JUDGMENT K.M. Dayal, J. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. This is a plaintiffs' Second Appeal. The suit of the plaintiff has been decreed by both the courts below, the plaintiffs filed suit for cancellation of the decree dated 12-9-52 passed in suit no. 1299 of 1952 of the court oi the Judicial Officer (Sub-Divisional Officer). The other reliefs claimed were a declaration that the plaintiffs were Bhumidhar of the disputed land and prior to the enforcement of the U.P.Z.A. & L. R. Act they were grove holder thereof. The relief of injunction and in the alternative possession was also claimed. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the finding of the court below that the suit for cancellation of the decree was time barred, was not correct. No Amaldaramad had been made till 1372F as is evident from the record. That question looses its importance due to fact that the courts below have given concurrent finding that the suit no. 1299 of 1952 was filed after abolition of Zamindari and consequently the decree passed therein on the basis of the compromise was without jurisdiction and ineffective. Learned counsel for the respondents drew my attention to the verification of the compromise made on the back of the compromise application i.e. (Paper no. 24-C) Ext. A. 7. From the verification made by the counsel at the bottom of this document it appears that the verification was made on 28-6-52. It is also noted on the top of the verification as 28-6-52. Learned counsel for the appellants, however, argued that this document seems to be erroneous as in the decree (Ext. 3) and the judgment Ext. A. 1 the date of the institution (Tarikh Marjuwa) is mentioned as 28-7-52. From this document there appears to be some confusion or mistake in either of the copies. From the judgment as well as from the application (69-C) I find that the original record of that case was summoned and it was before the court. Some times after dismissal of suit in default, the date of restoration is recorded in the revenue courts as date of institution. In the circumstances, the finding of the courts below holding that the suit had been filed after abolition of the Zamindari that is after the repeal of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, has to be set aside. Some times after dismissal of suit in default, the date of restoration is recorded in the revenue courts as date of institution. In the circumstances, the finding of the courts below holding that the suit had been filed after abolition of the Zamindari that is after the repeal of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, has to be set aside. An enquiry about the date of institution of the suit has to be made. 3. The other argument of the learned counsel for the applicants was that since 1335F the appellants were recorded as hereditary tenant under class 3 and they had been so recorded even in 1359F i.e. the year ending by 30th June, 1952 and even in 1372F. Certified copy of Khatauni of 1372F, is paper no. Ga. 7. As this is a certified copy, I do not understand why it was not exhibited. But it is clear from this document that the plaintiffs have been recorded as Sirdar. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, argued that the plaintiff claimed himself to be Bhumidhar. After he failed to prove himself as Bhumidhar, his suit was liable to be dismissed. I do not agree with the same. In case the plaintiff proves that he had lesser right i.e. the right of Sirdar, he was entitled to an injunction against defendant. In the circumstances, the courts below could not have held that merely because the plaintiff was not a grove-holder, he could not be granted injunction. Learned counsel for the respondents further argued that the finding of possession was in favour of the defendant-respondent. May it be so, it is borne out from the plaint that a decree of possession was also sought. In the circumstances the suit was not hit by Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L. R. Act nor by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 5. The last argument of the learned counsel for the appellants was that in view of Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L. R. Act the suit was cognisable by the revenue court and not by the civil court. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L. R. Act does not permit such objection to be raised at the appellate Stage. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L. R. Act does not permit such objection to be raised at the appellate Stage. However as held above, the earlier decree which has been held to be without jurisdiction by the courts below does not seem to be like that and further the effect of the entries in favour of the plaintiff from 1335F to 1359F and subsequently has not been appreciated by the courts below. 6. In the result, the judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside and the case is sent down to it for deciding afresh in accordance with law and observations made above. There will be no older as to costs.