiur Rahman and dealt dao blows upon Shanti wife of Matiur Rahman and her six months old son and one Nandi. Threafter the accused came to the house of Kemteswar and similarly dealt Khukri blows on him and on his daughter Rukmini. 4. Threafter the accused came to the house of Kemteswar and similarly dealt Khukri blows on him and on his daughter Rukmini. 4. After scrutiny of the evidence of all the witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the assault caused to other persons except Kamteswar and to his daughter Rukmini, could not be proved beyond all reasonable doubt by the prosecution and the accused-appellant therefore was found not guilty except causing grievous injury to Kamteswar and Rukmini. The prosecution examined Kamteswar as P.W.I 1 and his daughter Rukmini P.W. 12 to substantiate their allega­tions against the accused appellant. The learned Sessions Judge while convicting the accused-appellant under section 324 I.P.C. for causing grievous hurt to P.W. Kamteswar and P.W. Rukmini, relied upon the evidence of P.Ws 11,12,16 and 17 who were according to the learned Judge, the most material witnesses to prove the guilt of the accused appellant. 5. To convict an accused in a criminal case, the burden of proof to prove the guilt of the accused squarely lies on the prosecution. It is a settled law and there cannot be any further opinion in this regard. The expression "burden of proof” has definitely a distinct meaning. Their Lordships in the Supreme Court while explaining the meaning of observed :- "The expression "burden of proof" has two distinct mean­ings (I) the legal burden, that is the burden of establis­hing the guilt, (2) the evidential burden that is the burden of leading evidence. In a criminal trial the burden of proving everything essential to establish the charge against the accused lies upon the prosecution and that burden never shifts. Notwithstanding the general rule that the burden of proof lies exclusively upon the prosecution, in case of certain offences, the burden of proving a particular fact in issue may be led by law upon the accused. The burden resting on the accused in such cases is, however, not so onerous as that which lies on the prosecution and is discharged by proof of a balance of probabilities". 6. Now by applying the above principle strictly, let me consider in this case as to whether the prosecution has been able to discharge the burden to prove the guilt of the accused. 6. Now by applying the above principle strictly, let me consider in this case as to whether the prosecution has been able to discharge the burden to prove the guilt of the accused. Before considering the evidence on this court, mainly the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused under section 324, I.P.C. and for the purpose of considering the correctness of the findings of the learned trial Court, let me consider the various submissions made by Mr. A. K. Bhattacharyya, learned counsel for the appellant. Mr. Bhattacharyya has particularly referred the evidence of P. Ws 11,12,16 and 17 as relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge in basing conviction of the appellant. P.W. 16 Somnath Sangmai is not an eye witness. He has deposed only to the effect that he saw 4/5 persons lying in a bleeding condition in the hospital. These persons were Lulu, Shanti, one small boy and Nandi, Kamteswar and Rukmini. He further deposed that on being asked, Kamteswar told him that Debraj had assaulted them. Similarly, P. W. 17 Jogendra Singh whose evidence the learned Sessions Judge had relied upon, has spoken in the same terms. He is also not an eye­witness to the occurrence. He has stated that on being asked, Kamteswar told him that he had been assaulted by Debraj. Mr. Bhattacharyya, the learned counsel for the appellant hat drawn my attention to the evidence of P. W. 11, Kamteswar Baroi to the effect that if evidence of P. W. It. 16 and IT are read together, it is apparently clear that the evidence of P. Ws 16 and 17 implicating the accused-appellant as the assai­lant of Kamteswar and his daughter Rukmini appears to be inadmissible inasmuch as P.W. 11 who alleged to have stated the fact of assault to P. Ws 15 and 17 as to the injuries in­flicted upon him and to his daughter Rukmini does not find place in his evidence. Nowhere in evidence P.W. 11 he ever stated that he told P. Ws 16 and 17, on being asked by the, about the assault alleged to have been caused by the accused-appellant Debraj. The evidence of P. Ws 16 and 17 are therefore inadmissible and cannot be accepted. The submission of the learned counsel to this effect is acceptable in substance. The evidence of P. Ws 16 and 17 are therefore inadmissible and cannot be accepted. The submission of the learned counsel to this effect is acceptable in substance. I, therefore, hold that the evidence as adduced by P-Ws 16 and 17 are of no value to prove the guilt of the accused. Now the only evidence left for consideration are those of P. Ws 11 and 12. On going through the evidence of P. W. 12, it appears that her evidence and evidence of P.W. 11 differs in all material particulars. Mr. S.S. Rahman, learned Public prosecutor who appears on behalf of the State has submitted that even if the evidence of P.W. 12 is not considered, there is no reason to disbelieve P.W. 11 and the conviction can be based upon the sole testimony of P.W. 11 if otherwise his evidence can be believed. Mr. Rahman has relied upon the evidence of only P.W. 11 to base his submission and has contended before me that if the evidence of P.W. 11 is read 'to assess its face value, it is apparently clear that the accused-appellant Dsbraj caused grievous injuries by khukri blows upon him and on the per­son of his daughter P.W, 12 and that there is no infirmity in the entire evidence of P.W. 11 and can be relied upon to prove the guilt of the accused. 7. Now it appears that the scope for appreciation of evidence has been narrowed down only with regard to the evidence of P. W. 11. It is true that the sole testimony of a witness if relied upon, can be the basis of conviction if it is otherwise found that the guilt of the accused for commissi­on of a particular offence has been established beyond reason­able doubt. Mr. Bhattacharyya, the learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to the following passage from the evidence of P.W. 11 to be considered very seriously to assess his evidence. P.W, 11 in his cross-examination has stated that he had grudge against the accused-appellant as he deposed:- "I had quarrel with him before one month of the occurrence regarding my daughter. Since then I have grudge against him". P.W. 11 has further deposed :- "I was examined by police. I had stated to I.O. about assaults on my shoulder by Debraj. It is not a fact that I had not said so. Since then I have grudge against him". P.W. 11 has further deposed :- "I was examined by police. I had stated to I.O. about assaults on my shoulder by Debraj. It is not a fact that I had not said so. It is not a fact that I had said to I. O. about assaults on Rukmini." P.W. 11 has further stated that he was given khukri blows by the accused on his head. His further evidence is that :- "One person then came and assaulted me from behind on my head by a khukri. The assailant was Debraj. On my raising Hulla, I was given another blow on my shoulder. Rukmini, my daughter was then there. She was also assaulted by the accused with khukri. My wife was then in the house. Her name is Chukumoni. While returning, the accused again assaulted m.5 on my shoulder at the place where the second assault had been given. I chased the accused and snatched away the cover of the Khukri inside my house." 8. On going through the above evidence, it appears that the accused alleged to have caused there assaults one after another on the person of P.W. 11. P.W.I 1 was removed to hos­pital and he was treated by P.W, 1 Dr. Dilip Kumar Barua. P.W. 1 found two injuries on the person of P.W. 11 Kamteswar viz. (a) one incised wound about 3" in length over the occipital bone on the head and the other (b) incised wound on the right shoulder with restrictor movement (sic). Thus the evidence adduced by P.W. 1 has belied the story of causing there assaults on the person of P-W. 11 by the accused. Now let me consider about the assault on P.W. 12, Rukmini, the daugh­ter of P.W. 11. Dr. Surya Kanta Phukan who was examined as P.W. 2 by the prosecution was the Medical Officer of Attabari T.E. He treated the injury of P.W. 12 and found injury viz. one incised wound on the dormal aspect of the left hand. 3" X1/2" X1/2" and the injury he found was simple in nature caused by sharp weapoa. P.W. 11 did not state in his evidence as to what was the nature of injury on the person of P. W. 12. one incised wound on the dormal aspect of the left hand. 3" X1/2" X1/2" and the injury he found was simple in nature caused by sharp weapoa. P.W. 11 did not state in his evidence as to what was the nature of injury on the person of P. W. 12. In the evidence of P.W. 12 she stated :- "I was about to be assaulted on my shoulder but on my raising hand, the assault fell on my hand". Further, in her cross-examination she had stated :- "I had not stated to I.O. that I shouted 'thief, 'thief' and then she was assaulted," The learned public prosecutor has also not placed any reliance on the evidence of P.W. 12. I am convinced that the stand taken by the learned public prosecutor has its full bearing as P.W. 12 did not say any detail of the assault on her person and committed this important fact to be stated to I.O. while she was examined by police. This is a vital omission to be taken note of. From the evidence of P.W. 11 it is clear that besides the family members of P.W. 11, several other persons were present at the time of occurrence who carried him to the hos­pital and whose names were specifically mentioned. These persons were Dasarath, Ram Bharat and Wakul. The prosecution did not examine any of these witnesses named by P.W. 11 nor there was any explanation as regards to their non-examination. 9. On scrutiny of the evidence of P.W. II, the only witness relied upon by the prosecution before me and considering the infirmities appeared in the evidence, it is very difficult to hold that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond all reasonable doubt. It will not be out of way to note that it is apparen­tly clear in the evidence of P.W. 11 Kamteswar that he had grudge against the accused-appellant even from before the occurrence. Secondly this P.W. 11 did not tell to the I.O. that his daughter Rukmini was also assaulted by the accused. Thirdly his evidence was beloved by the evidence of P.W. 1 on the point as discussed easier. Therefore, on his evidence alone it is not safe to uphold the conviction of the accused-appellant and he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 10. Thirdly his evidence was beloved by the evidence of P.W. 1 on the point as discussed easier. Therefore, on his evidence alone it is not safe to uphold the conviction of the accused-appellant and he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 10. In the result, the conviction and sentence upon the accused-appellant passed by the learned Sessions Judge is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The accused-appellant who is already on bail, is discharged from his bail bond. 11. Before parting with the record of the case, I would like to observe that at the close of the judgment, the learned Sessions Judge had noted with deep regret about the conduct of P.W. 18, the Investigating Officer, for giving false evidence with the intention that such evidence be used in the case. No doubt, it is a matter of grave concern and the expression of such displeasure by the learned Sessions Judge is absolutely correct. The learned Sessions Judge on such observations, directed P.W. 18 to stand summary trial for giving false evidence. It is highly desirable that the police Officer who is entrusted to investigate a criminal offence should be very cautious in ex­ercising the duty cast upon them to investigate a crime and to place a correct and true picture before the Court more so when crime to the individual of the society is involved where society at large is also affected.