JUDGMENT :- This is a defendants Second Appeal in a suit for cancellation of a gift-deed executed by the plaintiff-respondent in favour of the appellant in the year 1963, and, in the alternative for the award of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. The plaintiff-respondent is the appellants mother. The appellant is her only issue. After the gift, the plaintiff-respondent was left with some four bighas of land, but that she is said to have sold to her brother and that sale seems to have been the cause of the present litigation. 2. It was alleged in the plaint that, being the only daughter, the defendant-appellant lived with the plaintiff-respondent and served and flattered her and promised to look alter her throughout her life. The plaintiff was made to believe that there may be trouble about the inheritance of the land after her death, and In view of the promise that the defendant-appellant would look after the plaintiff throughout her life, and the fear that there may be trouble about the property after her death, she made a gift of the property in suit to the defendant on 6th Dec. 1963. The suit was filed on 31st May, 1969, and the plaint proceeds on to allege that some two years before the suit the defendant left the plaintiffs house and started living at her father-in-laws place and stopped serving her or looking after her. That was an act of breach of faith or her part, while claiming the cancellation of the gift on these grounds, a decree for maintenance was specifically claimed. 3. The age of the plaintiff, as given in the title of the plaint is 40 years, and that of the defendant-appellant 22 years, it appears that after the institution of the suit, the property was sold by the defendant-appellant to the defendants Nos. 2 and 3. who were impleaded as defendants by an amendment of the plaint. The written statement is a joint written statement filed by the three defendants together. Apart from a general denial of the plaintiffs case for the cancellation of the gift-deed, it is said that after the gift the defendant No. 1 and her husband used to look after the cultivation of the land and the defendant-appellant used to live with her mother, the plaintiff but the plaintiff had some other land which was sufficient for her maintenance. The plaintiff was not prepared to take anything from the defendant-appellant as she said that it was a sin to take anything from the gifted property. That is followed by the allegations against the plaintiffs brother-in-law in whose favour the remaining land had been sold by the plaintiff. The written statement then proceeds to allege that the defendant-appellant found it difficult to look after the cultivation on account of the quarrels raised by the plaintiffs brother and since the defendant-appellant and her husband were in urgent need of money, they sold the property to the defendants Nos. 2 and 3, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in this Court. The further pleas raised were that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were bona fide purchasers for value without notice, that the suit for cancellation was barred by limitation, and that no charge for the plaintiffs maintenance could be created on the property in suit. In para 33 of the written statement, the defendant-appellant offered to look after the plaintiff and to maintain her if she was willing to live with her, that is with the defendant-appellant at her husbands place because it was necessary for her to live at her husbands place in order to properly serve him. The amount of maintenance claimed was also alleged to be heavy. 4. Eight issues were framed by the Trial Court. Issues Nos. 1, 6 and 7 were taken up together for consideration and it was held that the plaintiff did not need any maintenance; that the alleged agreement to maintain her was ineffective nor could any charge for her maintenance be levied on the property in suit. On issue No. 5, the suit for cancellation was held to be time barred. Issue No. 2, which raised the question whether the gift was vitiated by fraud or undue influence, was also answered against the plaintiff. On issue No. 3, the finding of the Trial Court was that the gift-deed being valid and there being no agreement to maintain the plaintiff, there could be no question of the knowledge of the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 of any such agreement, and therefore, their purchase was valid, and they were purchasers in good faith. Issue No. 5 was answered against the defendants. On issue No. 8. 2 and 3 of any such agreement, and therefore, their purchase was valid, and they were purchasers in good faith. Issue No. 5 was answered against the defendants. On issue No. 8. the Trial Court found that, although it was urged on behalf of the plaintiff that she was entitled to maintenance under Hindu Law, the claim for maintenance was based on the gift deed, but that was not found to be proved in the context of issue No. 1; hence the plaintiff was not entitled to any maintenance. 5. On appeal by the plaintiff, it was pleaded on her behalf that she was an aged and infirm mother without any means of support and was entitled to maintenance from the first defendant, and that the transfer made in favour of the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 being during the pendency of the suit, the title was subject to the result of the suit against the first defendant. The first question raised by the lower Appellate Court was whether the gift deed was liable to be cancelled. That was answered by the lower Appellate Court in favour of the defendants by holding that the claim was time barred: that the witnesses of the gift-deed or oral or documentary evidence to prove fraud or undue influence had not been produced, and that Lal Singh, who had executed the gift-deed along with the plaintiff had not joined in the suit. However, on the question about the plaintiffs claim to maintenance at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month, the lower Appellate Court found that the word "Kushamad" in the gift-deed includes "Parvarish", and that it was the legal duty of the first defendant as the only daughter of the plaintiff to maintain her under S.20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. As to the question of creating, a charge on the property in suit, the lower Appellate Court Observed that in their written statement under O.10, R.2 of the Civil P.C. the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 admitted that they had received a notice from the plaintiff at the time of the execution of the sale-deed, and thus found that they had notice of her claim of maintenance against the property in suit, and further found that the transfer was lis pendens and was subject to the result of the suit. 2 and 3 admitted that they had received a notice from the plaintiff at the time of the execution of the sale-deed, and thus found that they had notice of her claim of maintenance against the property in suit, and further found that the transfer was lis pendens and was subject to the result of the suit. The argument that the first defendant had not promised to maintain the plaintiff in future was met by the lower Appellate Court by observing that although in paras 17 and 23 of the written statement the first defendant denied having made any promise to maintain the plaintiff, yet in para 33 of the written statement she offered to maintain the plaintiff. According to the lower Appellate Court, it was a false and mischievous offer and the first defendant get angry when her mother sold the remaining four bighas of land. According to the lower Appellate Court, it was not possible for an old widowed lady to survive or maintain herself without the protection of any male member out of four bighas of land, and, therefore, the plaintiffs claim of Rs. 50 per month for her maintenance appears to be reasonable and just. The lower Appellate Court further observed that even if the sale by the plaintiff to her brother is a collusive transaction, the plaintiff was entitled to maintenance from her daughter, not only under the provisions of the gift-deed, but also under the provisions of Ss.23 and 28 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. The defendants argument that the plaintiffs age was only forty years and she could not be said to be old or infirm was countered by the lower Appellate Court by saying that although she could not, be regarded to be infirm, the plaintiffs statement on oath that her age was sixty years was inconsistent with the age of forty years given in the plaint on which the lower Appellate Court found that she "should be treated as aged and infirm in the eyes of law because at this stage she cannot be expected to maintain herself" by doing any service or menial work in accordance with the notions of the society in which she lives". The lower Appellate Court then proceeded to state that "a Hindu widow even of 55 years of age would be treated aged or infirm, particularly when she has sold away all her remaining land". With regard to the argument that only a parent unable to maintain herself or himself from her or his earnings or other properties was entitled to maintenance, the lower Appellate Court held that the first defendant "taking advantage of the fact that she has been able to obtain a major portion of her aged mothers property, tried to give her the remaining property so that she may ultimately be thrown on street and died out of harness and hunger of poverty". In the result, the lower Appellate Court decreed the suit for maintenance at Rs. 50/- per month from 31st May, 1969, which was the date of the institution of the suit, and levied a charge for recovery of the same on the property in suit on half the costs of the suit and the appeal were allowed to the plaintiff. 6. Mr. V.M. Sahai, learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant, was rather critical of the judgment of the lower Appellate Court. It is not easily possible to say that the criticism was unjustified in some respects at least, but looking at the basic facts of the case and taking a broad view of the matter, I am of the view that the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court does not call for any interference. 7. The plaintiff-respondents allegation that the defendant-appellant was residing with her and was solicitous of her comfort and assured to look after her and maintain her throughout her life was probably true, for the defendant-appellant was the plaintiff-respondents only daughter, so too the desire of the defendant-respondent to settle her property on the defendant-appellant by way of gift-deed which was executed on 6th Dec, 1963. There was nothing unnatural or improbable in the plaintiff-respondents expectation that in case of need the defendant-appellant would look after her and maintain her though at the same time the plaintiff-respondent hoped that she would never have to look to her daughter for maintenance and for that purpose she had four bighas of land reserved with her. It, however, appears that some two years before the suit the defendant-appellant shifted to her husbands place, probably, that was the proper thing for her to do. It, however, appears that some two years before the suit the defendant-appellant shifted to her husbands place, probably, that was the proper thing for her to do. But the plaintiff-respondent transferred the remaining four bighas of land to her brother. It may be that her brother got that sale-deed executed by some sort of undue influence or it may be that the plaintiff-respondent thought that that was the best thing for her to do. Nevertheless, this act of the sale of the remaining property by the plaintiff-respondent to her brother seems to have annoyed the defendant-appellant, at any rate her husband and that seems to have led to the litigation. The facts so far did not admit of much controversy. The question is of their legal effect and the rights of the parties. The plaintiff-respondent undoubtedly had the right to sell off the remaining four bighas of land to whomsoever she pleased. That sale could not detract from her right to maintenance against the defendant-appellant in case she had any such right in law, so far as the plaintiffs claim for cancellation of the gift-deed was concerned, that was clearly barred by limitation. Under the circumstances, the only claim, that could properly be considered by the Court, was the plaintiffs claim for maintenance that was made in the alternative. The foundation of that claim is to be found in S.20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The assurance or the promise, which the plaintiff might have had or might have believed to have had from the defendant-appellant of being looked after and maintained throughout her life when she made the gift is not enforceable as such in law, because the gift must have been made on account of natural love and affection and not in consideration of the said assurance or promise. 8. Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, reads as under :- "(1) Subject to the provisions of this section a Hindu is bound, during his or her lifetime, to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate children and his or her aged or infirm parents. (2) A legitimate or illegitimate child may claim maintenance from his or her father or mother so long as the child is a minor. (2) A legitimate or illegitimate child may claim maintenance from his or her father or mother so long as the child is a minor. (3) The obligation of a person to maintain his or her aged or infirm parent or a daughter who is unmarried extends in so far as the parent or the unmarried daughter, as the case may be, is unable to maintain himself or herself out of his or her own earnings or other property," 9. There is no dispute that the defendant is the plaintiffs daughter. The defendant is thus made liable during her lifetime to maintain the plaintiff; in case it could be said that the plaintiff, who is her parent, is aged or infirm. Her age given after her name, in the title of the plaint, was 40 years only, but, by an amendment allowed by the Trial Courts order dated 6th July, 1971, she was allowed to plead that her age was 50 years in para 2 of the plaint. The plaintiff declared her age to be 60 years, when she appeared as her first witness in the Trial Court on 23rd April, 1973, which was about four years after the date of the plaint. It appears that the plaintiff had grown wiser in the meanwhile. The lower Appellate Court has proceeded on the assumption that the plaintiffs age was 55 years without, however, recording a categorical finding to the effect. A sympathy for a widow is no substitute for law. Justice has to be administered according to law, and even equity must follow the law, but that does not mean that there is any real conflict between law on the one hand and justice and equity on the other. The law has to be interpreted and applied in a particular background of facts in a given state of society. So far as the answer to the question whether the plaintiff is aged or infirm is concerned, it is not merely the objective fact or her age that matters. The meaning of the term aged or infirm has to be interpreted in the context of a parents right to maintenance. The right to maintenance is conditioned by the ability of the person seeking maintenance to maintain himself or herself from his or her income or property. The meaning of the term aged or infirm has to be interpreted in the context of a parents right to maintenance. The right to maintenance is conditioned by the ability of the person seeking maintenance to maintain himself or herself from his or her income or property. For instance, a woman who is hundred years old and entirely bed ridden may not be found entitled to maintenance from her son in case it is found that she is possessed of mare than sufficient income and property to maintain herself. The idea of being aged or infirm is closely connected with the ability of a person to earn his or her livelihood, For example, a father, who has retired from service or other employment without any pension and who is, in the facts and circumstances, not able to get other employment can surely look for maintenance to his son. Parents are aged vis-a-vis their sons or daughters and if they are unable to make their own living, they may as well be called infirm.There could be no absolute objective test for determining whether a person was aged or infirm. 10. Looking at the facts of the present case in this light one would find that the plaintiff was above 40 years of age when she instituted the suit. Today, she might be about 55 years of age if the age originally given in the plaint is accepted. She may even be nearing 65 years of age if the age subsequently pleaded by her by amendment is taken to be correct. Much stress cannot be laid on the fact that a woman of 40 could be regarded by one standard to be young and by a some other standard past middle age. In our villages, a woman, who had crossed the age of 40, may, in some cases be regarded to be sufficiently aged so as not to be able to earn her livelihood independently. The parties, in the present case did not seem to belong to the working class. They were property owners, and the only means of livelihood of a woman in the state of the plaintiff would be the property, which she possessed, or the means which her husband, if alive, or in his absence the members of her family provide her. The parties, in the present case did not seem to belong to the working class. They were property owners, and the only means of livelihood of a woman in the state of the plaintiff would be the property, which she possessed, or the means which her husband, if alive, or in his absence the members of her family provide her. She may be healthy, but so far as earning her livelihood is concerned, she may be regarded to be totally infirm not because a woman of her age cannot work, but because she has been brought up in such circumstances that the only work she can possibly do is to look after the household. If a woman placed in the position of the plaintiff were not provided maintenance, she would surely die of starvation for she has never worked in her life and never learnt to make a living for herself. She has throughout been dependent on the male members of the family. 11. Under the circumstances, whether the plaintiff was aged 40 or was aged 50 when the suit was filed, and whether she was infirm or not due to any physical ailment, it is not possible, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, to interfere with the finding of the lower Appellate Court that she was entitled to maintenance against her daughter, to whom she had gifted almost all her property, which constituted the main source of her livelihood. The fact that she had four bighas of land left after the gift, explained why she did not claim maintenance so long as the land was with her. She claimed maintenance when that land was sold. As the owner, she was at perfect liberty to sell that land to any one she pleased and for whatever price she thought fit. If she was foolish or had been prevailed upon, that cannot lessen the liability of her issue to maintain her, when the need arose. She could surely look to the daughter for maintenance from out of the income of the fileds which she had gifted to her. It was ungrateful of the daughter to have tried to avoid that liability by accusing her of being foolish in transferring the land to her brother. She could surely look to the daughter for maintenance from out of the income of the fileds which she had gifted to her. It was ungrateful of the daughter to have tried to avoid that liability by accusing her of being foolish in transferring the land to her brother. If the sale of the land by the plaintiff to her brother could be impeached in law, the defendant ought to have impelled her to do so rather than to set up the sale as a ground for not maintaining her own mother. The fact that the defendant transferred the land after the institution of the suit giving rise to the Second Appeal makes matters worse for her, for it shows an attempt on her part to avoid the liability to maintain her mother. 12. Mr. V.M. Sahai, however, urged that a married daughter is under no liability to maintain her mother. The argument is wholly misconceived. Sub-sec.(1) of S.20 imposes the liability personally on every Hindu during his or her lifetime to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate children, and his or her infirm parents. Sub-sec.(2) carves out an exception, and is by way of a proviso to the above provision. It limits the liability of the father or the mother to maintain a child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, only so long as the child is a minor. The third subsection makes a second exception to the general rule enunciated by the first sub-section, the exception being that the obligation of a person to maintain his or her aged infirm parent, or to maintain a daughter who is unmarried, extends in so far as the parent or the unmarried daughter, as the case may be, is unable to maintain himself or herself out of his or her own earnings or property. The mention of the daughter, who is unmarried is with reference to the obligation of her father or mother to maintain her so long as she is a minor for a daughter being the child of a person can claim maintenance only so long as she is a minor in view of the exception provided by sub-sec.(2), It has nothing to do with the liability of a person to maintain his or her aged or infirm parents and the restriction of the liability to maintain a minor daughter, only so long as she is unmarried, is not without reason, for, on marriage, the liability to maintain her shifts oil to her husband under S.18 of the Act. It may however be added that the case of a daughter claiming maintenance from, her father or mother, even after marriage would be exceptional in view of the raising of the minimum age of marriage to 18, so that the right of a daughter to claim maintenance would generally cease on her attaining majority and all daughters, who have not attained majority would normally be unmarried. 13. As to the question of charge, that has been created, by the decree under appeal, on the property transferred by the appellant to the defendant-respondents Nos. 2 and 3 it is sufficient to say that they have not appealed from the decree of the lower Appellate Court and the appellant cannot surely be said to be aggrieved by the creation of the charge on the property in the hands of the transferees. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed; but, in the circumstances, I make no Order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.