M.C. JAIN, J.—This revision petition is directed against the order dated 18-11-1980 of the Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur, whereby the plaintiffs application for amendment dated 29-8-1980, was allowed on costs of Rs. 100/-. 2. The facts giving rise to the present revision petition, may, briefly, be stated as under: — 3. The plaintiff respondent Roopa Ram instituted a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment. The eviction was sought on the ground of personal reasonable and bonafide need. In the plaint, originally instituted, the default in payment of rent, was not made the ground for eviction. During the pendency of the suit the plaintiff moved an application under Or. 6, Rule 17 and Sec. 151, C.P.C. for amendment of the plaint. The plaintiff wanted to substitute para No. 3 and further wanted to add para 4(d). In the para sought to be substituted in place of para 3, the plaintiff stated that 22 months rent from 30.9.1978 to 29.7.1980, amounting to Rs. 24,200/- is due, against which on different dates a < sum of Rs. 14 420.63 p. has been paid and now a balance of Rs. 9,779.35 p. is outstanding, which the defendants neither paid, nor tendered. According to the plaintiff, the rate of rent was Rs. 1,100/- p.m. In para 4(d), which is sought to be added, it was stated that more than six months rent has neither been paid, nor tendered, so the defendants have become defaulters in payment of rent and the plaintiffs case is covered under Sec. 13(1) (a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") The plaintiff further sought consequential amendment in paras 5, 6(a) and 8(a). This application for amendment was resisted by the defendants and after hearing the arguments, the learned Additional District Judge allowed the application. Dis-satisfied with the order of the learned Additional District Judge, the defendant Bank have preferred this revision petition. 4. I have heard Shir B.L. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Shri G.R. Singhvi, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. 5. Shir Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that the learned trial court has proceeded to allow the application for amendment placing reliance on a Division Banch decision of this Court in Prem Lal vs. Jadav Chand (1). 4. I have heard Shir B.L. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Shri G.R. Singhvi, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. 5. Shir Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that the learned trial court has proceeded to allow the application for amendment placing reliance on a Division Banch decision of this Court in Prem Lal vs. Jadav Chand (1). Shri Purohit urged that the said decision his no more good law in view of the Supreme Court decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal(2). In view of the Supreme Court decision, termination of tenancy by notice is not essential to furnish to the landlord a cause of action to sue for eviction. Thus, the very basis of Prem Lals case (supra) does not stand and so the trial court ought not to have allowed an additional ground of eviction to be added in the original plaint by way of amendment, as it will furnish a new cause of action. Reliance was placed by Shri Purohit on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Rajeshwar Dayal vs. Padam Kumar Kothari (3) which was overruled by the Division Bench in Prem Lal vs. Jadav Chands case (supra). 6. Shri G.R. Singhvi, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the learned trial court has rightly allowed the amendment, as the nature of the suit and the relief are not changed. Subsequent event can be taken notice of by the Court when the same is brought to its notice and by way of amendment that can be allowed to be brought on record. As during the pendency of the suit more than six months rent had become due and the defendants became defaulters during the pendency of the suit. The Court is empowered under O. 6, Rule 17, or in any case, under Sec.151, C.P.C., to allow such amendment in order to avoid multiplicity of suits or to shorten the litigation. As regards the case of Rajeshwar Dayal v. Padam Kumar Kothari (supra), Shri Singhvi urged that this case does not lay down that an additional ground can never be added by way of amendment. If no fresh inquiry is required to be made, then an amendment can be allowed adding a new ground for eviction. As regards the case of Rajeshwar Dayal v. Padam Kumar Kothari (supra), Shri Singhvi urged that this case does not lay down that an additional ground can never be added by way of amendment. If no fresh inquiry is required to be made, then an amendment can be allowed adding a new ground for eviction. He pointed out that in the facts and circumstances of that case, this Court set aside the order of the trial court allowing amendments. He also submitted that the above S.B. decision of this Court is no longer good law in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. The Motor & General Traders(4). Shri Singhvi also urged that the order allowing amendments does neither occasion failure of justice, nor any irreparable injury would be caused to the defendants, so the revision petition itself is not maintainable. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the opinion that this revision petition is completely devoid of any force and the revision petition can be disposed of even on the preliminary objection raised by Shri Singhvi regarding the maintainability of the revision petition. In this case the issues were framed on 5-1-1979 and thereafter the case was posted for the plaintiffs evidence, but so far no evidence of the plaintiff has been recorded and the plaintiff presented the application for amendment on 29-8-1980. Considering the stage of the case, in my opinion, it is clear and that it cannot be conceived that the amendment, which has been allowed by the trial court, would in any way cause prejudice to the defendants, as it would be open to the defendants to raise all possible defences, which are available to them in the written statement, which they may file to the amended plaint. By the amendment no failure of justice would be occasioned, nor any irreparable injury would be caused to the defendants. On the contrary, the cause of justice would be advanced, as the available grounds for eviction can be fought out by the parties in this litigation and their rights and liabilities with respect to eviction would be finally determined and the parties would not be driven to another litigation. I thus, uphold the preliminary objection. 8. On the contrary, the cause of justice would be advanced, as the available grounds for eviction can be fought out by the parties in this litigation and their rights and liabilities with respect to eviction would be finally determined and the parties would not be driven to another litigation. I thus, uphold the preliminary objection. 8. Having upheld the preliminary objection, although it is not necessary to deal with the other contentions of Shri Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioners, but in view of the fact that Mr. Purohit has asserted and emphasised that as the trial court has proceeded in an erroneous manner relying on a Division Bench decision of this Court and even in face of the Supreme Court decision, the matter should be considered by this Court. Thus, I think it proper to examine the validity of the view expressed by the learned trial court, while allowing the application for amendment. 9. The Division Bench in Prem Lal vs. Jadav Chands case (supra) considered the trend of the Supreme Court decisions and observed that Sec. 13(1) is only as procedural restriction and does not create a substantive right; and it was further observed that the landlord sets out the "grounds of ejectment" in the plaint, not because they constitute his cause of action, but in anticipation of the tenant claiming the protection provided in Sec. 13(1) of the Act, to show that conditions have arisen which have taken away the protection of the tenant and removed the impediment in the way of the landlord for recovering possession. It was held that the grounds mentioned in Sec. 13(1) of the Act do not constitute a necessary part of the cause action for eviction of the tenant from the premises. 10. In Rajeshwar Dayal vs. Padam Kumar Kothari (supra) Shri Jagat Narayan, J., as he then was, took the view that the court has no power either under sec. 153 or under 0.6, R.17, C P.C., to allow an amendment of the plaint so as to include a cause of action which had not accrued on the date of the institution of the suit. 153 or under 0.6, R.17, C P.C., to allow an amendment of the plaint so as to include a cause of action which had not accrued on the date of the institution of the suit. It was also held in that case that in exceptional circumstances the courts may allow an amendment in the plaint in exercise of their inherent power so as to include a cause of action which had not accrued on the date of the suit provided the conditions laid down in Appalasuri vs. Kannamma Nayuralu (5) are satisfied. In that case ground under Sec. 13(1) was sought to be added by amendment, which was allowed by the trial court, but the High Court set aside that order in revision. Rajeshwar Dayals case (supra) was over-ruled by the Division Bench. 11. Now the question is what is the present position of law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal (supra). In that case a Bench consisting of seven judges considered the question as to whether a notice to quit under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is a necessary pre-requisite for an eviction petition under any of the State Rent Acts. His Lordship Untwalia, J., speaking for the Court, considered the whole body of case law and held that determination of lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceedings on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In my opinion in view of these observations it can be said that it is not the termination of tenancy, which furnishes the cause of action but it is the existence of ground of eviction, which furnishes cause of action for eviction. In my opinion in view of these observations it can be said that it is not the termination of tenancy, which furnishes the cause of action but it is the existence of ground of eviction, which furnishes cause of action for eviction. In my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge was in error in placing reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court even after the above Supreme Court decision, although the Division Bench decision can be pressed into service for the purpose of having laid down the law that a new ground for eviction can be allowed to be added by way of amendment and the reason may be that it is necessary to advance the cause of justice and to decide the rights and liabilities for eviction between the parties finally, though, this reasoning may not hold good after the Supreme Court decision that termination of tenancy, furnishes a cause of action for filing a suit for eviction. In the Division Bench case catena of decisions have been considered wherein additional grounds, which have arisen after filing of the suit, have been allowed to be added by way of amendment and reference has been made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateawarlu vs. The Motor & General Traders (supra). In para 6 Krishna Iyer, J , observed as under:— "We think it unfair to drive parties to a new litigation of unknown duration but direct, in the special circumstances of the case (which are peculiar) that (a) the revision before the High Court shall stand dismissed; (b) the Rent Controller will take note of the subsequent development disabling the landlord from seoking eviction on which there is already an adverse finding by the High Court: (c) the landlord be allowed to amend his petition if he has a case for eviction on any other legally permissible ground; and (d) the parties be given fair and full opportunity to file additional pleadings and lead evidence thereon. But we make it clear that the subsequent event that the petitioner had come by a nonresidential accommodation of his own in the same town having been found by the High Court, cannot be canvassed over again. That finding of legal disability cannot be reopened. But we make it clear that the subsequent event that the petitioner had come by a nonresidential accommodation of his own in the same town having been found by the High Court, cannot be canvassed over again. That finding of legal disability cannot be reopened. We keep open for enquiry only grounds, if any, which may reasonably be permitted by amendment if they are of any relevance or use for eviction." 12. The above observations conclude and clinch the matter. I may also profitably refer to a decision of this Court in Nand Kishore vs. Dr. Naraindas (6). In that case a new ground for eviction was allowed to be added by the trial court. The plaintiff sought an amendment for introducing the ground for his personal necessity. The application was resisted on the ground that the fresh cause of action cannot be made the basis for amendment. The Munsif, however, allowed the application. An argument was advanced in the revision petition that no amendment can be permitted under Or.6, Rule 17 for a fresh cause of action for which the plaintiff can bring a fresh suit. It was held that the amendment was allowed by the court below while exercising its inherent jurisdiction and, therefore, the discretion exercised by the court can be interfered with only if some prejudice is caused to the petitioner defendant. It was further observed that the defendant petitioner by filing his written statement can raise all defences which he could have raised if a new suit was brought on a subsequent cause of action and, therefore, it is difficult for to say that the petitioner has in any manner been prejudiced. In view of what I have considered above, this revision petition has no force so it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.