G. N. ROY, J. ( 1 ) THIS Rule is directed against the order of dismissal passed by the Assistant Security Officer, South Eastern Railway against the petitioner. The petitioner was appointed as a constable in the Railway Protection Force and at the relevant time, the petitioner was attached to the Shalimar Yard. The petitioner's case is that on 29th November, 1975, when the petitioner after performing his duties was about to hand over charge, the respondent no. 6, the Officer-in-Charge, Railway Protection Force, Shalimar, Howrah, along with other Railway Protection Force personal restrained the petitioner from leaving the office and he was taken to his office and was asked to sign some blank papers but the petitioner had refused to do so. The petitioner contends that thereafter he was assaulted severely and was tortured inhumanly and when the petitioner lost his normal sense because of such torture, the respondent no. 6 got something recorded. The petitioner also contends that four criminal cases against the petitioner were filed but the petitioner ultimately got discharged from the said criminal proceedings. Thereafter the petitioner was served with the order of dismissal. ( 2 ) IT has been stated in the said order which is annexure 'c' to the writ petition that the petitioner is also guilty of serious misconduct in that on the night of 25th November, 1975 there was theft of clothes from shed No. 4 in the Shalimar Yard and also in other identical crimes of theft of clothes from Shalimar Goods Shed reported on 26th September, 1975, his complicity in the crime came to light. The said Assistant Security Officer was satisfied that the circumstances of the case were such that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner as provided for in Railway Protection Force Rules 44, 45 and 46. The said Officer, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules removed the said petitioner from the service with effect from 29th November, 1975. The materials on the basis of which the said power under Rule 47 was exercised were, however, not disclosed and it was also not disclosed as to why holding of enquiry was not reasonably practicable in the case of the petitioner. The materials on the basis of which the said power under Rule 47 was exercised were, however, not disclosed and it was also not disclosed as to why holding of enquiry was not reasonably practicable in the case of the petitioner. ( 3 ) IT appears that the petitioner made representation to the higher authorities but the petitioner did not receive any intimation whatsoever and according to the petitioner his departmental appeal was pending. It has, however, been stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that the said appeal was disposed of and the same was dismissed. The notice of the same was sent to the petitioner but it could not be served as the petitioner was not found. The learned Counsel for the petitioner thereafter made an oral prayer before this Court that the writ petition should be treated as amended to the effect that the said appellate order is also challenged as illegal and invalid and the said prayer was allowed. ( 4 ) MR. Dutt, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that in appropriate cases, holding of formal enquiry as contemplated under the Rules 44 to 46 of the Railway Protection Force Rules may be dispensed with but such dispensation can be made only objectively and on the basis of cogent materials and not on mere ipsi dixit or the subjective satisfaction of the concerned authorities. He also submits that if the order of dismissal is illegal and bad because in the facts of the case such dispensation of holding of enquiry could not have been made then the order of dismissal is void from the very beginning and it is immaterial whether the said order is affirmed on appeal or not. For this contention Mr. Dutt refers to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Barada Kanta Misra vs. High Court of Orissa reported in AIR 1976 SC 1899 . It has been held by the Supreme Court in the said decision that the order of initial authority, if void, an order of appellate authority cannot make the said order a valid one. ( 5 ) IT may be noted in this connection that in the affidavit-in-opposition it has been disclosed on behalf of the respondents Nos. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the said decision that the order of initial authority, if void, an order of appellate authority cannot make the said order a valid one. ( 5 ) IT may be noted in this connection that in the affidavit-in-opposition it has been disclosed on behalf of the respondents Nos. 3,4 and 7 that the order or dismissal was passed against the petitioner because the enquiry revealed the complicity of the petitioner in the matter of theft of goods from the railway goods shed at Shalimar and holding of enquiry as envisaged under Rules 44 to 46 was not considered practicable for two reasons, namely, (1) ?it is considered not feasible, desirable or practicable to call for and to produce the witnesses of security of other railway departments and outsider in an open enquiry under the above rules for this procedure will expose them and make them ineffective for future, and (2) these witnesses if asked to appear at a confronted enquiry and depose the facts known to them about the said criminal operation, are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults thereafter or even thy and the members of their families may become targets of acts of violence. ? ( 6 ) MR. Dutt contends that although the reasons were not disclosed to the petitioner the same have now been disclosed in this affidavit-in-opposition and one of the reasons as quoted hereinbefore is that it is not feasible desirable or practicable to call for and produce witnesses of security/other railway departments and outsiders in an open enquiry under the above rules for this procedure will expose them and make them ineffective in future. Mr. Dutt contends that if the witnesses of security and the railway departments are called, it is not understood how they will be exposed and become ineffective in future. He submits that the reasons must have an objective basis and the same are also justiciable in a court of law. In this connection, he refers to a decision of this Court made in the case of Union of India vs. Chandra Bahadur reported in 1978 CHN 489. He submits that the reasons must have an objective basis and the same are also justiciable in a court of law. In this connection, he refers to a decision of this Court made in the case of Union of India vs. Chandra Bahadur reported in 1978 CHN 489. In the said case, a surprise check was made by the Security Officer, Assistant Security Officer and other officers of the Railway Protection Force and the delinquent officers were detected by them in such a way which suggested their complicity in the commission of crime. It was stated that because of the reign of terror unleashed by the said delinquent officers no witnesses would be available in the departmental enquiry but this Court held that the said grounds had no objective basis and as such should not be accepted as good grounds because Senior Officers were witnesses in that case. It was observed in the said decision that when the Commission of offence was detected by the officers of the security department, question of bringing witnesses from outside did not arise. Mr. Dutt contends that in the instant case it has been stated that the witnesses of security and other railway departments and also outsider could not be brought because in such an event they would be exposed and would become ineffective in future. He submits that even if for outsider such an argument is accepted there is no reason to accept the said contentions regarding the witnesses of security and other railway departments. ( 7 ) IN this connection Mr. Dutt has also referred to a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court made in the case of Makasudan Pathak vs. The Security Officer, Eastern Railway reported in 1981 Lab. I. C. 881. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held in the said decision that reasons for dispensing with the enquiry are not correlated with the merits of the case. The expression ?reasonably practicable? in the Rules are used in connection with the holding of enquiry and cannot be correlated to the merits of the charge. Reasonably practicable will apply in a case where the authority cannot in a reasonable manner put into practice the clauses in relation to enquiry because of certain facts and circumstances peculiar to the case. The expression ?reasonably practicable? in the Rules are used in connection with the holding of enquiry and cannot be correlated to the merits of the charge. Reasonably practicable will apply in a case where the authority cannot in a reasonable manner put into practice the clauses in relation to enquiry because of certain facts and circumstances peculiar to the case. In the said case the ground for dispensing with the enquiry was to the effect that there was collusion with the Railway Protection Force staff and the department was unable to collect evidence against the delinquent due to his influence at the station where the theft had occurred. The Allahabad Full Bench has held that for the said grounds the dispensation with the enquiry under Rule 47 could not be made and as such the action taken under Rule 47 was wholly arbitrary. Relying on the said decision Mr. Dutt has submitted that in the instant case also another ground for dispensing with the enquiry proceeding is that the witnesses are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults after the enquiry and they and their family members may become targets of acts of violence. Mr. Dutt submits that the said grounds really indicate that because of the influence and/or terror of the delinquent officer it was not possible to collect evidence and/or to lead them but the same cannot be a ground for dispensing with the enquiry proceeding and such dispensation must be correlated with the enquiry and not with the merits of the charge. Mr. Dutt has also submitted that since the secret enquiry made by the department is not known to the petitioner, it is not possible for the petitioner to precisely challenge the correctness of such enquiry but if the Court finds that extraneous materials were also taken into consideration which were not the basis of the charges for which the order of dismissal was made then the order of dismissal should be struck down by the Court. ( 8 ) MR. Chowdhury, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has produced the enquiry report on the basis of which the impugned order of dismissal was passed. ( 8 ) MR. Chowdhury, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has produced the enquiry report on the basis of which the impugned order of dismissal was passed. No other paper containing any statement noted or recorded by the enquiring officers has been produced before this Court and the learned Counsel has submitted before this Court that it is on the basis of the enquiry reports which have been produced before this Court, the said order of dismissal was passed and no other records were taken into consideration. It appears that on 26th November, 1975, the Respondent No. 6, namely, the Officer-in-Charge, Railway Protection Force submitted a report wherein he stated that a deep confidential enquiry was conducted and in such enquiry the complicity of a number of persons named in the said report including the petitioner came to light. A detailed report has been made about the modus operandi of the said persons in the matter of committing theft of goods stored in the railway yard at Shalimar. The petitioner's complicity in the matter of theft was clearly stated in the said report and how the petitioner took part in the commission of thefts was also described. It was stated in the said report that he collected the materials disclosed in the report by making secret enquiries from different persons and although there are eye witnesses who had seen the said persons to organize and commit the crime, they were not prepared to give any evidence openly either in Court or before any other person or authority for fear of their lives as they had been threatened in such a manner by the Rakshaks as well as the gang of collies involved in the crime. It has also been stated in the said report that such witnesses were also afraid of humiliation and harassment to the members of their family in case they would open their mouth to tell the truth publicly. It appears that similar report was also given by the D. I. R. P. F. , on 26th November, 1975. In the said report also the complicity of the petitioner was clearly stated and the details were given as to how the said commission of theft was made. It appears that similar report was also given by the D. I. R. P. F. , on 26th November, 1975. In the said report also the complicity of the petitioner was clearly stated and the details were given as to how the said commission of theft was made. The names of the source however, were not disclosed in the said report and it was stated that the sources who gave that information were not willing to come forward and give statements due to fear and threats. ( 9 ) MR. Chowdhury has submitted that the provisions of Rule 47 have been incorporated for dispensing with the departmental enquiry. In the special facts of the case he submits, that although in the enquiry report the names of the sources were not disclosed but the statements made by them had been recorded at length and the complicity of the petitioner was clearly revealed. Mr. Chowdhury has also contended that before passing the order of dismissal, no opportunity of being heard was required to be given because of the express provision of Rule 47. He submits that similar provision has also been made in rule 14 (ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. In this connection he refers to a decision of this Court made in the case of Chief Mechanical Engineer, Eastern Railway vs. J. P. Banerjee reported in 79 CWN page 709. In the said decision this Court has held that non-mentioning of the reasons in the order will not make it invalid although reasons are to be recorded in writing. It has also been held that such reasons must have an objective basis. ( 10 ) MR. Chowdhury contends that provision of Rule 47 are similar to those of Rule 14 (ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. He has submitted that before passing the impugned orders, the reasons had been recorded as to why the powers under Rule 47 was exercised. As such, the condition precedent for exercising the powers under Rule 47 was fulfilled. He has submitted that before passing the impugned orders, the reasons had been recorded as to why the powers under Rule 47 was exercised. As such, the condition precedent for exercising the powers under Rule 47 was fulfilled. He has also contended that since challenge has been thrown in this Court about the justification of the order passed under Rule 47, the secret enquiry reports have also been made available to the court and it will appear that such reports clearly reveal the complicity of the petitioner and also reveal that it will not be possible to hold any departmental enquiry because no evidence will be available to substantiate the charges in the departmental enquiry because of threats held out by the delinquent officer and his associates and also on the ground that the secret source from which information was collected will be exposed. Mr. Chowdhury in this connection has relied on a decision of this court made in the case of Jayanta Kr. Roy and Ors. vs. Union of India reported in 1981 (1) CHN page 368. In the said case also Rule 14 (ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 was considered and it has been held by this court in the said decision that when powers are conferred on public authorities to exercise the same on fulfillment of such conditions. Whether the conditions were fulfilled or not are matters which are justiciable in courts of law. The court is not concerned either with the sufficiency or even with the truth of these materials though these materials must have a factual basis to the grounds for the formation of the belief. To this limited extent the issible under Rule 14 (ii ). Relying on the said decision, Mr. Chowdhury has submitted that the condition precedent for judicial review of the action is permissible exercise of the powers under Rule 47 of the Rules have been fulfilled inasmuch as the reasons for dispensing with the departmental enquiry have been clearly given. The enquiry reports were made available to the Officer exercising powers under Rule 47, and the said enquiry reports had materials on the basis of which objectively the power under Rule 47 can be exercised. The enquiry reports were made available to the Officer exercising powers under Rule 47, and the said enquiry reports had materials on the basis of which objectively the power under Rule 47 can be exercised. He submits that the court should not be concerned with the truth or sufficiency of the materials and if the materials have a factual basis to the grounds for the formation of the belief, then the action taken must be held to be valid. ( 11 ) MR. Chowdhury has submitted that the nature of enquiry made in the instant case was a secret one and from the enquiry reports it is revealed that the petitioner along with the R. P. F. personal and coolies were involved in the commission of thefts. The 'sources' were contacted by the Enquiring Officer and the summary of their statements were recorded but the names of the sources were however, not disclosed in the enquiry report for the reasons that the exposure of their identity would not only dry the sources but was likely to endanger their lives and the lives of the members of their family. Mr. Chowdhury has contended that simply because the names of the sources were not disclosed in the two enquiry reports forming the basis of the impugned order, the said enquiry reports should not be held to be invalid reports not containing materials on the basis of which the impugned order could have been objectively passed. Mr. Chowdhury, therefore, submits that in the facts of the case, no interference is called for by the writ court and the Rule should be discharged. ( 12 ) AFTER considering the respective submissions of the learned Counsels appearing for the parties it appear to me that dispensation with the procedure laid down in Rules 44, 45 and 46 can only be made in a suitable case and as such dispensation takes away the right of defence, the power of dispensation can be exercised only when in the special facts of the case such dispensation becomes absolutely necessary. The reasons for such dispensation must also be recorded in writing and exercise of the power under Rule 47 can only be made after considering the relevant facts objectively. The reasons for such dispensation must also be recorded in writing and exercise of the power under Rule 47 can only be made after considering the relevant facts objectively. Consequently the reasons and/or facts for which the power under Rule 47 have been exercised become justiciable in a court of law whenever a challenge is thrown about mala fide or improper exercise of the discretion. It is true that it is not necessary to disclose the reasons in the order of punishment to be passed by the Disciplinary Authority but before exercising such power, the Disciplinary Authority must take into consideration the relevant factors and must record his reasons as to why the power under Rule 47 was exercised. The expression 'reasonably practicable' appearing in Rule 47 has been used in connection with the holding of enquiry. The factors for which the holding of enquiry cannot be reasonably held in accordance with the provisions of the relevant rules, cannot be precisely enumerated and such reason must obviously depend on the facts and circumstances in each case. ( 13 ) IN my view, if for good reasons, the evidences for establishing the guilt of the delinquent officer cannot be established in the disciplinary proceeding because of the threat held out to the witnesses and/or the risk of the source of information being exposed or for any other valid reasons, namely, non-availability of the relevant witnesses within a reasonable time or the impossibility of the presence of delinquent officer etc. then dispensation with the holding of departmental enquiry can reasonably be made because in such circumstances the holding of enquiry will be for no useful purpose but will be only an idle formality. It does not appear to me that Rule 47 should be construed in such a narrow manner so that the grounds for disposition must not be the grounds of collusion with the departmental staff or inability to adduce evidence in open trial because of influence and/or threats made by the delinquent officer on the witnesses to be examined. It does not appear to me that Rule 47 should be construed in such a narrow manner so that the grounds for disposition must not be the grounds of collusion with the departmental staff or inability to adduce evidence in open trial because of influence and/or threats made by the delinquent officer on the witnesses to be examined. ( 14 ) SO far as the merits of the instant case are concerned, it appears to me that in respect of the charge of theft committed of the instance and/or collusion of the petitioner from the Railway Goods Shed, two separate secret enquiries were held by the officers of the Railway Protection Force and both the secret enquiry reports were made available to this Court. Although in none of the said enquiry reports, the names of informants and/or verbatim statements made by them have been recorded, but both the said enquiry reports reveal the gist of the information collected from the ? sources? of the department and detailed reports as is the modus operandi of pilferage and/or theft of goods from the Railway Goods Shed have been given. The complicity of the petitioner has been clearly established in both the reports. It is evident from the said reports that the witnesses from whom the said information was collected, were afraid of giving any evidence in an open trial for fear of humiliation and or torture to themselves and to the members of their family and the authorities concerned also felt that for future enquiries, the names of the ?source? should not be exposed. The disciplinary authority before passing the impugned order objectively considered the facts and circumstances contained in the said reports and it appears that he was satisfied about the complicity of the petitioner and was also satisfied for the reasons recorded by him that it was not feasible and/or reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry. Accordingly, he exercised the power under Rule 47. In my view, in the aforesaid facts, it cannot be contended that such order was passed without any valid reasons and/or in the facts of the case, the provisions of Rule 47 were not attracted. In the result, no interference is called for by the writ court and the Rule is discharged but I make no order as to costs. Rule discharged.