Judgment 1. This second appeal at the instance of the plaintiff is directed against the judgment of reversal of the learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Chapra, by which the plaintiffs suit for eviction, on the ground of expiry of the period of tenancy, has been dismissed. 2. There is a house within the Chapra Municipality. Undisputedly the defendant was inducted in this house by the plaintiff-appellant Baidya Nath Prasad on the execution of a kerayanama by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff on 15th June, 1970, marked Ext. 1. The term of this tenancy was for 11 months, which period expired on 14th May, 1971. When the defendant did not vacate the premises after notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the instant suit was filed for eviction. 3. The defendant contested the suit on the ground, inter alia, that the suit was not maintainable and the defendant had taken a fresh tenancy of the disputed premises from one Jagarnath Prasad, brother of Baidya Nath Prasad, the plaintiff, on 20-7-1971 under a kerayanama marked Ext. A. It appears that subsequent to the institution of the suit on 26-7-1971, the defendant had succeeded in getting a sale deed executed in respect of the said premises from Jagarnath Prasad on 24-7-1972 for which a civil litigation is pending in which one Shanti Devi, said to be an earlier purchaser of the suit premises from Jagarnath as also the present appellant, stand arrayed as defendants. 4. The defence plea did not find favour with the trial court. It, therefore, decreed the suit. The defendant carried the matter in appeal. The lower appellate court allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit mainly on the grounds that the suit was bad for defect of parties, that Ext. 1 is an unregistered document which was not admissible in evidence and that it also stood vitiated on account of the provisions of Sec.3 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act,), This is how the plaintiff has come to this Court in second appeal. 5. Two substantial questions of law that were formulated by the learned single Judge while admitting this second appeal may be found in order No. 5, dated 18-8-1980. 5. Two substantial questions of law that were formulated by the learned single Judge while admitting this second appeal may be found in order No. 5, dated 18-8-1980. In addition to these points a further point that was canvassed before this Court was whether the finding of the lower appellate court as to the suit being bad for defect of parties, was correct and legal? 6. Coming to the mischief introduced by Sec.3 of the Act, in the terms in which Ext. 1 is couched, it is rather difficult to accept the contention of Shri Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent, that the payment of the sum of Rs. 600.00 as mentioned in Ext. 1, would come within the mischief of that section. The provision of law which puts limitation on the rights of a contracting party has to be construed strictly and unless a case comes within the four corners of the mischief created in that provision, the mischief of such a provision cannot be invoked to disentitle the claim of the plaintiff if he is otherwise entitled to the relief claimed by him in accordance with law. Sec.3 of the Act provides that "it shall not be lawful for any person to claim or receive, in consideration of the grant, renewal, or continuance of a tenancy of any building, the payment of any premium, salami fine or any other like sum in addition to the rent, or the payment of any sum exceeding 1 months rent of such building as rent in advance". A sum of Rupees 600.00 was indeed paid under Ext. 1. It was out and out by way of security presumably for payment of the rental of Rs. 100.00 in time as stipulated therein. This amount was to be held by the landlord as security and on determination of the tenancy the landlord was compellable under the terms thereof to return the amount intact to the defendant-respondent. It is, therefore, difficult to conceive that the taking of such amount by way of security on such terms and conditions will come within the mischief of Sec.3 of the Act. The lower appellate court has construed the provisions of Sec.3 wrongly and the contention of Shri Pandey in this regard is negatived. Ext. 1 was executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. The lower appellate court has construed the provisions of Sec.3 wrongly and the contention of Shri Pandey in this regard is negatived. Ext. 1 was executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. This document describes and gives out that the defendant acknowledged Baidya Nath Prasad as the sole landlord of the premises in question. After succeeding in getting the kerayanama (Ext. A) executed by Jagarnath, brother of Baidya Nath, and a sale deed with respect to the premises in question the defendant sought to go back upon the terms of Ext. A and it was contended that since the house belonged both to Baidya Nath and Jagarnath, the suit was bad for defect of parties on account of the non-impleading of the heirs of Jagarnath, who is since dead, as also on account of the plaintiff-appellant alone filing the suit as a sole plaintiff. 7. Sec.116 of the Evidence Act introduces the principle of estoppel against tenant. It states that no tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property, and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given. 8. Having acknowledged the plaintiff-appellant as the sole landlord in Ext. 1. the defendant-respondent will now be estopped from challenging the position asserted and acknowledged by him in Ext. 1. The principle of estoppel will, therefore, stand as a bar to any such contention being raised. 9. There is another aspect also. The definition of the term "landlord" in the Act, if I may say so, is a sweeping one. It includes a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of the building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf or for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant. P.W. 5, the deposing plaintiff, deposed that the premises in question belonged to his mother and brothers as also to him. In view of the partition suit instituted by him, referred to in his deposition, his brothers will not obviously include Jagarnath Prasad. In such a situation the suit cannot be held to be bad for defect of parties on account of the non-impleading of the heirs of Jagarnath Prasad who, as stated above, has since died. 10. Relying on a decision of a Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Nanalal Girdharlal V/s. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala, AIR 1973 Guj 131 , Shri Pandey submitted that in view of this decision the suit instituted by the plaintiff was not maintainable as the plaintiff alone, who was a mere co-sharer, cannot file a suit for eviction of the tenant inducted. The facts of the aforesaid Full Bench decision related to a case under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act and are distinguishable. This decision cannot, therefore, come to the rescue of the respondent. 11. In Ext. 1 the defendant acknowledged the right of the plaintiff-landlord to get the house vacated by him in accordance with law in appropriate circumstances. Having made such stipulation in Ext. 1, the defendant cannot be allowed to resile from that position and will be estopped from doing so. Under the Hindu Law, a Karta of a joint family is entitled to maintain a suit not only on his behalf but on behalf of the other members of the joint family. The instant suit has been instituted by the plaintiff in his capacity as Karta. Submission of Shri Pandey was that the Act in question being a special law, the principles of Hindu Law will not apply. Provisions of special law may, in appropriate circumstances, prevail over the general law, in case there be any inconsistency. Shri Pandey, however, failed to point out to me any provision in the Act which may disentitle a Karta of a Hindu joint family from instituting a suit for eviction based on a contract in which the tenant clothes him with such a right. This being so, this contention is not acceptable to me. 12. Coming to the inadmissibility of Ext. 1 as held by the lower appellate Court this document creates a tenancy in respect of the suit premises governed by the Act. This being so, this contention is not acceptable to me. 12. Coming to the inadmissibility of Ext. 1 as held by the lower appellate Court this document creates a tenancy in respect of the suit premises governed by the Act. The period of the tenancy is 6 months which is not covered by the periods mentioned in the Act. In such a situation, such an agreement as Ext. 1 will not require registration. Shri Ahmad, learned counsel for the appellant, relied in this connection on a decision of this Court in Om Prakash V/s. Additional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna, AIR 1955 Pat 305 in support of his contention. His contention is acceptable it is accepted and the finding of the lower appellate court is held to be wrong. 13. The last submission of Shri Pandey was that considering the narrow scope of this litigation coming up in this second appeal any finding given herein or observations made need not affect Title Suit No. 121 of 1974 pending in the court of Subordinate Judge, First, Chapra. This contention has merit and it is observed that any finding given of observation made in this second appeal is not intended to deter the court concerned from deciding the said title suit in accordance with law. 14. The result is that this appeal has to be allowed and it is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate court are set aside and those of the trial court are restored and the plaintiffs suit stands decreed. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case there shall be no order for costs of this second appeal and the parties shall bear their own costs.