JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. 1. Finding a conflict between the decisions of two Single Judges reported in Shri Chand Gupta v. Madan Lal, 1973 AWR 472 and Dinesh Chandra Gupta v. Kashi Nath Seth, 1976 ALJ 124, Hon. A. N. Varma, J., has referred the following question for decision by a larger Bench for its opinion : "Whether the court has jurisdiction to grant the benefit of Section 39 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 to a tenant, if the deposit made by him falls short of the amount or amounts required to be deposited under that provision on account of a bona fide mistake ?" 2. Suit No. 42 of 1973 was filed for eviction on the Small Cause Court side. It was contested by the defendant who alleged that since U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (U. P. Act XIII of 1972) had become applicable to the building in question, the plaintiff was not entitled to get a decree without complying with the conditions mentioned in Section 39 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. Holding that U. P. Act XIII of 1972 did not apply to the building in question, the Judge Small Causes, decreed the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent and damages. The defendant went up in revision to the District Judge under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The Additional District Judge, to whom the revision was transferred, held that by virtue of Section 2, U. P. Act XIII of 1972 became applicable to the building in question. Having further found that the defendant had substantially deposited the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum and the landlord's full costs of the suit, he held that no decree for eviction could be passed against the defendant. The decree of the trial court was thus reversed. This led to the filing of the present writ petition. 3. In the writ petition, the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiff was that since the deposit made by the defendant fell short by Rs. 104/-, the Additional District Judge committed an error in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act. This led to the filing of the present writ petition. 3. In the writ petition, the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiff was that since the deposit made by the defendant fell short by Rs. 104/-, the Additional District Judge committed an error in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act. Rebutting the said argument, defendant's contention made was that Section 39 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 was required to be substantially complied with and as the shortfall in the compliance of Section 39 was infinitesimal, the same could not amount to failure to comply with the requirement of Section 39. 4. On the above controversy, the parties relied on the two decisions, referred to in the first paragraph of this judgment, apart from others which the learned Single Judge found difficult to reconcile hence he made this reference. For appreciating the point urged, it may be noted that U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, applied to buildings which were constructed upto the month of January, 1951. There was no Act providing for the regulating of letting and rent in respect of buildings constructed after this date. In 1972, the U. P. Legislature passed U. P. Act XIII of 1972 and took within its purview all the constructions which were in existence at the time of coming into force of the said Act. It, however, provided for exemption in Section 2 from operation of the Act certain buildings which were enumerated therein. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 lays down that nothing contained in the Act applied to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed, as a result whereof the Act did not apply to a building for ten years from the date of its construction. 5. At one time, there was a controversy as to whether sub-section (2) of Sec. 2 was prospective and applied to buildings which were constructed after the coming into force of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. This controversy was, however, set at rest by a decision of a Full Bench of this Court reported in Gopal Krishna Endley v. Vth Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 1981 AWC 321 . This controversy was, however, set at rest by a decision of a Full Bench of this Court reported in Gopal Krishna Endley v. Vth Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 1981 AWC 321 . The Supreme Court has also taken the same view in Om Prakash Gupta v. Digvijendra Pal Gupta, AIR 1981 SC 1230 . As a result of these decisions, it is now apparent that U. P. Act XIII of 1972 would be applicable to the premises in question which had been constructed in 1963. As a result whereof Section 39 ipso facto became applicable with effect from the date on which the building came under the purview of this Act. 6. Section 39 confers right of saving tenancy to a tenant who within one month from the date of commencement or from the date of his knowledge of the pendency of the suit, whichever be later, deposits in the Court before which the suit is pending, (i) the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation, (ii) with interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum, (iii) the landlord's full cost of the suit. It provides that on the aforesaid deposits being made, no decree for eviction shall be passed against the tenant except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) or in Clauses (b) to (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 20. This section is in pari materia with sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. The object of Section 39 is to give to the defaulting tenant an opportunity to save his tenancy by paying or tendering the arrears of rent together with interest and cost. Dealing with the object of Section 13 (2) (i) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, which is on the same lines as sub-section (4) of Section 20 and Section 39, the Supreme Court observed : "Even if the Act allows eviction of the tenant on the ground of non payment of arrears of rent, the proviso affords sufficient protection to the tenant against eviction if the tenant deposits the rent in accordance with the proviso............" We may now take up the question whether Section 39 is mandatory or directory and does the non-compliance of depositing the entire amount mentioned in this section, deprives the tenant of the benefit or protection granted by it ? 7. 7. Section 39 lays down in detail the amounts which are required to be deposited by a tenant if he is interested in saving his tenancy. These details have already been given by us above. The object or purpose of giving the details by the legislature appears to make the deposit of the same as a condition precedent for getting its benefit or advantage. The intention of the Legislature is expressly stated in Section 39. "If the words of a Statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense......" (Tindal C. J. in the Sussex Peerage's case). 8. In this background, the real question which we have to decide is what does the word mean in the context in which we find them in Section 39. Having regard to the consequences of non-compliance of the provisions that flow therefrom, we are led to hold that Section 39 is mandatory. Its object would be defeated by holding the same to be directory. A mandatory enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment is obeyed or fulfilled substantially. (See Punjab Cooperative Bank Limited v. CIT Lahore, 1940 PC 230 and Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta, AIR 1956 SC 140 , 141). The general rule appears to be that non-compliance of mandatory requirements results in depriving a person the benefits of the same. Gajendragadkar, J. delivering the judgment in Shri Baru Ram v. Smt. Parsanni, AIR 1959 SC 93 at page 96 observed that : "Whenever a particular Statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to specific consequence, it would be difficult to accept the argument that the failure to comply with the said requirement should lead to any other consequene." In Mranalini B. Shah v. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah, AIR 1980 SC 954 the Supreme Court was called upon to consider Section 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, which provided for the deposit of rent regularly by a tenant. The Supreme Court held that the requirement of depositing the amount regularly in the court was mandatory. The Supreme Court held that the requirement of depositing the amount regularly in the court was mandatory. According to the view taken in this case, the tenant was held to deposit the amount month by month regularly to avail the benefit of saving his ejectment. The Supreme Court held that the Court had no discretion to treat irregular payments as substantial compliance with the mandate of requiring the deposits to be made month by month. In this case the Supreme Court was concerned with a similar controversy as arises before us in the present case. 9. Pointing out the difference between a mandatory rule and a directory rule, the Supreme Court has held in Sharifuddin v, Abdul Ghani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303 , that : "The difference between a mandatory rule and a directory rule is that while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of the latter, substantial compliance may be sufficient to achieve the object regarding which the rule is enacted." 10. In the aforesaid background, we find that Section 39 since is mandatory, it is necessary for a tenant to deposit the entire amount required by it. A tenant cannot get the benefit provided for by Section 39 by making substantial compliance of the same. Substantial compliance of Section 39 would not serve the purpose. We, therefore, hold that if the deposit made by a tenant falls short of amount or amounts required to be deposited under section 39, the tenant would not be entitled to take resort to the principle of substantial compliance and get the benefit of Section 39. Section 39 prescribes for depositing the particular amounts in the manner prescribed therein. The failure to comply with the said requirement leads to the consequence of depriving the tenant of its benefit. Since we have found above that substantial compliance of Section 39 is of on avail to a tenant, the question of his bonafides does not arise. Even if a tenant has acted in good faith without deceit or fraud or innocently, the benefit of Section 39 cannot be extended to him. Next comes the question of applicability of the principle of "de minimis non curat lex" (the law does not concern itself about trifles). The contention raised before us was that where trifling irregularities are brought to the notice of the Court, the maxim de minimis non curat lex is applicable. Next comes the question of applicability of the principle of "de minimis non curat lex" (the law does not concern itself about trifles). The contention raised before us was that where trifling irregularities are brought to the notice of the Court, the maxim de minimis non curat lex is applicable. "Courts of justice generally do not take trifling and immaterial matters into account, except under peculiar circumstances, such as the trial of a right, or where personal character is involved ; they will not, for instance, take notice of the fraction of a day, except in cases where there are conflicting rights, for the determination of which it is necessary that they should do so ; as, for instance, in a claim for demurrage of a ship, in which case it has been expressly held that a fraction of a day counts for a day." (Broom's Legal Maxims, Tenth Edition, page 88). Sir W. Scott observed that : "the Court is not bound to a strictness at once harsh and pedantic in the application of statutes. The law permits the qualification implied in the ancients maxim, de minimis non curat lex. Where there are irregularities of very slight consequence, it does not intend that the infliction of penalties should be inflexibly severe. If the deviation were a mere trifle, which, if continued in practice, would weigh little or nothing on the public interest, it might properly be overlooked." (Broom's Legal Maxims, Tenth Edition, page 90). 11. A case of substantial compliance of Section 39 should not be confused with a case where the aforesaid principle could be applied. The latter type of case would be one where the shortfall in deposit is of a negligible amount. This principle of de minimis has been applied by English and Indian Courts in administration of justice. 12. In Fredco Estates Limited v. Brvant, 1961 All England Law Reports 34 the notice required to be issued for enhancement of rent did not calculate the amount accurately. The argument raised before the Court was that as the amount had not been correctly worked out, no enhancement of rent could be permitted. 12. In Fredco Estates Limited v. Brvant, 1961 All England Law Reports 34 the notice required to be issued for enhancement of rent did not calculate the amount accurately. The argument raised before the Court was that as the amount had not been correctly worked out, no enhancement of rent could be permitted. This argument had been accepted by the Court of first instance, but the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and found that the case was subject to the minimis rule and, as such, it could not render the notice invalid for the purposes of enhancement. To us, it appears that the principle of de minimis can be applied to a case of shortfall in depositing the amount mentioned in Section 39 if the same is found to be trivial. This is due to the fact that a small error in calculation or in arriving at the amount due would be of a trivial nature and should not deny the tenant of the right conferred by Section 39. In fact, it is difficult to impute any motive to a tenant in a case where a slight error of a trifling nature takes place in calculating the amounts due. It may be accidental or due to erroneous calculations. In such a case even the bonafides of the tenant are not relevant. What is required to be seen is the amount that is not paid or deposited on the due date. If the amount is found to be small, which has no consequence, the Court would be justified in ignoring the said mistake by extending the de minimis rule to such a case. As to what is a case deserving the benefit of the aforesaid rule is a question of fact to be decided in each case for which no rigid and exhaustive law can be laid down. 13. For what we have said above, we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by Prem Prakash, J., in Dinesh Chandra Gupta v. Kashi Nath Seth (supra), that the rule of de minimis can be applied to a case of shortfall. But, we wish to reiterate that a tenant who claims to have made a substantial compliance of Section 39 would not be entitled to get its benefit. But, we wish to reiterate that a tenant who claims to have made a substantial compliance of Section 39 would not be entitled to get its benefit. There is a difference in a case of substantial compliance and in the case to which the rule of de minimis could be applied. Substantial compliance of Section 39 does not result in a complete discharge of obligation. The tenant would be still liable to deposit the balance. Substantial compliance would mean something less than full. In a case of de minimis, the Court ignores the shortfall and extends the benefit contemplated by Section 39 to the defaulting tenant. It will not grant any decree of the amount short deposited. The defence of substantial compliance does not absolve the tenant of his liability to pay the entire amount. 14. Although we have expressed our agreement with the view taken by Prem Prakash, J., in Dinesh Chandra Gupta v. Kashi Nath Seth (supra), that the rule of de minimis applies to a case of deposit under section 39 for an insignificant shortage in the deposit, the tenant will not be deprived of the benefit of the same. But, we are unable to subscribe to the opinion expressed by him in the aforesaid case that where a tenant has made the deposit in substantial compliance with Section 39, he will become entitled to get its benefit. We have found above that the question of substantial compliance is completely ruled out, that no tenant can get the benefit of Section 39 on that basis. It is only in a case of very small and trifling matter that the principle of de minimis can be brought into aid. As in our opinion such a small error would have no consequence at all, the same cannot be regarded as false or misleading in a material respect, hence a tenant is required to prove his bonafides by bringing evidence of the reason, e. g., clerical mistake in calculation etc. for getting the advantage of this rule. In the instant case, we have noted that the total amount which the tenant was required to deposit was Rs. 1944/- and there was a deficiency of Rs. 104/-. The amount of Rs. 104/- was not a small sum which could qualify the requirement of getting the benefit of rule of de minimis. 15. In the instant case, we have noted that the total amount which the tenant was required to deposit was Rs. 1944/- and there was a deficiency of Rs. 104/-. The amount of Rs. 104/- was not a small sum which could qualify the requirement of getting the benefit of rule of de minimis. 15. In Shrichand Gupta v. Madan Lal (supra) and Khadi Gramudyog Mandal v. Shri Ram Chandraji, 1977 AWC 342 it was held that Sec. 39 was mandatory and the entire amount was required to be deposited. We are in agreement with the view taken in these cases. In the aforesaid cases, the learned Judges were not called upon to decide the applicability of the de minimis rule. 16. For what we have said above, we do not consider it necessary to refer to the other decisions cited at the Bar. We answer the question in the negative by holding that the Court can grant benefit of Section 39 if the shortage is considered to be negligible or trifling and is caused by bonafide or accidental mistake. Let the papers be laid before the learned Single Judge with this opinion and answer. Question answered.