ORDER A. Banerji, J. - This writ petition is directed against an order of the District Judge, Kanpur, in a Small Cause Court Revision No. 23 of 1982, dated 4th March, 1982. The revision was dismissed and the order of the Additional Judge, Small Cause Court, Kanpur, dated 30th November, 1981 was upheld. The point in issue before the courts below was whether the building which was let out to the two petitioners would be deemed to have been illegally sublet by the act of the petitioners in admitting a partner in their business of 'Chartered Accountancy', applying the provisions of S. 12 (2), U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The facts are not much in dispute. The two petitioners, who are Chartered Accountants by profession took one single room in the building owned by respondent 3, Sri Tej Bahadur Sarin for the purpose of carrying on the business of Chartered Accountancy, which was being carried on in the name of 'Mehrotra & Company'. It is also not in dispute that the rest of the building was in possession of respondent 3 and was a residential .building. This room also formed a part of the main building but was being used for the purpose of the aforesaid business. It merely housed the firm, 'Mehrotra & Company'. It is also not in dispute that the above firm was not registered as a firm under the Income-tax Act or under the Societies Registration Act. It was registered within the purview of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. There is no dispute that these two petitioners carried on their business of Chartered Accountancy until 6-8-1977 when one Rakesh Mittal, a Chartered Accountant, was admitted as a partner into the firm. 3. A suit was filed by respondent 3 on 3rd May, 1980 in which he alleged that Shri Rakesh Mittal had been admitted as a 27 partner and this amounted to subletting 13 within the meaning of S. 12 (2) of the Act. 3. A suit was filed by respondent 3 on 3rd May, 1980 in which he alleged that Shri Rakesh Mittal had been admitted as a 27 partner and this amounted to subletting 13 within the meaning of S. 12 (2) of the Act. A defence was taken by the petitioners that Rakesh Mittal was admitted as a tenant with the consent of respondent 3, The Additional Judge, Small Cause Court, Kanpur, took the view that Rakesh Mittal had become a subtenant of the petitioners and consequent^ he held that the petitioners were liable for eviction besides for arrears of rent, damages and occupation at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month. 4. A revision was filed before the District Judge where three contentions were raised. Firstly, the building being a residential one, the provisions of S. 12 (2) of the Act could not be invoked. Secondly, the petitioners were not engaged in business, and lastly, the provisions of S. 12 (2) of the Act were inapplicable as Shri Rakesh Mittal was also a Chartered Accountant and no one other than a Chartered Accountant could be introduced as a partner of the firm. On behalf of the landlord the contention was that the room let out to the petitioners was purely a non-residential one and since Rakesh Mittal was not a member of the family, the admitting of a partner by the petitioners amounted to sub-letting. Further, the profession of Chartered Accountancy came within the meaning of the word 'business'. The learned District Judge held against the petitioners on these three points. 5. In this writ petition, Mr. K. M. Sinha along with Mr. P. N. Mehrotra appeared for the petitioner and Messers S. S. Bhatnagar. S. P. Gupta and L. P. Naithani appeared for the respondent. Learned counsel for the parties argued their cases ably and cited a number of decisions to which a reference would be made at appropriate places. 6. Mr. K.M. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners raised the following two points: Firstly, that the provisions of S. 12 (2) of the Act were not attracted at all and the learned District Judge had erred in applying those provisions. Secondly the building in question was a residential building and had wrongly been held to be a non-residential one. 6. Mr. K.M. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners raised the following two points: Firstly, that the provisions of S. 12 (2) of the Act were not attracted at all and the learned District Judge had erred in applying those provisions. Secondly the building in question was a residential building and had wrongly been held to be a non-residential one. In this context, he contended that the nature, purpose and the use of the entire building had to be taken into consideration and not merely of the one room that was let out to the petitioners. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision in the case of Smt. Kanti Khare v. Kali Prasad Asthana (1981 All LJ 795). He further contended that the decision in the case of Smt. Kanti Khare (supra) was taken to the Supreme Court and their Lordships did not disagree with the guidelines laid down by Haider, J. The Supreme Court had, however, remanded the case for being decided by a Division Bench of the High Court on the material already on the record. The further contention raised was in regard to non-applicability of the provision of S. 12 (2) of the Act, inasmuch as it used the word tenant' which connoted an individual, which was in consonance with the word family' used in this sub-section. In this case the room had been let to the firm Mehrotra & Company. Since a firm cannot have a family, as such the firm in this case could not be treated to be an individual. 7. The second point urged was that the suit had been filed on the ground of illegal subletting. A suit for eviction on the ground of illegal subletting could be filed under S. 20 (2) (e) of the Act. Since the present case did not come either under the provisions of sub-s (1' or (2) of S. 12 of the Act, the suit could only proceed under S. 20 (2) (e) of the Act and not as framed and hence no relief could be given. In other words, the contention was that there was a manifest error of law in the orders passed by the courts below, which called for an interference with those orders. 8. In other words, the contention was that there was a manifest error of law in the orders passed by the courts below, which called for an interference with those orders. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the criteria for judging whether the building is a residential one or a non-residential one would pertain to the portion which was let out and not to the rest of the building. Applying this test the room that was let out was admittedly for a non-residential purpose and consequently the provisions of S. 12 (2) of the Act were fully attracted. The decision in the case of Smt. Kanti Khare (1981 All LJ 795) (supra) was inapplicable to the facts of the present case and in any event that decision having been set aside by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, was no longer a good law. It was further contended that the firm could not be a tenant because a firm was not a juristic personality. The partners of the firm were tenants and this fact had been accepted by the petitioners. Consequently, the arguments that the tenant was a firm and the firm could not have a family were all misconceived. Admittedly, Shri Rakesh Mittal was not a member of the family of the two petitioners and admitting him as a partner in the firm amounted to the tenants ceasing to occupy the building. The view taken by the learned District Judge in 'his regard was correct and in accordance with law. The profession of Chartered Accountancy would come within the meaning of the word 'business' vide R. 2 (b) of the Rules made under the Act. 9. Mr. Sinha in the rejoinder stated that there was nothing in the plaint that the room was let out to the defendants. Reference was made to Annexure-5, a letter written by the petitioners to the landlord. It was produced as an exhibit in the suit. He also contended that a firm can also be a tenant. He, however, moved an amendment application to clarify the position that the plaint nowhere stated that the two petitioners were tenants of the building in dispute. This application was contested. He also referred to the term "building under tenancy" used in S. 20 (1) of the Act and urged that the same expression has not been used in S. 12 (2) of the Act. This application was contested. He also referred to the term "building under tenancy" used in S. 20 (1) of the Act and urged that the same expression has not been used in S. 12 (2) of the Act. Consequently, the nature and the purpose of the building itself had to be seen. He lastly contended that in case this Court did not agree with his contention, the matter may be referred to a larger Bench in view of the observations made in the case of Smt. D. Kaur v. Smt. Kanti Khare (1981-4 SCC 152) : (1982 All LJ 285) (2). 10. The first question to be considered is what exactly is meant by the word building' used in S. 12 (1) & (2) of the Act. Section 12 (1) uses the expressions 'tenant of a building', 'ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof and 'residential building.' Sub-section (2) uses the expressions a non-residential building, a tenant carrying on the business in the building and 'ceased to occupy the building.' In each case the expression used is 'building.' Now the word building' has been defined in S. 3 (i) as follows : (i) "building" means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes any land (including any garden), garages and out-houses, appurtenant to such building; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building; (iii) any fittings and fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof." According to this definition a building must be a roofed structure and includes garden, garages and out-houses pertaining to such building and also includes furniture supplied by the landlord and fittings or fixtures affixed to such building. We are not concerned in this case with any land, garden, garages, out-houses. fixtures or furniture's. The specific point is whether it relates to the entire structure which in common parlance is known as building and whether the expression 'building' used in the Act would cover only a part of that building. In other words, whether the expression building' used in the Act refers to the entire building of which a part only has been let out or refers only to that part which is let out to the tenant. In other words, whether the expression building' used in the Act refers to the entire building of which a part only has been let out or refers only to that part which is let out to the tenant. This, in my opinion, has an important bearing, for the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the test for finding out whether a building is a residential or non-residential one, is to see what the entire structure is' meant for and not merely what has been let out. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent on the contrary was that the expression 'building' as used in S. 12 of the Act refers only to that part of the building w inch is the subject matter of dispute and as such any investigation as to the nature and the purpose of the entire structure of which only a part is the subject matter of dispute is irrelevant. 11. The opening part of S. 12 (1) of the Act refers to the expression "a landlord or tenant of a building." It is, therefore, obvious that the word 'building' as used in S. 12 (1) relates to that part of the building which is the Subject matter of the contract of tenancy between the landlord and the natant. It may be the entire building or a part of such building. Whatever has been let out is 'building' within the meaning of S. 12 (1) of the Act. It was strenuously argued on behalf of the petitioners that the expression 'building under tenancy' as used in S. 21 of the Act has not been used in S. 12 of the Act. It is so, but then, in my opinion, it will make hardly any difference. Section 12 relates to deemed vacancy of a building in certain cases. A deemed vacancy can only occur if it is being occupied either by a landlord or tenant, as the case may be, on the happening of certain events as enumerated in S. 12 (1) or 12 (2) of the Act. It is clear from the above that the deemed vacancy will be in respect of the portion occupied by the tenant or the portion occupied by the landlord, as the case may be. We may leave the case of the landlord, for in this case no such question arises. It is clear from the above that the deemed vacancy will be in respect of the portion occupied by the tenant or the portion occupied by the landlord, as the case may be. We may leave the case of the landlord, for in this case no such question arises. Thus, the only question to be considered is in .what circumstances would the accommodation occupied by the tenant be deemed to be vacant. 12. In case of a residential building three circumstances have been mentioned in S. 12(1) of the Act viz., (a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, or (c) he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere. In the case of *a residential building, where a tenant or any member of his family builds or acquires in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential building in the same city he would be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under tenancy, but then we are not concerned with such a situation in the present case. 13. In regard to a non-residential building, there is a specific provision in 12 (2) of the Act. This provision is relevant. It stipulates that where a tenant carrying on business in the building under tenancy admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner, as the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. In my opinion, apart from this provision els. (a) and (b) of S. 12 (1) of the Act would also be applicable in the case of a non-residential building. However, it is not necessary to consider the provisions of els. (a) and (b) of S. 12 (1) of the Act for the case of the landlord respondent is confined to sub-s (2) of S. 12 of the Act. In the present case, Shri Rakesh Mittal, Chartered Accountant, had been admitted as a partner in the firm run by petitioners 1 and 2. It is no body's case that Rakesh Mittal was wholly in occupation and possession of the renamed portion. In the present case, Shri Rakesh Mittal, Chartered Accountant, had been admitted as a partner in the firm run by petitioners 1 and 2. It is no body's case that Rakesh Mittal was wholly in occupation and possession of the renamed portion. It is also not the case of respondent 3 that the petitioners had ceased to occupy the tenanted portion and had left the tenanted portion entirely in the occupation of Rakesh Mittal. An argument was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since the case instituted by the landlord respondent 8 was one under S. 12(2) of the Act, case under S. 12(1)(b) of the Act could not be considered. In support of this contention learned counsel referred to the Court observed that the Court could not shift the ground of declaration of vacancy to S. 12(1)(b) from S. 12(1)(a) without affording and opportunity to the petitioners. 14. This contention is acceptable, for if the relief is one for deemed vacancy under S. 12(2) of the Act, the relief cannot be granted in respect of deemed vacancy under cl. (b) of S. 12(1) of the Act. Specific case has to be put forward if the landlord seeks as declaration of deemed vacancy under any of the clauses of S. 12(1) of the Act. It is apparent from the pleadings and the relief sought that the declaration was sought for deemed vacancy in respect of non-residential accommodation in occupation of the petitioners on the ground of their having taken Shri Rakesh Mittal as a partner in their business run in the tenanted portion. It is, therefor, necessary to confine the case only to see if there was a deemed vacancy as contemplated under S. 12(2) of the Act. 15. Now coming back to the initial question regarding the nature of the building, whether it was residential on non-residential, attention must be focused on the building in dispute. As seen earlier the building in dispute, in the present case, is one room which was let out to the petitioners. As far as the user of this room, there is no dispute that it is being used as an office of the petitioners under the name and style "Mehrotra and Company" Chartered Accountants. As seen earlier the building in dispute, in the present case, is one room which was let out to the petitioners. As far as the user of this room, there is no dispute that it is being used as an office of the petitioners under the name and style "Mehrotra and Company" Chartered Accountants. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the nature and the user of the room that was let out to the petitioners is not relevant, but what is relevant is the structure, nature and the user of the entire building of which the room formed a part, In other words, the contention was that if the entire building for which the portion let out and in dispute was a residential one the concept of the building being a non-residential one would vanish and the case would not be covered under S. 12(2) of the Act. This argument of the learned counsel does not appeal to me, It is not possible to lose sight of the fact that a deemed vacancy in a portion of the entire building has nothing to do with the rest of the building, which may be with the landlord or under tenancy with others. Whether the residential in relation to the portion let out and in dispute has, in my opinion, no relevancy at all. The deemed vacancy has to be in relation to that part of the building which has been let out or is the subject matter of tenancy. 16. In the previous Act (Act No. 3 of 1947) the tenanted portion was termed as accommodation, but under Act 13 of 1972 no such expression has been used at all. What has been used is the expression building. Section 12 of the Act refers not only to the entire building of which a part may have been let out but also to that Consequently, it was necessary to use the expression building under tenancy in S. 12(1) of the Act. However, S. 12.(1) of the act contemplates deemed vacancy not only of that part which has been let out but also to the part of the building occupied by the landlord himself. There can be a deemed vacancy of the entire or a part of the building occupied by the landlord himself. However, S. 12.(1) of the act contemplates deemed vacancy not only of that part which has been let out but also to the part of the building occupied by the landlord himself. There can be a deemed vacancy of the entire or a part of the building occupied by the landlord himself. Consequently, to use the expression building, under tenancy in place of building in S. 12(1) of the Act would not have covered the cases of such buildings which were occupied by the landlords. It is necessary while interpreting the provisions of the Act to take a pragmatic view and consider the expression used in the Act. The rules of interpretation prohibit the interpretation which may lead to absurdity or to a position which is not intended. It is well settled that the provisions of a Statute cannot be so interpreted as to divorce it entirely from common sense. It is also well settled that a reasonable construction should be adopted to give effect to the legislative intendment. If possible, the words of a statute must be so construed as to give a sensible meaning. It is also well settled that it is the duty of the Court to interpret and give meaning to the expressions in the Statute where a controversy has arisen, but this must be done keeping in view the well established rules of interpretation. 17. In the present case, the expression 'non-residential building' used in S. 12 (2) of the Act refers only to that part of the building which is the subject matter of tenancy of the petitioners. In my opinion, there is no scope for examining whether the entire building is non-residential in character. I am, therefore, of the view that if a part of the building has been let out for a non-residential purpose, the provisions of S. 12 (2) of the Act would only be construed in relation to that part of the building. 18. There is no controversy that the entire building as originally constructed was for residential purposes. There is also no denying of the fact that the portion which has been let out prior to the coming in force of the Act to the petitioners and is the subject matter of tenancy was being used for the purpose of carrying on the business of Chartered Accountancy. There is also no denying of the fact that the portion which has been let out prior to the coming in force of the Act to the petitioners and is the subject matter of tenancy was being used for the purpose of carrying on the business of Chartered Accountancy. It consists of only one room in the entire structure owned by respondent 3. It is the nature and character of this one room that has to be examined, particularly in the light of its user. 19. In regard to the question whether the building is a residential or a non-residential one certain cases were cited at the Bar to which will presently refer, but before I do so I must take into consideration an argument that was raised as the last point in the writ petition, namely, that the writ petition may be referred to a Division Bench or await the decision of the Division Bench following the order of remand by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. D. Kaur v. Smt. Kanti Khare (1982 All LJ 285 (2)) (supra). Learned counsel for the parties were not aware if the above case had been heard or decided by the Division Bench. Consequently, an enquiry had to be made in the office of the Court and it was revealed that Writ Petition No. 6456 of 1978 Smt. Kanti Khare v. Kali Prasad Asthana was decided by a Division Bench by its judgment dated 6th May, 1982 (reported in 1983 All 45). A perusal of the judgment shows that their Lordships did not decide the question whether the building was residential or non-residential nor did the Division Bench express any opinion on the views expressed by Hon'ble Haider J., in the same case earlier. The Division Bench found that the material on the record was inadequate and the case was remanded to the Rent Control & Eviction Officer with a direction to permit the parties to lead evidence on the controversy and decide the same in accordance with law. In this view of the matter, the prayer made by the learned counsel either to refer the matter to the Division Bench or defer the decision in this case does not arise. 20. The appellate authority has referred in its decision to the following cases: (1) Dr. Bashir Uddin v. District Judge, Bulandshahr (1978 All LJ 82). In this view of the matter, the prayer made by the learned counsel either to refer the matter to the Division Bench or defer the decision in this case does not arise. 20. The appellate authority has referred in its decision to the following cases: (1) Dr. Bashir Uddin v. District Judge, Bulandshahr (1978 All LJ 82). (2) Radhey Shyam Vaish v. 3rd Addl. District Judge (1981 All Ren Cas 428) : (1981 All LJ 653). (3) Busching Schmitz v. Menghani ( AIR 1977 SC 1569 ); (4) Smt. Kanti Khare v. Kali Prasad sthana (1981 All LJ 795); (5) Smt. D. Kaur v. Smt. Kanti Khare (1 to 1 - 4 SCC 152) : (1982 All LJ 285 (2)). Learned counsel for the petitioners also referred to all these cases. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to a decision in the case of Govind Ram Mewa Ram v. 2nd Addl. District Judge by Hon'ble Ojha, J, reported in 1982 All Ren Cas 84. He also referred to the decision in the case of Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal ( AIR 1978 SC 1601 ). I will in this context refer to another decision of this court in the case of R. C. Mullick v. District Magistrate (1982 All LJ 754), decided by Hon'ble A.N. Verma, J. 22. In the case of Dr. Bashir Uddin v. District Judge, Bulandshahr (1978 All LJ 82) (supra) the Division Bench was construing the provision of cl. (b) of the third proviso to S. 21 of the Act and the true meaning to be assigned to the words "business purpose." In that case the petitioner, a doctor, had purchased a building consisting of one room and a Verandah which was occupied by a tenant, a washer-man. He had a family of ten members and he also kept a Bhatti in the verandah for his work of washer-man. Dr. Bashir Uddin had purchased this property and intended to get it released in his favour for the purposes of reconstructing the same and rendering it suitable for his professional requirement. A plea was raised that the building in occupation of the tenant was openings put to commercial use by the tenant, washerman, and as, such it could be released for his practice as a Surgeon. A plea was raised that the building in occupation of the tenant was openings put to commercial use by the tenant, washerman, and as, such it could be released for his practice as a Surgeon. The Court considered the position and observed (at p. 91) : We can and judicial notice of the fact that washing operations of clothes are usually performed by washer men either in rivers or ponds. The Bhatti apparently was used for part of the day only for the purpose of pressing the clothers already washed. The contention that the building in question was not residential but was used for business purposes was, in our opinion, rightly repelled by the learned District Judge." Their Lordships referred to the decisions of the Mysore and Madras High Courts where a Full Bench of the latter High Court observed that a premises must be deemed to be taken and used for residential purpose though a portion of the premises may be used for making certain items when they were not sleeping there. Their Lordships concluded that the dominant use of the house, which consisted of a single room and a verandah, in which ten persons resided was clearly residential. Learned counsel for the respondents emphasised that it is the dominant use of the portio ' in dispute that matters. 23. In the case of Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal ( AIR 1978 SC 1601 ) (supra), their Lordships were considering the question whether a small accommodation taken by a cobbler who resided there and also did some work was a residential or a non-residential accommodation. The High Court held that the lease being of a shop the purpose must have been commercial. Reversing the decision Krishna Iyer, J., held (at p. 1604): "It is impossible to hold that, if a tenant, who takes out petty premises for carrying on a small trade, also stays in the rear portion, cooks and eats, he so disastrously perverts the purpose of the lease." The Court emphasised that a realistic view has to be taken considering the prevailing circumstances. His Lordship observed, "Thus viewed, it is difficult to hold, especially when the lease has not spelt it out precisely, that the purpose was exclusively commercial and incompatible with any residential use, even of a portion." 24. His Lordship observed, "Thus viewed, it is difficult to hold, especially when the lease has not spelt it out precisely, that the purpose was exclusively commercial and incompatible with any residential use, even of a portion." 24. On behalf of the petitioners, heavy reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Busching Schmitz v. Menghani ( AIR 1977 SC 1569 ) (supra). The Supreme Court was, in this case, considering under what circumstance a building can be_ regarded to be a residential in contra-distraction of the term 'non-residential building'. An argument was raised that the purpose or the use for which the building in question was let out or was being currently put to at the time of making of the application for the release of the accommodation was relevant. Their Lordships repelled the contention by observing that the 'purpose test', or 'current use test' in regard to a building was not at all a safe guide or index for determining the nature of the building. In this case, Menghani the respondent was a Government servant who had let out his own building to the appellant-tenant (COMPANY) to carry on its business and use a part of it for its Manager's residence. Menghani was occupying a residential premises allotted by the Central Government and since he was directed by the Government to vacate the premises on the ground that he had let out his residential accommodation, he sought refuge under S. 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which provided for a right to recover immediate possession of premises in certain cases. Section 14-A refers to (sic) his wife or dependent child a residential accommodation. The question was whether the house, which had been let out to the appellant-Company was residential accommodation. Their Lordships considered the question whether the building in question would be deemed to be a residential accommodation or a non-residential accommodation. Their Lordships held : "A building which reasonably accommodates a residential user is a residential accommodation - nothing less, nothing else. The circumstances of the landlord are not altogether out of place in reaching a right judgment. The 'purpose test' will enable officers who own house to defeat the Government by pleading that they do not own 'residential premises' because the lease is for commercial use, built though it was and suitable though it is, for residence. The circumstances of the landlord are not altogether out of place in reaching a right judgment. The 'purpose test' will enable officers who own house to defeat the Government by pleading that they do not own 'residential premises' because the lease is for commercial use, built though it was and suitable though it is, for residence. Similarly, the 'possibility test" may make nonsense of the provision." 25. In the above case their Lordships were considering whether the hquse let out to the Company was a residential or non-residential one, while interpreting S. 14-A, Delhi Rent Control Act. A parallel provision in the Act is contained in S. 24-B. This is a provision which is aimed at compelling those Government servants who have a residential house in the same place where they are posted, to vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them and shift to their own house. However, if their house was tenanted, it would be liable to be vacated by the tenant, provided there was an order by the appropriate authority. It is not unusual for the Government servant owning such house to take a plea that their own house is not a residential one, as it has been let out to a Company, or is being used for a non-residential purpose. The test in such cases is not the 'purpose test' or the user test' but the 'structural test' viz., that is how has the house been built, with what object for its use. If the structure of the house is meant for its occupation as residential accommodation the mere fact it is being used for a non-residential purpose would not take the house out of the ambit of S. 24-B of the Act. It appears to me that the structural test laid down in S. 24-B is quite distinct from what is envisaged in S. 12 (2) of the Act. The words "carrying on business" in S. 12 (2) eliminate the 'structure' test, the said words emphasise the 'user test.' For if the tenant is not 'carrying on business' in the part let out to him, the provisions of S. 12 (2) of the Act would not apply and the concept of 'deemed vacancy' would not arise in such a case. 26. In the case of R.C. Mullick v. Addl. 26. In the case of R.C. Mullick v. Addl. District Magistrate (1982 All LJ 754) A. N. Verma, J. was considering the case of an entire house (building) taken for residential purpose but the tenant converted its use to non-residential purpose. This was a case in which the decision of their Lordships in the Busching case ( AIR 1977 SC 1569 ) (supra) fully applied. Such is not the position here. 27. Similarly in the case of Ram Asrey Ram v. 3rd Addl. District Judge (1980 All WC 423), the test applied was the functional' test. Hyder, J. was considering a case where only residential building had been let out to the predecessor-in-interest of he occupants and the latter were using it for commercial purpose at the time of the making of the application for release under S. 21 of the Act by the landlord. It was observed that the tenant by his unilateral act was wholly incapacitated from converting the building which had been taken for a residential purpose into a non-residential one by using it for commercial purpose. The occupants invoked the purpose test. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge on the basis of the decision in Busching Submits case ( AIR 1977 SC 1569 ). But then the expression 'building' in S. 12 (2) confines itself to the building which, is in occupation of the tenant, who is carrying on a business. If the case is confined to the building under tenancy, the structure or planning of the rest of the building, in my opinion, does not require to be taken into consideration. 28. Great reliance has been placed by .the learned counsel for the petitioners on the test laid down by Hyder, J., in the case of Smt. Kanti Khare v. Kali Prasad Asthana (1981 All LJ 795) (supra), but the view taken by Hon'ble Hyder, J., has not been approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and, as a matter of fact, that judgment was set aside. The contention that their Lordships did not disapprove of the tests laid down by Hyder, J. is neither here nor there. Once the judgment is set aside it cannot be relied upon. If their Lordships were approving of the guidelines laid down by Hyde'r, J., then their Lordships would have indicated the same in their judgment 29. The contention that their Lordships did not disapprove of the tests laid down by Hyder, J. is neither here nor there. Once the judgment is set aside it cannot be relied upon. If their Lordships were approving of the guidelines laid down by Hyde'r, J., then their Lordships would have indicated the same in their judgment 29. One thing must be noticed in all these cases that what was being considered was the accommodation that was in dispute namely, what was under tenancy. In each of these cases the consideration was only in respect of that part of the premises which was under tenancy. In the case of Dr. Bashir Uddin v. District Judge, Bulandshahr (1978 All LJ 82) (supra) it was one room and a verandah which formed the tenancy of the washerman. In the case of Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal ( AIR 1978 SC 1601 ) (supra), it was one room that the cobbler occupied. In the case of Bushing Schmitz v. Menghani ( AIR 1977 SC 1569 ) (supra), it was the entire house which had been let out to that Company. In the case of R.C. Mullick v. Addl. District Magistrate (1982 All LJ 754) (supra) it was the entire house that had been let out to the tenant. In the present case, the only thing with which we are concerned is the one room in the entire, building which had been let out to the petitioners. 30. Unlike those cases which have been referred to above, there is no dispute that this particular room which forms the tenancy had been let out to the petitioners for the purpose of carrying on the profession of Chartered Accountancy and keeping the office of the firm M/s. Mehrotra & Company, Chartered Accountants. It is nobody's case that this room had been let out for residential purposes and had been used as such. On the contrary, it is not in dispute that this room from the very commencement of the tenancy had been let out to the two petitioners for the purpose of running the business or profession of Chartered Accountancy and they had done so under the name and style of 'Mehrotra & Company.' 31. Reference may be made to the dominant purpose' test. Reference may be made to the dominant purpose' test. While the 'purpose' test and 'user' test were rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the Busching Schmitz's case ( AIR 1977 SC 1569 ) (supra), yet the dominant purpose test had not been discarded. This test was referred to by the Division Bench in the writ petition of Smt. Kanti Khare v. Kali Prasad Asthana ( AIR 1983 All 45 ) (supra) in the following passage: "This decision would be helpful in taking the view that it is the main purpose or the dominant purpose which is the governing factor and not the subsidiary use of the house." Thus the 'dominant purpose' test is relevant. In this case the room in tenancy, was let out to the petitioners in the year 1965 long before the coming in force of the Act. The room housed the office of the petitioners from the first day of its tenancy and has continued to be so till now. The purpose for which it was let out remains the same, there has not been any change of user or purpose. Consequently, the contention that the room formed part of a residential building and the dominant purpose was residential is not acceptable. 32. Now therefore the question is whether the profession or the business which the petitioners were carrying on in that room under tenancy came within the purview of non-residential purpose. In my opinion, the nature of the user of the building in a case under S. 12 (2) of the Act. forms a relevant consideration. There is no denying of the fact and there can be none in the circumstances of the case that the room was being used for the purpose of the business by the petitioners. A contention was raised that the business of Chartered Accountancy was not a business at all but Chartered Accountancy was a profession. There is no doubt that Chartered Accountancy is a profession like that of an Advocate and Doctor, but when several Chartered Accountants form a firm under a particular name and style and carry on business, they cannot be said strictly to be carrying on their profession. There is no doubt that Chartered Accountancy is a profession like that of an Advocate and Doctor, but when several Chartered Accountants form a firm under a particular name and style and carry on business, they cannot be said strictly to be carrying on their profession. If a person, all by himself carried on the profession of Chartered Accountancy in addition to residing therein, something could be argued, but R. 2 (b) makes it clear that even a profession is construed as a business. In this view of the matter, the carrying on the work of Chartered Accountant would be deemed to be a business. Consequently, the nature of the work done by the petitioners in the tenanted portion was a business i. e. a non-residential purpose. 33. It is, therefore, obvious from the above that the room which was let out to the petitioners was for a non-residential purpose and there can be no denying of the fact that it was being used for a non-residential purpose and it is still being used as such. It cannot be deemed to be a residential accommodation. Merely because it forms part of a big house which may be or is a residential building will not invest the room in question, which has been let out to the petitioners, to be a residential accommodation. In my opinion, the view taken by the appellate authority in this regard must be upheld as correct. 34. A contention was seriously canvassed In the learned counsel for the petitioners that the firm can be a tenant. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the contrary view is well established. Reference was made to the case of Puran Chand v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer (1959 All LJ 343), where it was held that a firm does not have the legal status of a person. It is merely a convenient name or I able for the person or the persons who own it and as such the firm is incapable of making a contract or being a tenant. A similar view was taken in the case of Govind Ram Mewa Ram v. 2nd Addl. District Judge (1982 All Rent Cas 84) (supra) that a firm cannot be a tenant and the proprietor or the partners of the firm, as the case may be, are the tenants. The Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Fisheries Co. A similar view was taken in the case of Govind Ram Mewa Ram v. 2nd Addl. District Judge (1982 All Rent Cas 84) (supra) that a firm cannot be a tenant and the proprietor or the partners of the firm, as the case may be, are the tenants. The Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Fisheries Co. v. I. T. Commr., Kerala ( AIR 1980 SC 176 ), held that a partnership firm under the Partnership Act is not distinct legal entity apart from the partners constituting it and equally in law the firm as such has no separate rights of its own in the partnership assets and when one talks of the firm's property or firm's assets all that is meant is property or assets in which all partners have a joint or common interest. It is, therefore, clear from the above that the firm M/s Mehrotra & Company, which was a firm registered under the Chartered Accountants Act could not be deemed to be a tenant. Effort was made in this Court to have the original written statement amended. That application has been rejected by a separate order. A perusal of the plaint which is Annexure-I to the supplementary affidavit shows that the two petitioners were arrayed as defendants in the suit. In para 2 of the plaint, it was stated "that the defendants were in occupation of a portion of the said premises consisting of a room only situated in the ground floor ......" Para 3 of the plaint reads : "That the defendant had illegally sublet the portion in their tenancy by admitting a nonfamily member as a partner in the firm In the written statement these averments were not specifically denied. 35. It will be relevant to mention here that the writ petition has been filed by the two petitioners and in para 2 of the petition they clearly stated that one room in the residential building 15/243, Civil Lines, Kanpur, was let out to the petitioners on a monthly rent of Rs. 75/- by opposite party 3, the landlord. They therefore, clearly admitted the position that the room was let out to the two petitioners and not to the tenants. Effort was made to show that the room in question had been let out to the firm M/s Mehrotra and Company. 75/- by opposite party 3, the landlord. They therefore, clearly admitted the position that the room was let out to the two petitioners and not to the tenants. Effort was made to show that the room in question had been let out to the firm M/s Mehrotra and Company. Reference was made to Annexure-5 to the supplementary affidavit, which was a letter dated 27th October, 1965 written by Sri S. P. Agarwal, petitidner 2, on behalf of M/s Mehrotra & Company. On the basis of this letter, it was urged that the tenant was M/s Mehrotra & Company, but this position is legally not tenable as seen above. In my view, the tenants were the two petitioners even though they were carrying on their profession or business of Chartered Accountancy under the name and style of M/s Mehrotra & Company. 36. The second point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the suit had been filed on the ground of illegal subletting and therefore the suit should have proceeded under S. 20 (2) of the Act. The case should not have been tried as one under S. 12 (2) of the Act. The ] contention of the petitioners is misconceived. A suit under S. 20 (2) (e) of the Act is filed for the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy on the ground that the tenant had sublet in contravention of the provisions of S. 25 of the Act. In that event, the suit has to be filed in the Court of Judge, Small Causes. Admitting a person, who is not a member of the family of a tenant carrying on business in the building is tantamount to subletting the building vide Explanation to S. 25 of the Act. The Statute has provided that where the tenant ceases to occupy the building within the meaning of S. 12 (2) of the Act, he shall be deemed to have sublet the same. Thus the suit for eviction from the suit premises on the ground of subletting in contravention of S. 25 of the Act, is contemplated under S. 20 (2) (e) of the Act. Such a suit has to be filed in the Court of Small Causes. In this case the suit was filed in the Court of Small Causes. Thus the suit for eviction from the suit premises on the ground of subletting in contravention of S. 25 of the Act, is contemplated under S. 20 (2) (e) of the Act. Such a suit has to be filed in the Court of Small Causes. In this case the suit was filed in the Court of Small Causes. On the suit being decreed a revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was filed. The revision has been dismissed by the District Judge. I do not find anything to observe that the suit was not properly filed as framed. The point is accordingly decided. 37. Another contention raised by the learned counsel was that the accommodation in question is exempted from the operation of the Act in view of the provisions of S. 2 (f) of the Act. This argument is wholly misconceived. Section 2 exempts the buildings mentioned in the els. (a) to (f) from the operation of the Act. Clause (f) pertains to a building built and held by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or by a co-operative society, company or firm, and intended solely for its own occupation or for the occupation of any of its officers or servants. The emphasis is on the word 'firm'. As seen above, the building in dispute in this case was taken on rent by the two petitioners and the firm was not the tenant. Legally also the firm could not be the tenant. In the present case the partners carried on business of Chartered Accountancy under name of "Mehrotra & Company." That would not bring the case within the meaning-of cl. (f) of S. 2. This ground has no merits. 38. In view of the above, it is clear that the petitioners had taken as a partner Shri Rakesh Mittal, who is not a member of their family, in their business. Admittedly, Shri Rakesh Mittal was not a member of the family of either of the two persons, who had taken the room on tenancy. In my opinion, the view taken by the learned district Judge was correct and does not call for any interference. 39. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. In my opinion, the view taken by the learned district Judge was correct and does not call for any interference. 39. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. It will, however, be necessary to give some time to the petitioners to vacate the room in dispute. The petitioners are granted two months' time from today to vacate the room, provided they deposit rent for these two months within 15 days from today. They will further give an undertaking in writing that they will vacate the room and hand over the possession peacefully on the expiry of the aforesaid period. In case the above conditions are not fulfilled, the order of the court Below will be executable at once. _ .