JUDGMENT K. Bhaskaran, J. 1. The appellant is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 201 of 1972 on the file of the Munsiff of Thodupuzha. The suit was one for recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,500, with interest and costs, covered by Ext. A-1 cheque for Rs. 1,000, dated 24th June,1972 and Ext. A-2 cheque for Rs. 2,500, dated 17th July, 1972, both drawn by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant and indorsed by him (the 2nddefendant) in favour of the plaintiff. Exts. A-1 and A-2 cheques having been dishonoured by the bank as per Ext. A-6 memo, dated 26th June, 1972, and Ext.A-6(a) memo dated 19th July, 1972 respectively, after the issue of Ext. A-3notice of dishonour, dated 3rd August, 1972 to defendants 1 and 2, to which while the 1st defendant did not send a reply, the 2nd defendant sent Ext. A-7 andA-8 replies respectively, dated 29th June, 1972 and 22nd July, 1972 informing the plaintiff that the amount would be paid within a short time, the plaintiff brought the suit for recovery of the amounts, which remained without being paid. The Trial Court by its judgment, dated 31st January, 1974 decreed the suit as prayed for. In appeal, as per the judgment in A.S. No. 14 of 1975 on the file of the District Court, Ernakulam, the plaintiff was given a decree only for the amount covered by Ext. A-1 cheque; and to that effect the decree of the Trial Court was modified. It is aggrieved by the modification by the first appellate court of the Judgment and decree of the Trial Court that the plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 2. The cross objection is by the 1st defendant who contends that the notice of dishonour was not received by him within a reasonable time and that Exts. A-1and A-2 cheques were issued by him to the 2nd defendant without consideration. 3. In this Court the counsel for the appellant plaintiff submitted that the learned District Judge was clearly in error in disallowing the amount covered by Ext. A-2cheque, taking the view that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course stating that the plaintiff had sufficient reason to believe that there was defect in the title of the person from whom he derived title to the cheques, Exts. A-1 and A-2. 4. A-2cheque, taking the view that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course stating that the plaintiff had sufficient reason to believe that there was defect in the title of the person from whom he derived title to the cheques, Exts. A-1 and A-2. 4. S.9 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, lays down: "Holder in due course, - 'Holder in due course' means any person who for consideration became the possessor of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque if payable to the bearer. or the payee or indorsee thereof, if payable and without having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he derived his title." The courts below concurrently found that the plaintiff was a holder for consideration, and also that the instruments had been transferred to him before it had become overdue; however, on the dispute whether he was a transferee in good faith and whether he had any reason to believe that there was any defect in the title of the transferee, in so far as Ext. A-2 cheque was concerned, in reversal of the finding of the Trial Court, the first appellate court held that he was not transferee in good faith, and that while accepting the cheque he did not believe that there was no defect in the title of the transferor. What led the learned District Judge to conclude that the plaintiff had sufficient cause to believe that there was defect in the title of the transferor, was the fact that Ext. A-1 cheque for Rs. 1,000drawn by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant and indorsed in favour of the plaintiff on 24th June, 1972 was dishonoured by the bank as per its memo Ext. A-6, dated 26th June, 1972; it was nearly more than three weeks there after that Ext. A-2 cheque, dated 17th July, 1972 for Rs. 2,500 drawn by the 1stdefendant in favour of the very same 2nd defendant, indorsed in favour of the plaintiff, was accepted by him without protest, which act, according to him, implied lack of good faith as well as absence of sufficient cause for the plaintiff to believe that there was no defect in the title of the transferor. 2,500 drawn by the 1stdefendant in favour of the very same 2nd defendant, indorsed in favour of the plaintiff, was accepted by him without protest, which act, according to him, implied lack of good faith as well as absence of sufficient cause for the plaintiff to believe that there was no defect in the title of the transferor. It would appear that in the view of the learned District Judge the fact that an earlier cheque issued by the drawer in favour of the endorser was dishonoured should by itself be considered to be sufficient cause for the indor see to conclude that there was defect in the title of the endorser. It is on this assumption that the decree of the Trial Court in so far as Ext. A-2 cheque was concerned was reversed by the learned District Judge. Defect in title might exist, for example, in a case where a person holds a stolen cheque or a cheque which happened to be drawn under fraud, mistake or coercion. On the facts of the case, the learned District Judge is seen to have concluded that the plaintiff had sufficient cause to believe that there was defect in the title of the endorser as the endorsement on Ext. A-2 cheque, dated 17th July, 1972 in his favour by the 2nd defendant was about three weeks after Ext. A-1 cheque drawn by the 1st defendant himself in favour of the 2nddefendant, indorsed to the plaintiff, was dishonoured by the Bank as per Ext. A-6memo, dated 26th June, 1972. This reasoning, I find, has no basis in law. 5. It has to be remembered that the holder in due course is concerned with the title of the person who transfers the instrument to him, not that of the drawer. This position is made abundantly clear by S.9 of the Act itself, wherein it is stated. "................ and without having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he derived his title." (emphasis supplied) The contention of the 1st defendant could not be upheld for yet another reason. Under S.118(g) of the Act there arises a presumption that the holder of a negotiable instrument is holder in due course. and without having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he derived his title." (emphasis supplied) The contention of the 1st defendant could not be upheld for yet another reason. Under S.118(g) of the Act there arises a presumption that the holder of a negotiable instrument is holder in due course. The burden of proving that the plaintiff who was the holder of the instrument was not a holder in due course, was on the 1st defendant who raised that plea. The 1st defendant did not make any attempt to prove his contention that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course. The learned District Judge had lost sight of these legal and factual positions also. 6. Under S.36 of the Act every prior party to a negotiable instrument is liable thereof to a holder in due course until the instrument is duly satisfied. In this case, neither the 1st defendant nor the 2nd defendant has a case that the instrument has been duly satisfied. That being the position, the first defendant who was the drawer was not entitled to plead that he had no liability to satisfy the instrument. The learned District Judge ought to have taken note of this legal position also. 7. We have noticed that the main ground urged in the cross objection is that there was no consideration for the cheques Exts. A-1 and A-2, issued by the 1stdefendant to the 2nd defendant. The 1st defendant would contend that they were issued only for the purpose of accommodation and therefore, the plaintiff who was the indorsee from the 2nd defendant could not derive a better title than what the 2nd defendant himself would have had. The concurrent finding of the courts below is that the plea that the cheques were not supported by consideration was not established. That apart, under S.43 of the Act the liability of the drawer as against a third party is absolute. That section reads: "Negotiable instrument made, etc., without consideration.- A negotiable instrument made, drawn, accepted, indorsed or transferred without consideration or for a consideration, which fails, creates no objection, of payment between the parties to the transaction. That apart, under S.43 of the Act the liability of the drawer as against a third party is absolute. That section reads: "Negotiable instrument made, etc., without consideration.- A negotiable instrument made, drawn, accepted, indorsed or transferred without consideration or for a consideration, which fails, creates no objection, of payment between the parties to the transaction. But, if any such party has transferred the instrument with or without indorsement to a holder for consideration, such holder, and every subsequent holder deriving title from him, may recover the amount due on such instrument from he transferor for consideration or any prior party thereto..........." In the light of this absolute liability of the 1st defendant to a third party like the indorsee in this case, the 1st defendant could not be heard to say that the first appellate court ought not to have granted a decree not only for the amount covered by Ext. A-1 cheque, but also for the amount covered by Ext. A-2cheque. I have already noticed that the concurrent finding of the courts below is that both the cheques were supported by consideration. Now that we find fromS.43 of the Act that the liability of the drawer as against a third party is absolute, the 1st defendant who issued Exts. A-1 and A-2 cheques has legally no right to raise, as against a third party, namely the plaintiff here, the contention that these instruments were not supported by consideration and, therefore, the plaintiff who is the holder in due course would not be entitled to recover amounts covered by the instruments on the plea of want of consideration. 8. The plea of the 1st defendant - the cross objector - that the plaintiff could not maintain the suit for want of notice of dishonour served on him, in time, is equally untenable. The latter part of S.94 of the Act extracted below would make it abundantly clear that the burden of the person obliged to issue such notice, would stand discharged if he sends the notice by post. "If the notice is duly directed and sent by post and miscarries, such miscarriage does not render the notice invalid." The evidence in this case adduced by the plaintiff is that the plaintiff had on 3rdAugust, 1978 issued notice of dishonour within a reasonable time, and that while he received Exts. "If the notice is duly directed and sent by post and miscarries, such miscarriage does not render the notice invalid." The evidence in this case adduced by the plaintiff is that the plaintiff had on 3rdAugust, 1978 issued notice of dishonour within a reasonable time, and that while he received Exts. A-7 and A-3 replies, dated 29th June, 1972 and 23rd July,1972 respectively, from the 2nd defendant, he did not receive any reply from the1st defendant. The suit was filed only after the expiry of the reasonable time after issue of the notice. There is no contra evidence in the case. Moreover as the drawer of the cheques there is little merits on his part in pleading that he had not known whether his bank balance position was such as to enable the bank to honour the cheques issued by him. For foregoing reasons the appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree of the first appellate court to the extent it modifies the judgment and decree of the trail court by disallowing the amount covered by Ext. A-2 cheque are set aside; and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court are restored. The cross objection is dismissed with costs. In the second appeal the appellant plaintiff would been titled to his costs.