JUDGMENT K. Bhaskaran, J. 1. The matter relates to proceedings under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1of 1964 as amended by Act 36 of 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The3rd respondent had put in an application O. A. No. 683 of 1965 on the file of the Land Tribunal, Kanhangad, whose jurisdiction later on was vested in the 2ndrespondent, Special Tahsildar (Land Reforms) No. 1, Kasargod, for fixation of fair rent under S.31 of the Act in respect of the land held by him under his landowners, the petitioners. The Land Tribunal passed orders fixing fair rent as per the order dated 28-2-1969. However, the matter was taken up in appeal by the petitioners herein in A. A. No. 593 of 1971 on the file of the 1st respondent Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Kozhikode, which authority by its judgment dated 27-4-1971 allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Land Tribunal. Thereupon, when the matter came up for hearing on 15-1-1977 before the Land Tribunal, the Land Tribunal was told by the parties that in as much as the application filed by the 3rd respondent herein under S.72 of the Act having been allowed in his favour in O. A. No. 524 of 1976, it was unnecessary to pursue the matter, and, accordingly the further action in the suo motu proceedings was dropped. This could be seen from Ext. P-1 order dated15-1-1977 produced along with the writ petition. To complete the narration it has to be stated that the Land Tribunal had initiated suo motu proceedings underS.72C of the Act having noticed that after the notification under S.72 of the Act the right, title and interest of the landlord had got vested in the State and, therefore, where the parties had not come forward to seek assignment of the landlord's right, title and interest, suo motu proceedings could be initiated. It would appear that the Land Tribunal passed an order saying that the application under S.31 of the Act Was converted into one of suo motu proceeding for assignment of the right, title, and interest of the landlord. It would appear that the Land Tribunal passed an order saying that the application under S.31 of the Act Was converted into one of suo motu proceeding for assignment of the right, title, and interest of the landlord. It has also to be noticed that in the meanwhile the petitioners had applied for resumption of half the land leased to the 3rd respondent, and as per the order in O. A. No. 111 of1971 petitioners 3 and 4 herein were allowed to resume half the extent of land held by the 3rd respondent, Thereafter the 3rd respondent filed O. A. No. 524 of1976, presumably under S.72B of the Act, for assignment of landlord's right, title and interest in respect of half the extent of land remaining with him after petitioners 3 and 4 had resumed half the land held by him. It is taking into consideration these two major factors, i.e., resumption by petitioners 3 and 4herein of half the extent of land and the assignment of the landlord's right, title and interest in respect of the remaining half in favour of the 3rd respondent, that the Land Tribunal though that the suo motu proceeding could be dropped without any further action. Against Ext. P-1 order dropping the proceedings in S. M. No.179 of 1972, the 3rd respondent filed appeal A. A. No. 2530 of 1978 on the file of the 1st respondent who by Ext. P-2 judgment allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order Ext. P-1, and remanded the matter for fresh disposal according to law after issue of notice to parties. It is aggrieved by this order of remand that this writ petition has been filed by the petitioners. 2. Sri K. P. V. B. Ejman, the counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the order of remand passed by the 1st respondent is without jurisdiction inasmuch as the parties had settled their dispute by the proceedings for resumption and assignment of landlord's right, title and interest as evidenced by the orders on S.M. No. 179 of 1972 and O. A. No. 524 of 1976, and therefore there was nothing further pertaining to the land which was the subject matter of any one of the applications or proceedings before the Land Tribunal which survived for consideration. His argument is that through O. A. No. 683 of 1965 filed underS.31 of the Act was pending till the 2nd respondent passed orders converting it into one of suo motu proceeding under S.72C of the Act, thereafter the application under S.31 of the Act had ceased to be in existence. According to him one-half having been resumed by petitioners 3 and 4 and the landlord's right, title and interest in respect of the remaining half having been purchased by the3rd respondent, cultivating tenant, there was nothing pertaining to the holiday tobe agitated or adjudicated between the petitioners on the one hand and the 3rdrespondent on the other, and, therefore the remand was absolutely uncalled for. 3. Sri U. P. Kunikullaya, the counsel for the 3rd respondent, on the other hand, contended that the fact that the 2nd respondent Land Tribunal dropped the suo motu proceeding under S.72C of the Act would not mean that the application filed under S.31 for fixation of fair rent had become nonexistent. He would point out that the 3rd respondent's advocate did not appear when the order Ext. P-1was passed and as a matter of fact he had no communication regarding the conversion of his application under S.31 of the Act into one of suo motu proceeding under S.72C of the Act. Though he had received a notice as required under S.72(C)(2) of the Act, that notice did not mention that O. A. No. 683 of1965 had been converted into a suo motu proceeding. The 3rd respondent understood the contents of the notice as conveying the idea that the suo motu proceeding for assignment of land had been initiated with which idea he had no objection. 4. The question is whether the 3rd respondent is estopped from pleading that his application filed under S.31 of the Act has to be disposed of according to law without it being treated as having been dropped. It appears to me that in the absence of any provision in the Act or the Kerala Land Reforms (Vesting and Assignment) Rules, 1970, the 2nd respondent Tribunal could not have by converting the application under S.31 as an application under S.72C of the Act put an end to the application for fixation of fair rent. It appears to me that in the absence of any provision in the Act or the Kerala Land Reforms (Vesting and Assignment) Rules, 1970, the 2nd respondent Tribunal could not have by converting the application under S.31 as an application under S.72C of the Act put an end to the application for fixation of fair rent. If at all the Land Tribunal had passed orders stating that the proceedings would be converted into suo motu proceedings, it could have only meant that steps for fixation of fair rent and assignment of landlord's right, title and interest would be taken simultaneously. The petitioners could not have reasonably understood that with the passing of Ext. P-1-order by the Land Tribunal the fair rent application filed under S.31 of the Act came to an automatic end along with the order for assignment of landlord's right, title and interest. The 3rd respondent is entitled in law to press for the fixation of fair rent in terms of the mandatory provision of the section mentioned above. 5. This admittedly not being a proceeding initiated under S.54 of the Act, the question of abatement of the proceedings under S.72B of the Act could not arise. The order for assignment of landlord's right, title and interest was passed only on O. A. No. 524 of 1976 which was an application filed under S.72B of the Act by the 3rd respondent herein. His application O. A. No. 683 of 1965 filed under S.31of the Act for all practical purposes remained without being disposed of. 6. Sri Ejman cited two decisions, one of this Court and the other of the Supreme Court. His application O. A. No. 683 of 1965 filed under S.31of the Act for all practical purposes remained without being disposed of. 6. Sri Ejman cited two decisions, one of this Court and the other of the Supreme Court. The decision of this Court relied on is that of a Division Bench in Sankara Pillai Kunju krishna Pillai v. Ananda Pillai Bharathi Amma 1957 KLT 732 ) wherein it was pointed out in Para.2 of the judgment, at page 734 of the report- "Now it is well settled that the record made by a court in its judgment or order in respect of what happened before it, cannot without more, be allowed to be assailed before an appellate court and we would accordingly be perfectly right in ignoring learned counsel's disclaimer." The other decision is that of the Supreme Court in Bank of Bihar v. Mahabir Lal ( AIR 1964 SC 377 ) wherein page 380 of the report it has been stated as follows:- "In our opinion where a statement appears in the judgment of a court that a particular thing happened or did not happen before it, it ought not ordinarily to be permitted to be challenged by a party unless of course both the parties to the litigation agree that the statement is wrong, or the court itself admits that the statement is erroneous." In this case the parties are not in agreement that the statement made was wrong. We will assume that the parties had brought to the notice of the Tribunal the fact that the later application filed by the 3rd respondent therein under S.72B of the Act had already been allowed and that it was in that background the 2nd respondent Land Tribunal decided to drop the suo motu proceedings. Then the further question is whether the parties had consciously, expressly or by necessary implication agreed to the dropping of the proceedings for fixation of fair rent on the initiation of the suo motu proceedings by the Land Tribunal for assignment of landlord's right, title and interest. The suo motu proceedings had become unnecessary after the Land Tribunal had assigned landlord's right and interest on the application of the 3rd respondent herein under S.72B in O. A. No. 524 of 1976. The reason for the dropping of the suo moto proceedings could, therefore, be understood. The suo motu proceedings had become unnecessary after the Land Tribunal had assigned landlord's right and interest on the application of the 3rd respondent herein under S.72B in O. A. No. 524 of 1976. The reason for the dropping of the suo moto proceedings could, therefore, be understood. The argument that with the passing of the order on an application filed under S.72B the application filed under S.31would have no relevance would have had some meaning if the fair rent order had no other relevance part from the bearing it might have had on the fixation of the price for the purpose of assignment of landlord's right, title and interest; however, the position is that the landowner is entitled to claim arrears of rent also, and that the fair rent order takes effect from the agricultural year during which the application was made, and the landowner's right to claim and the cultivating tenant's liability to pay arrears of rent could only be on the basis of the fair rent that might be fixed, not on the basis of the contract in that behalf. In the light of the facts stated above the decisions of the Supreme "Court and the Division Bench of this Court cited by Sri. Ejman could easily be distinguished. 7. After all, by remanding the matter, what the Appellate Authority has asked the Land Tribunal to do is to consider the matter afresh and pass appropriate orders according to law. The apprehension of the petitioners is understandable they presumably feel that once the fair rent is fixed under S.31 of the Act, they would-be entitled to claim only the fair rent, not the contract rent, for the relevant period during which the 3rd respondent is liable to pay rent for the holding. In other words, the attempt of the petitioners is to see whether the statutory benefit embodied in S.31 of the Act could be deprived to the 3rd respondent cultivating tenant by raising a technical plea that with the dropping of the suo motu proceedings for the assignment of landlord's right, title and interest the application for fixation of fair rent also had come to an automatic end for the reason that it had got merged with the suo motu proceedings. Even if there is any far-fetched scope for an argument of this sort, this Court would be slow in interfering under Art.226 of the Constitution with an order in the nature of Ext.P-2 which manifestly is just and fair. For the foregoing reasons the writ petition is without merit and is dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.