JUDGMENT N. D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner was served with notices of demand requiring it to deposit a total sum of Rs. 84,586.74 as its contribution under the Employee's State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.). The State Government had by a notification dated 22nd Feb, 1966, appointed Additional District Magistrates (Judicial) to be the Presiding Officers of the Employee's Insurance Court constituted under S. 74 of the Act An application was moved by the petitioner purporting to be under Sections 75, 76 and 77 of the Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad (respondent No. 3) challenging the aforesaid demand. Respondent no.3 by an order dated 27th Aug, 1974, held that since the power to act as Employee's Insurance Court under S. 74 of the Act had been conferred on Additional District Magistrates (Judicial) and that post had been abolished the application could not be decided by him inasmuch as he was not an Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) but was a Chief Judicial Magistrate. This writ petition "was filed by the petitioner challenging the aforesaid order passed by respondent No. 3. 2. It appears that during the pendency of the writ petition the State Government issued another notification dated 17th Feb, 1975, whereby it conferred the power of Employee's Insurance Court on all the executive magistrates in certain districts including Allahabad where the petitioner carries on its business. An application for amendment was made by the petitioner on 6th May, 1975, with a prayer that the notification dated 17th Feb, 1975, copy whereof had been attached as Annexure VII, may be quashed. The ground on which this notification is sought to be quashed is that sub-s. (3) of S. 74 contemplates that only such person can be appointed to be the presiding officer of Employee's Insurance Court who is or has been a Judicial Officer or is a legal practitioner of five year's standing. On that application notice was issued on 29th July, 1975. 3. Having heard counsel for the parties we find that the amendment application deserves to be allowed and it is accordingly allowed. We have heard counsel for the parties on the basis of the amended writ petition. 4. The only point which has been urged by the counsel for the petitioner is that the notification dated 17th Feb, 1975, deserves to be quashed on the ground already stated above. We have heard counsel for the parties on the basis of the amended writ petition. 4. The only point which has been urged by the counsel for the petitioner is that the notification dated 17th Feb, 1975, deserves to be quashed on the ground already stated above. We, however, find it difficult to accept this submission. 5. As seen above, the qualification to be a Judge of the Employee's Insurance Court is that the person who is to be appointed as a Presiding Officer of that Court is or has been a Judicial Officer or a legal practitioner of five year's standing. In the instant case we are not concerned with the latter requirement inasmuch as the executive magistrates have been conferred with the power of Employee's Insurance Court by the impugned notification on the basis that they are Judicial Officers within the meaning of sub-s. (3) of S. 74 of the Act. S. 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure classifies the classes of criminal Courts. They are : (1) Court of Session; (2) Judicial Magistrates of the First Class, and in metropolitan area, Metropolitan Magistrate; (3) Judicial Magistrates of the Second Class, and (4) Executive Magistrates. In view of S. 6, therefore, executive magistrates constitute criminal Courts. In Mammoo v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1980 Ker. 18 ) a Full Bench of that court held that (at p. 20) : "The functions exercisable by the executive Magistrates under the Code of 1973 are not necessarily executive. They are invested with judicial functions also under the Code. Under S. 133 of the Code Executive Magistrates have the power to order the removal of nuisance. Under S. 145 of the Code they have power to determine dispute concerning land or water if such dispute is likely to cause breach of the peace." The question as to whether an executive magistrate could be said to be a judicial officer came up for consideration squarely before the Supreme Court in Statesmen (Pvt.) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb ( AIR 1968 SC 1495 ): (1968 Lab IC 1525). In that case an executive magistrate had been appointed a Presiding Officers of a Labour Court under S. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Sub-s. (3) of S. 7 prescribes the qualification for appointment of the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court. Cl. In that case an executive magistrate had been appointed a Presiding Officers of a Labour Court under S. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Sub-s. (3) of S. 7 prescribes the qualification for appointment of the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court. Cl. (d) of sub-s. (3) reads as follows : "(d) He has held any judicial office in India for not less than 7 years; or" From para 6 of the judgment it appears that between Jan. 23, 1940 and July 26, 1959 Sri Hem Ranjan Deb who had been appointed a Presiding Officer of the Labour Court under S. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act had worked in various capacities as magistrate and on July 27, 1959, by a notification issued in this behalf he was appointed the Presiding Officer of the Second Labour Court. The question urged before the Supreme Court was that Mr. Deb did not fulfil the requisite qualification of being a judicial officer of not less than 7 year's standing notwithstanding the fact that he had been an executive magistrate - for much more than 7 years; The argument was repelled. It was, after referring to a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, held that: "It is not necessary, to go over this field. All learned Judges seem to agree that a magistrate exercises Judicial function. This does not admit of any doubt and no reasons are required. That his duties are partly judicial and partly other do not, in any way, detract from the position that while acting as a magistrate he is a judicial officer." Various reasons were given for the aforesaid finding which we do not find necessary to repeat. In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the impugned notification dated 17th Feb., 1975, appointing executive magistrates as Presiding Officers of the Employee's State Insurance Court does not deserve to be quashed on the ground Urged by the counsel for the petitioner. The application made by the petitioner under Sections 75, 76 and 77 of the Act was not decided by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad, respondent No. 3, on merits, but on the finding that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the same it was ordered to be returned for presentation before the appropriate court. The application made by the petitioner under Sections 75, 76 and 77 of the Act was not decided by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad, respondent No. 3, on merits, but on the finding that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the same it was ordered to be returned for presentation before the appropriate court. Now that the executive magistrates in the district of Allahabad have been appointed as Presiding Officers of the State Employees Insurance Court by the notification dated 17th Feb., 1975, the aforesaid application made by the petitioner is to be decided by the appropriate "Employee's Insurance Court. We have already held that the notification dated 17th Feb. 1975, does not deserve to be quashed. In this view of the matter the course open to the petitioner is to take back his application aforesaid in pursuance of the impugned order and to file it before the appropriate Employee's Insurance Court constituted under the notification dated 17th Feb., 1975. 6. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.