JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - In this reference dated December 17, 1976, the learned Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur, has recommended that the order of the learned trial court dated March 20, 1976 by which the restoration application by the Gaon Sabha was allowed, may be set aside and the case be sent back to the learned trial court for fresh trial. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and have also perused the record. 3. The facts of the case in brief are that the plaintiff-revisionist Jagropan filed a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act against the State and the Gaon Sabha defendants/opposite-parties, the written statement was filed by the State and none by the Gaon Sabha, and the suit was decreed on December 4, 1972. On December 10, 1973, an application was filed by the Pradhan Gaon Sabha that the ex parte decree against the Gaon Sabha may be set aside. The learned trial court on March 20, 1976, allowed the application and set aside the ex parte decree against which the plaintiff went in revision before the learned Additional Commissioner who has made the above reference. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the D.G.C. (R) had appeared on behalf of the State and the Gaon Sabha both as is clear from the memo of appearance dated September 12, 1972 and it must be presumed that the Gaon Sabha had been duly informed. In support, he has cited a ruling reported in 1976 R.D. 223 and another ruling of a Division Bench reported in 1975 R.D. 329. In the former case, it was held that the knowledge by the Gaon Sabha must be legally presumed throughout the process of litigation in view of the physical presence of its standing counsel in court though ostensibly on behalf of the State alone. The learned counsel has not shown the applicability of the latter ruling and I alone do not find it applicable here. The learned D.G.C. (R) for the Gaon Sabha has pointed out that the L.M.C. by its resolution dated December 9, 1973 authorised the Pradhan Ram Nath to do Pairvi on behalf of the L.M.C. This resolution clearly shows that the L.M.C. had no notice of the suit decreed against it. The learned D.G.C. (R) for the Gaon Sabha has pointed out that the L.M.C. by its resolution dated December 9, 1973 authorised the Pradhan Ram Nath to do Pairvi on behalf of the L.M.C. This resolution clearly shows that the L.M.C. had no notice of the suit decreed against it. The learned D.G.C. (R) has argued that the D.G.C. in that district mainly appeared for the State and not for the Gaon Sabha unless he had instructions also from the Gaon Sabha concerned. If was just in a routine manner that a printed memo of appearance had been filed which did not even indicate for which Gaon Sabha he was appearing lie further argued that there is a ruling by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1400, to the effect that a party should not suffer for the lapse of his counsel. The precise wordings are that no party shall suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission or misdemeanour of his agent. While entirely agreeing with and following this view, I am further to observe that a D.G.C. doing Pairvi for the Gaon Sabha is more than one ways different than a particular counsel engaged by any other individual. A D.G.C. at the district headquarters is also a panel lawyer for the Gaon Sabhas under Section 127-B of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act and by way of routine precaution he does put up his appearance on behalf of State and the Gaon Sabha both but without instructions, he cannot file any written statement His powers also are very limited as would be clear from section 127-B(4) of the Act. He does not enjoy full authorisation. Without prior sanction of the L.M.C. accorded by its resolution, he cannot enter into any agreement or compromise with reference to or withdraw from any suit or other proceedings on behalf of a Gaon Sabha. This provision of law cannot be overlooked. Unless the plaintiff is able to show that the L.M.C. had been served with a notice, it is hazardous to presume on the basis of the appearance by the D.G.C. in a most general manner that the L.M.C. had been duty informed. This provision of law cannot be overlooked. Unless the plaintiff is able to show that the L.M.C. had been served with a notice, it is hazardous to presume on the basis of the appearance by the D.G.C. in a most general manner that the L.M.C. had been duty informed. In the ruling by esteemed Member, Board of Revenue (1976 R.D. 228), it is not revealed as to whether the D.G.C. was appearing on his own or on the instructions of the L.M.C. Hence, it must, be distinguished from the present case, on account of the limitations imposed by Section 127-B(4) of tho Act and want of evidence showing knowledge to L.M.C. 5. Even the Pradhan cannot take the place of L.M.C. for he also is only a limited Pairokar without any discretionary powers. Vide Para 128 of the Gaon Sabha and L.M.C. Manual, the conduct of Gaon Sabha litigation does net depend upon the individual discretion of the Chairman of the L.M.C. but is a matter of resolution of the L.M.C. The learned Additional Commissioner has obviously conceded to the finding by the learned trial court that the service of summons to Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha was Farzi and has only from the appearance of the D.G.C. concluded knowledge to the Gaon Sabha or L.M.C. Obviously, this conclusion is not well-founded, in view of the legal position shown above. Since there was no other evidence to show that the L.M.C. had any information of the earlier litigation prior to the resolution dated December 9, 1973, the restoration application must be deemed to be within limitation. Accordingly, no question of consideration of a finding on the application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act arises. 6. This being the only ground for the reference, it loses all force. In fact, the learned first appellate court has not found any error in the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned trial court for a mistaken finding on consideration of all evidence does not amount, to an irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. It may further be observed that the learned trial court exercised its discretion in favour of hearing and a revisional court should not take upon itself burden to shut out hearing. This is sup ported by the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed in the ruling reported in 1978 Allahabad Kent Cases page 498. 7. It may further be observed that the learned trial court exercised its discretion in favour of hearing and a revisional court should not take upon itself burden to shut out hearing. This is sup ported by the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed in the ruling reported in 1978 Allahabad Kent Cases page 498. 7. In consequence, the reference cannot be accented and the revision petition is rejected.