( 1 ) BY consent of the learned Counsel these appeals are treated as having been posted for hearing and we have heard them. ( 2 ) THESE seven appeals are from the common order of Puttaswamy, J. , dated 2-11-1981 in W. Ps. Nos. 21048, 21756, 21973, 22587 and 23373 of 1980 and W. Ps. Nos. 1 and 7040 of 1981. The petitioners therein have presented these appeals and they will hereinafter be referred to as the petitioners. "the petitioners were sought to be assessed under the provisions of the karnataka tax on entry of goods into local areas for Consumption, use or sale therein Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Entry Tax Act, 1979) which came into force with effect from 1-6-1979. The petitioners presented W. Ps. Nos. 7660, 8270, 865. 1, 8668, 8670, 9765 and 10809 of 1979, challenging the constitutional validity of that Act and also prayed for issue of writs in the nature of mandamus restraining the State of Kar nataka from cnforcing the provisions of that Act against them (the petitioners ). A Division Bench of this Court heard those writ petitions along with a large number of similar writ petitions. By its common order dated 24-8-1979 Hunsa corporation v. State of Karnataka (1) that division Bench allowed those petitions, held the Entry Tax Act, 1079 as unconstitutional, struck down the notification dated 31-5-1979 issued by the state Government under S. 3 of that act and issued a mandamus directing the state Government and its officers and servants to forbear from enforcing the provisions of that Act against the petitioners. " ( 3 ) THOUGH a common otder was made by this Court in as many as 159'0 writ prtitions, the State of Karnataka chose to prefer to the Supreme Court only one appeal, C. A. No. 3094 of 1979 from the common order of this Court, in so far as it related to W. P. No. 7039 of 1979 wherein the petitioner was M/s hansa Corporation. The State of Karnataka did not prefer appeals from that common order dated 24-8-1970 in so far as it related to other 1589 writ petitions. The present appellants-petitioners were among the petitioners in those 1589 writ petitions. The State of Karnataka did not prefer appeals from that common order dated 24-8-1970 in so far as it related to other 1589 writ petitions. The present appellants-petitioners were among the petitioners in those 1589 writ petitions. ( 4 ) THE Supreme Court by its judgment dated 25-9 1980 State of Karnataka v. M/s Hansa C orporation (2) reversed the decision of this Court, upheld the constitutional validity of the Entry Tax Act, 1979 and dismissed W. P. No. 7039 of 1979 presented by Hansa Corporation. ( 5 ) WHILE C. A. No. 3094 of 1979 state of Karnataka v. Hunsa Corporation (2) was pending before the Supreme court, the Karnataka Tux or. Entry of goods into Local areas for Consumption, use or sale therein Ordinance, 1980 (Kar. Ordinance No. 5 of 1980) was promulgated. That Ordinance purported to remove the infirmities in the Entry Tax act, 1979 as found by this Court. That ordinance was replaced by the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into a Local area for Consumption, use or sale therein Act, 1980 (Kar. Act No. 21 of 1980) (hereinafter referred to as the Entry Tax act, 1980) which was given retrospective effect from 8-6-1980, the date on which the Kar. Ordinance No. 5 of 1980 had been promulgated. ( 6 ) AFTER the Supreme Court rendered its, decision in Hansa Corporation case, the Karnataka Tax on Entry of goods into Local Areas for Consumption use or sale therein (Repeal) Ordinance, 1980 (Kar. Ordinance No. 11 of 1980) was promulgated. That Ordinance repealed the Entry Tax Act, 1980 from its inception, but, however, with a provision for adjustment of tayes, if any, paid under that Act, towards the taxes due under the Entry Tax Act, 1979. That ordinance was replaced by the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for consumption. use or sale therein (Repeal) Act, 1981 (Kar. Act No. 30 of 1981) (hereinafter reffered to as the Repealing act, 198j ). Karnataka Ordinance No. 3 of 1981 as well as the decpeling Act, 1981 made the Entry Tax Act. 1979 operative only from 1-10-1980. use or sale therein (Repeal) Act, 1981 (Kar. Act No. 30 of 1981) (hereinafter reffered to as the Repealing act, 198j ). Karnataka Ordinance No. 3 of 1981 as well as the decpeling Act, 1981 made the Entry Tax Act. 1979 operative only from 1-10-1980. ( 7 ) AFTER the pronouncement of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hansa corporation case and the repeal of Entry tax Act, 1980, the Tax authorities issued notices under the Entry Tax Act, 1979 to the petitioners calling upon them to register themselves, to file returns and to pay the amounts of tax due by them under the Entry Tax Act, 1979. ( 8 ) FEELING aggrieved by such notices, the petitioners presented the writ petitions out of which these appeals have arisen. ( 9 ) IN the writ petitions, the main contention of the petitioners was that the order of this Court dt. 24-8-79 in their earlier writ petitions, which declared the entry Tax Act, 1979 as unconstitutional and the mandamus issued in those writ petitions, had become final, as no appeal bad-been preferred to the Supreme Court from that order, in so far as it related to their writ petitions and that therefore the State of Karnataka and its officers and servants were bound by that order and the mandamus and hence could not enforce the Entry Tax Act, 1979 against then. ( 10 ) ON behalf of the State, it was contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court upholding the validity of the Entry Tax Act, 1979, was a judgment in rem and that the law declared in that judgment was binding on every Court, authority and persons, it was also con. tended that S. 3 of the Repealing Act, 1981 had rendered ineffective every judgment or Order of this Court which had held the Entry Tax Act, 1979 as uncon. stitutional and also rendered unenfore. able the mandamus issued by this Court in pursuance of such judgment or order. ( 11 ) THE learned single Judge upheld the above contentions and dismissed the writ petitions. stitutional and also rendered unenfore. able the mandamus issued by this Court in pursuance of such judgment or order. ( 11 ) THE learned single Judge upheld the above contentions and dismissed the writ petitions. ( 12 ) IN these appeals, Sri K. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the appellants, reiterated the contention that though the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Entry Tax Act, 1979, such declaration of law by the supreme Court, did not affect the finality and binding nature of the decision of this Court in the earlier batch of writ petitions except W. P. No 7039 of 1979, as no appeals had been preferred to the supreme Court from the common order of this Court in so far as it related to 1589 writ petitions. He also contended that S. 3 of the Entry Tax Act, 1981 purporting to validate the Entry Tax act, 1979 which had been struck down by this Court, did not succeed in validating that Act. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate sought to support the impugned decision of the learned single Judge. ( 13 ) IN support of his contention that in spite of the decision of the Supreme Court in C, A. No. 3094 of 1979, the decision of this court and the mandamus issued by this court, were binding on the State in regard to writ petitioners except Hansa Corpn. Sri Srinivasan strongly relied on the decision of the Supreme court in State of Punjab v. Joginder Sigh (3 ). The facts of that case were briefly these : The Governor of Punjab had made Rules under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution to give effect to an earlier order made by the Punjab Government in exercise of its executive power regulating the absorption, conditions of service, pay scales etc. , of erstwhile employees of District Boards and municipal Boards who were absorbed in the State Government service. The validity of that executive order and those rules, was challenged by one Joginder Singh and three other absorbed Government officials in four separate writ petitions on the ground that the Government order and those Rules were violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. All those four writ petitions were allowed by the High Court by a common order and that Government order and those rules were struck down. All those four writ petitions were allowed by the High Court by a common order and that Government order and those rules were struck down. The State of Punjab preferred an appeal from that common order only in so far as it related to the writ petition of Joginder singh, but did not prefer appeals in regard to three other writ petitions. The supreme Court allowed that appeal and reversed the decision of the High Court. The legal position resulting from the appeal having been preferred in regard to only one out of the four writ petitions and the decision of the High Court being reversed in that appeal, was explained by the Supreme Court thus. :"in our opinion, the true position arising if the present appeal by the State Government should succeed, would be that the finality of the orders passed in the other three writ petitions by the Punjab High court would not He disturbed and that those three successful writ petitioners would be entitled to retain the advantages which they had secure by the decision in their favour not being challenged by an appeal being filed. That however would not held the present respondent who would Be bound by our judgment in this appeal and besides, so far as the general law is concerned as applicable to everyone other than the three writ petitioners (who would be entitled to the benefit of decisions in their favour having attained finality), the law would still be as laid down by this Court. " ( 14 ) ON the other hand, the learned government Advocate who appeared for the State of Karnataka strongly relied on a later decision of the Supreme Court in makhan Lal Waza v. State of Jammu and kashmir (4 ). There the facts were briefly these : An order of the Government of jammu and Kashmir providing reservation for Muslims, Jamvi Hindus and others in making promotions to posts in the State service in the ratio of 50:40:10 was assailed before the Supreme Court as being violative of Art. 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held such reservation as unconstitutional and invalidated the promotions of respondents 3 to 83 in those writ petitions and directed the Government of Jammu and kashmir to devise a scheme of reservation consistent with the provisions of constitution. The Supreme Court held such reservation as unconstitutional and invalidated the promotions of respondents 3 to 83 in those writ petitions and directed the Government of Jammu and kashmir to devise a scheme of reservation consistent with the provisions of constitution. Prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court in those petitions, certain persons who were not parties to the writ petitions before the Supreme court had been promoted and even after that judgment some more persons were promoted in accordance with the reservation which had been held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Instead of complying with the mandamus issued by the Supreme Court, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir continued the persons who had been so promoted. Those petitioners again presented writ petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the omission of the Government to annul those promotions. The Government sought to justify its action by pleading that as there were many persons who were rot parties to the earlier writ petitions, they were not bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court therein and that therefore, their cases would not be governed by the decision given in those petitions. Rejecting the plea of the State Government, the Supreme Court observed thus in Makhan Lal waza's case (4) :"the judgment which was delivered did not merely declare the promotions granted to the respondents in the petition filed at the previous stage as unconstitutional but also laid down that the distribution of appointments, posts or promotions made in implementation of communal policy was contrary to the constitutional guarantee of Art. 16. The law so declared by this Court was binding on the respondent State and its officers and they were bound to follow it whether the majority of the respondents were parties or not to the previous litigation". ( 15 ) IN our opinion, there is no conflict between the aforesaid two decisions of t he Supreme Court. As rightly pointed out by Sn Srinivasan, in Makhan Lal waza's case, the decision turned on the fact that the direction in the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court, was made against the State Government and not against promotees who were not parties in the earlier writ petition. As rightly pointed out by Sn Srinivasan, in Makhan Lal waza's case, the decision turned on the fact that the direction in the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court, was made against the State Government and not against promotees who were not parties in the earlier writ petition. The state Government which was a party in the earlier writ petition, was bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court therein and could not disregard the direction of the Supreme Court on the ground that the promotees were not parties in the earlier writ petition. Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court in makhan Lal Waza's case (2) is diatinguishable on facts. As the material facts of the present cases are similar to those in jcginder Singh's case (1) the law laid down by the Supreme Court in that case, is squarely applicable to these cases. ( 16 ) ALL the petitioners in the 1589 writ petitions which were decided in their favour and from which no appeals were preferred by the State, would have been entitled to the benefit of the decision of this Court in their favour in spite of the decision of the Supreme Court in CA No. 3094 of 79 if nothing more had happened. But, as stated earlier, after the decision of the Supreme Court, the State legislature enacted the Repeal. ing Act, 1981 and S. 3 thereof provides, inter alia, that the Entry Tax Act, 1979, shall notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, be deemed always to have been valid and in force. We shall now exa- mine the effect of such validating provision. ing Act, 1981 and S. 3 thereof provides, inter alia, that the Entry Tax Act, 1979, shall notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, be deemed always to have been valid and in force. We shall now exa- mine the effect of such validating provision. ( 17 ) S. 3 of the Repealing Act, 1981, reads:"savings etc.-The Karnataka tax on Entry of goods into a Local area for Consumption, use or sale therein Act, 1980 (Karnataka Act 21 of 1980) shall be deemed never to have been enacted and the Karnataka Tax on entry of Goods into a local Area for Consumption, Use or sale therein Act, 1979 (Karnataka Act 27 of 1979; shall notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court be deemed always to have been valid and in force and shall continue to be in force and any tax levied and collected by the authorities from, or paid by; any person under the Act repealed under s. 2 shall be adjusted towards the tax payable by such person under the karnataka Tax on entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein Act, 1979 (Karnataka Act 27 of 1979 ). (Underlining italics is ours ).- ( 18 ) THE question whether and how far the legislature can validate a law which has been declared as invalid by a Court or can render ineffective such judicial declaration, has been considered by the Supreme Court in several decisions. The law on this point has been succinctly stated thus by the Supreme court in I. N. Saksena v. State of MP. (5 ). "while, in view of this distinction between legislative and judicial functions, the legislature cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly overrule, reverse or override a judicial decision, it may, at any time in exercise of the plenary powers conferred on it by Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution, render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing with retrospective, curative or neutralising effect the conditions on which such decision is based. As pointed out by Ray, C. J. in Indira Nehru gandhi v. Raj Narain (AIR. 1975 SC. 245 and 246 of the Constitution, render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing with retrospective, curative or neutralising effect the conditions on which such decision is based. As pointed out by Ray, C. J. in Indira Nehru gandhi v. Raj Narain (AIR. 1975 SC. 2299) the rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent courts and Tribunals by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a well known pattern of all validating Acts. Such validating legislation which removes the causes for ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceedings is not an encroachment on judicial power. In Hari Singh v. Military Estate officer ( AIR 1972 SC. 2205 ) a Bench of seven learned Judges of this court laid down that the validity of a validating law is to be judged by two tests. Firstly whether the legislature possesses competence over the subject-matter, and secondly, whether by validation the legislature has removed the defect which the Courts had found in the previous law. To these we may add a third; Whether it is consistent with the provisions of Part III of the constitution. " ( 19 ) WE shall now examine whether the three tests Ltd down by the Supreme court in regard to validation of a law which has been declared as invalid by the Court have been satisfied in the present cases. It was not contended by sri Srinivasan that the State legislature had no legislative competence over the subject matter of the Repealing Act, 1981. Nor did he contend that the provisions of S. 3 of that Act violated any of the provisions of Part III of the constitution. Hence, it is Sufficient to focus our attention to the test whether the State legislature in enating S. 3 of the Repealing Act, 1981 removed the defects which this court had, in its common order in Hansa Corporation case, found in the Entry Tax Act, 1979 and the notification dated 31-5-1979 issued by the State Government under that Act. Those two defects, according to that decision were : (i) Non-exemption of petty dealers from the levy of Entry Tax imposed an unreasonable restriction on their fundamental right to carry on trade and business and hence the imposition of such tax on them was violative of Art. 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution. Those two defects, according to that decision were : (i) Non-exemption of petty dealers from the levy of Entry Tax imposed an unreasonable restriction on their fundamental right to carry on trade and business and hence the imposition of such tax on them was violative of Art. 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution. (ii) S. 3 of the Act did not authorise the State Government to specify local areas in which entry Tax might be levied under that section and hence the notification dated 31-5-1979 issued by the Stale Government under that section was invalid. ( 20 ) SRI Srinivasan contended that s. 3 of the Repealing Act, 1981 merely declared that Entry Tax Act, 1979 shall be deemed always to have been valid and in force notwithstanding any judgment or order of any court and that section did not remove the two infirmities, in the Entry Tax Act, 1979 as found by this Court in Hansa Corporation case. He maintained that without removing such infirmities, S. 3 of the Repealing act, 1981 could not validate the Entry tax Act, 1979, which had been declared to be invalid by this Court in Hansa Corporation case and that hence S. 3 of the entry Tax Act, 1979 which had been struck down by this Court was not resurrected. ( 21 ) IF the decision of this Court in Hansa Corporation case, had not been reversed by the Supreme Court and the two infirmities in the Entry Tax Act, 1979 as held by this Court, had subsisted, Sri Srinivasan's contenlion would have been irrefutable. But, even before the Repealing Act, 1981 was enacted, the Supreme Court had reversed the decision of this Court in Hansa Corporation case, holding, inter alia, that there were no infirmities in the Entry tax Act, 1979. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it must be held that there were no infirmities in the entry Tax Act, 1979 which required to be removed by the validating Act. ( 22 ) WHEN the invalidity which formed the basis of this Court's decision holding the Entry Tax Act, 1979 as un-conststitutional, had disappeared on account of the Supreme Court reversing in appeal that decision, there was no impediment for the legislature declaring that that Act shall be deemed always to have been valid and shall continue to be in force. ( 23 ) HOWEVER, Sri Srinivasan leaned heavily on the decision of the Supreme court in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (6 ). There the material facts were these : The Life Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the lic) had arrived at a settlement with its employees on 24-1-1974 regarding the conditions of service of such employees including the bonus payable to them. That settlement was approved by the Central Government. Subsequently, the LIC. , by its Circular dated 25-9-1975, directed that no bonus should be paid to its employees under the then existing provisions until further instructions, since the question of payment of bonus was being reviewed in the light of the Bonus Ordinance issued on that date. Thereupon, the All India Insurance Employee's Association and some others filed a writ petition in the High court of Calcutta praying for a mandamus directing the LIC to act in accordance with the terms of the settlement dt. 24-1-1974. A single Judge of that high Court allowed that petition and issued a mandamus as prayed for. Against that decision, the LIC preferred a letters patent appeal. In the meantime, the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of settlement) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Modification Act) came into force. The LIC withdrew the appeal before the Division bench stating that there was no need to proceed with that appeal. The result, was that the judgment of the learned single Judge became final. ( 24 ) S. 3 of the Modification Act provided as follows :"notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes act, 1947, the provisions of the settlement in so far as they relate to the payment of an annual cash bonus to every class III and class iv employee of the Corporation at the rate of fifteen per cent of his annual salary, shall not have any force or effect and shall not be deemed to have had any force or effect on and from the 1st day of April 1975"the validity of the Modification Act was impugned before the Supreme Court on two grounds. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Calcutta high Court had become final and binding and that in spite of S. 3 of the modification Act, 'the LIC could not claim to be absolved from the obligation imposed by the judgment to carry out the writ of mandamus and that the LIC. , was bound to obey the mandamus and to pay the bonus. The reasoning of bhagawati, J. , who delivered the majority judgment, was as follows :"here, the judgment given by the Calcutta High Court, which is relied upon by the petitioners, is not a mere declaratory judgment holding an impost or tax to be invalid, so that a validation statute can remove the defect pointed out by the judgment amending the law with retrospective effect and validate such impost of tax. But it is a judgment giving effect to the right of the petitioners to annul cash bonus under the settlement by issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Life Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of such bonus. If by reason of retrospective alteration of the factual or legal situation, the judgment is rendered erroneous, the remedy may be, by way of appeal or review, but so long as the judgment stands, it cannot be disregarded or ignored and it must be obeyed by the Life Insurance Corporation". ( 25 ) STRONG reliance was also placed by Sri Srinivasan on the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in a. V. Nanchane v. Union of India (1) and connected writ petitions. There, the facts were these : After the decision of the Supreme Court in Modem Mohan pathak v. Union of India (6) the LIC. , issued a notification under S. 49 of the life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 amending the Terms and conditions of service of Employees Order, 1957 with effect from 1-6-1978. The relevant clause of that order, after amendment, read as follows :"no employee of the Corporation shall be entitled to profit sharing bonus. , issued a notification under S. 49 of the life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 amending the Terms and conditions of service of Employees Order, 1957 with effect from 1-6-1978. The relevant clause of that order, after amendment, read as follows :"no employee of the Corporation shall be entitled to profit sharing bonus. However, the Corporation may, haying regard to the financial condition of the Corporation in respect of any year and subject to the previous approval of the Central Government, grant non-profit sharing bonus to its employees in respect of that year at such rate as the Corporation may think fit and on such terms and conditions as it may specify as regards the eligibility for such bonus". The effect of that amendment was to annul cash bonus in terms of the settlement of 1974. Such amendment was challenged in a writ petition before the allahabad High Court which allowed that petition. From that decision, the lic preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981 was promulgated on 31-1-1981 inserting new sub-clause (cc) in sub-sec. (2) of S. 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act and new sub-sections (2-A) (2-B) and (2-C) in S 48 of that Act, with retrospective effect from 20-6-1979. By the Notification dated 2-2-1982 certain rules were made with retrospective effect providing that no class-III or class-IV employee of the L1c. shall be entitled to (he profit sharing bonus or any other kind of cash bonus. The validity of the above Ordinance and the above rules, was chajlen- ged in W. P. No. 501 of 1981 and connected petitions before the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, the Ordinance was replaced by an Act. shall be entitled to (he profit sharing bonus or any other kind of cash bonus. The validity of the above Ordinance and the above rules, was chajlen- ged in W. P. No. 501 of 1981 and connected petitions before the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, the Ordinance was replaced by an Act. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners therein that the provisions of the amendment Act of 1981 could not nullify the effect of the writ issued by the Supreme Court in appeal from the decision of the Allahabad High Court and the connected cases, directing the LIC to give effect to the terms of the 1974 settlement relating to bonus- ( 26 ) FOLLOWING its earlier decision in Madan Mohan Pathak's case (4) the supreme Court upheld the petitioner's contention that the amendment Act of 1981 and the new rules made under the notification dated 2-2-1982, could not abrogate the terms of the 1974 settlement relating to bonus, but could operate only prospectively from the date of publication of those rules. ( 27 ) THE decision of the Supreme court in M. M. Pathak's case (4) and the common judgment of the Supreme court in A. V. Nanchane v. Union of india (1) and connected writ petitions, are distinguishable on facts from the present cases. As pointed out by the supreme Court in M. M. Pathak's case (4) the judgment of the single judge of the calcutta High Court was not merely a declaratory judgment, but had given effect to the right of the petitioners therein to get the cash bonus under the settlement of 1974 and the High Court had issued a mandamus directing the lic to pay the amount of such bonus. Likewise, in A. V, Ncnchane v. Union of india, the Supreme Court noticed that it (the Supreme Court) had earlier issued in D. J. Bahadur's case a mandamus directing the LIC to give effect to the terms of the 1974 settlement relating to bonus. The judgment in D. J. Bahadur's case also was not merely a declaratory one. Likewise, in A. V, Ncnchane v. Union of india, the Supreme Court noticed that it (the Supreme Court) had earlier issued in D. J. Bahadur's case a mandamus directing the LIC to give effect to the terms of the 1974 settlement relating to bonus. The judgment in D. J. Bahadur's case also was not merely a declaratory one. But, in the present cases, the earlier judgment of this Court in Hansa corporation case was substantially a declaratory judgment declaring the entry Tax Act 1979 as unconstitutional though incidentally a mandamus was issued directing the State Government and its officers and servants to forbear from enforcing the provisions of the Act against the petitioners therein. The present cases are similar to Prithvi Cotton Mills ltd. , v. Broach Borough Municipality (8) in which the facts were these : In Patel hargordhahdas v. Municipal Commissioner ahamadabad (9), the levy of property tax by the Municipality on buildings and lands on the basis of capital value thereof, was held to be invalid, since S. 73 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 empowered the Municipality to levy the'rate' on buildings and lands, and the term 'rate' was confined to imposition on the basis of the annual letting value. To overcome the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in patel Hargordhandas case (8) the Gujarat imposition of Taxes of Municipalities (Validation) Act, 1963 was enacted. S. 3 of that Act provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, no tax assessed or purported to have been assessed by a Municiplity on the basis of a capital value of a building or land and imposed, collected and recovered by the Municipality at any time before the commencement of the validation Act, shall be deemed to have been invalidly assessed, imposed, collected or recovered and the imposition, collection and recovery of the tax so assessed shall be valid and shall be deemed always to have been valid and shall not be called in question merely on the ground that the assessment of the tax on the basis of the capital value of the building or land, was not authorised by law. That Validation Act was challenged in Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. , v. Broach Municipality (8) The Supreme court upheld the validity of that Act. That Validation Act was challenged in Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. , v. Broach Municipality (8) The Supreme court upheld the validity of that Act. ( 28 ) EXPLAINING the judgment of the supreme Court in Prithvi Cotton Mills case (8) Bhagawati, J. observed in M. M. Pathak's case (6) that by S. 3 of the validation Act, the Gujarat legislature had retrospectively imposed tax on buildings and lands on the basis of the capital value and if the tax had already been imposed, such imposition of the tax was valid notwithstanding the declaration by the Supreme Court that such imposition was incompetent. Bhagawati J added that it was clearly permissible for the legislature to validate the imposition of tax declared as invalid, because, in doing so the legislature did not seek to reverse the decision of the Supreme court on the interpretation of the word 'rate', but, retrospectively amended the law by providing for imposition, levy, collection and recovery of tax on the basis of capital value and that the decision of the Supreme Court holding the levy of property tax to be incompetent on the basis of the unamended law, therefore became irrelevant and could not stand in the way of the tax being assessed, Collected and recovered on the basis of the capital value of buildings and lands under the law as retrospectively amended. ( 29 ) THE observations in Prithvi cotton Mills case (%), as pointed out by bhagawati, J. , in M. M. Pathak's case (6), suggest that a court's decision may cease to be binding when the conditions on which it was based, are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. ( 30 ) IN the present case, the conditions on which the decision of this court in Hansa Corporation, was based, namely, that non-exemption of petty dealers from the Entry Tax was violative of Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution and that S. 3 of the Entry Tax act, 1979, did not authorise the Government to specify local areas in which entry tax might be levied, ceased to exist as a result of the decision of the Supreme court reversing the decision of this court on those two points. The decision of this Court in Hansa Corporation case could not have been given in such altered circumstance of fundamental character. The decision of this Court in Hansa Corporation case could not have been given in such altered circumstance of fundamental character. By S 3 of the Repealing Act, 1981 the legislature did not seek to reverse the decision of this Court in hansa Corporation case which had already been reversed by the Supreme court. S. 3 of the Repealing Act, 1981, should, in our opinion, be construed as re-enacting the Entry Tax Act, 1979, after the obstacle to its validity had been removed by the Supreme Court which reversed the decision of this court in Hansa Corporation case. In other words, the decision of this court holding the Entry Tax Act, 1979 as invalid, became irrelevant after that decision was reversed by the Supreme Court and did not stand in the way of the State legislature re-enacting that Act by declaring that the Entry Tax Act, 1979, shall be deemed always to have been valid notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court and be deemed to be in force and shall continue to be in force. ( 31 ) IN our opinion, the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in m. M Pathak's case- (6) and A. V. Nanchane's case (7), does not apply to the present case, because, as stated earlier, s. 3 of the Repealing Act, 1981 should be regarded as having re-enacted the Entry tax Act, 1979 after the bisis for its invalidity, as held by this court in Kansa corporation case was removed by the supreme Court which reversed that decision of this court. By such re-enactment the writ of mandamus issued by this Court in Hansa Corporation case, became ineffectivethe conditions on which that decision was based, were so fundamentally altered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in appeal that that decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. ( 32 ) WE agree with the conclusion of the learned single Judge, though not for identical reasons. ( 33 ) IN the result, we dismiss these appeals. ( 34 ) IN the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Accordingly, we decline to grant the certificate prayed for and dismiss the oral application. --- *** --- .