JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This first appeal from order is directed against the order of the lower appellate court by which it has set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and has remanded the suit to it with a direction to readmit to its original number and decide it in accordance with law. The trial court had earlier by its order dated 1-9-76 ordered that the suit had abated u/s 5(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 2. The facts relevant for the purposes of this appeal are that the Plaintiffs had filed a suit claiming to be entitled to certain properties in dispute which according to them had been wrongly got recorded in favour of the Respondent. When a sun u/s 229-B of UP ZA and LR Act was filed against them, a fictitious compromise was got recorded on 28-1-74 adversely affecting the rights of the Plaintiffs. In para. 11 of the plaint, it was stated that the Plaintiffs and Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 v ho were minors had not entered into any compromise nor they had signed any such deed of compromise. It was further alleged that at the relevant time the Plaintiffs as well as the Defendant No. 2 and 3 were minors and neither they were consulted before entering into the compromise nor any sanction was obtained from the court. It was next pointed out that since the properly of the minor was being transferred under the compromise, the permission of the District Judge had to be' obtained and the same had not been taken. It is said that the compromise is not for the benefit of or in the interest of the minors and being collusive, it was not binding. On the ground that the decree had no binding effect on the rights of the Plaintiffs and Defendant Nos. 2 and 3, it was sought to be cancelled by the decree of the civil court as it was likely to create clouds on their rights. The Plaintiffs on these allegations prayed that the decree in case No. 1622 of 72 decided on 19-1-74 be cancelled 3. 2 and 3, it was sought to be cancelled by the decree of the civil court as it was likely to create clouds on their rights. The Plaintiffs on these allegations prayed that the decree in case No. 1622 of 72 decided on 19-1-74 be cancelled 3. Shri R. S. Misra, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant has urged that the decree in this case was not merely voidable but was void and as such the consolidation courts were competent to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, completely ignoring the decree. In such a situation, therefore, it was not necessary that the civil court should enter upon adjudication in the matter in order to cancel the decree. He has, in this connection, relied upon the case of Amanat Ullah v. Mohd. Fariyad 1978 ALJ 661 where the learned single Judge of this Court was dealing with a suit for declaration that the decree in an earlier suit was void as it had the effect of deciding the rights and interest of the parties in the land in suit and also sued for declaration of Bhumidhari and Sudan rights in respect of the suit land. It was held that the suit out of which the appeal arose should be abated in pursuance of Section 5(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It has been pointed that this case was subsequently distinguished in 1979 AWC 69 in Second Appeal No. 3062 of 65 Sheo Pujan v. Beni Madhav Tiwari, decided on 1-9-79. From the full report of that case I find that there the cancellation of the revenue court decree was sought on the ground of negligence alleged to have been committed by the guardian in the conduct of that case. There the question was whether the guardian had acted negligently or not. Clearly that was a case in which the decree was only voidable and was not void and it was on this oasis that the learned single Judge held that civil court had jurisdiction to entertain that suit. Where, however, the decree itself is void different considerations would arise. This case, therefore, cannot be of any help to the Respondents. 4. Clearly that was a case in which the decree was only voidable and was not void and it was on this oasis that the learned single Judge held that civil court had jurisdiction to entertain that suit. Where, however, the decree itself is void different considerations would arise. This case, therefore, cannot be of any help to the Respondents. 4. A reference was made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Sheopal v. Sri Lekhpata 1979 AWC 524 in which various authorities on this point have been reviewed and on a consideration of the principles evolved therefrom the court came to the conclusion that in a civil suit for cancellation if a sale deed had been obtained by mis-representation, but the fraudulent act related not to the contents of the document but to the nature of the document, the same was void and the consolidation courts could decide the rights of the parties by completely ignoring such a sale deed. In such circumstances, in view of Section 5(2) the suit pending in the civil court must abate. In this ease, Rasool Ahmad v. Beni Prasad 1965 ALJ 70, Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna 1976 AWC 412 and Baijnath v. Binda 1978 AWC 52 were relied upon. The court also took into account the principles laid down in Gorakh Nath Dube Vs. Hari Narain Singh and Others, AIR 1973 SC 2451 . 5. In view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision, it is apparent that in all cases in which the decree is void, its cancellation by the civil court is not essential and in suitable circumstances, the consolidation courts will have the jurisdiction to determine all these questions pertaining to title after ignoring the void decree of deed completely without first getting the same cancelled. Applying the principles to the facts of the present case it is clear that the decree assailed herein was void and it need not be first got cancelled through the decree of the civil court. It is urged for the Respondents that this was only partially void as against the minors but so far as the Plaintiffs were concerned, the same was not void. However it appears from the plaint allegations that the Plaintiffs themselves claimed to be minors at the time when the compromise decree was passed. It is urged for the Respondents that this was only partially void as against the minors but so far as the Plaintiffs were concerned, the same was not void. However it appears from the plaint allegations that the Plaintiffs themselves claimed to be minors at the time when the compromise decree was passed. Apart from this, ground No. 1 in paragraph 11 of the plaint is itself to the effect that none of the Plaintiff or Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had signed the said compromise at all and any decree based on such alleged compromise would be void and shall fall through. 6. In the result, I find force in this appeal and the same is allowed. The decision of the lower appellate court is set aside that of the trial court restored. The suit stands abated u/s 5(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954. There will be no order as to costs, which will be borne by the parties themselves throughout.