JUDGMENT K.M. Dayal, J. - This is plaintiff s appeal. The undisputed facts of the case are that plaintiff was appointed as a Sanskrit teacher by an application letter dated 20-8-64 (Ex. 4). The next day an application for approval was sent to the management which has been filed by the defendants and is paper No. 4371 (306) on record, i. e., the statement sent to the Deputy Inspector of Schools. In column 9 of that statement, the appointment has been shown to have been made on one years probation. In column 12 of the same the following is mentioned. "Appointed in place of Sri Gautam Deo Shastri, who did not join the institution. Fresh vacancy under three language scheme. The approval should have been given within two weeks, hut in the instant case it has been given late."Ex. A-1 dated 5-6-65 is the letter of approval of the Inspector of Schools. In that letter as w ell it was mentioned that the approval of the petitioner on probation of one year was granted under the three language scheme. The petitioner continued to work in the institution till June, 1972. On 30th June, 1972, a notice was served on the petitioner which has been filed along with the complaint, that is Ex. 10. That notice is dated 16-5-1972 and is on an inland letter card. In that letter it is mentioned that the plaintiff was appointed on a temporary post under a temporary three language scheme, as no approval of the Inspector of Schools, Bulandshahr was received. His services were illegal. Therefore, his services would stand terminated on 30th June, 1972. It w as further mentioned in that letter that to fill up the vacancy under three language scheme, the post will be advertised in the newspaper again and in case the plaintiff wanted to apply again, he could do so. The plaintiff alleged that this letter of termination was wholly illegal and void and did not terminate his services. He accordingly filed the instant suit claiming and injunction against the defendants that they be restrained from interfering in the working of the plaintiff in the institution. According to the plaint allegations, the plaintiff was appointed on probation and thereafter he became permanent. It is accepted by the defendants as well that during that period he was treated as permanent. 2. According to the plaint allegations, the plaintiff was appointed on probation and thereafter he became permanent. It is accepted by the defendants as well that during that period he was treated as permanent. 2. After considering the case of the parties and the evidence led by them, the suit was decreed by the Trial Court. The lower appellate court, however, has dismissed the suit and reserved the decree. According to the findings of the lower appellate Court in respect of the fact that the plaintiff was treated as a permanent teacher throughout, the scheme it self being temporary, his appointment must be deemed to be temporary. Without any plea on the part of the Inspector or the defendants, the Court below also recorded a finding that the formal approval dated 5-7-65 Ex. A-1 would also have no effect and the Inspector acted illegally in according approval to the appointment of the petitioner on probation. The Inspector of Schools has not been examined nor there was any statement of any other person on his behalf to show that the Inspector approved the appointment of the plaintiff in a temporary capacity. Still the Court below surmised and held that the approval to the appointment of the plaintiff was as a temporary measure alone. It also gave a finding in para 9 of the judgment that the scheme was temporary and the appointment of the plaintiff was absolutely temporary. On these findings he allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has come up in this appeal. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has produced before me a copy of G.O. No. A/2673/XV-3422/1956, dated June, 10, 1963. After a perusal of that G.O., I am satisfied that the scheme w as not temporary. It prescribed the syllabus under the scheme for clauses 6 to 8. It also did not use the word for the time being or any other such word which could indicate that the scheme was temporary. Another G.O. that has been produced by the learned counsel before me is G.O. No. Shiksha (A)/835/XV-342 65 dated Lucknow, March 16, 1963. This document states that the Government after full consideration has decided to adopt the formula. There is another G.. dated 5th September, 1972 that is in the shape of clarification from Joint Secretary, U.P. Government to Additional Director of Education. This document states that the Government after full consideration has decided to adopt the formula. There is another G.. dated 5th September, 1972 that is in the shape of clarification from Joint Secretary, U.P. Government to Additional Director of Education. The letter says that the three Language Formula Scheme was not temporary and the-same rules and regulations shall apply to the teachers under the scheme which apply to other teachers. It is, thus, clear that the scheme was not temporary and was permanent. Even from the letter of termination, it is apparent that the post was not abolished. On the other hand the post was to be advertised again in the newspaper and the plaintiff could apply again. Under the circumstances there was absolutely no basis before the the Court below to hold that the scheme of Three Language Formula was temporary, at any tine and on that round the services of the plaintiff were also temporary. The letters of appointment, the statement sent to the Inspector, the approval of the Inspector of Schools, every thing indicates that the plaintiff was appointed as a probationer, the probation period was never extended. The plaintiff continued in service for period of seven years after appointment. Under these circumstances, the findings of the Court below can only be held to be perverse and against the record itself. Even the termination letter goes to show that the post was not abolished and the services were being terminated by giving a notice of 15 days. At this stage it may be pointed out that the termination of the services of a teacher could he ordered only in accordance with the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act and Chapter III of the regulations framed thereunder. The services on a temporary employee could not be terminated by giving him 15 days notice. Under rule 25 of the Chapter HI of the regulations even for terminating the services of a temporary employee the management was bound to give one months notice or-one months pay in lieu thereof. Under these circumstances the notice of termination is wholly void and can have no effect. 4. The next contention of the learned counsel for the respondent was that the plaintiff has claimed the relief of injunction alone and has not claimed any relief of declaration of reinstatement and consequently his suit was barred. 5. Under these circumstances the notice of termination is wholly void and can have no effect. 4. The next contention of the learned counsel for the respondent was that the plaintiff has claimed the relief of injunction alone and has not claimed any relief of declaration of reinstatement and consequently his suit was barred. 5. As I have already held above, the notice of termination of the services of the plaintiff was null and void and had no effect, the plaintiff continued to remain in the service of the defendants and was entitled to work and receive his emoluments. It may be made 'clear that as the plaintiffs services were not terminated in accordance with law, it was for the defendants to take work from him or not, but the plaintiff was entitled to his salary. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a case reported in Sakal Deep Sahai v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 338 . In that case the services of an employee of Railways were terminated in the year 1949. The appellant in that case made representations after representations and ultimately filed a suit in the year 1962 claiming, his backwages. The Supreme Court held that the order of termination of the appellant was wholly illegal and should have been ignored by him, and rs the order was null and void he continued to remain in service and accordingly his wages also continued to accrue. There was no need to get the order set aside. The Supreme Court granted a decree for salary to the appellant only for a period of three years and repelled the arguments of the plaintiff that as the order should have been deemed to be set aside in 1959, and the suit was within time, The suit for the period prior to three years was dismissed. 6. Under these circumstances I find that in the present case the termination order being wholly illegal and void and neither in accordance with the regulations framed under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act or according to any other law, the plaintiff continues to be in service till he attains the age of superannuation and he was entitled to the relief of injunction against the defendants in respect of the same. 7. 7. In the result the present appeal is allowed with costs and the judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court are set aside and that passed by the Trial Court are restored.