S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS Confirmation Case along with the companion Criminal Appeal by the original accused arise out of order of conviction and sentence dated 31/07/1981 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Rajkot in Sessions Case No. 57 of 1980. By his aforesaid decision the learned Additional Sessions Judge has convicted the original accused Shashikant Keshavlal Parmar under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for committing triple murders of Gaurishanker Ishwarlal Dave Ashaben Niranjan Dave and Vibha Narendra Dave. He has also convicted the accused for offence punishable under sec. 307 (2) of the Indian Penal Code for having caused serious injuries to prosecution witness Janak Kanaiyalal. He has also convicted the accused for the offence punishable under sec. 324 of the Indian Penal Code for having caused knife injuries to prosecution witness Kanaiyalal Jagjivan. The learned trial Judge has also found the accused guilty of an offence of criminal trespass punishable under sec. 452 of the Indian Penal Code for having committed criminal trespass in the house of Hasubhai Dave after taking preparation for committing the offence which would be punishable with imprisonment. He has also convicted the accused for the offence punishable under sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act for contravention of the notification issued under sec. 37 (1) of the Bombay Police Act 1951 ( 2 ) FOR the offence punishable under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for three different murders the learned trial Judge has sentenced the accused to death and has directed that the accused should be hanged by neck till his death. That is of course subject to its confirmation by this Court. ( 3 ) THE accused Shashikant Keshavlal Parmar who is the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 826 of 1981 and who will be referred to by us in the later part of this judgment as the accused was charged under secs. 302 307 324 452 of the Indian Penal Code and under src. ( 3 ) THE accused Shashikant Keshavlal Parmar who is the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 826 of 1981 and who will be referred to by us in the later part of this judgment as the accused was charged under secs. 302 307 324 452 of the Indian Penal Code and under src. 135 of the Bombay Police Act 1951 for having caused fatal injuries by two knives to deceased Gaurishanker Ishwarlal Dave Ashaben Niranjan Dave and minor infant Vibha Narendra Dave as well as having caused severe injuries to Janak Kanaiyalal Pandya and a simple hurt to Kanaiyalal Jagjivan Pandya on 17/10/1980 at about 7-45 p. m. in a building named and styled as Yogesh belonging to Advocate Hasubhai Gaurishanker Dave of Rajkot situated in Gaekwadi Plot area of Rajkot City. As revealed from the prosecution case against the accused it is found that in the twilight hours of 17/10/1980 which was the eighth day of Navratra known as Havanasthami a grim tragedy struck the household of one Hasubhai Gaurishanker Dave a practicing Advocate at Rajkot Labour Court Bar who was at the relevant time the President of the said Bar. In the process three innocent lives were lost and two neighbors got injured. Those innocent victims who lost their lives were Gaurishanker Ishwarlal Dave the aged father of Advocate Hasubhai who was reciting prayers at the relevant time in the Pooja room of Yogesh building the minor infant girl Vibha Narendrabhai niece of Advocate Hasubhai and Ashaben Niranjanbhai wife of the brother of Hasubhai. Two neighbours who were staying opposite and who came to rescue the inmates of the house from the attack by the assailant accused also got injured in the process and these neighbours were Janak Kanaiyalal Pandya and Kanaiyalal Jagjivan Pandya. The injuries received by Janak Kanaiyalal Pandya on the vital part of his body practically landed him in the jaws of death but by a stroke of good-luck he survived. The prosecution case further is that the District Magistrate Rajkot had issued a Notification under sec. 37 (1) of the Bombay Police Act prohibiting persons from carrying dangerous Weapons like knives and in violation of the said notification the accused had armed himself with deadly knives at the relevant time and hence he was guilty of an offence punishable under sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 37 (1) of the Bombay Police Act prohibiting persons from carrying dangerous Weapons like knives and in violation of the said notification the accused had armed himself with deadly knives at the relevant time and hence he was guilty of an offence punishable under sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act. It is the prosecution case that the accused who was aged about 28 years at the time of the incident was belonging to Veraval. He was harbouring a grudge against Advocate Hasubhai Gaurishanker Dave though the said grudge was misplaced and uncalled for and that the accused had made studied preparations to do away with the family members of said Hasubhai with a view to inflict severe sufferings on said Hasubhai. The accused accordingly having made all preparations and being armed with two knives criminally trespassed upon the residential house Yogesh belonging to said Hasubhai and thereafter had perpetrated the aforesaid crime by fatally injuring and taking lives of three innocent inmates of Hasubhais house and by injuring two neighbours who came on spot to discharge their neighbourly functions and for rendering assistance and help to the victims. The charge (Exh. 1) as framed by the learned trial Judge clearly brings out the relevant details of the alleged offences said to have been committed by the accused on the fateful evening of 17/10/1980 ( 4 ) THE prosecution alleges that accused was an unemployed labourer who was permanently stationed at Veraval in Junagadh District; that he was formerly serving as a boiler operator and electrician in Cosmopolitan Marine Enterprises at Veraval on a monthly salary of Rs. 330. 00 since September 1976; that his services came to be abruptly and illegally terminated by his employer namely the said Enterprises from 22/12/1977 without giving any show-cause notice or without holding any inquiry against him. The said termination order gave rise to an industrial dispute between the employee-accused on one hand and the employer M/s. Cosmopolitan Marine Enterprises-on the other. After the conciliation proceedings which failed a reference was made under sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 by the Assistant Commissioner of Labour Rajkot. The said Reference was received by the Labour Court Rajkot in the closing months of the year 1978. After the conciliation proceedings which failed a reference was made under sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 by the Assistant Commissioner of Labour Rajkot. The said Reference was received by the Labour Court Rajkot in the closing months of the year 1978. It was ultimately decided in favour of the accused-workman under an award passed by the Presiding Officer 2 Labour Court Rajkot on 12/11/1979 The employer-company was directed to reinstate the accused to his original post in continuity of service and Rs. 1 0 were awarded to the workman as back-wages. The prosecution-case further is that the accused was not satisfied by the said award of the Labour Court as he felt that the award of back-wages was too low and that he was entitled to be awarded full back-wages from the date of his illegal termination till the order of reinstatement. The accused therefore went on hunger strike in the beginning of the year 1980 in the premises of the Rajkot Labour Court itself. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court Shri D. A. Chhaya thereupon requested the members of the Rajkot Labour Court Bar to intervene and to see that the accused gives up his fast unto death. That is how Advocate Hasubhai Gaurishanker Dave President of the Rajkot Labour Court Bar intervened in the matter at the request of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court and by using his good offices he persuaded the accused to give up his fast and agreed to take up his matter free of charge to help him. The prosecution case further is that thereafter Advocate Hasubhai Dave filed a Recovery Application under sec. 33 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 before the Labour Court for realising the awarded back-wages with costs as payable to the accusedconcerned workman. The hearing of the said application dragged on for couple of months in the Labour Court and it appears that by 1st of September 1980 the Labour Court substantially granted the said Recovery Application in favour of the accused and directed the employer-company to pay up within 10 days an amount of Rs. 1381. 00 to the accused failing which usual recovery certificate was ordered to be issued in favour of the accused applicant in the said proceedings. 1381. 00 to the accused failing which usual recovery certificate was ordered to be issued in favour of the accused applicant in the said proceedings. The prosecution-case further is that in spite of the fact that Advocate Hasubhai Gaurishanker Dave had agreed to render free legal aid to the accused and had filed recovery proceedings on behalf of the accused before the Labour Court and which had ultimately culminated in his favour the accused was all the while nurturing a grievance that the full back-wages were not awarded to him and that his lawyer was also negligent. He was all the while harbouring a belief that if he had not given up his hunger strike at the intervention of Advocate Hasubhai he would have got all the reliefs much quicker and fully. Thus he felt to have been let down by Advocate Shri Hasubhai Dave and that is why he was feeling sore all the while about the proceedings before the Labour Court and the happenings therein. The prosecution case further is that the accused with a view to take vengeance of said Advocate Shri Hasubhai Dave made detailed preparations in that behalf purchased two knives from a hawker at Bhavnagar and armed with these knives he criminally trespassed upon the residential premises of Advocate Hasubhai Dave on that fateful evening and inflicted fatal injuries to the aforesaid innocent inmates in Hasubhais house. Prosecution witness Dakshaben Jethalal wife of another brother of Advocate Hasubhai who was staying in the same house initially spotted the accused entering the house armed with a knife in one hand and apprehending danger to the occupants of the house said Dakshaben is said to have run out of the house shouting that one unknown person had entered her house and was likely to injure her father-in-law Gaurishanker. The prosecution case further is that on hearing the shouts of Dakshaben neighbours who were staying just opposite Yogesh Building namely Janak Kanaiyalal Pandya and Kanaiyalal Jagjivan Pandya rushed on spot but they were also injured by the accused and they were removed to the hospital by the daughter of injured Kanaiyalal Jagjivan Pandya namely Alka. The prosecution case is that the accused was armed with two knives and he inflicted five knife-blows on the old father of Advocate Hasubhai Dave aged 73 namely Gaurishanker Dave who was saying prayers to Goddees Ambaji at the relevant time. The prosecution case is that the accused was armed with two knives and he inflicted five knife-blows on the old father of Advocate Hasubhai Dave aged 73 namely Gaurishanker Dave who was saying prayers to Goddees Ambaji at the relevant time. He also inflicted two knife-blows to infant Vibha Narendrabhai aged 27 wife of another brother two knife blows to Ashaben Narendrabhai aged 4 years and also gave of said Hasubhai who had come to meet her mother-in-law and other family members on the day of the incident. Ashaben being severely injured took shelter in the house of an adjoining next-door neighbour Chandrakant Hiralal P. W. 13 and from there she was removed to the Civil Hospital Rajkot by prosecution witness Parvatiprasad @ Prafulkumar Durlabhji Joshi P. W. 9. In the meantime on hearing the shouts and entreaties Dakshaben Jethalal P. W. 6 Umed Polabhai P. W. 8 Ibrahim Usmanbhai and P. W. 9 Parvatiprasad @ Prafulkumar Durlabhji Joshi who were sitting on the Ota of a `darga situated just in the vicinity ran on spot and witness Ibrahim Usmanbhai caught hold of both hands of the accused while P. W. 6 Umedbhai Polabhai caught hold of the accused from behind. During the aforesaid hubbub P. W. 14 Harshad Vinaychandra ran to the nearby Police Chowky and informed the Police Constable on duty about the incident. Accordingly Police Head Constable Visaman Somalbbhai P. W. 41 accompanied by Police Constable Yatindev Lalubha P. W. 42 rushed on spot and took over the custody of accused on the scene of incident itself from prosecution witnesses Ibrahim Usmanbhai and Umed Polabhai. Thereafter the accused was taken to Junction Police Station. An arrest Panchnama was made by P. S. I. Malek P. W. 44 His blood-stained clothes were seizd. Thereafter the accused was removed to main Police Station being Pradyumannagar Police Station. Thus the accused was apprehended on spot and was arrested by Police and thereafter he has continuously remained in Police-custody and Jailcustody. ( 5 ) INJURNED Gaurishanker was removed to Hospital by his wife Jayaben who had gone out of the house at the relevant time and who thus escaped the onslaught of the accused but had returned by the time the accused was apprehended and caught by witnesses Ibrahimbhai and Umedbhai. While infant Vibhaben Narendrabhai niece of Advocate Hasubhai Dave was removed to hospital by her father Narendrabhai. While infant Vibhaben Narendrabhai niece of Advocate Hasubhai Dave was removed to hospital by her father Narendrabhai. It appears that only the dead body of minor Vibhaben reached the hospital. During the treatment injurned Ashaben succumbed to her injuries by 1 OClock night within few hours after the incident while injurned Gaurishanker succumbed to his injuries in the hospital six days later. Injurned witnesses Janak Kanaiyalal and Kanaiyalal Jagjivan after treatment were discharged from the hospital after a few days. Looking to the grave condition of injurned Gaurishanker Ishwarbhai Dave Ashaben Niranjanbhai and injurned Janak Kanaiyalal Pandya and Kanaiyalal Jagjivan Pandya their dying declarations were recorded at the hospital. The Investigating Officer also held identification parade on the third day of the incident that is on 20th October 1980 In the said parade prosecution witnesses Dakshaben Jethalal P. W. 2 and witnesses Kanaiyalal Jagjivan P. W. 3 and Janak Kanaiyalal P. W. 24 identified the accused as the assailant. The Panchnama of the scene of offence was prepared at 11p. m on the date of the incident-itself. The Investigation Officer recorded the statements of the concerned prosecution witnesses and on 22/10/1980 Inspector Shri Rana took the accused to Bhavnagar from where the accused had purchased two knives from a street-hawker Mustafa Ahmed Rekadiwala plying his hand-barrow on Haries Road at Bhavnagar. Articles which were seized during investigation were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory Junagadh and on the receipt of the post-mortem examination reports of the Medical Officers regarding the dead bodies of Gaurishanker Ishwarlal Vibha Narendra Ashaben and receipt of the reports of the Chemical Analyser and Serologist the charge-sheet was submitted in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Rajkot on 24-11-1980. As seen above the accused was arrested on the date of the incident that is on 17tb October 1980 on spot. He was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Rajkot on 18/10/1980 and thereafter the accused remained in judicial custody pending the trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) IT is under the aforesaid circumstances that the present confirmation proceedings and the companion Criminal Appeal have been filed it this Court and which have reached hearing before us. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) IT is under the aforesaid circumstances that the present confirmation proceedings and the companion Criminal Appeal have been filed it this Court and which have reached hearing before us. ( 7 ) AS mentioned in earlier part of this judgment the present confirmation proceedings arise out of the sentence of death as imposed by the learned trial Judge on the accused for his having committed the triple murders as indicated earlier. The present conrfimation proceedings arises under sec. 366 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and for their disposal. The procedure laid down by sec. 367 to sec. 371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be adhered to. The scope and ambit of confirmation proceedings have now been clearly laid down by the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1980 S. C. 898. Sarkaria J; speaking for the majority of the Constitutional Bench has made the following pertinent observations at paragraphs 157 to 159 of the report on the question at hand:"157 We may next notice other provisions of the extant Code (corresponding to secs. 374 375 376 and 377 of the repealed Code) bearing on capital punishment. Sec. 366 (1) of the Code requires the Court passing sentence of death to submit the proceedings to the High Court and further mandates that such a sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court. On such a reference for confirmation of death sentence the High Court is required to proceed in accordance with sec. 367 and 368. Sec. 367 gives power to the High Court to direct further inquiry to be made or additional evidence to be taken. Sec. 368 empowers the High Court to confirm the sentence of death or pass any other sentence by law; or to annul or alter the conviction or order a new trial or acquit the accused. Sec. 369 enjoins that in every case so submitted the confirmation of the sentence or any new sentence or order passed by High Court shall when such court consists of two or more Judges be made passed and signed by at least two of them. Sec. 369 enjoins that in every case so submitted the confirmation of the sentence or any new sentence or order passed by High Court shall when such court consists of two or more Judges be made passed and signed by at least two of them. Sec. 370 provides that where any such case is heard before a Beach of judges and such Judges are equally divided in opinion the case shall be referred a third Judge. ( 8 ) IN this faciculus of sections relating to confirmation proceedings in the High Court the Legislature has provided valuable safeguards of the life and liberty of the subject in cases of capital sentences. These provisions seek to ensure that where in a capital case the life of the convicted person is at stake the entire evidential material bearing on the innocence or guilt of the accused and the question of sentence must be scrutinised with utmost caution and care by a superior court. ( 9 ) THE High Court has been given very wide powers under these provisions to prevent any possible miscarriage of justice. In State of Maharashtra v. Sindhi AIR 1975 SC 1665 this Court reiterated with emphasis that while dealing with a reference for confirmation of a sentence of death the High Court must consider the proceedings in all their aspects reappraise reassess and reconsider the entire facts and law and if necessary after taking additional evidence come to its own conclusion on the material on record in regard to the conviction of the accused (and the sentence independently of the view expressed by the Sessions Judge". ( 10 ) WE will have therefore to consider the questions involved in the present proceedings in the light of the aforesaid authoritive pronouncement of the Supreme Court. However before coming to the grips of the problem posed for our consideration we must at the outset note that Mr. D. K. Shah the learned advocate appearing for the accused before us candidly stated that looking to the overwhelming prosecution evidence of clinching nature consisting of natural witnesses like neighbours who rushed on spot and two of them got injured in the process it will not be possible for him to submit with any emphasis that the accused was not guilty of the offences with which he was charged Mr. Shah was fair enough to submit that it will not be possible for him to challenge the order of conviction as rendered by the learned trial Judge against the accused but his main endeavour will be to try to convince this Court that this was not a fit case for imposing the extreme penalty of death on the accused and that the accused deserved the sentence of life imprisonment. We will deal with the main submissions of Mr. Shah centering round the imposition of proper sentences on the accused at a later stage when we will come to the consideration of that question. For the present it is sufficient to note that the order of conviction as passed by the learned trial Judge against the accused could not be effectively challenged by Mr. D. K. Shah in view of the clinching evidence in the case. Still however this being a confirmation case we have independently examined the entire prosecution evidence with a view to find out as to whether it was the accused and none else who had committed the crimes with which he was charged. Having given our most anxious thoughts on this question we have independently come to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved to the hilt its case against the accused and that the concession made by Mr. Shah the learned Advocate for the accused on this aspect is proper and justified. We shall accordingly turn to the consideration of the main planks of the prosecution case against the accused. X. Pattern-finale (A) Nature of the offiences proved. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 11 ) A resume of the aforesaid prosecution evidence on the relevant points leaves no room for doubt that on the date of the incident that is on 17/10/1980 in the twilight hours between 7-45 and 8-00p. X. Pattern-finale (A) Nature of the offiences proved. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 11 ) A resume of the aforesaid prosecution evidence on the relevant points leaves no room for doubt that on the date of the incident that is on 17/10/1980 in the twilight hours between 7-45 and 8-00p. m. the accused armed with two knives criminally trespassed upon the residential premises of witness Hasubhai Dave Practicing Advocate of Rajkot Labour Bar and he entered the said house with an intention to commit murders of the inmates of the said house with a view to wreck vengeance on said Hasubhai and in the process he caused five fatal injuries on vital parts of the body of Gaurishanker the aged father of Hasubhai and he also gave two fatal knife blows on the vital part of the body of Ashaben the wife of the brother of Hasubhai. The accused also gave two fatal blows with knives on the abdomen of minor infant Vibha who instantaneously succumbed to her injuries and at the same spot as a part of the same incident the accused gave two knife blows on the vital part of the body of Janak Kanaiyalal and one knife blow to his father Kanaiyalal Jagjivan. We find that the prosecution has proved its aforesaid case to the hilt against the accused beyond any shadow of doubt. The accused who caused these injuries was apprehended on spot and was handed over to the Police. The accused had deep-seated grievance against Advocate Hasubhai and was out to wreck his vengeance. He had preplanned these ghastly acts since number of months as his letter (Exh. 563 written to the Governor of Gujarat in May 1980 shows. Having made full and deliberate preparations in the said direction the accused criminally trespassed in the house of Hasubhai on the fateful evening of the day of the incident and mercilessly pounced upon the innocent helpless inmates being old and aged father a young house-wife Ashaben wife of the younger brother of Hasubhai and an innocent infant girl aged four years. The injuries caused to Gaurishanker Ashaben and Vibha proved fatal. There is no escape therefore from the conclusion that the accused was guilty of having committed triple murders of the aforesaid three persons. He had done this act after pre-determination and pre-planning. The injuries caused to Gaurishanker Ashaben and Vibha proved fatal. There is no escape therefore from the conclusion that the accused was guilty of having committed triple murders of the aforesaid three persons. He had done this act after pre-determination and pre-planning. He had purchased the muddamal knives 15 days prior to the incident. Thus with a cool and determined mind the accused had pre-planned the crimes in question. The medical evidence clearly shows that the injuries to Gaurishanker Ashaben and Vibha were individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The prosecution evidence also clearly reveals that accused had motive to cause utmost injury pain and suffering to Hasubhai Dave and after making all preparations in that direction and after having armed himself with two murder weapons which he had purchased 15 days prior to the incident he trespassed upon the house of Hasubhai Dave and inflicted fatal injuries to the aforesaid three helpless victims. These injuries were aimed at vital parts of the body and vital parts were affected. He has therefore got to be convicted under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code so far as the offences of triple murders of Gaurishanker Ashaben and minor child Vibha are concerned ( 12 ) SO far as the injuries caused to Kanaiyalal are concerned the medical evidence shows that only one injury was caused to Kanaiyalal though on a vital part of the body. It was a sample injury but a stabwound by a sharp cutting instrument. Therefore the accused deserves to be convicted for the offence punishable under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code so far as injury to Kanaiyalal is concerned. ( 13 ) SO far as injuries caused to witness Janak Kanaiyalal are concerned there were two incised wounds one on left side of the chest which was muscle deep and another over abdomen and both these injuries were aimed at the internal vital parts namely heart and liver. It was by sheer good luck that Janak escaped from the jaws of death and if death would have been caused by these injuries the accused might have been guilty of murder as he was the author of these injuries aimed at the vital part of the body of Janak. It was by sheer good luck that Janak escaped from the jaws of death and if death would have been caused by these injuries the accused might have been guilty of murder as he was the author of these injuries aimed at the vital part of the body of Janak. It must therefore be held that so far as injuries caused to Janak are concerned the accused had committed an offence punishable under sec. 307 Part I of the Indian Penal Code. ( 14 ) WE have already seen above that the accused had also committed breach of the directions issued by the District Magistrate under sec. 37 of the Bombay Police Act. Hence he had committed an offence punishable under sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act for contravention of the notification issued by the District Magistrate Rajkot. ( 15 ) IT is also obvious from the prosecution evidence that the accused committed the offence under sec. 449 of the Indian Penal Code since he entered the residential house of Hasubhai Dave being armed with two deadly knives and with a resolute prior intention to kill the inmates of the house. He should therefore ought to have been charged and convicted accordingly. But he has been charged under sec. 452 of the Indian Penal Code which is a lesser offence. We did not consider it necessary to alter the charge at this stage in view of the fact that we are confirming the conviction of the accused under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It may be noted that the conviction of the accused under sec. 452 of the Indian Penal Code was not assailed before us by Mr. Shah and hence we maintain the same. (B) Imposing of proper sentence on the accused. ( 16 ) WE now come to the moot question as to whether the accused deserves the extreme penalty of death for having committed triple murders of Gaurishanker Ashaben and Vibha or whether he deserves the sentence of life imprisonment. This is the most vital question in the Present proceedings. So far as the sentences inflicted on the accused for the offences under secs. 307 Part II 324 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code and sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act by the learned trial Judge are concerned Mr. Shah had rightly not made any submissions. This is the most vital question in the Present proceedings. So far as the sentences inflicted on the accused for the offences under secs. 307 Part II 324 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code and sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act by the learned trial Judge are concerned Mr. Shah had rightly not made any submissions. We also find that the sentences imposed by the learned trial Judge for the aforesaid other offences are quite reasonable and proper. But the main question for our consideration is whether the accused deserves to be given the extreme penalty prescribed by law for the offence punishable under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 17 ) IN this connection we must note one submission put forward by Mr. Shah for the accused. He contended that the learned trial Judge by his judgment dated 31st of July 1981 held the accused guilty of the various offences with which he was charged including the offence of triple murders punishable under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and on the very day the learned trial Judge permitted the learned Advocate for the accused as well as the learned Public Prosecutor address him on the question of proper sentence to be imposed on the accused for the offences punishable under sec. 302 of the Indian Panal Code Mr. Shah also invited our attention to the question put by the learned trial Judge to the accused on 31/07/1981 regarding the propriety of the sentence. The said question is found noted below Exh. 2 whereat the learned trial Judge earlier had recorded the statement of the accused under sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 on 13/07/1981 The question put to the accused on 31/07/1981 by the learned trial Judge was to the effect that offences under secs. 302 307 324 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code were held proved against him the offence under sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act was also held proved against him and proper sentences were to be passed against him for the same and whether he had anything to say for imposing lesser sentences for the aforesaid offences. In the answer the accused stated to the learned trial Judge that he had not committed any offence. Even then if it was felt that he had committed the said offences he prayed for mercy. In the answer the accused stated to the learned trial Judge that he had not committed any offence. Even then if it was felt that he had committed the said offences he prayed for mercy. He was unmarried his father was of unbalanced mind and in his family there was his mother and his younger sister both of them were serving. The learned trial Judge on the same day heard the learned Advocates of both the sides on the question of sentence and passedhis order of sentence against the accused for the various offences which he held to have been proved against the accused. In the background of the aforesaid factual position it was submitted by Mr. Shah the learned advocate appearing for the accused that the learned trial Judge has not properly followed the statutory requirement of sec. 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 which provides that if the accused is convicted the Judge shall unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of sec. 360 hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him according to law. In the submission of Mr. Shah the legal requirements of the aforesaid provisions are not complied with is the present case by the learned trial Judge. In that connection he invited our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dagdu and Others v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1579 In the aforesaid decision Chandrachud J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of himself and Shinghal J. and to which judgment the learned third Judge Goswami J. endorsed his concurring note has made the following pertinent observation:"the imperative language of sec. 235 (2) leaves no room for doubt that after recording the finding of guilt and the order of conviction the Court is under an obligation to hear the accused of the question of sentence unless it releases him on probation of good conduct or after abmonition under sec. 360. The social compulsions. the pressure of poverty the retributive instinct to seek an extra-legal remedy to a sense of being wronged the lack of means to be educated in the difficult art of an honest living the parentage the heredity all these and similar other considerations can hopefully and legitimately tilt the scales on the propriety of sentence. The mandate of sec. the pressure of poverty the retributive instinct to seek an extra-legal remedy to a sense of being wronged the lack of means to be educated in the difficult art of an honest living the parentage the heredity all these and similar other considerations can hopefully and legitimately tilt the scales on the propriety of sentence. The mandate of sec. 235 (2) must therefore be obeyed in its letter and spirit. IT is true that the Court on convicting an accused must unquestionably hear him on the question of sentence. But if for any reason it omits to do so and the accused makes a grievance of it in the higher court it would be open to that Court to remedy the breach by giving a hearing to the accused on the question of sentence. That opportunity has to be real and effective which means that the accused must be permitted to adduce before the Court all the data which he desires to adduce on the question of sentence. For a proper and effective implementation of the question contained in sec. 235 (2) it is not always necessary to remand the matter to the Court which has recorded the conviction. . . . . . . . " ( 18 ) GOSWAMI J. in his concurring judgment has made the following observations on that question at issue;" Whenever an appeal Court finds that the mandate of sec. 235 (2) for a hearing on sentence had not been complied with it at once. becomes the duty of the appeal court to offer to the accused an adequate opportunity to produce before it whatever materials he chooses in whatever reasonable way possible. Courts should avoid laws delay and necessarily inconsequential remands when the accused can secure full benefit of sec. 235 (2) Cr P. C. even in the appeal Court in the High Court or even in the Supreme Court". ( 19 ) HAVING seen the sequence of events that occurred in the trial Court and the way the learned trial Judge disposed of the question of sentence we found ourselves in complete agreement with the submission of Mr. Shah for the accused that the accused was not given full opportunity to have his say on the question of sentence as required by sec. Shah for the accused that the accused was not given full opportunity to have his say on the question of sentence as required by sec. 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 In the light of the aforesaid settled legal position therefore we directed the accused to be brought before us to have his say on the question of sentence accordingly the accused was brought before us on 23/12/1981 On that day he produced his statement in writing in support of his say on the question of sentence. We also recorded his additional statement about what he had to say orally before us. The statement of the accused submitted in writing before us containing his say on the question of sentence is taken on record at Exh. 189 while his oral statement recorded by us is kept on record at Exh. 190. We will have to consider the question regarding imposition of proper sentence on the accused for the triple murders committed by him in the light of his statement in writing (Exh. 189 his oral statement recorded by us at Exh. 190 and also in the light of other evidence on the record of the case having bearing on this question. Before we address ourselves to this moot question as to whether the accused deserves the extreme penalty of death we may go through the legal position in the background of which we have to answer the said question. B (i) (LEGAL POSITION) ( 20 ) MR. D. K. Shah the learned Advocate appearing for the accused has submitted before us various decisions of the Supreme Court and two decisions of this Court to support his contention that the accused in the present case does not deserve the extreme penalty of death. We shall therefore deal with the aforesaid authorities on which Mr. Shah placed reliance and we shall try to see as to how far these various authorities can render any assistance to Mr. Shah in making good his contentions regarding the award of proper sentence to the present accused. . ( 21 ) MR. Shah first invited our attention to the case of Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1974 Supreme Court 799 The accused a young married woman had extra-marital relations with a widower. The deceased who was also a married woman had developed illicit relations with the formers paramour. . ( 21 ) MR. Shah first invited our attention to the case of Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1974 Supreme Court 799 The accused a young married woman had extra-marital relations with a widower. The deceased who was also a married woman had developed illicit relations with the formers paramour. The accused murdered her rival with a reckless passion of a jealous mistress. By the evening of 4/11/1971 the dead body of the deceased was found in a field outside village Konapur Medak District Andhra Pradesh. On 8/11/1971 the dead body of a baby daughter of the deceased was recovered from the sandbed of a stream near the field. The accused who had perpetrated these crimes was prosecuted and convicted and sentenced to death by the trial Court. The High Court affirmed the guilt and upheld the sentence. Thereafter the matter was carried to the Supreme Court by way of jail-appeal. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision reduced the sentence to life imprisonment on the following grounds which are found in paragraph 26 of the report: Where the murderer is too young or too old the clemency of penal justice helps him. "where the offender suffers from socio-economic psychic or penal compulsions insufficient to attract a legal exception or to downgrade the crime into a lesser one judicial commutation is permissible. Other general social pressures warranting judicial notice with an extenuating impact may in special cases induce the lesser penalty. Fact that the death sentence has hung over the head of the culprit excruciatingly long may persuade the court to be compassionate. Likewise if others involved in the crime and similarly situated have received life imprisonment or if the offence is only constructive being under sec. 302 read with sec. 149 or again the accused has acted suddenly under anothers instigation without premeditation perhaps the court may humanly opt for life even like where a just cause or real suspision of wifely infidelity pushed the criminal into the crime". But thereafter followed the following pertinent observations (which have now become classic) ;" On the other hand the weapons used and the manner of their use the horrendous futures of the crime and helpless state of the victim and the like steel the heart of law for a sterner sentence". But thereafter followed the following pertinent observations (which have now become classic) ;" On the other hand the weapons used and the manner of their use the horrendous futures of the crime and helpless state of the victim and the like steel the heart of law for a sterner sentence". On the special facts in Ediga Anamms case (supra) the Supreme Court was inclined to impose lesser sentence on account of the fact a that the criminals social and personal factors are less harsh her femineity and youth her unbalanced sex and expulsion from the conjugal home and being the mother of a young boythese individually inconclusive and cumulatively marginal facts and circumstances tend towards award of life imprisonment. It will therefore be appreciated that the aforesaid special facts of the case had weighed with the Supreme Court introducing the sentence imposed on the accused Ediga Anamma. However the Supreme Court even in the aforesaid judgment has highlighted certain peculiar features of a given case which may justify imposing extreme penalty of death and they are: (1) The weapons used (2) The manner in which they were used. (3) The hard features of the crime. (4) Helpless state of the victim. The decision in Ediga Anammas case (supra) does not render any real Assistance to the defence in the present case in view of the facts of the present case which we have noted above and which we shall highlight in the later part of this judgment. ( 22 ) MR. Shah then drew our attention to the case of Namu Ram Bora v. The State of Assam and Nagaland AIR 1975 Supreme Court 762. In the aforesaid case the facts were that the accused who was the appellant before the Supreme Court had committed murder of his wife and two minor daughters in a stage of imbalanced mind. He had no particular motive to murder them nor was the act a pre-planned one. In view of these extenuating circumstances the sentence was reduced from that of death to one for imprisonment for life. Obviously the facts have no bearing on those of the case before us inasmuch as the accused before us did not have an imbalanced mind but on the contrary did the act in a pre-planned manner. In view of these extenuating circumstances the sentence was reduced from that of death to one for imprisonment for life. Obviously the facts have no bearing on those of the case before us inasmuch as the accused before us did not have an imbalanced mind but on the contrary did the act in a pre-planned manner. ( 23 ) OUR attention was then invited to the case of Shiv Mohan Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration AIR 1977 Supreme Court 949. In the aforesaid case a review petition was filed before the Supreme Court for reviewing its earlier order by which it had refused to interfere with the death sentence imposed upon the accused by the trial Court and as confirmed by the High Court. As Krishna Iyer J. put it a treacherous murder of a tender school-boy by the petitioner the circumstances of which were so heartless and heinous terminated condignly at the trial Court and the High Court the extreme penalty having been visited on the offender for his horrendous killing. The Supreme Court refused Special leave and thereafter a review petition was filed. In the aforesaid review petition the following pertinent observations were made by Krishna Iyer J. :"under the Indian Penal Code death penalty has been ruled to be constitutional The law having sanctioned it and the Supreme court having refused special leave against conviction and sentence it is a vanquished cause to argue for a vague illegality vitiating capital sentence as such. In India under present conditions deterrence through death penalty may not be a time-barred punishment in some frightful areas of barbarous murder. Illustratively the Court has mentioned that the brutal features of the crime and the hapless and helpless state of the victim steel the heart of the law to impose the sterner sentence. The law is thus harsh and humane and when faced with arguments about the social invalidity of the death penalty the personal predilections of the Judge must bow to the law". ( 24 ) IT has been further observed therein as under:"the heinousness of the crime is a relevant factor in the choice of the sentence. The circumstances of the crime especially social pressures which induce the crime which we may epitomise as a just sentence in an unjust society are another consideration. ( 24 ) IT has been further observed therein as under:"the heinousness of the crime is a relevant factor in the choice of the sentence. The circumstances of the crime especially social pressures which induce the crime which we may epitomise as a just sentence in an unjust society are another consideration. The criminal not the crime must figure prominently in shaping the sentence where a reform of the individual rehabilitation into society and other measures to prevent recurrence are weighty factors. The Penal Code does not give the Judge a free hand where murder has been made out. The choice is painfullynot quite scientifically though limited to but two alternatives". So far as the aforesaid observations in this decision are concerned it is pertinent to note that Krishna Iyer J. had highlighted the special features of a given case which would justify extreme penalty of death in Ediga Anammas case (supra ). In the aforesaid judgment also the said test is reiterated. However the observations of Krishna Iyer J. regarding the criminal and not the crime that must weigh prominently in shaping of the sentence as employed in this case will have to be read in the light of the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in Bachan Singhs case AIR 1980 Supreme Court 898 and the aforesaid observations will stand modulated accordingly by what the Constitutional Bench has to say in the aforesaid decision and to the consideration of which we shall turn a little later. At this juncture we may note that Krishna Iyer J. in later judgments of the Supreme Court in AIR 1979 Supreme Court 916 - Rajendra Prasad v. State of U. P. as well as in AIR 1979 Supreme Court 964 Deo v. State of W. B. emphatically reiterated his views that it is the criminal which must prominently figure in inflicting capital punishment on him. These views expressed in these judgments have been overruled by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in Bechan Singhs case (supra) where the emphasis laid on both the nature of the commission of the crime as the character of the criminal as reflected therefore. ( 25 ) MR. Shah then invited our attention to the case of Dagdu and others v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1579 The aforesaid decision was relied upon by Mr. ( 25 ) MR. Shah then invited our attention to the case of Dagdu and others v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1579 The aforesaid decision was relied upon by Mr. Shah to support his contention that if the learned trial Judge has not given proper opportunity to the accused to have his say on the question of sentence the appellate Court should give him that opportunity. Now this contention would not survive for the simple reason that in the present case we bad called the accused before us and we had questioned him on the question of sentence. He tendered before us his written statement which we have taken on record and he has put forward his oral say in the matter which was duly recorded by us. In that view of the matter it is not necessary to dilate further on the question whether sec. 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure being mendatory in nature was fully complied with or not. We will have however an occasion to refer to this very judgment while we shall consider the authorities cited by Mr. J. U. Mehta the learned Public Prosecutor for submitting that this is a fit case for confirming the capital sentence as ordered to be imposed upon the accused by the trial Court. ( 26 ) OUR attention was next invited to the ease of Srirangan v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1978 Supreme Court 274 In that case the facts were that a toddy tapper young in age and a mental case while returning after a day-long toil with his tool the sickle and tense in state was provoked by some trivial and went into tantrums and inflicted triple killings all in one somber sunset. He was convicted by the trial Court and sentenced to death. The said death sentence was confirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court speaking through Krishna Iyer J. held that the conviction was justified. But so far as the question of sentence was concerned it was held that the plurality of factors bearing on the crime and the doer of the crime must carefully enter the judicial verdict. The winds of penological reform notwithstanding the prescription in sec. 302 binds and death penalty is still permissible in the punitive pharmacopoceia of India. But so far as the question of sentence was concerned it was held that the plurality of factors bearing on the crime and the doer of the crime must carefully enter the judicial verdict. The winds of penological reform notwithstanding the prescription in sec. 302 binds and death penalty is still permissible in the punitive pharmacopoceia of India. But in the facts of the case before the Supreme Court it was held that lesser sentence of life imprisonment was justified. A close reading of the aforesaid decision leaves no manner of doubt that what appealed to the Supreme Court was the fact that the accused being provoked by some trivial cause went into tantrums and indulged in the triple killings under Circumstances which showed that the accused was a young man who was a mental case. It is obvious that the facts of the present case are entirely different since it was a pre-planned perpetration of the crime. Since in the present case there is proved the pre-planned perpetration of crime involving triple murders of absolutely helpless innocent victims who had given no cause whatsoever to the accused to go into trantrums against them nor is the present accused a mental case. ( 27 ) AT this stage we may observe that the aforesaid decisions which Mr. Shah had relied upon for the defence have been based on the peculiar facts which obtained in these respective cases. It is also enlightening to note that prior to the enactment of Criminal Procedure Code 1973 which brought on the statute book secs. 354 (3) and 235 (2) it was left to the discretion of the sentencing Court as to whether on the facts of a given case an accused found guilty of murder should be sentenced to life imprisonment or to death. But after the coming into force of the New Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 imposition of life imprisonment has become the rule and imposition of extreme penalty of death has become an exception which can be resorted to on recording special reasons. We will have therefore to decide the present proceedings in the light of the aforesaid legal position. The scope and ambit of special reasons as required under sec. We will have therefore to decide the present proceedings in the light of the aforesaid legal position. The scope and ambit of special reasons as required under sec. 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 have been crystalised by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court presided over by Y. V. Chandrachud C. J. in the case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1980 Supreme Court 898 In fact Mr. Shah the learned advocate for the accused candidly stated that the decision in the present case will have to follow the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bachan Singhs Case (supra ). We may mention at this stage that we have already referred to this judgment while considering the perimeters of the present proceedings in the earlier part of this judgment in another context. We therefore now turn to the consideration of the said judgment in the present context. In Bachan Singhs case (supra) the Constitutional validity of sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code was on anvil before the Supreme Court. While upholding of the vires of the said provision the Supreme Court speaking through Sarkaria J. who spoke for himself as well as on behalf of Chandrachud C. J. and A. C. Gupta and N. L. Untwalia JJ. and which was the majority vie v considered the scope and ambit of sec 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 In that connection the following pertinent observations have been made. "sec. 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 marks a significant shift in the legislative policy underlying Code of 1898 as in force immediately before 1/04/1974 according to which both the alternative sentences of death or imprisonment for life provided for murder and for certain other capital offences under the Penal Code is imprisonment for life (or imprisonment for a term of years) and death penalty is an exception. In this context sec. 235 (2) is also relevant. Although sub-sec. (2) of sec. In this context sec. 235 (2) is also relevant. Although sub-sec. (2) of sec. 235 does not contain a specific provision as to evidence and provides only for hearing of the accused as to sentence yet it is implicit in this provision that if a request is made in that behalf by either the prosecution or the accused or by both the Judge should give the party or parties concerned an opportunity of producing evidence or material relating to the various factors bearing on the question of sentence The present legislative policy discernible from sec. 235 (2) read with sec. 354 (3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment or making the choice of sentence for various offences including one under sec. 302 Penal Code the Court should not confine its consideration principally or merely to the circumstances connected with the particular crime but also give due consideration to the circumstances of the criminal". ( 28 ) SARKARIA J. has also made the following observations:" Pre-planned calculated cold-blooded murder has always been regarded as one of an aggravated kind. In Jagmohan it was reiaterated by this Court that if a murder is diabolically conceived and cruelly executed it would justify the imposition of the death penalty on the murderer. The same principle was substantially reiterated by V. R. Krishna Iyer J. speaking for the Bench in Ediga Anamma in these terms:the weapons used and the manner of their use the horrendous features of the crime and hapless helpless state of the victim and the like steel the heart of the law for a sterner sentence. IT may be noted that this indicator for imposing the death sentence was crystalised in that case after paying due regard to the shift in legislative policy embodied in sec. 354 of the Criminal Procedure 1973 although on the date of that decision ( 11/02/1974 this provision had not come into force. In Paras Rams ease also to which a reference has been made earlier it was emphatically stated that a person who in a fit of anti-social piety commits blood curdling butchery of his child fully deserves to be punished with death. In Rajendra Prasad however the majority (of 211) has completely reversed the view that had been taken in Ediga Anamma regarding the application of sec354 (3) on this point. According to it after the enactment of sec. In Rajendra Prasad however the majority (of 211) has completely reversed the view that had been taken in Ediga Anamma regarding the application of sec354 (3) on this point. According to it after the enactment of sec. 354 (3) `murder most foul is not the test. The shocking nature of the crime or the number of murders committed is also not the criterion It was said that the focus has now completely shifted from the crime to the criminal. Special reasons necessary for imposing death penalty must relate not to the crime as such but to the Criminal. WITH great respect we find ourselves unable to agree to this enunciation. As we read secs. 354 (3) and 235 (2) and other related provisions of the Code of 1973 it is quite clear to us that for making the choice of punishment or for ascertaining the existence or absence of special reasons in that context the Court must pay due regard both to the crime and the criminal. What is the relative weight to be given to the aggravating and mitigating factors depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Nore often than not these two aspects are so intertwined that it is difficult to give a separate treatment to each of them. This is so because style is the man. In many cases the extremely cruel or beastly manner of the commission of murder is itself a demonstrated index of the depraved character of the perpetrator. That is why it is not desirable to consider the circumstances of the crime and the circumstances of the criminal in two separate water-tight compartments. In a sense to kill is to be cruel and therefore all murders are cruel. But such cruelty may vary in its degree of culpability. And it is only when the culpability assumes the proportion of extreme depravity and special reasons can legitimately be said to exist". ( 29 ) THE Supreme Court has also further observed as under:" There ate numerous other circumstances justifying the passing of the lighter Sentence; as there are countervailing circumstances of aggravation It cannot be over-emphasised that the scope and concept of mitigating factors in the area of death penalty must receive a liberal and expansive construction by the Courts in acccord with the sentencing policy writ large in sec 354 (3 ). Judges should never be blood-thirsty. Judges should never be blood-thirsty. Hanging of murderers has never been too good for them. Facts and figures albeit incomplete furnished by the Union of India in the instant case show that in the past Courts have inflicted the extreme penalty with extreme infrequency a fact which attests to the caution and compassion which they have always brought to bear on the exercise of their sentencing discretion in so grave a matter. It is therefore imperative to voice the concern that courts aided by the broad illustrative guidelines indicated will discharge the onerous function with evermore scrupulous care and humane concern directed along the highroad of legislative policy outlined in sec. 354 (3) viz that for persons convicted of murder life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through laws instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed". ( 30 ) IT is therefore obvious that we will have to decide the present proceedings in the light of the authoritative pronouncement of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court and we will have to see as to whether special reasons exist in the present case and whether the present case is such a rarest of the rare cases which would call for the extreme penalty of death. ( 31 ) OUR attention was next invited by Mr. Shah to certain later decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U. P. AIR 1981 Supreme Court 911 Chandrachud C. J. speaking for the Supreme Court had to consider the casein which a collegegoing boy was murdered because he was trying to wean his sister from the influence of the accused who had set his heart upon her. But the accused was smarting under the insult hurled at him by the deceased the previous evening. The dispute assumed the proportions of a feud over social status the poor man fretting that the rich mans daughter would not be allowed to marry him for the mere reason that he did not belong to an equal class of society. He believed rightly or wrongly that the sister of the deceased was not willing to take him as a husband. He believed rightly or wrongly that the sister of the deceased was not willing to take him as a husband. It was observed that the mental turmoil and the sense of being socially wronged through which the accused was passing cannot be overlooked deciding which is the appropriate sentence to pass. It was also observed that the rule being that for the offence of murder the normal sentence is the sentence of life imprisonment and not of death. ( 32 ) IT will be observed that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court centres round the peculiar facts of that case. The accused was found to be undergoing a mental turmoil and a sense of being socially wronged while he inflected fatal blows to the brother of his fiancee. It is also pertinent to note that in the aforesaid decision it has been found that the prosecution had not revealed the entire story. It has weighed with the Supreme Court that If witnesses on whose evidence the life of an accused hangs in the balance do not choose to reveal the whole truth the Court while dealing with the question of sentence has to step in interstitially and take into account all reasonable possibilities having regard to the normal and natural course of human affairs. Since a part of the crucial event has been screened from the Courts scrutiny and the possibility of an altercation between the appellant and the deceased cannot reasonably be excluded we consider it unsafe to sentence the appellant to the extreme penalty. It is therefore obvious that the decision of the Supreme Court in Dudh Nath Pandeys case (supra) centres round the peculiar features of the case which are distinguishable from the features of the present case. ( 33 ) MR. Shah next invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh v. State of U. P. AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1122. In the said case the Supreme Court speaking through Chandrachud C. J. had to consider the case of a young accused aged 21 years who was a servant in the family of the deceased and who bad committed the crime under a sudden impulse of sex or theft which had made him momentarily insensible. In the said case the Supreme Court speaking through Chandrachud C. J. had to consider the case of a young accused aged 21 years who was a servant in the family of the deceased and who bad committed the crime under a sudden impulse of sex or theft which had made him momentarily insensible. He had been in jail for ten long years and he had probably earned by that time the right to be released after takings into account the remissions admissible to him were he sentenced to life imprisonment. The case against the accused was based on the evidence of sole eye-witness being a five-year old child. Considering all these peculiar features of the case the sentence of death was reduced to sentence of life imprisonment. It needs hardly be said that none of these special features exist in the present case. ( 34 ) NEXT our attention was invited by Mr. Shah to another decision in the case of Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1220 Chandrachud C. J. speaking for the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision held that special reasons must be given for imposing the extreme penalty of death and that all murders are terrific and if the fact of the murder being terrific is an adequate reason for imposing the death sentence then every murder should have to be visited with that sentence. In that event death sentence will become the rule not an exception and sec. 354 (3) will become a dead letter. The facts in the aforesaid case were that the appellant Muniappan was convicted by the learned Sessions Judge Sharmapuri under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to death on the charge that he had committed the murder of his mothers brother also called Muniappan and his son Chinnaswamy. The conviction for murder and the sentence of death having been confirmed by the High Court of Madras a further appeal was taken to the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave which was limited to the question of sentence. The Supreme Court observed therein that merely because a murder was cold-blooded was not a special reason which could justify the sentence of death. The Supreme Court observed therein that merely because a murder was cold-blooded was not a special reason which could justify the sentence of death. ( 35 ) IT appears that the following reasons appealed to the Supreme Court for not confirming the death sentence: (1) There were certain features in the case which needed a close reflection. (2) One of the questions was as to the time when the double murder was committed because upon that circumstance depended the veracity of the eye-witnesses. (3) Yet another question which bad an important bearing on the case was as to the delay caused in filing the FIR. (4) One more aspect related as to whether the Muchilikka bears the signature of the appellant. The High Court compared the admitted signatures of the appellant with the disputed signature and came to the conclusion that the disputed signature was of the appellant himself. ( 36 ) THESE various aspects made it unsafe to confirm the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant. Further the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for imposing death sentence were not found to be special reasons within the meaning of sec. 353 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 37 ) THEREFORE the grounds on which the death sentence was reduced in this reported case have no bearing or relevance so far as the case before us is concerned. ( 38 ) THE last Supreme Court decision to which Mr. Shah invited our attention is rendered in the case of Ujjagar Singh and Another v. Union of India and Others AIR 1981 Supreme Court 2009 In the said decision the Supreme Court while dealing with the sentence of death imposed on accused Ujjagar Singh observed that the said accused was only aged 17 years and taking into consideration the extreme young age of the accused the sentence of death was reduced to life imprisonment. It need not be stated that the aforesaid decision turns on its own peculiar reasons of the extreme youth of the accused at the relevant time and can obviously have no application to the facts of the present case where the accused is a matured person aged 28 years who was exposed to reality of life for over six years. ( 39 ) MR. Shah has cited all the aforesaid rulings in support of the reduction of the sentence of capital punishment. ( 39 ) MR. Shah has cited all the aforesaid rulings in support of the reduction of the sentence of capital punishment. We have carefully read and discussed each of the rulings cited by him. We have noted above how each one of them turns on the facts peculiar to its own and therefore they cannot be considered as straightway applicable to the present case. ( 40 ) MR. Shah thereafter invited our attention to two judgments of this Court. The first judgment to which our attention was invited by him was delivered by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of D. P. Desai and A. M. Ahmadi JJ. in Confirmation Case No. 1 of 1978 with Criminal Appeal No. 882 of 1978 decided on 28th/ 29/11/1978 and 12/12/1978. In the said judgment D. P. Desai J. speaking for the Division Bench considered the question regarding imposition of proper sentence on accused Nos. 1 and 3 who were held guilty of murder by the learned trial Judge and who were sentenced to death by him subject to the confirmation of this Court. The said accused were original accused Nos. 1 and 3 in that case. The prosecution case was that an incident took place at about 11-15 or so at night when one Abdul Vahab Sultan Ahmad a tenant of a room in a chawl belonging to Menaben (original accused No. 5) mother of appellants Nos. 1 to 3 in Criminal Appeal No. 882 of 1979 was done to death by inflicting as many as 19 injuries on his person of which 14 were incised wounds 2 stab wounds (one of them coupled with an incised wound) and three scratches and abrasions. This crime according to the prosecution had its roots in Court proceedingsboth Civil and Criminal-between the parties. It was the prosecution case that six accused persons involved in the case had decided to do away with the deceased who was a leader of the tenants and who was involved in Cross Criminal Cases between the parties. Therefore as per the prosecution case between 11-00 and 12-00 midnight all the six accused persons came in a truck belonging to Menaben to the Chawl. Therefore as per the prosecution case between 11-00 and 12-00 midnight all the six accused persons came in a truck belonging to Menaben to the Chawl. Original accused No. 6 i. e. appellant No. 5 in the said appeal was the driver of that tru ck and original accused No. 4 i. e. appellant No. 4 was the conductor in that truck. Besides them Menaben and her three sons i. e. original accused Nos. 1 to 3 were also in the truck. The truck was stopped near the room of the deceased and the deceased who was resting inside the room with a knicker only on his person was called from outside by saying that his death was calling him and he should come out. At that time Shantaben wife of the deceased the star prosecution witness and the sole eye-witness was also inside the room. On hearing the shouts the deceased got up put on a pant and without even putting on a banian or any other upper garment on his person opened the door and came out of the room. His wife followed him. When both of them were in the Osri of their room Shantaben saw accused Nos. 1 and 2 outside the truck accused No. 4 in the truck behind drivers cabin and accused Nos. 3 5 and 6 in the drivers cabin. Prosecution case further was that accused Nos. 1 and 2 who were standing on the ground were asked by Menaben to get into the truck and thereafter she told the driver to run the truck over the deceased who was standing in the Osri. The driver accordingly drove the truck towards the room but the deceased escaped the impact and ran into the open ground outside the room. In this process it was alleged that the outer cutcha structures of the adjoining three rooms were broken by the impact with the truck. One bicycle and a cot were also damaged. The truck was turned round and the deceased who was running in the open ground was chased by the truck. It was the further case of the prosecution that after covering a distance of about 100 to 125 paces the truck slowed down and accused Nos. 1 2 and 3 the sons of Menaben as well as accused No. 4 attacked the deceased. It was the further case of the prosecution that after covering a distance of about 100 to 125 paces the truck slowed down and accused Nos. 1 2 and 3 the sons of Menaben as well as accused No. 4 attacked the deceased. In this attack it was alleged that accused No. 3 gave a pipe blow on the head of the deceased whereas accused Nos. 1 and 2 attacked him with Dharia. Accused No. 4 having come down the truck stabbed the deceased twice on the side of his body. Shantaben saw accused No. 1; and 2 each giving one blow of Dharia on her husband and then as she could not tolerate the sights she closed her eyes. All the six accused persons thereafter went away from the place in the truck towards India Colony. . ( 41 ) THE learned trial Judge after recording evidenceconvicted the accused Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 under sec. 302 read with sec. 34 and sec. 302 read with sec. 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Accused No. 6 was further convicted under sec. 427 of the Indian Penal Code. Accused No. 5 was given benefit of doubt. So far as the question of sentence was concerned the learned trial Judge had taken the view that capital punishment should be awarded to accused No. 1 Dinesh and accused No. 3 Jayanti. They were therefore sentenced to death subject to confirmation by this Court for the aforesaid offences. So far as accused Nos. 4 and 6 were concerned they were awarded life imprisonment for the aforesaid offences. It was observed by this Court in the aforesaid case that accused No. 3 Jayantilal Shivshanker Jani was held to have committed the offence of murder in prosecution of common object of unlawful assembly he being a member thereof at the relevant time. The story of prosecution witness Shantaben as regards accused No. 3 having given a pipe blow to her deceased husband was held to be unacceptable. In the light of the aforesaid finding to which this Court reached so far as the culpability of accused No. 3 was concerned it was further observed that his case virtually became not distinguishable from the case of the driver of the truck accused no. In the light of the aforesaid finding to which this Court reached so far as the culpability of accused No. 3 was concerned it was further observed that his case virtually became not distinguishable from the case of the driver of the truck accused no. 6 so far as the question of sentence was concerned and the learned trial Judge himself had thought it fit to give lesser sentence of life imprisonment to accused No. 8 for his involvement in the offence of murder under sec. 302 read with sec. 149 of the Indian Penal Code. It was held by this Court that so far as accused No. 3 was concerned it would be wrong and discriminatory on the part of the Court to adjudicate upon the question of sentence by a different yard-stick and therefore the award of death sentence to accused No. 3 could not be confirmed and he was required to be given lesser sentence of life imprisonment as the driver of the truck accused No. 6 was awarded by the trial Court itself. So far as accused No. 1 was concerned it was held that antecedents did not show that he was a desparate character or was a danger to the society. It was true that he acted as a member of unlawful assembly in prosecution of its common object and initiated attack in the company of accused No. 2 with a Dharia on the deceased. But the Court had to consider the fact that be was carrying out the common object of the unlawful assembly and the court did not know what part he might have played in deciding upon the common object of the unlawful assembly. It was further noted by the Court that elder brother of accused No. 3 was already in the picture and therefore he might have been guided by the opinion of his elder brother in the formation of the common object of that assembly to murder the deceased. It was further noted by the Court that elder brother of accused No. 3 was already in the picture and therefore he might have been guided by the opinion of his elder brother in the formation of the common object of that assembly to murder the deceased. It was further held that accused No. 3 was a young boy and except the chapter cases mutually between him his brother and mother on the one hand and the tenants on the other there was no other blot on his character earlier and that he seemed to have taken part in carrying out the common object of the unlawful assembly finding that his two brothers were also there and finding himself in the company of the driver and the cleaner of the truck. The prosecution evidence was also not clear as to how many blows he gave to the deceased with Dharia Shantaben the poor widow of the deceased could see only one blow given by him. After seeing another blow given by accused No. 2 and the knife blows this lady could not tolerate the sight and therefore she closed her eyes. Under the aforesaid state of prosecution evidence the court was not in a position to say that accused No. 1 had given several blows to the deceased mercilessly. Considering all these factors it was held that it was a fit case in which the court could make an effort to see that that boy was reclaimed to the society and lived a good and decent life after serving out his life term and accordingly the sentence of death imposed upon accused Nos. 1 and 3 was not confirmed and instead it was reduced to the sentence of imprisonment for life. It is obvious that the aforesaid decision of this Court proceeds on peculiar facts of that case. So far as accused No. 3 was concerned only because he was a member of an unlawful assembly he was held guilty of murder and as the other member of the unlawful assembly namely the driver of the truck accused No. 6 was given lesser sentence accused No. 5 was also given lesser sentence by this Court so that the sentencing inter se between the concerned accused and the members on the unlawful assembly may not remain discriminatory. So far as accused No. 1 was concerned the prosecution evidence could not show as to how many blows were inflicted by him on the deceased and he being a member of the unlawful assembly dominated by his brother was found to have taken part in the incident. On these peculiar facts of the case this Court reduced the sentence imposed on accused No. 1 by the trial Court to lesser sentence of life imprisonment. The aforesaid decision of this Court turned round the peculiar facts of that case. The facts of the present case are entirely different. In the present case the prosecution has proved by clear cogent and convincing evidence that the accused had mercilessly inflicted nine knife blows to three helpless victims who were members of the house of Hasubhai Dave being his old father Gurishanker his brothers wife Ashaben and the minor infant Vibha. All the three of them perished as a result of the said mercilessly predetermined assault on them by the accused armed with two knives. There is no question of any unlawful assembly in the present case and hence the ratio of the decision of this Court in confirmation case No. 1 of 1978 pressed in service by Mr. Shah cannot be of any assistance to him. ( 42 ) MR. Shah then invited our attention to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of D. C. Gheewala and I. C. Bhatt JJ. in Criminal Appeal No. 471 of 1980 with Misc. Criminal Application No. 852 of 1980 decided on 24/11/1981 (Dinkar Shivram v. State 23 (2) G. L. R. 102: 19 GLT. 77 ). Gheewala J. speaking for the Division Bench has indicated certain restrictive categories of special reasons which would justify imposition of extreme penalty of death in the light of the statutory provisions of sec. 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same is as under : (1) If the accused has diabolically designed has meticulously planned and has efficiently executed his object of doing away with a human life. (2) If the motive for the crime is sheer greed or lascivious lust and lechery. 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same is as under : (1) If the accused has diabolically designed has meticulously planned and has efficiently executed his object of doing away with a human life. (2) If the motive for the crime is sheer greed or lascivious lust and lechery. (3) If a real or supposed wrong of the victim howsoever trivial it may be has weighed with the accused to such an extent that he has made a deliberate preparation spreading over a period of time to do away with the deceased. (4) If the accused under the arise of befriending the victim has lured him to a particular place and has subsequently to realise his object has acted in an unusually cruel or fiendish way while doing away with the victim. (5) When at the time of the commission of the crime the accused has acted with fiendish ferocity and with a spine-chilling and blood-curdling cruelty and where the very act indicates that the accused wanted to inflict the greatest amount of torture on the victim of his wrath and where his conduct indicates that he took sadistic delight in it. (6) Where the conduct of the accused subsequent to the crime does not show any remorse and on the contrary indicates that he is gloating over the successful execution of his design. (7) Where the act of the accused is not his first brush against the law and where it is established that he is a hardened criminal whose subsequent release even after a period of long years is likely to let loose a menace over the society and at whose hands innocent lives are likely to be jeopardised. (8) Where from the totality of circumstances it is revealed that the accused though he passes off under the tag of a human being is devoid of all traces of humanity. and where it can be reasonably concluded that he is as much misplaced in a civilized society as wolves would be in a populous territory. (8) Where from the totality of circumstances it is revealed that the accused though he passes off under the tag of a human being is devoid of all traces of humanity. and where it can be reasonably concluded that he is as much misplaced in a civilized society as wolves would be in a populous territory. (9) Where the crime of the accused is not a sporadic display of violence but where it is established that he has adopted violence as a way of life and in order that the rest of the society might experience a safe peaceful and terror-free existence sniffing out of such a life by a judicial edict becomes the painful duty of the court. It has been thereafter observed that if the above circumstances or a large majority of them exist in a given case the imposition of extreme penalty is not only called for but would become the duty of the Court to impose the same. In the case before the Division Bench the accused was charged for the offence of having committed murders of two innocent kids aged 11 years and 8 years who were his own nephews. The learned trial Judge had imposed a sentence of life-imprisonment on the accused for the aforesaid offence which was held to have been proved by the prosecution. While admitting the appeal of the accused against conviction this Court had issued a notice of enhancement. The prosecution case was that one Anand Krishan Shetti was residing with his wife and children outside Pani Gate Baroda. The accused was cousin brother of said Shri Shetti. It was alleged by the prosecution that on 20/08/1979 the accused visited the said residential house of Shri Shetti at about 11-30 a. m. One Padmaben along with her nieces Subhanginiben and Lalitaben went to see the movie Khandan which was currently being shown in Sapana Talkies. Padmaben asked the accused whether the said movie was a good one. The accused replied in the affirmative. The three ladies therefore decided to visit the theatre for a show starting at 3-00 p. m. After the ladies left deceased Suresh aged about 11 years and Ramesh aged about 9 years were the only two persons present in the bungalow along with the accused because the accused in the meantime had once again returned to the bungalow. The three ladies therefore decided to visit the theatre for a show starting at 3-00 p. m. After the ladies left deceased Suresh aged about 11 years and Ramesh aged about 9 years were the only two persons present in the bungalow along with the accused because the accused in the meantime had once again returned to the bungalow. Anand Krishan Shetti was running a canteen in the Polytechnic College and was in the habit of leaving the residence at about 6-30 a. m. and was returning only late in the evening at about 8-00 p. m. By about 5-00 p. m. when another daughter of Shetti namely Lilavati came from school she found the two boys lying in pools of blood. It was also found that gold ornaments which were kept in the safe in the cupboard in the drawing room were stolen. Thereafter the accused who was last seen together with the two deceased boys by about 3-00 p. m. in the afternoon on that day was arrested. Stolen articles were found from the pocket of the accused and other ornaments were discovered from the residence of the accused. Under the aforesaid circumstances the accused was required to stand his trial for the offences under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code of having murdered his two nephews. ( 43 ) THIS court confirmed the conviction and dismissed the appeal of the accused but at the same time discharged the notice for enhancement of sentence by holding that looking to the young age of the accused and the fact that he had not planned the attack in advance which was evinced by the fact that he had not brought the weapon of offence with him that he had done it on the spur of the moment for concealing his crime of making good his escape with a large amount of cash and jewellery and where his only anxiety in committing the crime seemed to be to wipe out the last vestiges of the evidence of his petty crime the accused in that case was held not to have deserved the extreme punishment of death. ( 44 ) THE aforesaid decision of this Court discharging the notice of enhancement against the accused proceeded on its own facts. ( 44 ) THE aforesaid decision of this Court discharging the notice of enhancement against the accused proceeded on its own facts. It was firstly not the case of confirmation where the learned trial Judge in the first place had decided to impose sentence of death which was required to be confirmed by this Court. It was a case arising on the issuance of enhacement notice where in the question whether the discretion exercised by the trial Court was required to be interfered with or not would obviously be very relevant Even apart from the aforesaid distinguishing feature the further distinguishing features were that the accused in that case was a young man who was not found to have been guilty of a pre-determined or pre-planned murder; that he had not come armed with a weapon to do away with anyone; that his main object was to steal the ornaments and cash and when he found that the two young nephews of his who were present in the house might be an impediment and might in future come forward as witnesses to the theft which he was committing the accused inflicted fatal blows with the help of any weapon which came handy to him on spot. The aforesaid peculiar facts of that case are conspicuously absent in the present case. On the contrary out of the nine types of illustrative cases indicated by the Division Bench to justify imposition of extreme penalty of death on an accused exist to a major extent in the present case as we will indicate a little later when we will consider the rival contentions submitted for our consideration by the learned Public Prosecutor as well as Mr. D. K. Shah for the accused on the question of awarding proper sentence in the factual background of the present case. It is sufficient for our present purpose to note that the decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 471 of 1980 cannot be of any assistance to Mr. Shah for supporting his proposition that the present accused does not deserve the extreme penalty of death as ordered by the trial Court. ( 45 ) WE will now turn to the various decisions of the Supreme Court to which our attention was invited by Mr. Shah for supporting his proposition that the present accused does not deserve the extreme penalty of death as ordered by the trial Court. ( 45 ) WE will now turn to the various decisions of the Supreme Court to which our attention was invited by Mr. I. U. Mehta the learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State in support of his contention that the sentence of death imposed by the learned trial judge upon the appellant-accused deserves to be confirmed. ( 46 ) IN the case of the Supreme Court confirmed the award of sentence of death as imposed by the learned Sessions Judge and as confirmed by the High Court on the accused of that case who was found to have committed a brutal murder to execute his declared intention by causing 16 injuries on a defenceless person. The deceased in that case had made an award regarding wages payable to the accused by P. W. No. 13 P. W. 13 made the payment to the accused according to the award. The accused was dissatisfied with the said award made by the deceased and on the day previous to the date of the incident he uttered a threat that if the entire amount due to him was not paid he would murder the deceased. On the next day while the deceased was working in his timber depot the accused went to his shop and stabbed him indiscriminately as a result of which the deceased sustained injuries and died. It is in the background of these facts that the aforesaid decision was rendered at the time when the provisions of sec. 354 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 were not holding the field and the question of sentence was within the discretion of the Judge concerned and the Court could impose either sentence of death or sentence of life imprisonment depending on the facts of each case and in the light of extenuating circumstances if any. But the fact remains that the aforesaid decision is an authority for the proposition that in case of such brutal murders which are pre-planned wherein the victims are a defenceless persons sentence of death could be imposed. ( 47 ) WE now turn to the consideration of the next decision to which our attention was invited by. Mr. Mehta for the Prosecution. ( 47 ) WE now turn to the consideration of the next decision to which our attention was invited by. Mr. Mehta for the Prosecution. In the case of Perumal v. The State of Kerala AIR 1975 Supreme Court 95 the Supreme Court was concerned with a case in which the accused had attacked the deceased in a pre-meditated fashion. The accused was found to have stabbed the deceased in back in abdomen and in clevicle as also on both the hands and was ordered to be hanged by the learned Sessions Judge and the said sentence was confirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the sentence of death in the light of the aforesaid facts. This case of course was also decided prior to the coming into force of sec. 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 Still it does indicate that in a case in which the pre-medidated brutal attack on vital parts of the body of the deceased is resorted to the sentence of the death could be imposed in the discretion of the Court and which would in its turn indicate that such type of case would serve as an illustrative case. In Perumals case (supra) the facts were that the accused arming himself with a dagger went to the house of the deceased and called the deceased. At that time a neighbour of the deceased Abraham Tampan was present with him at that time. The deceased came out of the house followed by Abraham Tampan. The accused then moved towards the house of Thankamma Abraham (P. W. 3 in that case) at a distance of about 200 meters from the house of the deceased. Deceased followed the accused to that place. The accused then turned towards the deceased and asked him whether he would go away only after receiving the money. The deceased thereupon remarked as to why the accused was insulting him. An altercation then took place between the accused and the deceased. The accused then caught hold of the Kailee Mundu of the deceased. A scuffle followed between the two during the course of which the accused and the deceased moved towards the bank of a river. The accused then put his foot on the loose end of deceaseds Mundu as a result of which the Mundu dropped on the ground. The accused then caught hold of the Kailee Mundu of the deceased. A scuffle followed between the two during the course of which the accused and the deceased moved towards the bank of a river. The accused then put his foot on the loose end of deceaseds Mundu as a result of which the Mundu dropped on the ground. When the deceased went forward to pick it up the accused took out a dagger and stabbed the deceased on his back and thereafter on other parts of the body. It is in the background of the aforesaid facts that the Supreme Court observed that it was a case in which the accused deserved sentence of death as his attack on the deceased was a pre-determined one and was mounted on vital parts of the body of the deceased. ( 48 ) OUR attention was then invited to another decision of the Supreme Court in the same Vol. at page 783. In the case of Suresh v. The State of Maharashtra the Supreme (Court was concerned with a case in which the accused had come inside the room where the deceased was sitting unarmed and the accused had come with an intention to murder her. While the deceased tried to run away she was given the first stab and thereafter the accused pursued her and inflicted several blows on the vital parts of the body. On these facts the learned trial judge imposed the sentence of death on the accused which was confirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court also in its turn confirmed the same. The Supreme Court noted the fact that the trial Court had noticed no extenuating circumstances. The aforesaid case also indicates by way of an illustration a situation in which extreme penalty of death was found to be called for when the accused inflicted with a pre-determined mind various stab blows on the vital parts of the body of the deceased who was totally unarmed and defenceless. ( 49 ) WE now turn to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the same year 1975 in the case of Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1320. The accused Maghar Singh had committed a pre-planned cold-blooded murder and no extenuating circumstances were found to exist. ( 49 ) WE now turn to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the same year 1975 in the case of Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1320. The accused Maghar Singh had committed a pre-planned cold-blooded murder and no extenuating circumstances were found to exist. The facts in the aforesaid case were that one Smt. Surjit Kaur was living with the deceased for about 9 to 10 years as his wife. The approver Baldevsingh (P. W. 11) was her Pichhlagu son offspring from the first husband. What appeared to be a happy married life for quite a few years appeared to have been subsequently disrupted by the entry of the accused who started clandestine visits to the house of the deceased three-four years before the occurrence and developed illicit intimacy with Smt. Surjit Kaur. According to the prosecution Smt. Surjit Kaur eloped with the appellant about six-seven months before the occurrence but returned to her husband the deceased after an attempt was made by him to bring her home 9/10 days before the occurrence. As the deceased appeared to be a very serious obstacle in the illicit relations of Surjit Kaur and the accused the two accused after taking Baldev Singh (approver) into confidence planned the murder of the deceased. The immediate cause for the murder of the deceased was provided by the fact that the deceased had made a will in favour of the Pichhlagu son. Baldev Singh and Surjit Kaur thought that lest the deceased might change his mind it was better to finish him off and grab the entire property for her son. Animated with this object Maghar Singh knocked at the door of the house of the deceased at 10-p. m. when the deceased was sitting in his house. The door was opened by Smt. Surjit Kaur and the accused entered with a Kirpan. Surjit Kaur caught the deceased by his long hair while the approver Baldev Singh caught his legs. Accused gave several Kirpan blows in quick succession on the neck and other parts of his body causing as many as 17 injuries out of which 5 injuries were incised wounds and were sufficient to cause the death of deceased. It was in the light of the aforesaid facts that the Supreme Court endorsed the sentence of death imposed on Maghar Singh by the courts below. It was in the light of the aforesaid facts that the Supreme Court endorsed the sentence of death imposed on Maghar Singh by the courts below. This case also indicates an illustrative situation where a cold-blood murder of a helpless victim and especially when it was a pre-planned murder was thought to be a proper case in which the extreme penalty could be imposed on the accused perpetrating such a heinous crime. ( 50 ) WE must however note that all the aforesaid decisions to which our attention was drawn by Mr. Mehta the learned Public Prosecutor were rendered when the present statutory provisions of sec. 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 were not holding the field but they at least present the various types of illustrative cases wherein the Supreme Court in its discretion thought it fit to confirm the sentence of death imposed on the concerned accused who were held guilty of the heinous crimes of murder in the background of the peculiar facts of the respective cases. ( 51 ) IN the case of Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1976 Supreme Court 230 the Supreme Court noted the advent of the provi sions of sec. 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 Untwalia J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed in his aforesaid decision as under:" Under sec. 354 (3) the Court is required to state the reasons for the sentence awarded and in the case of sentence of death special reasons are required to be slated. It would thus be noticed that awarding of the sentence other than the sentence of death is the general rule now under the new Code and only special reasons that is to say special facts and circumstances in a given case will warrant the passing of the death sentence. It is unnecessary nor is it possible to make a catalogue of the special reasons which may justify the passing of the death sentence in a case. But to indicate just a few such as the crime has been committed by a professional or a hardened criminal or it has been committed in a very brutal manner or on a helpless child or a woman or the like. (Emphasis supplied)". But to indicate just a few such as the crime has been committed by a professional or a hardened criminal or it has been committed in a very brutal manner or on a helpless child or a woman or the like. (Emphasis supplied)". ( 52 ) IN Balwant Singhs case (supra) the accused was aged 60 years at the time of occurrence and he was bearing a grudge against the deceased Mohan Singh who was a member of the Managing Committee of the Gurudwara and in the early hours of 13/04/1974 the accused gave Karah Prashad of Granth Sahib to Mohan Singh mixing opium in it. The result was that Mohan Singh became sick and inspite of medical aid he breathed his last. In the view of the Supreme Court there were no special reasons to impose the extreme penalty of death on the accused in that case. But while so holding in the background of the peculiar facts of that case Untwalia J. speaking for the Supreme Court has in terms indicated the various illustrative cases in which the extreme penalty of death would be called for and such cases would themselves supply the illustrative categories of special reasons as contemplated in sec. 354 (3 ) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 It will at once become apparent that in a case in which the offence is committed in a brutal manner or on a helpless child or a woman the case would give rise to an occasion for inflicting extreme penalty of death as indicated by the Supreme Court in Balwant Singhs case (supra ). In the present case as we will point out the accused had committed the crime of triple murders in a most brutal manner and his victims were helpless and innocent child a young woman and an old man. Accordingly as indicated by the Supreme Court in Balwant Singhs case (supra) the factual background of the present case would give rise to special reasons for imposing the extreme penalty of death on the accused. ( 53 ) THE next judgment of the Supreme Court in the same volume and to which our attention was invited by Mr. Accordingly as indicated by the Supreme Court in Balwant Singhs case (supra) the factual background of the present case would give rise to special reasons for imposing the extreme penalty of death on the accused. ( 53 ) THE next judgment of the Supreme Court in the same volume and to which our attention was invited by Mr. Mehta the learned Public Prosecutor is found at page 653 of the report in the case of Lajar Masih v. State of U. P. The Supreme Court endorsed the capital sentence imposed on the accused by the Courts below by holding that the conduct of the accused in that case to disrupt the matrimonial home of the deceased was highly immoral and cannot be looked upon with commiseration particularly when after her marriage the deceased had returned to the path of rectitude and was firmly faithful to her husband. It was found that the crime was committed in a dastardly fashion. No less than four unarmed persons were indiscriminately stabbed when most of them were lying asleep unawares and helpless. The crime was pre-meditated and pre-planned. The injury to the deceaseds husband was dangerous to life. But for timely medical aid the injury would have proved fatal. Even the mother of the deceased was not spared. In the background of the aforesaid facts it was held by the Supreme Court following its earlier decision in Ediga Anammas ease (supra) that the horrendous features of the crime the hapless the helpless state of the victim and the like steel the heart of the law for a sterner sentence. In Lajar Masihs case (supra) the facts were that for about two years preceding the occurrence the appellant had illicit connection with the deceased. He was anxious to marry her. But her parents did not agree to this matrimonial on the ground that there was a disparity in age. The accused however persuaded one Mehlus father to marry Mehlu to the deceased. The deceased after her marriage with Mehlu was staying as a faithful wife with him. On the night between the 2nd and 3rd of October 1971 the accused entered the house of the deceased and gave stab blows to various occupants of the house and in the same incident caused fatal injuries to the deceased. The deceased after her marriage with Mehlu was staying as a faithful wife with him. On the night between the 2nd and 3rd of October 1971 the accused entered the house of the deceased and gave stab blows to various occupants of the house and in the same incident caused fatal injuries to the deceased. It is in the background of the aforesaid facts that the Supreme Court was required to reiterate its earlier ratio in Ediga Anammas case (supra) and to hold that such facts would steel the heart of law for a sterner sentence. ( 54 ) WE now turn to another decision of the Supreme Court in the same year in the case of Mahadeo Dnyamu Jadav v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2327 In the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court took the view that the High Court was justified in confirming the conviction and death sentence imposed on the accused when there was clearest evidence of eye-witnesses and the medical evidence also pointed out that the four murders were committed at about the same time and as part of the same transaction by one and the same accused. Of course that was a case which arose prior to the coming into force of Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. But the Supreme Court put its seal of approval on the sentence of death as awarded by the learned trial Judge and as confirmed by the High Court when it was found that the accused inflicted fatal injuries to one Prahlad Jadhav his two wives Dhendubai and Yashodabai and his infant daughter Malan in the morning of 9/11/1973 It was a case in which multiple murders were committed by the accused at the same time and as a part of the same transaction and where all the deceased were helpless hapless victims. ( 55 ) OUR attention was next invited to the case of Dagdu and others etc. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1579 In that case five small girls about ten years of age a year old infant and four women in their mid-thirties were found murdered between 14/11/1972 and 4/01/1974 in a village called Manwat in Maharashtra. The murders of these ten females showed significant similarities in pattern and conception. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1579 In that case five small girls about ten years of age a year old infant and four women in their mid-thirties were found murdered between 14/11/1972 and 4/01/1974 in a village called Manwat in Maharashtra. The murders of these ten females showed significant similarities in pattern and conception. The time and place chosen for the crimes the preference for females as victims the nature of injuries caused to them the strange possibility that the private parts of some of the victims were cut in order to extract blood the total absence of motive for killing these very girls and women the clever attempt to dodge the police and then to put them on a false scent and the extreme brutality surrounding the crimes which gave to the case an eerie appearance were found sufficient to visit the culprits with the extreme penalty of death. ( 56 ) IN paragraphs 82 and 83 of the report the Supreme Court has observed as under:"having considered the matter in all its aspects penal juristic and sociologicaland having given our most anxious consideration to the problem we are of the opinion that accused Nos. 3 9 to and 11 deserve the extreme penalty of law and that there is no justification for interfering with the sentence of death imposed upon them. ACCUSED No. 3 put an end to four innocent lives three small girls ten years of age and a woman in her thirties. Accused Nos. 9 10 and 11 committed the murders of Haribai her nine year old daughter and her infant child. The victims had given no cause for the atrocities perpetrated on them. They were killed as a child kills flies. And the brutality accompanying the manner of killing defies an adequate description. The luring of small girls the gagging the cutting of their private parts the ruthless defiling in order to prevent identification of the victims and the mysterious motive for the murders call for but one sentence. Nothing short of the death sentence can atone for such callous and calculated transgression of law. Morbid pity can have no place in the assessment of murders which in many respects will remain unparallelled in the annals of crime". Nothing short of the death sentence can atone for such callous and calculated transgression of law. Morbid pity can have no place in the assessment of murders which in many respects will remain unparallelled in the annals of crime". Thus the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case was concerned with a merciless and wanton spree of mass murders with extreme abandon on the part of the accused. ( 57 ) THE next judgment in the same Vol. is at page 1812 in the case of Joseph Peter v. State of Goa Daman and Diu. Krishna Iyer J. speaking for the Division Bench of the Supreme Court noted the provisions of sec. 354 (3) of the New Code and observed as under :" Sec. 354 (3) of the new (Code gives the convicting Judge on a murder charge a discretion to choose between capital sentence and life term. It is true that in the present Code the unmistakable shift in legislative emphasis is on life imprisonment for murder as the rule and capital sentence an exception to be resorted to for reasons to be stated. The Judge is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition methodized by analogy disciplined by system and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life". It has been further observed therein as under :"the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in its precedents are that if the offence has been perpetrated with attendant aggravating circumstances if the perpetrator disc-loses an extremely depraved state of mind and diabolical trickery in committing the homicide accompanied by brutal dealing with the cadaver the court can hardly help in the present state of the law avoiding infliction of the death penalty. When discretion has been exercised by the trial Court and it is difficult to fault that court on any ground statutory or presidential an appellate review and even referal action become too narrow to demolish the discretionary exercise of power by the inferior court". In the aforesaid case youth of convict and long spell of torment alone were not held to be sufficient to award lesser sentence and it was pointed out that Presidential power is wider but judicial power is embanked. In the aforesaid case youth of convict and long spell of torment alone were not held to be sufficient to award lesser sentence and it was pointed out that Presidential power is wider but judicial power is embanked. ( 58 ) WE may next turn to another decision in the same ruling at page 2102 in the case of Ramiah Asari v. State of Tamil Nadu. S. M. Fazal Ali J speaking for the Supreme Court confirmed the sentence as imposed on the accused by the learned Sessions Judge and as confirmed by the High Court as the accused had committed unprovoked dastardly double murder of his wife and his father-in-law. It was found in that case that his father-in-law had given him shelter in his house and in the bargain the father-in-law received 13 injuries and his own daughter wife of the accused was given 22 injuries by the accused. Characterising the case being one of unprovoked dastardly murder it was held that it was a fit case in which the extreme penalty of death was rightly inflicted especially when the accused had killed his own wife and father-in-law who had given him shelter in his house. ( 59 ) WE next turn to another decision of the Supreme Court in the same vol. at page 2407 in the case Rau Chima Chougule v. State of Maharashtra. In that case the accused had murdered his daughter Vijaya and his son-in-law Shivaji. The accused was found to be a mature person aged 60 years and the murders were committed by him in a pre-planned and cold-blooded manner and were found to be acts of treachery of the worst kind. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the sentence of death as imposed by the learned trial Judge and as confirmed by the High Court of Maharashtra. The facts of the case were that the accused was harbouring a grudge against his own daughter and son-in-law who had married against his wish. But thereafter he had brought both of them to his own house where they were staying and supporting the accused. On the night of the incident the accused killed both his daughter as well as his son-in-law who were asleep in the same house in which the accused was residing. But thereafter he had brought both of them to his own house where they were staying and supporting the accused. On the night of the incident the accused killed both his daughter as well as his son-in-law who were asleep in the same house in which the accused was residing. In the background of the aforesaid facts the Supreme Court held the imposition of sentence of death to be justified. ( 60 ) IN the same Vol. there is one more judgment reported at page 2423 in the case of Sarveshwar Prasad Sharma v. The State of Madhya Pradesh. In the case the accused had murdered the entire family of nine persons which were found to be gruesome murders wiping out an entire family of nine persons and two infants. It was further found that these murders were committed by the accused with a deliberate motive of wrongful gain and the accused was neither demented nor mentally sick and there were no extenuating circumstances. In that case the Supreme Court took the view that the trial Court was justified in ordering death sentence of the accused and it was also properly confirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court negatived the contention on behalf of the accused that the crime was committed as the accused was financially in straits having wife and two children. It was held that the weak financial condition of the accused would not justify imposition of lesser sentence on him. Being financially in straits was not considered to be an extenuating circumstance and it was held that there were sufficient special reasons mandated under law which justified imposition of extreme penalty of death for committing such cruel and diabolical murders. In the aforesaid case the accused who was practising Ayurved had come close to the family of the deceased; that the accused having suffered financial difficulties entered the house of the deceased removed cash ornaments and other valuables and also exterminated the entire family of deceased Ram Swaroop. It was found that the accused for achievement of his vicious object to relieve him of his cash and valuables not only killed the deceased but also exterminated his whole family including his aged parents his wife and five children two of whom were infants aged five years and three years respectively. It was found that the accused for achievement of his vicious object to relieve him of his cash and valuables not only killed the deceased but also exterminated his whole family including his aged parents his wife and five children two of whom were infants aged five years and three years respectively. He committed these blood chilling murders of the nine innocent persons for monetary gain and to destroy the evidence of the crime he had committed. He the background of the aforesaid facts the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the sentence of death imposed on the accused by the courts below and found sufficient special reasons for hanging the accused. The aforesaid case clearly lays down the proposition that being in financial difficulties affords no justifiable reason for not imposing the extreme penalty of death if the crime committed is a cold-blooded premeditated crime. . ( 61 ) OUR attention was next invited by Mr. Mehta to a decision of the Supreme Court in Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1978 Supreme Court 1248. It was a case in which the accused was found to have committed double murders in a Sikh Gurudwara on the night between September 8 and September 9 1973 and the victims were three persons who were sleeping at the relevant time when they were assaulted by the accused. This crime was detected by one Shyam Singh who went to the Gurudwara of his village at about 7-00 a. m. for brooming and burning incence. He found three persons one of whom Mada Singh lay groaning on a cot. Two other persons were also found injured and lying on the cot. The locks of the rooms were found broken and the goods lay scattered. It was found out that the accused was the author of this crime. On the question of awarding proper sentence to the accused it was held by the Court that the Crimes were committed in a most brutal and dastardly fashion. The victims were taken unawares when they were asleep. Two of them were blind persons. His Noronian conduct even after the occurrence in languishing in the stricken premises looking for something to eat in the kitchen drinking water smoking the bidis bringing water and bathing himself mindless of the spectre of the slain and the groans and gasps of the dying betrays an extreme depravity of character. Two of them were blind persons. His Noronian conduct even after the occurrence in languishing in the stricken premises looking for something to eat in the kitchen drinking water smoking the bidis bringing water and bathing himself mindless of the spectre of the slain and the groans and gasps of the dying betrays an extreme depravity of character. The grisly and gruesome nature of the murders the hapless and helpless state of the victims the fiendish modus operandi of the appellant to first kill and then steal-all steel the heart of law to call for its extreme penalty. ( 62 ) WE now turn to two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in the year 1981 and to which our attention was invited by Mr. Mehta for the Prosecution. In Gayasi v. State of U. P. AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1160 the Supreme Court was concerned with the case of murder of Amin a Government servant who was done to death by the accused while the deceased was discharging his ministerial duty. Sentence of death imposed on the accused was confirmed by the Supreme Court by observing that crimes committed against public servants for reasons arising out of performance by them of their public duties must be discouraged and put down with a firm hand. ( 63 ) LASTLY our attention was invited to the case of Kuljeet Singh alias Ranga v. Union of India and Another AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1572 where Chandrachud C. J. speaking for the Supreme Court held that the two accused who were professional murderers deserved no sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society. These accused were held guilty of having committed murder of two young children. The accused had made all the preparations for committing the murder of a person or persons whom they would apparently oblige by offering a lift. The plan which they had hatched was that they would offer lift to some young children try to extort ransom from their parents by kidnapping them and do the children to death in the event of any impediments arising in the execution of their plan. The murder was most certainly not committed on the spur of the moment as a result of some irresistible impulse which can be said to have overtaken the accused at the crucial moment. The murder was most certainly not committed on the spur of the moment as a result of some irresistible impulse which can be said to have overtaken the accused at the crucial moment. In other words there was a planned motivation behind the crime though the accused had no personal motive to commit the murder of these two children. Any two children would have been good enough for them. In the background of the aforesaid facts it was held by the Supreme Court that the death sentence imposed upon them was quite justified as the inhumanity committed defied all belief and description. ( 64 ) WE will now proceed to deal with the question of imposing proper sentence on the accused in the light of the aforesaid settled legal position and especially in the light of the decision of the Constitutional Bench in Bachan Singhs case (supra ). 224 B (ii) Rival Contentions. We may at this stage note the rival contentions urged before us by the learned Advocate for the accused as well as for the State of Gujarat regarding the imposition of proper sentence on the accused in the background of the facts of the present case. ( 65 ) MR. D. K. Shah appearing for the accused contended that this is not a fit case in which the extreme penalty of death can be imposed. He submitted that the accused was facing unemployment since the end of the year 1977. He had made many attempts to get alternative employment but he had failed. Thus he was victim of economic forces prevalent in the Society. Inspite of the award of reinstatement having been passed in his favour by the Labour Court the employer on one pretext or the other had refused to comply with the award. That exasperated the accused. He comes from a poor family. He is a bachelor. His father is mentally deranged and is of no assistance to the family. As his statement in writing filed before us at Exh. 189 shows the accused belongs to a poor family his father Keshavlal is mentally deranged since last seven years and there was none else to maintain his family. His mother Triveniben is keeping bad health but only because the accused became unemployed she has started working as an Aya with a local doctor on a monthly salary of Rs. 150. 00. His mother Triveniben is keeping bad health but only because the accused became unemployed she has started working as an Aya with a local doctor on a monthly salary of Rs. 150. 00. His other sister who stays with the accused was also supplementing the meagre income of the family by serving and doing manual work; that the accused has stated in his statement in writing (Exh. 189) that as he was unemployed since three years he was undergoing mental tension and torture and was not in a position to maintain mental equilibrium and poise; that another brother of the accused is also a bachelor and is doing stray labour. His another brother Chhotalal who was staying separately at Baroda had lost his one eye while working on a lathe machine at Baroda; that his father is aged 65 and his mother is aged 60 years; that marriage of his sister aged 25 could not be arranged due to paucity of funds. Mr. Shah also invited our attention to what the accused had stated before us orally when he was called by us for having his say in the matter. His oral statement before us is at Exh. 190 Mr. Shah stated that the accused had clearly stated before us in his aforesaid statement that he had joined Veraval Factory in 1976 March and he had started earning by the time he had come to S. S. C. Standard. The accused had passed S. S. C. without English and even before he joined Veraval Factory the accused was working in Veraval since two years prior thereto and that he was not involved in any other offence earlier. No complaint was also filed against him for any other offence. Mr. Shah has put special emphasis on the oral statement of the accused (Exh. 190) where he stated that he was not in full control of his mind at the relevant time and that he was bothered; that during the time he was unemployed he had tried to get employment at several places. He had applied in Greaves Cotton Veraval. He was called for interview but was not selected and inspite of the order of reinstatement as passed by the Labour Court the management had not taken him on job and he had made a complaint about the same even before the Collector. Mr. He had applied in Greaves Cotton Veraval. He was called for interview but was not selected and inspite of the order of reinstatement as passed by the Labour Court the management had not taken him on job and he had made a complaint about the same even before the Collector. Mr. Shah has also invited our attention to certain events which have been clearly proved by the prosecution evidence led on the question of motive underlying the crime and which evidence has been discussed earlier by us in details when we dealt with that topic. Mr. Shah submitted that in November 1979 the award (Exh. 42) was passed in favour of the accused by which he was ordered to be reinstated by the Labour Court. Still the employer did not reinstate him and the accused also had a serious grievance regarding the award of only Rs. 1000/by way of back-wages as ordered by the Labour Court. His grievance is clearly reflected by his subsequent letter addressed to Labour Court Judge as per Exh. 62. Mr. Shah further submitted that as the accused could not get justice as desired by him he went on hunger strike and it was given up by him on being persuaded by Advocate Hasubhai who intervened at the instance of the learned Labour Court Judge. The recovery application under sec. 33 (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act was filed on behalf of the accused by Advocate Hasubhai as per Exh. 32; that it lingered on for couple of months on the file of the Labour Court. That exasperated the accused. He was unemployed and struggling all these months and years. It is in the background of this kind of mental frame of mind that be had addressed letter (Exh. 56) in May 1981 to the Governor of Gujarat. But this mental background of the accused should call for pity rather than wrath against the accused. Rightly or wrongly he was entertaining a grudge against Advocate Hasubhai. Mr. Shah submitted that the inci- dent which took place on 17/10/1980 shows that the accused was not possessed of his full sense and was mentally imbalanced and he must not have known what he was doing. Otherwise he would not have infli- cted injuries on innocent persons-inmates of Hasubhais house who had given no cause of complaint to the accused even remotely Mr. Otherwise he would not have infli- cted injuries on innocent persons-inmates of Hasubhais house who had given no cause of complaint to the accused even remotely Mr. Shah submitted that this is not a case of a hardened criminal. His past back- ground is absolutely blotless and but for the incident in question there is no other blemish in his entire career that persistent frustration and economic pains and sufferings had momentarily effected his control over the mind and hence the crime committed by him should be looked at with compassion and he should be treated more as a victim of economic and social forces rather than a perpetrator of oppression and atrocities on others and such an accused deserves to be given a chance to be reclaimed to the society. That his is not a case of a lost cause or dead- wood or a menace to the society required to be chopped off. Mr. Shah therefore contended that the Court must look at his case with sympathy and should reduce the sentence to imprisonment for life. ( 66 ) MR. J. U. Mehta the learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand contended heavily relying upon the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in Bachan Singhs case (supra) that the special reasons required to be given under sec. 354 (3) read with sec. 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 must have due reference not only to the crime but also to the criminal. Mr. Mehta submitted that murder is a crime against society. Retribution and deterrence are equal foundations on which punishment has to be based. That while inflicting proper puni- shment its effect on the society has also to be kept in view. Mr. Mehta contended that in the present case extreme penalty of death is called for; that the accused suffered from no impulse of sex or theft nor was he mentally deranged at the relevant time. That on the contrary he has acted in a cool and calculated manner; that he is a fully matured person aged 28 at the time of the incident; that he had seen life; that as his oral statement (Exh. 190) shows he had passed S. S. C. without English and he was working since two years prior to March 1976 when he joined Veraval factory. 190) shows he had passed S. S. C. without English and he was working since two years prior to March 1976 when he joined Veraval factory. The prosecution evidence and especially oral evidence of witness Mr. Chhaya Exh. 14 Senior Labour Court Judge shows that the accused used to appear in Labour Court off and on as representative of other workmen; that the prosecution evidence shows that the accused was a type of man who was at war with the world. He always believed that what he felt was truth and justice; that inspite of the order of reinstatement made by the learned Labour Court Judge way back in November 1979 and inspite of the fact that the management had agreed to reinstate him the accused did not like to rejoin the service till the question of his back-wages was settled. Thus he was even holding the management to ransom; that evidence of prosecution witness Hasmukhbhai Gaurishanker (Exh. 55) shows that after the witness agreed to help the accused free of charge and took up his case the witness personally went to Veraval with the accused to see that he was reinstated in service. In paragraph 25 of his deposition the witness had stated that he had told the accused that if the management did not reinstate him he would come to Veraval and would try to persuade the management to take him back in job and accordingly he had gone to Veraval with the accused. Thus Advocate Hasubhai had tried his best to help the accused and still the accused was not prepared to get reinstated and start earning till the question of past arrears of wages was amicably settled to his satisfaction. Thus the accused according to Mr. Mehta was perennially a recalcitrant person who believed in the theory of self-righteousness and who moved about with a sense of injured innocence. That the accused had consistently harboured grievance against Hasmukhbhai as well as against the Labour Court Judge Shri Chhaya and against others who were instrumental in making him give up his fast unto death in January 1980 Hence as per the letter (Exh. That the accused had consistently harboured grievance against Hasmukhbhai as well as against the Labour Court Judge Shri Chhaya and against others who were instrumental in making him give up his fast unto death in January 1980 Hence as per the letter (Exh. 56) addressed by him in May 1980 to the Governor of Gujarat the accused had committed himself to take vangeance on Hasubhai and others and thereafter with a pre-determined mind the accused had planned out the entire incident and having purchased two knives from Bhavnagar the accused went armed with the knives and committed trespass in the house of Hasubhai on the day of the incident and he pounced upon three innocent hapless and helpless inmates of the house who were old father of Hasubhai a young house-wife Ashaben and an infant baby Vibha who were unarmed and who had given no cause whatever for grievance to the accused but the accused was out to exterminate the entire family of Hasubhai with a view to take vengeance on Hasubhai. He pounced upon these innocent inmates and butchered them in a cold-blooded and cruel manner as a child would kill the flies. The action of the accused was therefore totally callous and wanton and as the accused had come with a pre-determined mind and perpetrated this heinous crime of multiple murders of innocent inmates of Hasubhais house he deserved the extreme penalty of death. Mr. Mehta further contended that this is not a case of a person who was deranged in mind or who had even momentarily lost control or presence of mind. This is clearly evidenced by the words he addressed to Hasubhais mother Jayaben who appeared on the scene soon after the assaults on Gaurishanker Ashaben Vibha Janak and Kanaiyalal. Thus this was a case of a well thought out pre-planned cold-blooded triple murders. Mr. Mehta submitted that the accused was a sworn enemy of Hasubhai and it was by sheer stroke of good luck that mother of Hasubhai namely Jayaben had gone for Darshan of Gabbar and she was not on spot when the accused mounted his assault on the innocent inmates of the house. Otherwise she also would perished by the knives of the accused. Otherwise she also would perished by the knives of the accused. The fact that the accused bad no remorse for what he had done and was firmly determined to annihilate the entire family of Hasubhai is seen from the fact that even though he was caught by witnesses Ibrahimbhai and Umedbhai when he saw witness Jayaben entering the house he shouted at her Come here old woman I want to kill you. This type of his conduct in unmistakable terms reflects upon the hard character of the accused and speaks volumes for his deep set criminal leanings; that he had no compunction or remorse for what he had done that he inflicted a dozen knife-blows on five innocent defenseless persons including even innocent unarmad neighbours who had rushed to intervene with a view to restrain him. One of these neighbours Janak barely escaped the jaws of death. This shows the vengeance with which she accused acted on spot. If style is the man the mode and the manner of the commission of the crime by the accused in the present case speaks volumes for the depraved character of the accused and he deserves no lighter sentence as canvassed by Mr. D. K. Shah Mr. Mehta submitted that the result of the sentence of life imprisonment would be that such an accused who criminally trespassed and perpetrated butchery of the innocent and helpless victims would be hazardously back in society only after a period of 14 years considering the remission that he would earn. He would be a menace to Hasubhai and members of his family. On the other hand meeting out a mild sentence to him would have an adverse effect on the morale of the society as a whole and no house would feel safe. By butchering the innocent family members of Hasubhai the accused inflicted the unkindest cut of all. Such type of crime deserved the strictest punishment in law. Mr. Mehta further submitted that economic distress was a self-imposed one so far as the accused was concerned. If he was really in a starving condition he could have first accepted the job and could have thereafter negotiated for the past arrears of wages. Such type of crime deserved the strictest punishment in law. Mr. Mehta further submitted that economic distress was a self-imposed one so far as the accused was concerned. If he was really in a starving condition he could have first accepted the job and could have thereafter negotiated for the past arrears of wages. But he was in no mood to resume his duties as per the order of reinstatement as passed by the Labour Court in November 1979 when the management itself had given consent to reinstate him and even though his Advocate Hasubhai went with him all the way to Veraval to see that he was reinstated the accused did resume his duties. On the contrary he kept everyone to ransom by contending that unless his past arrears are cleared off he would not resume his duties. He appeared to be a person who did not exert and intended to ultimately earn salary without working His mother and sister who were working for him seem to have maintained him all these years. Thus he appears to be a person accustomed to live on income of others. Hence no question of economic distress can be effectively urged on behalf of the accused. Even otherwise submitted Mr. Mehta economic distress cannot be aground to perpetrate gruesome murders of innocent persons and it would not furnish a reason for not imposing strictest punishment under law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarveshwar Prasad Sharmas case (supra) AIR 1977 SC 2423 ). B. (iii ). Special reasons for imposing the extreme penalty of death. ( 67 ) HAVING given our most anxious thought and consideration to the aforesaid rival contentious of the learned Advocates of both sides and having considered the legal position pertaining to the question of imposing of proper sentence in the backdrop of circumstances obtaining in the present case we have reached the conclusion that this is a fit case in which the extreme penalty of death should be imposed on the accused. We fully endorse the reasons submitted by Mr. Mehta the learned P. P. for imposing capital sentence on the accused. T6e special reasons which commend to us for coming to the aforesaid conclusion as under: (1) The accused was a seasoned person and not an immature youth. We fully endorse the reasons submitted by Mr. Mehta the learned P. P. for imposing capital sentence on the accused. T6e special reasons which commend to us for coming to the aforesaid conclusion as under: (1) The accused was a seasoned person and not an immature youth. At the time of incident he was aged 28 years and he had seen life and the vicissitude thereof. He had passed his S. S. C. Examination and he was working at least since 1974 and was doing stray jobs. He had worked even as representative of other labourers before the labour Court. The crime which the accused committed therefore cannot be ascribed to him as done by an immature youth in a sudden impulse and on a spur of the moment in a temporary state of mental inbalance. On the contrary it was a deliberate and a diabolical heinous crime committed as a result of simmering discontent nursed over a long period of time. (2) The letter addressed by the accused to the Governor of Gujarat (Exh. 56) in May 1980 shows that by that time the accused had made up his mind to take vengeance against Hasubhai. Thus he had brooded over months and hatched the plan to take vengeance and to inflict grave sufferings on Hasubhai and the modus operandi to take revenge which he adopted after a planned and deliberate design was to massacre innocent occupants and family members staying in Hasubhais house. The accused having obtained the amount ordered in his favour in the recovery application from the Labour Court in the beginning of October 1980 went to Bhavnagar and purchased the murder weapons the two knives. The fact that he purchased two knives with which he was found armed at the relevant time shows that he was out to destroy as many inmates of the house of Hasubhai as possible. Having purchased these knives before 15 days of the incidental the accused on the day of the incident ascertained the exact whereabouts of the house of Hasubhai and then entered the said house armed with the two knives determined to exterminate the entire household. In the process he fatally stabbed three innocent helpless and hapless victims who had no resistance to offer and who had never seen the accused in their life and who had never crossed his path. In the process he fatally stabbed three innocent helpless and hapless victims who had no resistance to offer and who had never seen the accused in their life and who had never crossed his path. Still the accused pounced upon these innocent persons who were an old man an infant girl and young house-wife. The other inmates fortunately escaped as they were not present on spot. But even after inflicting 12 injuries to 5 victims the inveterate vengeance and burning wrath of the accused were not yet appeased as can be visualised from the way he shouted out at Jayaben that he would finish her also. It is pertinent to note that the accused even though caught by witnesses Ibrahimbhai and Umedbhai on spot did not shout at them but moment he saw the old mother of Hasubhai entering the house be shouted at her that she might go near so that she might be killed. His attack was concentrated against the family members of Hasubhai and none else. Janak and Kanaiyalal the neighbours got hurt by the accused because they tried to intervene but if they had not gone on spot they would obviously not have been injured. This shows that the accused had a predetermined mind to destroy each and every member of Hasubhais family. As observed by the Supreme Court in Bachan Singhs case (supra)style is the man. The way the accused attacked the innocent inmates on that fateful evening shows that he had no compunction. He had no sense of mercy and he was out to destroy the entire household of Hasubhai for really no fault of anyone. He butchered innocent inmates as a child would kill the flies. Such a person would be a menace to the society. No household would be safe if such persons are allowed to be at large even after their serving out the entire sentence of life imprisonment which under the present position of law would be minimum 14 years. (3) The method and manner of perpetrating the crime speak volumes of the depraved mental condition of the accused. (4) Economic distress as put forward by Mr. Shah to show the agitated mind of the accused at time relevant time is a mere excuse on the part of the accused. The accused appeared to be suffering from self-induced sense of injustice at the hands of Hasubhai. (4) Economic distress as put forward by Mr. Shah to show the agitated mind of the accused at time relevant time is a mere excuse on the part of the accused. The accused appeared to be suffering from self-induced sense of injustice at the hands of Hasubhai. He was ordered to be reinstated by the Judicial order. His employer had agreed and consented to take him back. His Advocate Hasubhai had gone all the way to Veraval to see that he was put back in service. Still the accused was not willing to join unless all his past arrears were cleared. Even otherwise economic distress cannot give a handle to anyone to kill innocent people and it would not be a ground for imposing lesser sentence as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of sarveshwar Prasad Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1977 SC 2423 (supra ). (5) The accused had diabolically designed and had meticulously planned and had effectively executed his object of exterminating the inmates of Hasubhais house. (6) The motive of the crime was sheer ingratitude and a false sense of taking revenge on Hasubhai. We cannot accept the submission of Mr. Shah for the accused that if the accused was really desirous of hurting Hasubhai he would have attacked him at his office rather than attack his family members at his residence and that showed that the accused was not in flies control of his senses. On the other hand this shows a deliberate design harboured by the accused to give maximum pain and suffering to Hasubhai by killing his innocent family members. Such a person who bad become morally depraved and whose all senses of justness had got blunted cannot be permitted to be let loose in the Society. Even after passage of time he would be a potential danger to diverse innocent persons who were catelogued in his letter (Exh. 56 ). We cannot permit the other innocent persons to remain in perpetual dread. It Can not be forgotten that the accused was a sworn enemy of the entire household of Hasubhai. Other members of Hasubhais family by forfuitous circumstances escaped the jaws of death. 56 ). We cannot permit the other innocent persons to remain in perpetual dread. It Can not be forgotten that the accused was a sworn enemy of the entire household of Hasubhai. Other members of Hasubhais family by forfuitous circumstances escaped the jaws of death. The obstinate self-righteous bent of mind to which those others who crossed his path were enemies deserving punishment betrays a character which is at once perverted depraved and a hanging sword a menace to those others. Such a hard soul having all sense of decency and discretion blunted cannot be permitted to be let loose in the society even after the efflux of the full term of incarceration. Since he is a potential danger to innocent others and since he has already proved himself to be a pitiless criminal we cannot think of his redemption in the hope that after his regaining freedom he will be civilized. (7) Even if we were to change places with the accused and were to consider that the grudge he bore had some basis the ghastly acts which he committed after long deliberation are extremely disproportionate to his supposed grievance and prove him to be an exceptionally depraved person. The supposed wrong done to the cause of the accused by Hasubhai was such a trifle that in normal circumstances it could not have given any just grievance a rational mind. But the accused took it otherwise and thought of making a deliberate plan spread over a period of time at least from May to October 1980 to perpetrate the crime in question. Thus the act on his part was a highly thought over and pre-planned act. (8) At the time of the commission of the offence the accused had acted with fiendish ferocity and with a blood-curdling cruelty. It is pertinent to note that having inflicted five fatal blows on the old man Gaurishanker and having given two knife blows on Ashaben the accused pounced upon a child aged four years Vibha and stabbed with such force on her abdomen that she instantaneously died. There was no excuse for the accused to snatch the life of a minor child who would never have been a witness against him in any future litigation. But he was out to destroy the entire family of Hasubhai with a view to bring untold miseries and sufferings to him. There was no excuse for the accused to snatch the life of a minor child who would never have been a witness against him in any future litigation. But he was out to destroy the entire family of Hasubhai with a view to bring untold miseries and sufferings to him. This clearly shows that the accused was intending to inflict the greatest amount of torture on the victims of his wrath. The way he shouted at Jayaben that he would finish her shows that he was not satisfied by inflicting 12 knife-blows to five innocent persons out of whom three were family members of Hasubhai. Still the flame of his vengeance against Hasubhai burnt unflinched and unabated. Such a person cannot be permitted to move in future at large in the society. (9) The conduct of the accused subsequent to the crime clearly did not reflect any remorse but on the contrary indicated that his blood thirst was not yet quenched after the successful execution of his design as evidenced by the manner in which he addressed Jayaben immediately after he was apprehended on spot. (10) It clearly appears from the totality of the circumstances that the accused was devoid of all traces of humanity. He is in our opinion a veritable wolf as can be bracketed in the dictum that he is as much misplaced in a civilised society as wolves would be in a populous territory. ( 68 ) IN the light of the aforesaid special features of this case it must be held that this is one of the rarest of the rare cases in which capital sentence is required to be inflicted on the accused. We feel ourselves duty bound to confirm the sentence of death as imposed on the accused by the trial Court lest the administration of justice and entire sentencing procedure may get reduced to a stage of mockery and ridicule in the society especially for those who after perpetrating pre-meditated brutal crimes may escape with an impression that whatever be the nature of the atrocities that they may deliberately choose to inflict on innocent helpless victims and however gross their mass massacre may be they are not likely to be ever inflicted capital sentence by courts charged with the duty to administer justice. We therefore cannot refuse to sign the death warrant against the accused in the present case. We therefore cannot refuse to sign the death warrant against the accused in the present case. ( 69 ) WE may also mention at this stage that various Supreme Court decisions cited by Mr. Mehta the learned Public Prosecutor and to which we have made a detailed reference earlier clearly indicate that in cases having parallel features like the present one the Supreme Court had from time to to time approved the capital sentence imposed on the concered accsed by the Courts below. ( 70 ) WE have also carefully gone through the special reasons given by the learned trial Judge in paragraph 65 of his judgment. We find that all these special reasons narrated by the learned trial Judge therein are well made out on the record of this case and they clearly indicate that this is a fit case for imposing the extreme penalty of death on the accused. We are indeed sad that it has become our painful duty to con. firm the death sentence imposed on the accused by the learned trial Judge. ( 71 ) WE have paused to consider whether the accused needs to be leniently dealt with but having repeatedly recapitulated his action against innocent persons we are constrained to confirm the capital sentence. It is not our domain to alleviate the suffering of the accused by showing mercy to him. Capital sentence confirmed. Editors Note: Appeal against the above judgment was dismissed by the Honble Supreme court of India confirming the death sentence. .