JUDGMENT P.C. Balakrishna Menon, J. 1. The plaintiffs are, the appellants. The suit is for partition of 20/28 stares in the A schedule one item of immovable property and the B schedule movable mentioned in the plaint. The plaintiffs claim partition on the basis that the properties belong to the tavazhi of the plaintiffs and the defendants. The tavazhi consists of the descendants of one Manni. She had three children Kalliani, Anandan (1st defendant) and Devaki Plaintiffs 1 and 10 and defendants 2 and 3 are the children of Kalliani and the 4th defendant is the daughter of Devaki. 2. The defence to the suit is that the A schedule property is not tavazhi property, the same belonged in tenancy in common to Manni and her three children, and after the death of Manni each of her children is entitled to 1/3 share in the property. The defendants deny the existence of the B schedule movable and according to them no movable are available for partition. The Trial Court held that the plaint A schedule property is not tavazhi property, it is the acquisition of Manni and her children Kalliani, Anandan and Devaki, and after the death of Manni, each of her children is entitled to 1/3 share in the property. A preliminary decree was passed for partition of the property into 12 shares and for allotment of one share each to the plaintiffs 1 and 10 and defendants 2 and 3, and 4 shares each to defendants 1 and 4. The plaintiffs who are admittedly in possession of the A schedule property are held liable for the share of profits due to the other shares, the quantum of which was left for decision in the final decree proceedings. A house constructed by the plaintiffs is directed to be reserved in their favour. The claim for partition of the B schedule movable properties was rejected on the ground that there is no proof of the existence of such movable. 3. The lower appellate court has confirmed the preliminary decree except for a modification in regard to the decree for profits fixing the liability on plaintiffs 1 and 10, who alone among the plaintiffs are the sharers as per the decree. It is against this that the plaintiffs have come up in Second Appeal. 4. 3. The lower appellate court has confirmed the preliminary decree except for a modification in regard to the decree for profits fixing the liability on plaintiffs 1 and 10, who alone among the plaintiffs are the sharers as per the decree. It is against this that the plaintiffs have come up in Second Appeal. 4. Both the courts below have concurrently found that the plaint A schedule property was acquired by Manni and all her children namely Kalliani, Anandan and Devaki as per a document of assignment dated 26-4-1906 in their favour. It is not disputed before me that the acquisition was in the joint names of Manni and all her children as early as in 1906. There is also no dispute that on the date of the acquisition, the tavazhi of Manni consisted of only herself and her children. The lower appellate court has found that the acquisition of property was by a natural group of persons constituting a tavazhi under the Marumakkathayam Law. 5. The only question urged before me by the learned counsel Sri P. A. Mohammed appearing for the appellants is that the acquisition of property by a natural group of persons constituting a tavazhi should be presumed to be for the benefit of the "tavazhi itself and not as an acquisition of property for the benefit only of those whose names appear in the document of acquisition. 6. There cannot be any dispute that an acquisition by the joint exertion of persons constituting a tavazhi will enure for the benefit of the tavazhi and the property so acquired is tavazhi property. There: can be a joint family both under Hindu Law as well as under the Marumakkathayam Law without any joint family property. The existence of family property is not an essential requirement to constitute a joint family under the Hindu Law or a tavazhi or tarwad under the Marumakkathayam system of law, In Media's Hindu Law Fourteenth Edition, at page 279, it is stated thus: "In the absence of any proof of partnership, property jointly acquired by the members of a joint family without the aid of joint family property is, as stated above, to be presumed to be joint. But is it also to be presumed to be joint family property? But is it also to be presumed to be joint family property? It was at one time held by the High Court of Bombay that property jointly acquired without the aid of joint family property was not joint family property and that the male issue of the joint acquirers did not acquire an interest in it by birth, unless it was thrown into the common stock. In later cases, however, it has been held that such property must be presumed to be joint family property, and this has been followed in Lahore, Nagpur and Gudh. In Madras it has been held that property so acquired must be presumed to be joint family property unless the acquirers intended to hold the property as coowners between themselves in which case it would be their joint property." 7. In Raghavachariar's Hindu Law, Seventh Edition, Volume I, at age 259 (paragraph 248) it is stated thus: "248. Joint acquisitions without the help of ancestral property - Property acquired by the joint exertions of the coparceners, though without the aid of ancestral assets must be presumed to be joint family property. But this presumption does not arise where the acquirers are only some of the members of the coparcenary, or where they are living separately, and not under the same roof as coparceners are ordinarily expected to live and can to rebutted even when the acquisition is made by all the members by proof of intention on their part to treat the acquisition merely (i) as a partnership property governed by Partnership Act in which case the share of one of the acquirers will, en his death, devolve on his own heirs and not by survivorship, or (ii) as joint property with the incident of survivorship as between the acquirers, but without the right by birth accruing to their sons." 8. S. V. Gupta in his Book on Hindu Law, Third Edition Volume I summarises the law with reference to decided cases as follows at pages 103 and 52 as follows:- "page 103. In connection with property jointly acquired without the aid of joint family property two points may be noted first, since property acquired even without the aid of joint family property is joint family property in certain circumstances, it is quite clear that no nucleus of ancestral or any other joint family property is necessary to bring into existence joint family property. The reason why no nucleus is necessary is that neither for the formation of a joint family nor for that of a coparcenary is any joint property necessary. A joint family may have no joint property until it should acquire joint property by the exertions of its coparceners or a gift or a grant made to them; and secondly, joint property acquired by two or more coparceners of the family is not joint property of the family merely because the acquirers are members of a joint family; it must be acquired in circumstances in which it could be regarded as joint family property." "132. There is a presumption that property jointly acquired by two or more members of the family by joint labour or exertions is joint family property although the same is acquired without the aid of joint family property. It will be recalled that property jointly acquired by two or more members of the family may be joint family property although it is acquired without the aid of joint family property. Where property is jointly acquired by grant or gift, it is a question of the intention of the donor and the construction of the deed or grant (if any) whether it is acquired as joint family property. There, on the other hand, it is acquired by joint labour or exertions, it is a question of the intention of the acquirers whether the property so acquired was acquired as joint family property or merely as joint property of the acquirers. The intention of the acquirers decides the question but it may be taken as settled that it is to be presumed that property so acquired was acquired as joint family property in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary." 9. A learned Judge of this Court Balagangadharan Nair J. in Viswanathan v. Ramankutty & Others ( 1975 KLT 434 ), after referring to certain passages from the text Books on Hindu Law by Mayne, Hulls and Raghavachariar, stated thus at page 436. A learned Judge of this Court Balagangadharan Nair J. in Viswanathan v. Ramankutty & Others ( 1975 KLT 434 ), after referring to certain passages from the text Books on Hindu Law by Mayne, Hulls and Raghavachariar, stated thus at page 436. "From the extracts made earlier it is obvious that in the absence of a contrary intention the law recognises as joint family property an acquisition made by the joint labour of the members of the joint family." The question as to whether the property is a joint family property or not does not depend on the existence of a joint family nucleus when it is shown that the acquisition is by the joint labour by the members of the joint family. 10. A Division Bench of this Court in Karthiayini Amma and others v. Parukutty Amma ( AIR 1957 Ker. 27 ) stated at page 29 thus: "It seems to us however that the principle applicable to a case of this kind is one of earnings effected by the joint labour of the members of the tarwad as a whole, rather than the existence of a nucleus of tarwad property contributing to the acquisition of fresh property on behalf of the tarwad. In our judgment, the existence of an original nucleus upon whose absence very considerable reliance was placed by the appellants' learned counsel, is not essential and all that is necessary is, that the persons acquiring jointly stand in the relation of the members of an undivided tarwad." After referring to the decision in Ouseph v. Govinda Menon (28 Cochin LR 9), at the same page, the division bench staled: "The learned Judges referred to the presumption available under Hindu Law, that in the absence of evidence of an intention to the contrary, the acquisitions by the joint labour of persons constituting the members of a joint family living in commensality, are the joint family properties of such family and went on to hold that the mature and incidents of tarwad property being (identical with those of the joint Hindu family property in most respects, the rule of presumption as above must apply also to Marumakkathayam tarwads." We respectfully agree." 11. A Full Bench of this Court in Seetha & Others v. Krishnan & others ( 1975 KLT 156 ) in considering the question as to the nature of the property obtained by gift or bequest from relations or acquired with funds supplied by husband or other near relations, stated thus do Para.23: "23. The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that under the rules of customary Marumakkathayam law which were applicable in Malabar prior is the introduction of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, it is only in cases where the gift or acquisition is made in favour of a marumakkathayee woman and all her children or in the names of all the children who by themselves constitute a tavazhi (the mother being dead) that a presumption would arises that the acquisition '. is for the benefit of the tavazhi. There is no scope for raising any such presumption in cases where the gift, bequest or acquisition is in favour of the wife along or of the wife and same of the children alone leaving one the others. The underlying principle is that the presumptions would be attracted only in cases where the transaction is in favour of all the members of a group, who constitute a natural tavazhi capable of acquiring holding property." 12. Even though there is no evidence in the case, with respect to the source of consideration for the acquisition of property by a natural group consisting of Manni and all her children there is a presumption in law that the acquisition is on behalf of the natural group constituting the tavazhi. 13. From the authorities quoted above, it is clear that there is no need of the existence of a joint family nucleus for an acquisition to be on behalf of the joint family. Once it is found that the acquirers constituted a natural group and form a tavazhi by themselves, there can hardly be any doubt that the acquisition should be presumed to be on behalf of the tavazhi. There is no evidence in the case to rebut the presumption. It should therefore be held that the plaint A schedule property belongs to the tavazhi of Manni and her descendants in the female line. 14. The courts below are wrong in holding that the property belongs in tenancy-in-common to children of Manni. There is no evidence in the case to rebut the presumption. It should therefore be held that the plaint A schedule property belongs to the tavazhi of Manni and her descendants in the female line. 14. The courts below are wrong in holding that the property belongs in tenancy-in-common to children of Manni. On my finding that the A schedule property is tavazhi property, the plaintiffs are entitled to 20/28 shares as claimed in the plaint. 15. The learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the direction' of the courts below for reservation] of the house in the property in favour of the plaintiff's is unsustainable in law if the property is to be held as tavazhi property. There is force in this submission. Some; of the members of a tavazhi constructing buildings and improving the properties belonging to the tavazhi are not entitled to a reservation of the same. They are only entitled to an equitable allotment of the portion of the property improved upon by them towards their share with put valuing the improvements if such allotment can be made without prejudice to the rights of the other sharers to get their shares separated from the joint family property. 16. The concurrent finding of the courts below is that the B schedule properties are not available for partition. Nothing is made out to interfere with this finding of fact. 17. The result is in modification of the decree of the courts below a preliminary decree is passed for partition of the plaint A schedule property into 28 shares and for allotment of 20 shares to the plaintiff. Defendants 1, 2 and 3 will be allotted 1 share each and defendants 4 to 8 will be allotted 5 shares in a group. The plaintiffs are admittedly in possession of the property and they are liable to account for the profits due to the other shares, from the date of plaint the quantum of which will be decided in final decree. There will be a direction for allotment of the house constructed by the plaintiffs to their share if it is possible without prejudice to the rights of the other sharers to get their shares separated. If (the building could be allowed in equity to the share of the plaintiffs the same will not be valued as an asset belonging to the tavazhi. If (the building could be allowed in equity to the share of the plaintiffs the same will not be valued as an asset belonging to the tavazhi. The Second Appeal is allowed as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.