JUDGMENT R.S. Verma, Member - It may appear unpalatable, but it is a fact that sometimes working of courts results in hardships to litigate and creates complication in the law and in its administration. The case in hand is an example of the same. 2. Second appeal No. 689 of 1967-68 was filed in the Board on June 14, 1968 and was admitted on the same day. Then, it was kept in the office to await its turn, for being heard, in due course of time. Normally, in this Board, it takes six to eight years for a case to be listed for final hearing after its admission. So the turn of this case came for the first time on July 28, 1976. On that date, the Member was not present and the case was adjourned to December 2, 1976, but that date was declared a holiday and the case was fixed for December 30, 1976. However, an order was passed on December 2, 1976 to issue notices under Section 5(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to parties because it had transpired that the village, in which the land in suit was situate, had been brought under consolidation operations. On December 30, 1976, as no objection filed by the opposite party against the notices issued under Section 5(2), U.P. C.H. Act, Shri Syed Mubarak Hasan, learned Judicial Member, ordered abatement of the appeal and of the suit under Section 5 (2) (a), U.P. C.H. Act. The order-sheet discloses that counsels of both the parties had been informed of the date. 3. On January 29, 1977, Shri H.S.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent filed an application for recalling the order dated December 30, 1976 on the ground that due to illness he could not attend the court on that date and could not point out the fact that the appeal abated under Order XXII, Code of Civil Procedure, because some of the respondents had died without their legal representatives having been brought on the record. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant-respondent is that as the appeal had abated under Order XXII, Code of Criminal Procedure, there was no question of its being abated under Section 5(2), U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant-respondent is that as the appeal had abated under Order XXII, Code of Criminal Procedure, there was no question of its being abated under Section 5(2), U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 4. On January 11, 1978, the respondent No. 1 filed an affidavit to the effect that the respondent No. 2, Smt. Ram Kesha, had died six years ago that respondent No. 3, Ram Naresh, died four years ago and that respondent No. 4 Bhagwat Nath died six years ago. According to this averment, respondent Nos. 2 and 4 died in 1972 and respondent No. 3 died in 1974. No substitution application was filed and hence it has been urged that the appeal had already abated under Order XXTI, C.P.C. much before December 30, 1976 and no appeal was pending, in law, on that date and so the further question of abating the appeal under Section 5(2)(a), U.P. C.H. Act did not arise. It has been contended that the order dated December 30, 1976 abating the suit and the appeal under Section 5 (2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was a nullity and it must be recalled and a proper order should be passed to the effect that the appeal had abated under Order XXII, Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Shri H.S.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the applicant-respondent has urged that a suit or proceeding, of the type described in Section 5(2)(a), U.P. C.H. Act, pending before any court shall stand abated, not from the date of notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, but (1) after giving notice to the parties and (2) 'on an order being passed in that behalf,' by the concerned court or authority. The burden of his argument is that Section 5(2)(a), U.P. C.H. Act, does not envisage automatic abatement of a suit or proceeding like Order XXII, Rules 3 and 4 Code of Civil procedure because in the latter provision there is no mention of any notice being given to the parties or of any order to that effect, being passed by the court; while Section 5(2) U.P. C.H. Act insists "on an order being passed in that behalf" by the court or authority and that also after giving notice to the parties. He has argued that unless and until the order of abatement is passed under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the case remains pending and if, in the meantime, the suit or proceeding abates under Order XXII Rules 3 or 4. C.P.C., nothing survives for abatement under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The argument is attractive and appears to be formidable. We have considered this argument in its depth and also in its widest aspects. And we have arrived at the conclusion that the argument does not represent the correct position of law. 6. In the instant case, the village, in which the land in suit is situate, was notified under Section 4(2). U.P. C.H. Act, on August 30, 1969. The first casualty amongst the respondents occurred in the year 1972. Thus if the case would have been taken at any time between August 30, 1969 and 1972, it was bound to be abated under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. C.H. Act. But it was not taken during that time for the simple reason that the appeal, having been filed on June 14, 1968, was not ready to be listed for final hearing within 6 or 8 years of its admission. We have already adverted to the fact that in this Board it normally takes 6 to 8 years for an admitted case to come up for final hearing. As the case did not come up to the court during this period the question of abatement under Section 5(2)(a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act could not be considered and decided. There it is not the fault of the lawyer of the parties that the question of abatement under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was not decided by this Board at the appropriate time. 7. The Consolidation Act or the authority that Act did not and could not, envision a situation in which the question of abatement under that Act could have beet deferred upto some unspecified but inordinately belated point of time. The relevant law laid down that upon the publication of the notification under Section 4(2), U.P. C.H. Act, certain consequences shall ensue and one of those consequences was the, abatement of the suit or the proceeding pending in any court. The relevant law laid down that upon the publication of the notification under Section 4(2), U.P. C.H. Act, certain consequences shall ensue and one of those consequences was the, abatement of the suit or the proceeding pending in any court. Such notifications are published in the official Gazette to be taken note of by courts, authorities and the public concerned. The law reasonably expects, and it is also expected of courts, authorities and concerned public, that necessary follow up action will be taken by all, including courts. If the law lays down that upon happening of a certain event, certain consequence shall ensue then, in all logic, the time for determining as to what will be the consequence will be that every time when the specified event happens or some reasonably proximate time thereafter. But it is illogical that the question about those consequences is to be taken after several years, either due to negligence or some procedural defect or anachronistic functioning of higher courts. In all cases, and especially in suck eases, time is the essence of the matter. If the question of abatement is taken after many years it may happen that by the time such question is taken up by the court, the consolidation operation might have come to an end or that the consolidation courts might have made final adjudication about the rights and title of tenure-holders. Then what will be the use of Section 5 (2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In the meanwhile other complications, as hat happened in this case, will arise. Justice demands that such resultant complications should be ignored, and the law should be applied as it ought to have been applied all that very time when the requirement of the law had demanded its application. Other wise the mandatory provisions of law mil become otiose. 8. The correct position of law is that when a notification under Section 4(2). Justice demands that such resultant complications should be ignored, and the law should be applied as it ought to have been applied all that very time when the requirement of the law had demanded its application. Other wise the mandatory provisions of law mil become otiose. 8. The correct position of law is that when a notification under Section 4(2). U.P. C.H. Act, is published in the official Gazette in respect of a village or an area, the courts of law should make an order that all the cases pending in the court and which are liable to be abated under Section 5(2) (a), U.P. C.H. Act, should be immediately posted for hearing, notices to the parties be issued and the question of abatement be decided within a reasonable time, when a particular situation demands action, there can be no justification for refusing to act. Of course, the U.P. C.H. Act does not say that after notification under Section 4 of that Act, the courts of law shall immediately decide the question of abatement. Facts of life are so myriad and complex that no law can claim, much less visualise, all the situations arising in the behaviour of human beings or institutions. However, we can say with some definiteness that the framers of the U.P. C.H. Act could not have reasonably imagined that the consequences mentioned in Section 5(2)(at of the U.P. C.H. Act would not ensue upon publication of the notification under Section 4(2) of the Act and that it would ensue at some remote, unspecified point of time. Law is enacted for the purpose of being enforced and being followed. If it is not enforced or followed at the proper time, it becomes useless, and in some case, dangerous. 9. Be it what it may, in the instant case, the question of abatement under the Act was not decided at the proper time, with the result that a complication occurred and by the time (December 30, 1976) the case was taken up, some of the respondents died without their legal representative having been brought on the record. The appeal remained pending till that date. The crucial question is to be decided in this context is as to when the suit or the proceeding died or abated. The appeal remained pending till that date. The crucial question is to be decided in this context is as to when the suit or the proceeding died or abated. We have already said that from August 30, 1969 to 1972 it was bound to be abated under Section 5(2) fa) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, had it been fortunate enough to be heard by the court. But unfortunately the case was not taken up during that period. By the time it came up for hearing, Order XXII Rules 3 or 4, C.P.C., intervened. This complication arose solely due to the functioning or non functioning of this court. 10. We have already indicated that in this case the appeal and the suit abated under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. C.H. Act and not under Order XXII, Rule 4 C.P.C. In 1969 R.D. 218, the Supreme Court held that, "On the notification under Section 4 of the Act, by operation of law, under Section 5 of the Act the suit gets abated and an appeal before the Supreme Court becomes infructuous," There is no discussion in this judgment and it relics on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1968 R.D., 88. In the latter cited case (1968 R.D. 83) question of Section 5(2)(a) U.P. C.H. Act vis-a-vis Order XXII, Rules 3 and 4, C.P.C. was not involved. As the present question was not before the Supreme Court, its answer to some, other question will not be treated as an answer to the question agitating this court. 11. The point is why do we say that in this case the suit and the appeal abated under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and not under Order XXII, C.P.C.? The reason is that once there is an end of a matter, it docs not survive and there is no possibility of its being finished a second or a third time. Suppose a man on the top of a precipice dies of hear, failure and is immediately thereon on the ground several thousands feet below, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to result in instant death, it will be hold that he died when his heart failed earlier and not when he dashed against the ground later. Suppose a man on the top of a precipice dies of hear, failure and is immediately thereon on the ground several thousands feet below, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to result in instant death, it will be hold that he died when his heart failed earlier and not when he dashed against the ground later. In the present case also the appeal and the suit had been abated under Section 5(2)(a) U.P. C.H. Act between August 30, 1969 and 1972, though not formal order was passed to that effect, and therefore, the question of second abatement under Order XXII, C.P.C. did not arise. 12. We will like to take the help of another analogy for illustrating the nature of approach required in such cases. Supposing that the limitation for prescribing tenancy rights in land is six years and the rightful owner files a suit for ejectment of the trespasser a little before the expiry or the period of limitation, the suit continues for several years before the final order of ejectment is passed and the trespasser remain in possession throughout this period for more than the prescribed period of limitation. Will the trespasser in such a case, be allowed to take the plea that his adverse possession subsequent to the filing of the suit, be taken into account so as to confer on him tenancy rights? The law is now settled that the later adverse possession will not be taken into consideration and shall be completely ignored. The courts have arrived at such conclusion by taking recourse to a legal fiction that they will judge the case by applying the law as was applicable at the time of the suit and not that which could be applicable at the time of passing the final judgment. This analogy is, of course, not very apt but it shows that when an application of a certain law is to be made to the circumstances of a particular case, the best course to take is to apply it to the facts of that time when the matter was at the initial stage. 13. Unless we ignore the provisions of Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the question of abatement under consolidation law is to be decided at the time when the notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. C.H. Act is published in the Gazette. 13. Unless we ignore the provisions of Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the question of abatement under consolidation law is to be decided at the time when the notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. C.H. Act is published in the Gazette. It has been laid down, in no uncertain term, that the consequences, mentioned in Section 5(2) will ensue upon the said publication of the notification. If it so happens that at the time, when the said notification is published, the suit or appeal is found to be incompetent because of some legal defect or by abatement under Order XXII, Rule 3 or 4, Code of Civil Procedure, the suit or the proceeding will be thrown on that ground and the question of abatement under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act will not arise. To be specific, if a suit or proceeding has already abated under Order XXII, Rule 3 or 4, C.P.C., before the notification under Section 4(2), U.P. C.H. Act no order under Section 5(2)(a) U.P. C.H. Act will be passed and it would be held that the suit or proceeding has abated under Order XXII, Rule 3 or 4, C.P.C. But if on the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(2), U.P. C.H. Act, the suit or the appeal is competent, the provisions of Section 5(2)(a), U.P. C.H. Act, shall he applied. Whenever this question arises the approach should not be other than what we have mentioned above. When a certain state of fact exists or is shown to exist at a particular point of time, the court should ordinarily apply the law which is applicable at that time and see as to what is the result thereof. If by application of the correct law a point is finally determined there should be an end to the matter and subsequent complications should be brushed aside. 14. In the case before us the notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was published in the official Gazette on August 30, 1969. At that time this second appeal was pending. It was a competent appeal and there was no defect in it. From August 30, 1969 to 1972 none of the respondents had died and there was no question of any substitution. At that time this second appeal was pending. It was a competent appeal and there was no defect in it. From August 30, 1969 to 1972 none of the respondents had died and there was no question of any substitution. Had the relevant law been applied at that time - and it was required to be applied at that time the appeal, along with the suit, was bound to be abated under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. C.H. Act. The Legislature, in its wisdom, used the words 'stands abated'. This is a strong and unequivocal phrase. There the Supreme Court decision reported in 1969 R.D. 100, and 1969 R.D. 218, becomes a clue for interpreting the spirit of the Consolidation Act. In 1969 R.D. 218, Supreme Court, it was held that 'on the notification under Section 4 of the Act being issued, by operation of law, under Section 5 of the Act the suit gets abated and an appeal before the Supreme Court becomes infructuous'. In 1969 R.D. 100, Supreme Court, it was held that, '.............. this court must take notice of the fate of the suit from which the appeal arises before it. If the law has validly declared the suit to have abated, the consequence of it would be that this court must declare the appeal to be infructuous by reason of the abatement of the suit'. Article 141 of the Constitution of India lays down that 'The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of 'India'. These declarations of law by the Supreme Court, made in quick succession (1968 R.D. 83; 1969 R.D. 100 and 1969 R.D. 218) must have been brought to the notice of all persons affected by consolidation operations and the appellant, in this case, could have no reason to apprehend that, in spite of this declaration of law by the highest court of India, his second appeal in the Board had not become infunctuous and that the suit, out of which the appeal had arisen, had not abated. Hence he had valid reasons to rest assured that the appeal had become infunctuous and that he was not required to do anything in that connection. 15. Hence he had valid reasons to rest assured that the appeal had become infunctuous and that he was not required to do anything in that connection. 15. It is, no doubt, true that the suit or proceeding shall stand abated on publication of notification after giving notice and on order to that effect being passed by the court or the Authority. This provision had been inserted with a view to avoid passing ex parte and incorrect order. There is bound to be some time lag between the publication of the notification and the order of abatement But the law of abatement shall be applicable immediately after the said notification and if the state of facts at that lime call for applying the law of abatement, it shall be applied, irrespective of the fact that the actual order is passed at a later point of time. The reasoning is analogous to that of a case for ejectment of a trespasser the subsequent adverse possession, after the institution of the suit and before the final order of ejectment, is totally ignored. The crucial date is of the publication of the notification, and the provision of giving notice to the parties and of passing a formal order of abatement cannot be isolated from that date; on the other hand they must be correlated with the time of publication. 16. Here in this case, after the notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. C.H. Act on August 30, 1969 and before the death of some of the respondents in 1972, the appeal was bound to be abated under Section 5(2)(a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It is immaterial that the order of abatement was not passed at that time. Whenever this question arose before the court, the first point for determination was whether the appeal was liable to be abated under consolidation law between August 30, 1969 and 1972. If the answer is in the affirmative, it will be deemed that the appeal abated under Section 5 (2) (a) of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. We will have to take the help of legal fiction, and it cannot be avoided for the reason that the appeal had actually abated or it should have been abated under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act before the death of the respondents occurred. We will have to take the help of legal fiction, and it cannot be avoided for the reason that the appeal had actually abated or it should have been abated under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act before the death of the respondents occurred. Hence, on the death of those respondents, there was no point in giving substitution application and there was no question of abatement under Order XXII, Rules 3 or 4, Code of Civil Procedure, because much before that, the suit and the appeal had legally abated under Section 5(2)(a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 17. On summing up the following position of law emerges: - (a) The question of abatement under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act cannot be delinked from the time of the publication of the notification under Section 4(2) of the U.P. C.H. Act because this is the starting point at which, and from which, the consequences, regarding abatement, ensue, (b) If it is found that before that publication the suit or the proceeding had abated under Order XXII, Code of Civil Procedure, or had become incompetent by reason of deficiency of court fees, limitation, or other like causes, the suit or proceeding may be dismissed on those grounds, (c) But, if at the time of that publication the suit or proceeding was competent, it shall be abated under Section 5(2) (a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, notwithstanding the fact that the order of abatement is passed at a later date when other complications, due to the delay, have arisen. 18. Thus, there is no reason to recall the order of the Board passed on December 30, 1976. That order was correct and there was no illegality in it. 19. Moreover, the application dated January 29, 1977 given by the respondent, is time-barred. There is no application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. On this ground also, the application is liable to be dismissed. 20. There is yet another ground for dismissing this application. The learned counsel for the respondent had been given notice of the date of hearing. He did not come. It is said that he was ill, but in that case an adjournment application should have been given. On this ground also, the application is liable to be dismissed. 20. There is yet another ground for dismissing this application. The learned counsel for the respondent had been given notice of the date of hearing. He did not come. It is said that he was ill, but in that case an adjournment application should have been given. Even if his clerk or any other colleague had informed the court that he was ill and wanted an adjournment, this court must have granted that oral application. But nothing was done by him or at his instance. Hence, this court was perfectly justified in passing final order in this case. There is no justification for recalling a validly passed order of this court. 21. The result is that this application is dismissed with costs and Rs. 50/- as counsel's fees.