JUDGMENT T.S. Misra, J. - This appeal arises in the following circumstances. The present appellant met with a serious accident on 11-1-1971 having been hit by a motor vehicle which was insured with the new Great Insurance Company, respondent No. 1. On 22-2-1972 the appellant filed a regular civil suit in the court of civil Judge, Faizabad claiming damages with respect to that accident. The Insurance Company aforesaid contested that suit and filed a written statement on 1-5-1972 pleading inter alia that the court of the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and that it should have been filed before the Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act. An issue was framed on that objection which was decided on 21-10-1972. The learned Civil Judge held that he had no jurisdiction in the matter. 22-10-1972 was sunday. The present appellant filed the claim petition before the Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act on 25-10-1972. Along with the claim petition the present appellant also filed an application purporting to be under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the claim petition before the Tribunal. That application under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act was supported by an affidavit. It was opposed by the Insurance Company. The Tribunal rejected that application and declined to condone the delay on the ground that the delay from 11-7-1971 to 22-2-1972 had not been explained. Since the application under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act had been rejected the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition also on the ground of its being barred by time. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed the instant appeal. It is opposed by the Insurance Company, the respondent No. 1. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as also for the respondent No. 1. 3. For the appellant it was urged that the Court below had erred in not condoning the delay under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. It is opposed by the Insurance Company, the respondent No. 1. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as also for the respondent No. 1. 3. For the appellant it was urged that the Court below had erred in not condoning the delay under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. Sub-s. (3) of S. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides that no application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. As pointed out earlier the accident had occurred on 11-1*1971, so in view of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act the application for compensation should have been filed before the Claims Tribunal by 11-7-1971. That was, however, not done. On the other .and a regular Civil Suit was filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, Faizabad, on 22-2-1972. On the objection raised on behalf of the Insurance Company a preliminary issue was framed by the Civil Judge with regard to its jurisdiction and the objection was upheld. The learned Civil Judge held that the Civil Suit was not cognizable by that Court and that a claim petition should have been filed before the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellant's contention is that he had been prosecuting the civil suit in the court of Civil Judge, Faizabad with due diligence and in good faith. He says that he had filed that suit on the advice tendered to him by his counsel and that he continued to prosecute that suit on the basis of that advice. He has also stated in his affidavit that the prosecution of the suit was done in good faith and as soon as the learned Civil Judge held that the suit was not cognizable by his Court he filed the claim petition on 25-10-1972 because 23-10-1972 was Sunday and he had fallen ill on 24-10-1972. He has also stated in his affidavit that the prosecution of the suit was done in good faith and as soon as the learned Civil Judge held that the suit was not cognizable by his Court he filed the claim petition on 25-10-1972 because 23-10-1972 was Sunday and he had fallen ill on 24-10-1972. So with regard to the period spent in litigation in a wrong forum the appellant tried to explain the delay on the ground that he was prosecuting the suit on a mistaken advice given by his counsel. In the affidavit filed in support of the application it was also said in para 8 thereof that he remained confined on account of the accident in the hospital as well as at his house and it took a long time as he had become totally disabled. The averments made in the affidavit of Ram Chandra Gupta dated 21-10-1972 had remained controverted. I have, therefore, to believe what Ram Chandra Gupta had said in his affidavit because there is nothing before me to indicate that the allegations made in that affidavit are wrong. Two things, therefore, emerge from the facts stated in that affidavit; (1) as a result of that accident Ram Chandra Gupta the appellant remained confined in the hospital as well as at his house for a long time and that he had become totally disabled, and (2) that he filed the suit in the Court of the Civil Judge on 22-2-1972 on the advice tendered to him by his counsel and that he continued to prosecute that suit with due diligence and in good faith on the legal advice; hence by reason of S. 14 of the Limitation Act the time from 22-2-1972 to 22-10-1972 shall have to be excluded while computing the period of limitation. The claimant had deposed in his aforesaid affidavit that he had fallen ill on 23rd and 24th Oct., 1972 and then he filed the claim petition on 25-10-1972 before the Claims Tribunal. Since this averment has not been controverted it has to be accepted to be correct that the present appellant had fallen ill on those dates. There was, therefore, sufficient reason for his not filing the claim petition before the Claims Tribunal on 23rd or 24th Oct., 1972. 4. Since this averment has not been controverted it has to be accepted to be correct that the present appellant had fallen ill on those dates. There was, therefore, sufficient reason for his not filing the claim petition before the Claims Tribunal on 23rd or 24th Oct., 1972. 4. It is now to be seen whether the appellant had shown sufficient cause for not making the application before the Claims Tribunal within six months of the occurrence of the accident. The period of six months as pointed out above had expired on 11-7-1971 but the suit was filed by the appellant in the Court of the Civil Judge on 22-2-1972. The delay from 11-7-1971 to 21-2-1972 had, therefore, to be explained. The applicant in his aforesaid affidavit had said that he had remained confined on account of the accident in the hospital as well as at his house and that he had become totally disabled. That fact has also not been controverted by the Insurance Company or by the other opposite party. Consequently, there is no reason to disbelieve the appellant on this score. He had met with the accident and he remained confined to bed in the hospital as also in his house for a long time. He had also become totally disabled. Thus my view is a sufficient cause for not making the application before the Claims Tribunal from the date of the occurrence to 22-2-1972. When a person was confined to bed and had become totally disabled it was not possible for him to claim compensation and approach any lawyer, delay in moving the application for compensation was, therefore, liable to be condoned under S. 5 of the Limitation Act read with sub-sec. (3) of S. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The observation of the Court below that the applicant had not shown sufficient cause for not making the application from 11-7-1974 to 22-2-1972 is, therefore, not correct. In fact the attention of the Court below was not drawn to the averments made in para 8 of the affidavit. The present appellant was, therefore, entitled to the benefits of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act and S. 110A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Court below erred in rejecting the application moved under those provisions of law. The present appellant was, therefore, entitled to the benefits of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act and S. 110A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Court below erred in rejecting the application moved under those provisions of law. In consequence the Court below also erred in rejecting the claim petition as being barred by time. 5. In result, the F.A.F.O. is allowed. The order of the Court below dated 6-12-1975 rejecting the application under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act is set aside and the said application is allowed. The order dated 6-12-1975 rejecting the claim petition on the ground that it is barred by limitation is also set aside. The case is remanded to the Motor Vehicles Tribunal. The Motor Vehicles Tribunal shall now decide the claim petition on merits and in accordance with law. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.