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1982 DIGILAW 1020 (ALL)

Shiv Prasad v. Deputy Director of Consolidation

1982-09-07

S.SAGHIR AHMAD

body1982
ORDER S.S. Saghir Ahmad, J. - The present writ petition is directed against the proceedings relating to the allotment of chak under the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 2. Chak No. 422 was proposed to be allotted to the Petitioner while the chak No. 39 was proposed to be allotted to Gurdin (opposite party No. 2). It appears that in the objections which were filed by the Petitioner it was claimed that since he had his "abadi" in plot No. 113, he may be allotted a chak adjacent to that plot towards south and that Gurdin (opposite party No. 2) may be accommodated towards south-west of the said plot. These objections were disposed of by the Consolidation Officer by his order dated 28-3-1980 and the objections were dismissed. 3. The Petitioner then filed an appeal, which was allowed by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on 12-4-1980. The opposite party No. 2 Gurdin, thereafter filed a revision which was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 4-8-1980. A certified copy of the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is annexure 2 to the Writ Petition. It is in these circumstances that the present writ petition has been filed. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 5. It has been contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while disposing of the revision was not justified in relying upon the information obtained by him outside the court and since the Deputy Director of Consolidation has acted upon the said information the judgment and order passed by him are liable to be quashed. It has also been contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not provide him an opportunity of hearing at the time of the disposal of the revision. 6. It is not disputed on behalf of the opposite parties that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while disposing of the revision did not rely upon the knowledge obtained by him outside the court. It is also not disputed that the said knowledge or information related to the present dispute between the parties. 6. It is not disputed on behalf of the opposite parties that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while disposing of the revision did not rely upon the knowledge obtained by him outside the court. It is also not disputed that the said knowledge or information related to the present dispute between the parties. It is, however, contended by the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 that the revision was disposed of by the Deputy Director of Consolidation not only on the basis of the information received by him outside the court but also on the basis of the arguments heard by him as also on the basis of the relevant map and the evidence and material on record. He, therefore, contends that if the order passed by the Consolidation Officer or the Deputy Director of Consolidation can be sustained on the basis of the material already on record, this Court should not be interfered with the impugned order merely on the ground that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while disposing of the revision has relied upon the information gathered by him outside the court. 7. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, in his judgment, has observed as under: "Prastut nigraniyon ke sambandh men maine pakshon ko suna, bhuchitra wa abhilekhon ka avlokan kiya. Mujhe "off the court" pakshon se yah bhi gyat huwa ki Gata Sankhya 113, 111 aadi par bane chakon ke sambandh men gaon men sangharsh huwa." 8. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has further observed "Gata Sankhya 113 par chhori gayi sarvajanik abadi ki bhumi par bhi chakdar sankhya 422 ne avaidh kabja kar rakkha hai." 9. The aforesaid observations were made by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in his judgment on the basis of the information received by him outside the court. 10. The law is well settled that a Judge or the Presiding Officer of a Court cannot utilise his personal knowledge or information derived by him from other sources. If it is done, the order passed by the officer concerned would be bad. It has been observed by the Calcutta High Court in Durga Prasad Singh v. Ram Dayal Chaudhuri, (1911) ILR 38 Cal. 153 that a judgment which is based on materials which were not in evidence and which have been improperly admitted or on the personal knowledge of the Judge, is not in accordance with law. It has been observed by the Calcutta High Court in Durga Prasad Singh v. Ram Dayal Chaudhuri, (1911) ILR 38 Cal. 153 that a judgment which is based on materials which were not in evidence and which have been improperly admitted or on the personal knowledge of the Judge, is not in accordance with law. This Court in a recent decision in Sugar Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1982 RD (Summary Cases) 12 has held that where the Deputy Director of Consolidation on local inspection, was informed by persons of the locality who had collected on the spot that the trees in question belonged to a particular party and the case was decided on the basis of that information, the judgment passed by him would be vitiated inasmuch as the information gathered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation could not be treated to be "evidence" and it could not be made the basis of the decision. 11. Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has contended that notwithstanding the above infirmity, the judgment ultimately passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation can be sustained on the basis of the village map and the evidence on record which were perused by him. Since in the instant case it is not clear as to what extent the mind of the Deputy Director of Consolidation was affected by the information gathered by him outside the court, it would not be proper to scrutinise the judgment any further in order to find out whether the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation can still be sustained on the basis of the material on record. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and in view of the glaring infirmity in the order, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, I have no option but to allow the writ petition. 13. The writ petition is consequently allowed. The judgment and order dated 4-8-1980 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation contained in annexure 2 is hereby quashed. The revision shall be restored to its original number and shall be disposed of afresh by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law. The parties shall bear their own costs.