ORDER.- This writ petition illustrates how a resourceful and recalcitrant tenant can drive the landlord from pillar to post and push him to the point of exasperation. The petition for eviction in H. R. C. No. 2919 of 1970 preferred against the writ petitioner on 10th October, 1970. That was filed on the basis that the petitioner was in arrears of rent and the bona fide need for personal occupation of the residential premises. P. W. 1 the landlord had been examined. At that stage, a compromise was entered into between the parties, when the landlord offered to grant the tenant two year's time;as a result of this, an order of eviction was passed on 6th March, 1972. By reason of the expiry of the two years’ period, the writ petitioner (tenant) was required to deliver possession on or before 6th March, 1974. However, he did not do that. He filed O. S. No. 2276 of 1974 on the file of the learned 4th Assistant City Civil Judge, Madras. The following issues were framed for trial is that suit. (1) Whether the consent order passed in H. R. C. No. 2446 of 1979 and H. R. C. No. 2919 of 1970 is null, void and inoperative? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to injunction? (3) To what relief? The suit was dismissed for default on 15th October, 1974. Thereafter, I. A. No. 25191 of 1974 in that suit was filed, seeking to set aside the ex parte order of dismissal. In the meanwhile, the order of eviction was put in execution and on 21st November, 1974, the executing Court ordered delivery of possession. However, on 27th November, 1974, the suit was dismissed on merits. Thereupon A. S. No. 60 of 1976 was preferred to the learned If Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. During the pendency of the appeal on 16th February, 1976 possession, excepting for one room, was taken by the landlord-respondent herein. On 26th February. 1976 C. M. P. No. 719 of 1977 was filed for the transfer of the appeal, which was originally pending before the learned I Additional City Civil Judge, Madras, to another Court. On 29th July, 1977, transfer of the appeal was ordered. On 21st January, 1976, the appeal A. S. No. 60 of 1976 was dismissed for default. C. M. P. Nos. On 29th July, 1977, transfer of the appeal was ordered. On 21st January, 1976, the appeal A. S. No. 60 of 1976 was dismissed for default. C. M. P. Nos. 37 and 38 of 1978 were filed for restoration of the appeal and for stay. The application for injunction was dismissed in C. M. P. No. 52 of 1979. On 11th April, 1978, again the appeal was dismissed for default notwithstanding the earlier restoration. Thereafter, C. M. P. No. 261 of 1978 was filed for restoration of the appeal on 12th June, 1978. On 26th March, 1979 the appeal was dismissed with costs on merits. 2. InE. P. No. 116 of 1976 the following orders came to be passed: Call on 8-2-79 -do- 7-2-79 Call on 9-2-79 -do- 8-2-79 Call on 12-2-79 -do- 9-2-79 Call on 13-2-79 -do- 12-2-79 Call on 22-2-79 -do- 13-2-79 22-2-79 M.P. 413/76, M.P. 1133/76, M.P. 396/76 and M.P.1586/78 dismissed to-day Delivery by 19-3-79 Thereupon M. P. No. 413 of 1976 in H. R. C. No. 2919 of 1970 was filed and the following orders were passed Notice 3/3 IIId M.S. VII Judge 1-3 T.R. 8/3 IIId M.S. VII Judge 3/3 Notice taken, counter 17/3 IIId. M.S. VII Judge 17/3 Call on 8/4 -do- 2/3 Call on 26/4 -do- 8/4 Call on 19/6 -do- 26/4 Call on 13/7 -do- 19/6 Call on 22/7 -do- 13/7 B.N.R. 31/7 IId. M.S. VII Judge 22/7 B.N.R. 12/8 IId. M.S. VII Judge 31/7 Call on 2-9-76 -do- 12-8-76 Further arguments heard in full. Exs. P-1 to P-17 marked. Affidavit received. Respondent reply 2-8-77. IId. N.C. VIII Judge 1-8-77 22-2-79 ORDER M. P. 1133/76 filed by the petitioner under section 47, Civil Procedure Code, to declare the order of eviction null and void and dismiss the eviction petition is dismissed today. The order of eviction passed in the H. R. C has not been reversed or set aside or modified or altered in any appeal or revision or in any other proceedings and the petitioner cannot invoke the provision of section 144, Civil Procedure Code, to order re-delivery of the portion of the property already delivered. This petition is liable to be dismissed. In the result, this petition is dismissed. No costs”. 3. Again, M. P. No. 133 of 1976 was filed and on 22nd February, 1979, the following order was passed. 4. This petition is liable to be dismissed. In the result, this petition is dismissed. No costs”. 3. Again, M. P. No. 133 of 1976 was filed and on 22nd February, 1979, the following order was passed. 4. “The point for consideration is to what relief the petitioner is entitled. Point.-The petitioner herein filed a suit in O. S. No. 227 of 1974 as against the respondents/landlords on the file of City Civil Court, Madras, to declare the orders of eviction passed in the present H. R. C. as null, void and inoperative. All the points raised in the present petition have been raised in the suit and the suit was ultimately dismissed. This Court is bound by the judgment and decree of the City Civil Court in O. S. No. 2271 of 1974 and the same grounds cannot be agitated once again by the petitioner herein. 5. Moreover the order passed in the H. R. C. by the Rent Controller by no stretch of imagination, can be termed as non-speaking and an invalid order. The Rent Controller has framed the necessary points for consideration and after analysing the evidence tendered before the Court answered the points in favour of the landlords; ultimately an order of eviction was passed. It is meaningless to contend that the order was by the Rent Controller without applying his mind. The executing Court is not an appellate authority to canvass the correctness of the decision taken by the Rent Controller. The decisions relied on by the petitioner do not apply to the facts of the present case, The execution petition has been launched on the strength of the order by the Rent Controller, which is valid and executable. This Court properly ordered delivery and the same is not liable to be set aside. The execution petition cannot be dismissed for the untenable grounds raised in the petition. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the petition is liable to be dismissed. I answer this point against the petitioner. In the result, this petition is dismissed. No costs. IId V. R. VII Judge, 22-2-1979. 6. It is to quash the order passed in E. P. No. 116 of 1976 that the present writ petition is preferred. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the petition is liable to be dismissed. I answer this point against the petitioner. In the result, this petition is dismissed. No costs. IId V. R. VII Judge, 22-2-1979. 6. It is to quash the order passed in E. P. No. 116 of 1976 that the present writ petition is preferred. The following points are urged for consideration in support of the prayer in the writ petition: (1) The order which was executed, was passed by consent and such order in the teeth of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 must be held to be void in law. In support of this submission the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the rulings reported in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal1, and in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpairam Iccharam alias Brij Ram2.The second contention urged by the petitioner is that in so far as there was no notice before the order of eviction came to be executed, the same is clearly bad and opposed to the mandatory provisions under Order 21 , rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and such execution would be a nullity, as laid down in the decisions reported in Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramanujachriar3, and in Natarajan v. M/s. Chandmull Amarchand4, where the possession had been taken pursuant to an order of nullity without notice to the petitioner, re-delivery can be ordered. As laid down in the decisions reported in B.V. Patankar v. C.G. Sastry5, and in Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash6, it is only under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, during the execution stage, these points can ever be urged by the petitioner and the fact that the suit and further appeal thereon came to be filed, is not a bar to raise these points before the executing Court. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. 7. Per contra, it is argued by the learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 that it is impossible to think that the basis of eviction was a compromise. The landlord was examined and the matter stood adjourned for further examination. At that stage when an offer of two years period was made, the tenant seized the same and agreed to have the order passed. It is not correct to contend that such an order is a nullity. The landlord was examined and the matter stood adjourned for further examination. At that stage when an offer of two years period was made, the tenant seized the same and agreed to have the order passed. It is not correct to contend that such an order is a nullity. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court itself pointed out in K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri7, that such an order is perfectly valid. In Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal1, the decision came to be rendered, because there was no material to show that there was satisfaction on the part of the Rent Controller, which alone would confer on him the jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction. As a matter of fact, in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam1, the Supreme Court (in paragraph 26) has succinctly stated the entire law thus: “From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which the Court could he prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admissions if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under section 58 of the Evidence Act, made “by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admission. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong”. Looked at on this basis, the order cannot by any stretch of imagination, be contended to be an order of compromise which the Rent Controller is incapable of passing. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong”. Looked at on this basis, the order cannot by any stretch of imagination, be contended to be an order of compromise which the Rent Controller is incapable of passing. Besides, the order of eviction was unsuccessfully challenged on the very same grounds before the civil Court and the matter was taken up even in appeal. Under those circumstances having regard to the fact that there is a conclusive judgment, however erroneous it may be, binding between the parties, it would clearly constitute res judicata. Therefore, apart from the fact that it is not an order based on compromise, it is a well considered order by the Rent Controller, and further the Civil Court has put a seal of approval on this order and therefore, that would be conclusive and binding between the parties. 8. No demur can be taken to the proposition of law that re-delivery could be ordered if the decree itself is a nullity. But, here the decree can never be contended to be a nullity. Then again if the Rent Controller were to go into the merits of the order of eviction, it would amount to going beyond the decree which is clearly forbidden by law as far as the executing Courts are concerned. It is a moot question whether section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to rent control proceedings notwithstanding section 18 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Assuming that it applies, the aid of that section for the purpose of re-delivery can be invoked only when the basis of the decree is gone. Here that remains very much, all the more so when it has received the approval of the civil Court. 9. It is not correct to contend that there was no notice before execution. As a matter of fact, the tenant at every possible stage had notice of the proceedings. He had driven the landlord almost from pillar to post and such a contention at this belated stage could never be accepted. If, therefore, there was notice, the rulings reported in Rajagopala Ayyar v. Ramachandra Ayyar2, and in Sunder Dass v. Ram Parkash3, would not be relevant for the question in issue. 10. He had driven the landlord almost from pillar to post and such a contention at this belated stage could never be accepted. If, therefore, there was notice, the rulings reported in Rajagopala Ayyar v. Ramachandra Ayyar2, and in Sunder Dass v. Ram Parkash3, would not be relevant for the question in issue. 10. I have given careful consideration to the above argument relating to want of notice. I have at the outset of the judgment characterised the attitude of the tenant. That is further strengthened when we have looked into the appellate Court's judgment wherein the very order of eviction was questioned. In paragraph 11 of the Judgment in A. S. No. 6 of 1976, the learned Judge points out as follows: “The plaintiff then raised a contention that he was not allowed to cross examine the first defendant (as P. W. 1) by the Rent Controller and hence there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice and consequently the order of the Rent Controller is void. This argument, appears to me, is an entire misrepresentation of what must have happened before the Rent Controller. It should be remembered as is disclosed by Exhibit A-2 that the first defendant had been examined on a particular day and further examination had been postponed to a subsequent date, (6th March, 1972) on which date he was further examined and on which date the parties made a joint endorsement also signed by themselves and their counsel. In the circumstances, it is but natural that the plaintiff did not even think of cross-examining P. W. 1 on any of the matters he had spoken about. I think it would be wholly incorrect to suggest that the plaintiff was not allowed to cross-examine the witness. No doubt, the plaintiff points out that in Exhibit A-2 there is” no note either that the plaintiff did not cross-examine the witness or that he did not want to cross-examine the witness. But equally so, it should be noted, that there is no note that the plaintiff wanted to cross examine the witness but was prevented from doing so. It should be remembered that the plaintiff is an advocate with several years of practice and is, in fact, actively practising before the Rent Controller as well as other Courts in Madras. But equally so, it should be noted, that there is no note that the plaintiff wanted to cross examine the witness but was prevented from doing so. It should be remembered that the plaintiff is an advocate with several years of practice and is, in fact, actively practising before the Rent Controller as well as other Courts in Madras. In the circumstances, it is wholly inconceivable that he would have wanted to exercise a right of cross-examination but was prevented from doing so. Therefore, this ground of attack also does not appear to be correct or valid”. The above extract clearly sums up as to what happened before the Rent Controller. Therefore, it is impossible to contend that the order of eviction is based on compromise without the Rent Controller being satisfied of the ground of eviction. As a matter of fact, the order is in the following terms: “I am satisfied with the evidence of P. W. 1 which show that the respondent's denial of title is not bona fide, that the respondent has committed wilful default from March, 1966 and that the requirement of the petitioners in respect of the respondent's premises is bona fide”. He had, therefore, answered the points for consideration in favour of the petitioners and had allowed the petitions ordering eviction of this plaintiff. It, therefore, would prima facie be incorrect to state that the learned Rent Controller had not applied his mind and had not subjectively satisfied himself with the fulfilment of the conditions requisite under Act XVIII of 1960 before ordering eviction”. 11. I am satisfied that the order puts beyond every doubt that it was passed on a valid basis for eviction. In Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal1, there was no satisfaction by the Rent Controller which is clearly in violation of the terms of the statutory enactment. Here it is not so. Therefore, that ruling is clearly distinguishable. The decision in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam2, (paragraph 26 already extracted) points out the correct legal position. The order of eviction referred to above squarely falls under the ratio of this ruling. To the same effect is the ruling in K.K. Chari v R.M. Seshadri3, which has been referred to in the decision just cited. 12. Nobody can have quarrel with the proposition that where execution had taken place under a void decree, re-delivery could be ordered. The order of eviction referred to above squarely falls under the ratio of this ruling. To the same effect is the ruling in K.K. Chari v R.M. Seshadri3, which has been referred to in the decision just cited. 12. Nobody can have quarrel with the proposition that where execution had taken place under a void decree, re-delivery could be ordered. This is exactly the ratio laid down in B.V. Patankar v. C.G. Sastry4; but that ruling has absolutely no bearing on the facts of the present case, because that is a case where the decree of the civil Court was executed when there was a bar on the jurisdiction of the civil Court from bypassing the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. That is not the position here, because the order that is sought to be executed was only that of the Rent Controller. I may say at this stage that the Rent Controller will be empowered under section 10 of the Act to pass such an order. Equally, the ruling reported in Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash1, will have no application to the present case. It is a moot question whether section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to the present case. I say so notwithstanding section 18 of the Act, which is to the following effect. Assuming that it applies, what is the basis for such application to seek redelivery? In my considered view, the order of eviction will stand and that is approved by the civil Court not once but twice because all the points that were urged before me were unsuccessfully urged in O. S. No. 2271 of 1974, followed by an appeal in A. S. No. 60 of 1976, on the file of the II Additional City Civil Judge, Madras. Therefore, the application for re-delivery itself, in my view is misconceived. 13. I am totally unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was lack of notice before execution, as the above narration will disclose that at every stage the writ petitioner had notice. Therefore, neither the ruling in Rajagopala Ayyar v. Ramachandra Ayyar2, nor the ruling in Natarajan v. M/s. Chandhulal Amarchand3, would apply to the facts of the present case. 14. Therefore, neither the ruling in Rajagopala Ayyar v. Ramachandra Ayyar2, nor the ruling in Natarajan v. M/s. Chandhulal Amarchand3, would apply to the facts of the present case. 14. In the result, I hold that the writ petition is totally devoid of merits and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee fixed at Rs. 250 payable to respondents 2 and 3. R. S. ----- Petition dismissed.