ORDER K. P. Singh, J. - This writ petition arises out of a suit under Sections 229B/209, of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. The plaintiff-petitioner No. 1 had filed the suit with the allegations that he was hereditary tenant and Sirdar of the land in suit along with defendant No. 14, i.e., petitioner No. 2. The petitioner No. 2 was managing the property and had kept Gyan Singh as Sajhidar of the land in suit. The aforesaid Gyan Singh took undue advantage of the absence of the plaintiff from the village in question and got his relations, that is, defendants Nos. 1 to 13 recorded over the disputed land and also got an entry of "Farar" against the plaintiff in revenue records, and the petitioner No. 2 did not co-operate with the petitioner No. 1 hence the suit was filed by the petitioner No. 1 impleading petitioner No. 2 as defendant No. 14. Prayer for declaration of the plaintiffs right and recovery of possession was made. 2. The defence in the case was the denial of the plaintiffs right in the disputed land and assertion to the effect that the defendants Nos. 1 to. 13 had acquired hereditary tenancy and sirdari right in the disputed land and that the plaintiffs suit was barred by time and various other pleas were taken with a view to negative the plaintiffs claim as is evident from the issues framed in the judgment of the trial Court. 3. The trial court through its judgment 'dated 9-5-1974 dismissed the plaintiffs suit (Annexure II attached with the writ petition). Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court the plaintiff petitioner No. 1 filed an appeal which was allowed by the appellate Court through its judgment dated 30-6-1975 (See annexure III attached with the writ petition). Thereafter the defendants preferred second appeal which has been allowed by the second appellate Court through its judgment dated 16-12-1977. Aggrieved by the Judgment of the second appellate Court the plaintiff along with the defendant No. 14 as petitioner No. 2 have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned counsel for . the petitioners has contended before me that the second appellate Court has no jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence on record and disturb the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate Court. 4. The learned counsel for . the petitioners has contended before me that the second appellate Court has no jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence on record and disturb the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate Court. He has also contended that the second appellate Court has misconstrued the provisions of Sections 87 and 88 of the U. P. Tenancy Act and has arrived at patently erroneous conclusions which should be quashed. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. According to him the second appellate Court has taken correct interpretation of Sections 87 and 88 of the U. P. Tenancy Act and has rightly set aside the findings recorded by the first appellate Court It has also been contended that the defendants have acquired right under the provisions of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act applicable to the area in question hence it is not a fit case where interference should be made with the impugned judgment. It has also been stressed that on the materials on record it is undisputed that the defendants were in possession of a part of the disputed property, hence their possession over the whole area in dispute would be presumed and that the plaintiffs claim was barred by time as the plaintiff was not in possession over the disputed property since long. Emphasising the provisions of S. 87 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has assert * that the plaintiff abandoned the disputed land and his right came to an end in view of the provisions of S. 87 (1) read with sub-cl. (4). According to him there is no law which required that the entry of Farer against the plaintiff tenure-holder should be recorded for a period of five years continuously and thereafter the plaintiffs right would be extinguished. 6. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioners has stated that there is not evidence led by the land holder or the defendants to the effect that the plaintiff had permanently severed his connection with the disputed land hence the second appellate Court has patently erred in construing the provisions of S. 87 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. 6. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioners has stated that there is not evidence led by the land holder or the defendants to the effect that the plaintiff had permanently severed his connection with the disputed land hence the second appellate Court has patently erred in construing the provisions of S. 87 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. He has emphasised that the 'Farar' entry against the plaintiff petitioner was not made strictly in accordance with law, hence the conclusions arrived at by the second appellate court regarding the extinction of the plaintiffs right in the disputed land is patently erroneous and the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed. 7. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and 1 have gone through the impugned judgment of the second appellate court. It appears that the second appellate court relying upon the provisions of S. 87 (1) read with sub-sec. (4) of the U. P. Tenancy Act has arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff has abandoned the holding. S. 87 (1) (4) of the Act reads as below : - "87. (1) Subject to the provisions of the sub-secs. (2) and (3), a tenant, who ceases to cultivate and leaves the neighbourhood, shall not lose his interest in his holding, if he leaves in charge thereof a person responsible for payment of the rent as it falls due and gives written notice to the land holder of such arrangement. (2) and (3) .............. (4) A tenant who ceases to cultivate and leaves the neighbourhood otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (1) shall be presumed to have abandoned his holding." 8. The learned counsel for the Opposite Party also vehemently argued by placing reliance upon the provisions of S. 87 (1) (4) of the Act that the second appellate Court has correctly arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff had abandoned the holding. (1) shall be presumed to have abandoned his holding." 8. The learned counsel for the Opposite Party also vehemently argued by placing reliance upon the provisions of S. 87 (1) (4) of the Act that the second appellate Court has correctly arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff had abandoned the holding. In this connection it would be proper to quote Para 85 of the U. P. Land Records Manual which reads as below : - "When a tenant leaves the neighbourhood without leaving in charge of his holding, a person responsible for the payment of his rent as it falls due and giving a written notice to the landholder of such arrangement, the patwari will show the tenant's name in column 5 with the addition of the word "farar" in red ink. The name of the actual cultivator will be shown in the column of remarks preceded by the word "biz". In such case, the tenant's name will be removed as soon as the landholder has made arrangement for the cultivation of the holding, provided that he has filed a notice in the office of the tahsildar stating that he has treated the holding as abandoned and is about to enter on it accordingly and such notice has been served on the tenant or published by the tahsildar under S. 88 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, at least 15 days before the land-holder has entered upon '.he holding and made such arrangement. The Patwari shall call the attention of the supervisor kanungo to all such cases when he next visits the circle and shall obtain his signature to the revised entry. If the above mentioned notice has not been filed, the tenant's name will not be expunged until he has been shown "farar" for a period of five years." (2) ............. (3) ............. 9. During the course of argument, the learned counsel for the opposite party, Shri V.K.S. Chaudhary, emphasised by interpreting the provisions of Sections 87 (1) and 87 (4) that the second appellate Court has correctly inferred in the circumstances of the present case that the plaintiff had abandoned the holding. According to him mere leaving the holding without making necessary arrangement was enough to raise a presumption that the tenure-holder had abandoned the holding. According to him mere leaving the holding without making necessary arrangement was enough to raise a presumption that the tenure-holder had abandoned the holding. I tried to learn as to whether the "Farar" entry could be made if the tenant had left the village without proper arrangement even for a year. The learned counsel answered emphatically that in view of the provisions of S. 87, it would be presumed that the tenant had abandoned the holding. In my opinion, the learned counsel for the opposite party was not right in his assertions in view of the provisions of Para. 85 (1) of the U. P. land Records Manual quoted above. The first appellate court had emphasised that the "Farar" entry was not made in accordance with law because for five years the entry of "Farar" was not repeated. Hence it did not accept the theory of abandonment of the holding by the plaintiff tenure holder but the second appellate court appears to have held that the requirement of recording "Farar" entry for a period of five years was relevant only in the cases governed by the provisions of S. 87 (2) of the U. P.-Tenancy Act which reads as below : - "87. (2) If the persons so left in charge is a person - (a) On whom, in the event of the tenant's death, the tenant's interest would devolve; or (b) Who is to manage the holding for the benefit of the person on whom in the event of the tenant's death the tenant's interest would devolve, the tenant shall on the expiry of a period of five years, lose his interest in his holding unless he, within such period, resumes cultivation thereof, and such interest shall devolve on the person on whom the tenant's interest would devolve in the event of his death." 10. It is noteworthy that the second appellate court has failed to notice the provisions of para 85 (1) of the U. P. Land Records Manual quoted above, hence it has arrived at patently erroneous conclusion and it has wrongly observed that the first appellate court appears to have erred seriously in interpreting the provisions of S. 87 of the U. P. Tenancy Act (See para. 6 of the impugned judgment). 11. 6 of the impugned judgment). 11. Here, it is necessary to mention the ruling reported in 1945 Rev Dec 407 Sheo Darshan v. Bhagwat Singh wherein three Members of the Board of Revenue have expressed themselves while construing the provisions of S. 87 (1) (4) of the U. P. Tenancy Act as below in Para 7 of the judgment : - " But it is an essential ingredient of abandonment in the ordinary sense that there shall be an intention to severe connection permanently. I consider that this applies to abandonment of a holding by a tenant. This seems to me implicit in Kharagjit Singh v. Dharam Singh, 7 S. D. 1932 - 1 RD, (R. E.) 594 :(1933 Rev Dec 1). as applied in Bhagelu v. Ram Padarath Koeri 1935 Rev Dec 349 and other rulings. A similar view was Taken in Mathuri v. Narain 1942 Rev Dec 279 a ruling to which the officiating Commissioner has referred in this case a tenant being in difficulties with his rent had left his village for another and was absent for three years before he returned. The Board held that his absence was only a temporary absence and that consequently there was no abandonment.The absence occurred, however, while Act 111 of 1926 was in force". Later on in Para 9 the following observation has been made : - "My conclusion is that 'the proper interpretation of the words "ceases to cultivate and leaves the neighbourhood". In S. 87 (1) and (4) is that the circumstances must indicate an intention of the tenant to severe his connection with his holding permanently. When there is such an intention, he may still retain a lien on his holding for a period by leaving in charge of it a person responsible for payment of the rent as it falls due and giving written notice to the landholder of such an arrangement. Written notice to the landholder is essential. I hen sub-secs. (2) and (3) become applicable. If he does not take this course, then the presumption of abandonment arises under S. 87 (4) and the land holder shall proceed in accordance with S. 88. But. Written notice to the landholder is essential. I hen sub-secs. (2) and (3) become applicable. If he does not take this course, then the presumption of abandonment arises under S. 87 (4) and the land holder shall proceed in accordance with S. 88. But. if the circumstances do not indicate any intention to severe connection with the holding permanently, then the landholder is not entitled to make any presumption of abandonment under S. 87 (4) and to take proceedings under S. 88." In the instant case the second appellate Court has erred in interpreting the provisions of S. 87 of the U. P. Tenancy Act and it has failed to examine the facts of the ease in the light of Para 85 of the U. P. Land Records Manual and the ruling of the Board of Revenue mentioned supra. In my opinion, the judgment of the second appellate court suffers from patent error of law and deserves to be quashed. 12. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to support the judgment of the second appellate Court on the ground that the defendants had acquired right under the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act applicable to the area in question. The claim of the plaintiff has not been negatived by the second appellate court due to accrual of any title to the defendant, hence it would not be proper to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party at this stage. It would be open to the contesting opposite party to raise all pleas before the second appellate court. 13. For the foregoing discussions, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the second appellate court dated 16-12-1977 in Second Appeal No. 46 of 1974-75 Nainital - Smt. Gurdayal Kaur v. Gur Charan Singh is hereby quashed and the second appellate court is directed to decide the claims of the parties afresh strictly in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.