JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - The Petitioner has directed this petition against the order dated 5-1-1979 passed by the Public Authority City Magistrate constituted under U.P. Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1959), hereinafter called Eviction Act, as amended by U.P. Public Land and Premises Laws (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970 by which the Petitioner's application for impleadment of Custodian for the State in proceedings pending before the authority has been rejected. The Petitioner had claimed impleadment of the Custodian on the basis of Section 50 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (U.P. Act No. 31 of 1950), hereinafter called the Administration Act. The material question that arises for determination is whether the Public Authority is a Civil or Revenue Court within the meaning of Section 50 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. The petition has arisen in the circumstances hereinafter indicated. 2. On 31-12-1970 the State of U.P. in the Department of Nazool through the Deputy Commissioner, Faizabad, made an application before the Public Authority, Faizabad, claiming Petitioner's eviction from plot No. 921M. (Area 6-10-0 K) Chak No. 13 Mohalla Khirki Ali Beg, Post Office, Faizabad, Annexure No. 5. The application was made u/s 3/4 of the U.P. Public Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959. The claim of the State was that it was the owner of the land in question and the Petitioner had no right or title whatsoever therein but he illegally occupied the same in the year 1957 and illegally enclosed the land by boundary walls. It was claimed that the land in question was a public land within the meaning of the Eviction Act. In the relief clause it was claimed that the Petitioner be evicted from the land and damages may be awarded against the Petitioner for wrongful occupation of the land. On receipt of notice of this application the Petitioner preferred an objection by filing written statement, Annexure No. 6. In this written statement the Petitioner pointed out that the land in dispute originally belonged to one Sri. Mohammad Yaqub who migrated to Pakistan whereupon the land in dispute was treated as Evacuee Property and was declared as 6uch after full enquiry and the same vested in the Custodian for the State. In this written statement the Petitioner pointed out that the land in dispute originally belonged to one Sri. Mohammad Yaqub who migrated to Pakistan whereupon the land in dispute was treated as Evacuee Property and was declared as 6uch after full enquiry and the same vested in the Custodian for the State. It was further asserted that the land in dispute was auctioned on behalf of the Custodian Department and the Petitioner's bid was accepted and the sale was knocked down in his favour and he was delivered possession of the land. On this basis the Petitioner claimed title in the land in dispute. During the pendency of the proceedings the Petitioner made application before the Public Authority for impleadment of the Custodian. From the order passed by the Public Authority it appears that Section 50 of the Administration Act was relied upon by the Petitioner .for claiming impleadment of the Custodian. The application was opposed on behalf of the State and it was rejected by the Public Authority by its order dated 15-1-1979 Annexure-9. Aggrieved by this order the Petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. It appears that before the public authority the application was opposed on behalf of the State on the ground that the present proceedings were under the special enactment and, therefore, Section 50 of the Administration Act was not applicable. The Public Authority has merely noticed the arguments of the learned District Government Counsel who opposed the application without recording any finding as to whether Section 50 was applicable or not. Before me Sri. K.M.N. Chak, learned Counsel for the State, argued that Section 50 has no application to the present proceedings inasmuch as the Public Authority was neither a Civil Court nor a Revenue Court. The learned Counsel argued that in fact the Public Authority was not at all a Court but was merely a Tribunal and, therefore, Section 50 was not attracted. Sri. H.S. Sahai, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the Public Authority while dealing with the application for eviction exercised same powers as were exercised by a Civil or Revenue Court and, therefore, the Public Authority was a Court within the meaning of Section 50. Sri. H.S. Sahai, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the Public Authority while dealing with the application for eviction exercised same powers as were exercised by a Civil or Revenue Court and, therefore, the Public Authority was a Court within the meaning of Section 50. He also argued that since the matter engaging the attention of the Public Authority was of the civil nature, the said authority was acting as Civil Court. 4. Section 50 of the Administration Act reads as follows: 50. Notice of suits to the Custodian (1). If in any 6uit it appears to the Civil or Revenue Court that a question relating to the property of an evacuee or intending evacuee is involved, the Court shall not proceed to determine that question until after notice has been given to the Custodian. (2) A Court may, at any stage of suit or proceeding, either on its own motion or on application made in this behalf by the Custodian, make an order that the Custodian shall be added as party to the suit or proceeding, if the Court is satisfied that such addition is necessary or proper for the satisfactory determination of the suit or proceeding. From the above it is apparent that Section 50 would be attracted only when a suit is pending before a Civil or Revenue Court. It, therefore, requires to be determined whether the Public Authority constituted under the Eviction Act can be said to be a Court. The term Court has not been defined in the Administration Act. In the Eviction Act the term Public Authority is defined in Clause (c) of Section 2 as meaning any person authorised by the State Government by Notification in the Official Gazette to perform the functions of the Public Authority under the Act. From this it would be seen that by the definition clause the Public Authority has not been constituted a Court muchless a Civil Court or a Revenue Court The question as to when a Tribunal or a body can be said to be a Court has engaged the attention of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in several cases. The earliest case in which the controversy was noticed is The Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi v. The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi and the Bharat Bank Employee's Union Delhi AIR (37) 1950 SC 188. The earliest case in which the controversy was noticed is The Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi v. The Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi and the Bharat Bank Employee's Union Delhi AIR (37) 1950 SC 188. In this case the question was whether the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act was a Court or merely a Tribunal, Kania, C.J. in paragraph 2 observed that the functions and duties of the Industrial Tribunal were very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions but the Tribunal is not a Court. Mahajan, J. in paragraph 23 observed that to be a Court, the person or persons constituting it must be entrusted with judicial functions, that is, of deciding litigated questions according to law. In the same paragraph it has further been observed that before a person or persons can be said to constitute a Court, it must be held that they derive their powers of the State. In view of the fact that the Industrial Tribunal did not fall in the hierarchy of the ordinary judicial system, the Tribunal was held not to be a Court although it performed judicial functions and had the trappings of a Court. 5. Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 was a case arising from proceedings for contempt of Court initiated by the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The question was whether the Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, (Act No. 37 of 1850), was a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution. A certain proceeding under the Act was pending before the Commissioner. Brijnandan Sinha, who was Deputy Secretary to the Bihar Government, wrote a letter to the Commissioner which, according to the delinquent government servant, against whom proceedings were pending before the Commissioner, amounted to contempt of the Commissioner. The Patna High Court held that Sri. Sinha was guilty of contempt of Court and accordingly he was punished. Against this order Sri. Sinha preferred an appeal in the Supreme Court, which was allowed tafter holding that the Commissioner was not a Court. The Patna High Court held that Sri. Sinha was guilty of contempt of Court and accordingly he was punished. Against this order Sri. Sinha preferred an appeal in the Supreme Court, which was allowed tafter holding that the Commissioner was not a Court. In paragraph 14 of this judg-nent it was observed thus: (14) The pronouncement of a definitive judgment is thus considered the essential 'sine qua non' of a Court and unless and until a binding and authoritative judgment can be pronounced by a person or body of persons it cannot be predicted that he or they constitute a Court. Again in paragraph 18 it was observed as follows: (18) It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having 6ome of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. 6. The question was again examined in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1669 . In this case the question was whether the Central Government while exercising the power of appeal u/s 111 of the Companies Act, was a Court. It was observed by Hidayatullah, J. as follows: All tribunals are not Courts, though all Courts are tribunals. The word Courts " is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the administration of justice. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish "wrong". Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the Courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed. (See para 30). Again in paragraph 31 the following observation finds place: When rights are infringed or invaded, the aggrieved party can go and commence a quarrel before the ordinary Civil Courts. These Courts, which are instrumentalities of Government, are invested with the judicial power of the State, and their authorty is derived from the constitution or some Act of Legislature constituting them. Their number is ordinarily fixed and they are ordinarily permanent, and can try any suit or cause within their jurisdiction. These Courts, which are instrumentalities of Government, are invested with the judicial power of the State, and their authorty is derived from the constitution or some Act of Legislature constituting them. Their number is ordinarily fixed and they are ordinarily permanent, and can try any suit or cause within their jurisdiction. Their numbers may be increased or decreased, but they are almost always permanent and go under the compendious name of " Courts of Civil Judicature.... Again at page 1680 it was observed that by "Courts" was meant Courts of Civil Judicature and by "tribunals" those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. The position was summed up in paragraphs 33 and 34 as follows: (33) In my opinion, a Court in the strict sense is a tribunal which is a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts of Civil Judicature maintained by the State under its constitution to exercise the judicial power of the State. These Courts perform all the judicial functions of the State except those that are excluded by law from their jurisdiction.... That an officer is required to decide matters before him "judicially" in the second sense does not make him a Court or even tribunal, because that only establishes that he is following a standard of conduct, and is free from bias or interest. (34) Courts land tribunals act "judicially" in both senses, and in the term " Court" are included the ordinary and permanent tribunals and in the term "tribunal" are included all others, which are not so included.... 7. In The Engineering Mazdoor Sabha Representing Workmen Employed Under the Hind Cycles Ltd. and Another Vs. The Hind Cycles Ltd., Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 874 it was observed in paragraph 6 of the judgment as follows: The expression "a Court" in the technical sense is a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the State's inherent judicial powers. The tribunal as distinguished from the Court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi judicially, but it does not constitute a Court in the technical sense. The tribunal as distinguished from the Court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi judicially, but it does not constitute a Court in the technical sense. From the above decisions the following principles are deducible: (1) All Courts are tribunals although all tibunals are not Courts; (2) Mere exercise of judicial power by Tribunal does not constitute that Tribunal a Court; (3) In order to constitute a Court the Tribunal must derive power from the constitution or some Act of Legislature constituting it; (4) In order to constitute a Court the Tribunal must form part of the ordinary hierarchy of the Courts which are ordinarily permanent and are competent to try any suit or cause falling within their jurisdiction; (5) The Tribunal must be capable of pronouncing a definitive and binding judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are essential tests of a judicial pronouncement; (6) The tribunal constituted to decide controversies arising under special laws are not Courts unless specifically so designated. 8. It is on the basis of the above principles that it has to be determined whether the Public Authority constituted under the Eviction Act is a Court or a mere Tribunal. For determining this question the nature of the power conferred upon the Public Authority under the Eviction Act has to be seen. The Public Authority which decides disputes under Sections 3 and 4 has not been constituted either by the Constitution or by the Act itself. u/s 2(d) the Public Authority is constituted by the State Government through notification in the official Gazette. This Public Authorty is not part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts maintained by the State. Since the existence of the Public Authority depends upon the notification issued by the State Government, it is also not a permanent Tribunal. The Public Authority is constituted under a special enactment namely, the Eviction Act, and under the Act itself it has not been designated as a Court although u/s 10 of the Act, while holding an enquiry, it has the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit but, as is apparent from Section 10 itself the Authority does not exerciie all the powers vested in Civil Court under the CPC but exercise only the powers enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 10. Section 12 of the Act provides that except as otherwise provided by or under the Act Jno order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under the Act shall be called in question in Court. This provision would appear to give finality to the ordes of the Public Authority but this provision has to be read along with Section 3, 4 and 7 of the Act. Section 3(1) provides as follows : (1) Where public land is in unauthorised occupation of any person and the Public Authority is of the opinion that the same is required for any of the following purposes, namely: It may by notice in writing, call upon him to show cause, within the period specified therein, not being less than 10 days from the date of service thereof, why an order of his eviction therefrom in accordance with the provisions of this Act be not passed. 9. From the above provision it would be seen that the notice referred to in Section 3 can be issued only in respect of public land. The term public land has been defined in Clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act. Section 4 of the Act provides for eviction from public land and for assessment of damages to be paid by an unauthorised occupant of such land. It reads thus: 4. (1) Where in pursuance of the notice u/s 3 no objection is filed, or if an objection, not being an objection referred to the Civil Judge u/s 7, is filed, then after giving the parties reasonable opportunity of producing evidence, if any, and of being heard, the Public Authority, may, on being satisfied that the public land or part thereof is in unauthorised occupation, assess damages of such occupation, having regard to such principles of assessment as may be prescribed and make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded in writing directing that the public land or part thereof, shall be vacated and damages paid.... Section 7 reads as follows : 7. Section 7 reads as follows : 7. Objection as to the nature of public land- (1) Where an objection is taken on the ground that the disputed land is not public land and the Public Authority is of the opinion that the objection is not prima facie baseless or frivolous, he shall refer the question to the Civil Judge, having jurisdiction stating the facts of the case and the point at issue. (2) Upon receipt of the reference, the Civil Judge, shall after giving the parties reasonable opportunity of being heard, decide the reference as hereunder: (3) Where as a result of the investigation under . Sub-section (2), the Civil Judge is satisfied that the land- (i) is public land, he shall dismiss the objection, or (ii) is not public land, he shall allow the objection. (4) Subject to the result of the appeal under Sub-section (5), if any, the order of the Civil Judge shall be final and conclusive. (5) Any (party, including the State Government), aggrieved by an order of the Civil Judge under Sub-section (3) may, within thirty days of the date of the order prefer an appeal to the District Judge, who shall, after affording resaonable opportunity of being heard to the parties, dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. The order of the District Judge in appeal shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any Court of law. 10. u/s 7 the jurisdiction to determine the dispute as to whether the land in respect of which notice has been issued u/s 3 is public land or not has been conferred not upon the Public Authority but upon the Civil Judge. Once the Civil Judge comes to the conclusion that the land is not public land he has, under sub-seciion (3), to allow the objection, the consequence of which is that the Public Authority loses jurisdiction either to pass an order of eviction or to assess damages. It would thus be seen that the Public Authority exercises a very limited jurisdiction and it does not have jurisdiction even to decide the question whether it has jurisdiction to deal with tine matter or not. It is therefore incapable of pronouncing a definitive judgment which was considered in Braja-nandan Sinha's case (supra) to be the essential sine quo non of a Court. 11. It is therefore incapable of pronouncing a definitive judgment which was considered in Braja-nandan Sinha's case (supra) to be the essential sine quo non of a Court. 11. In view of the above discussion I am of the opinion that the "Public Authority" constituted under the Eviction Act is not a Court. Section 50 of the Administration Act is attracted only when a suit is pending in a "Civil or Revenue Court". Since the "Public Authority" Is not a Court, much less "Civil or Revenue Court" the impleadment of the Custodian sought by the Petitioner by relying upon Section 50 was misconceived. The order of the Public Authority, therefore, deserves to be sustained although for different reasons. 12. Some controversy was raised as to whether the proceedings pending before the Authority could be termed "suit". This controversy arose becauseSection 50(1) uses the words "If in any suit.... ". Thus another requirement for the attraction of Section 50 of the Administration Act is that the proceeding pending before the Civil or Revenue Court should be a "suit". In view of the finding that the Public Authority is not Court it is not necessary to go into the controversy whether the proceeding is "suit" or not. 13. Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha Vs. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Another, AIR 1967 SC 1494 relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is clearly distinguishable. In that case the question was whether the Assistant Registrar discharging the functions of the Registrar u/s 6(2) of Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act was Court so that its contempt could be punished under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. After reviewing several decisions, including the decisions in Bharat Bank Ltd. and Brijnandan Sinha (Supra), their Lordships held that the Registrar was a Court. After reviewing several decisions, including the decisions in Bharat Bank Ltd. and Brijnandan Sinha (Supra), their Lordships held that the Registrar was a Court. A perusal of the judgment indicates that their Lordships came to the conclusion on these grounds: (1) The Registrar had been constituted under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act and the Assistant Registrar was delegated powers of the Registrar by the State Government and, therefore, the Assistant Registrar was constituted under the Act itself; (2) The Assistant Registrar was competent to pronounce a definitive, authoritative, final and binding judgment in respect of the dispute coming before him; (3) The procedure which the Assistant Registrar was required to follow under the Act was similar to the one followed by the Civil Court while trying a suit. These attributes on the basis of which their Lordships held the Assistant Registrar to be a Court are not possessed by the Public Authority constituted under the Act. 14. In view of the above, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs. The stay order, if any shall be discharged.