JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 8-2-1974 by Sri G. S. M. Tripathi, learned J. S. C. C. Meerut who allowed civil appeal No. 555 of 1970 and reversed the judgment of II Additional Munsif, Meerut dated 7-9-1970 by which original suit No. 841 of l%7 was dismissed. 2. Dispute relates- to an enclosure shown in the site-plan appended to the plaint which lies in plot No. 387 of village Nagli Abdullah, Pargana-Kithore, Tehsil-Mavana, district-Meerut. Plaintiff and defendant No. 6 are own brothers, sons of Buddan Singh. Relief sought was for a perpetual injunction restraining defendants Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 from interfering with the possession of plaintiff over the disputed enclosure. 3. It was averred that the disputed site was in possession of plaintiff and defendant No. 6 for last 50 years. They have their Kolhu and manure pit and haycock on this land. They also used to tether their cattle there. Its number is 387 as allotted in consolidation and its earlier number was669 in 1336 Fasli settlement which corresponded to old plot No. 659 of 1314 Fasli. It pertains to Mohal Ramlal Khewat No. 3, plaintiff ancestors were the erstwhile Zamindars in this khew at. In Suit No. 39 of 1952. Ram Dei v. Buddhan and others plaintiffs claim about this land was again allowed. Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 had nothing to do with the disputed land but they alleged that the land belonged to Gaon Sabha and Therefore the Chairman of the Land Management Committee settled this land with defendants Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 and on that basis they intended to interfere with the possession of plaintiff. 4. The claim was resisted by defendants Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 who filed three separate written statements raising similar pleas. 5. It was pleaded that plaintiff was neither the owner nor in possession over the disputed land: no Kolhu belonging to plaintiff operated on the disputed land: there was no cattle trough, etc. on the disputed land. 6. Plot no. 387 measuring 9 biswas was a hanjar land and vested in Gaon Sabha. It was set apart for abadi purposes. Plot No. 385 with an area of 3 biswas was set apart for Kolhu purposes. on the disputed land. 6. Plot no. 387 measuring 9 biswas was a hanjar land and vested in Gaon Sabha. It was set apart for abadi purposes. Plot No. 385 with an area of 3 biswas was set apart for Kolhu purposes. In the meeting dated 21-12-1967 the Gaon Sabha settled the land with the defendants, plaintiff did not file any objection before the S. D. O. Mawana and therefore this land was auctioned in favour of defendant and now it could not be challenged in the civil court. Defendants have entered into possession No injunction was claimable. 7. In plot No. 385 there is kolhu of several other persons including the parties. An objection was raised by plaintiff before the Consolidation Authorities about this land which they lost. 8. Learned trial court found that plaintiff was not owner in possession of the disputed land. He further found that civil court had no jurisdiction to try this suit and thus the suit was dismissed with costs. 9. The appeal was allowed by the impugned judgment and decree. 10. Contesting defendants have come up in appeal before me now. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants took me through the scheme of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 1953 (U.P. Act No. 5 of 1954) as amended up to date. He pointed out that under S. 27. sub-cl. (2) entries in the record of rights prepared during consolidation operations were to be presumed to be correct until the contrary was proved. 12. He further pointed out that by virtue of S. 49 of the aforesaid Act civil court had no jurisdiction to decide this matter. In its wide amplitude S. 49 could have included every adjudication or proceedings about every matter for which proceedings could or ought to have been taken under the said Act. Before appreciating the legal position may briefly aver to the facts. 13. Admittedly the land in dispute lies in plot no. 387 new. There is no dispute on the point that plaintiff is an erstwhile intermediary and his ancestors had connections with the disputed land which belonged to the Khewat of plaintiffs ancestors. Ext. 13 is khatauni for 1335 Fasli about Mohal Ram Dayal Patti Jasram. Jasram was the grandfather of plaintiff, plot no. 659/5 was recorded as Banjar with an area of 9 biswas pertaining to patti of Jasram aforesaid. 14. Ext. Ext. 13 is khatauni for 1335 Fasli about Mohal Ram Dayal Patti Jasram. Jasram was the grandfather of plaintiff, plot no. 659/5 was recorded as Banjar with an area of 9 biswas pertaining to patti of Jasram aforesaid. 14. Ext. 1 is the khasra for 1317 Fasli about plots Nos. 659 to 659/4 only. 15. Ext. 4 is the comparative table of 1336 Fasli which shows that plot No. 669 corresponded to old plot No. 659 and measured one bigha 2 biswas as explained in impugned judgment also. 16. Ext. A 1 is C. H. form no. 41 which shows that out of plot no. 669 four sub plots have been carved out. plot no. 385 with an area of three biswas was made out of plot no. 69/2 recorded as kolhu. Out of 669/1, 2 biswas area, plot no. 385 was carved out and allotted as Abadi. Again out of plot no. 669/3, 9 biswas area plot no. 387 had been carved out and from plot no. 669/4. 8 biswas area of plot no. 388 had been carved out. All these plots were recorded'as Bhud Doyam uncultivated land). 17. Thus plots nos. 388 and 386 were abadi at the time of consolidation. Plot no. 385 was kolhu and plot no. 387 was entered as new parti. 18. Ext. A 2 is Khasra lor 1374 Fasli which recorded the disputed land us new parti set apart for public Abadi purposes. 19. Ext. A 3 is the khatauni from 1373 to 78 Fasli and Ext. A 4 is the khasra for 133(1 Fasli. These documents were filed to show that plot no. 387 was not allotted to plaintiff. 20. Ext. A 5 is the judgment of the A. S. O. (c) dated 3-5-1965 in appeal filed by the plaintiff against the order of the Consolidation Officer. The plaintiffs appeal was rejected by Consolidation Authorities. 21. On plaintiffs side the oldest document is order dated 1-2-1911 Ext. 2 by Partition Officer in petition no. 4 filed by Jasram, grandfather of plaintiff. The partition court allotted 9 biswas land of plot no. 659 to Jasram as he found his Kolhu, etc. on this land. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that this document was of the year 1911 and could have little evidentiary value now. 2 by Partition Officer in petition no. 4 filed by Jasram, grandfather of plaintiff. The partition court allotted 9 biswas land of plot no. 659 to Jasram as he found his Kolhu, etc. on this land. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that this document was of the year 1911 and could have little evidentiary value now. It was incumbent on plaintiff to show that they were in possession over this land at the time of coming in operation of U. P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act viz. 1st July, 1952. 22. Another important document filed by plaintiff appellant in support of his claim is Ext. 3, copy of judgment in civil appeal no. 71 of 1956, Budhan Singh and another v. Smt. Ramam Devi. This document also related to the land in dispute. There is an admission of Raghubir defendant No. 2 dated 19-6-1953 in which he unequivocally conceded continuous possessionof plaintiff Budhan Singh on the disputed land for 28 or 30 years prior to his deposition. He also mentioned about kolhu of Buddhan Singh which operated on this land. A similar statement was made by Durga Prasad, husband of plaintiff of that case which is Ext. 8. Ext. 6 is copy of police report initiating proceedings under section 107/117 of Cri. P. C. Budhan Singh asserted his possession over the disputed land in those proceedings. 23. Parties also adduced oral evidence which was scrutinised by the courts below and after appraisal of evidence it was held by lower appellate court that plaintiff was in possession over the disputed land on 1-7-1952 when zamindari was abolished in this state. 24. As regards the contention put forward by learned counsel for appellant about finality of consolidation proceedings it is obvious that admittedly the land in dispute was banjar. Consolidation Authorities had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties in respect of Banjar land, as was held in Rama v. State reported in 1971 RD 520. It was said that a Banjar land does not form part of holding and therefore the Consolidation Authorities had no jurisdiction to decide the rights about such land. 25. Moreover the plaintiffs claimed easementary rights with respect to this land. It was said that a Banjar land does not form part of holding and therefore the Consolidation Authorities had no jurisdiction to decide the rights about such land. 25. Moreover the plaintiffs claimed easementary rights with respect to this land. Section 4 of Easements Act defines an easement as a right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses as such, for the beneficial enjoyments of that land, to do and continue to do something or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done, in or upon, or in respect of certain other land not his own. 26. Thus it is obvious that adjudication about the easementary rights was not within the competence of consolidation authorities and so S. 49 of the aforesaid Act did not operate as a bar to this suit. 27. Learned appellate court based himself upon S. 7 (aa) of the U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Act which is worded as below : "Nothing contained in this Chapter shall in any way affect the right of any person (a)....... (aa) being a bhumidhar, sirdar, adhivasi, or asami of any land, to continue to enjoy any easement or any similar right for the more beneficial enjoyment of the land, as he was enjoying on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting :......" Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there was no evidence on record to show that plaintiffs Kolhu was in operation on the disputed land on 1 July 1952 also. In this connection there are statements of Champat Singh, P. W. 1, and Nathua, PW 2, who testified about the continuous possession of plaintiff and his ancestors over the land in dispute. Champat Singh further testified that they were in possession over the disputed land at the time of abolition of Zamindari. He further testified that they were Zamindars of this land also. He referred to the earlier litigation as evidenced by Ext. 5 and Ext. 30 and deposition of Raghubir Ext. 7 and statement of Durga Prasad, Ext. 8 in suit no. 339 of 1952. He further testified about receipts Exts. 9 to 24 from 1948 onwards and alleged that plaintiffs were operating their kolhu over this land throughout and not over any other land. They were in possession continuously without any break. Ext. 6 is the police report initiating criminal proceedings under Section 107/117, Cr. 8 in suit no. 339 of 1952. He further testified about receipts Exts. 9 to 24 from 1948 onwards and alleged that plaintiffs were operating their kolhu over this land throughout and not over any other land. They were in possession continuously without any break. Ext. 6 is the police report initiating criminal proceedings under Section 107/117, Cr. P. C. showing plaintiffs kolhu on this land. Gaon Sabha never ejected plaintiff from the disputed land. So by virtue of the aforesaid provision (Section 7 (aa) of the Act) plaintiffs could maintain the action as was held in Surat Singh v. Paltoo reported in 1963 RD 81 which lays down : "When the Gaon Samaj fails to bring a suit (or ejectment from the land of Gaon Samaj within the period of limitation the person taking or retaining possession would become sirdar under the provisions of S. 210. The law does not give protection to a person who sleeps over his rights but since Gaon Samaj is a public body 11 law does provide the procedure for ejectment of a Sirdar who acquired-' sirdari rights under S. 210 of the Act. The user M the land immediately preceding the date of vesting for purposes of keeping manure and crowding cakes and metering cattle is a purpose connected with agriculture and the plaintiff would be deemed to have acquired sirdari rights in such land by virtue of S. 210." 28. Learned counsel for appellant next argued that the evidence in support of the findings recorded by learned appellate court was insufficient. I do not subscribe to this view. There is ample oral and documentary and circumstantial evidence on record to show that plaintiff has been using kolhu since 1911 and so his rights could not be disturbed now by defendants. Moreover the finding of fact recorded by court below cannot be reversed on account of insufficiency of evidence as was held in V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar ( AIR 1963 SC 302 ) (at p. 306) : "The error or defect in the procedure to which cl. (c) of S. 100 (1) refers is, as the clauses clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to the procedure, it is not an error _ or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merit. (c) of S. 100 (1) refers is, as the clauses clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to the procedure, it is not an error _ or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merit. That is why, even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure. On the other hand, if in dealing with a question of fact, the lower appellate court has placed the onus on a wrong party. and its finding of fact is the result, substantially, of this wrong approach, that may be regarded as a defect in procedure. If a finding of fact has been recorded by the first appellate Court without any evidence, that finding can be successfully challenge in second appeal, because a finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence can be questioned under Section 100, and in that connection, it may be said that the decree proceeding on such a finding discloses a substantial defect or error in procedure. This, however, does not mean that wherever the High Court thinks that the evidence accepted by the lower appellate Court could not have been reasonably accepted, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the lower appellate Court. All that it means is that it should be a case where the evidence, which is accepted by the lower appellate court, no reasonable person could have accepted and that really amounts to saying that there is no evidence at all." 29. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. The impugned judgment and decree are affirmed.