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1982 DIGILAW 1043 (ALL)

Randeep Singh Tomar alias Deependra v. VIth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut

1982-09-10

A.N.VARMA

body1982
JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against an order passed by the learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut allowing an appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 under section 22 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and rejecting an application filed oi behalf of t he petitioner by his natural guardian, his mother, namely, Smt. Lilawati under section 21 of the aforesaid Act for an order of eviction of the said respondent. 2. The aforesaid application was filed on the assertion that the property originally belonged to one Thakur Lakhpat Singh, the grand-father of the petitioner. Thakur Lakhpat Singh bequeathed this property to the petitioner under a will dated 6-1-1974 and under that will be appointed the petitioner's sister Smt. Manju Chauhan and her husband Sri B. R. Chauhan to act as guardian of the petitioner in respect of the property bequeathed under that will. The petitioner's mother Smt. Lilawati filed this application after the death of Thakur Lakhpat Singh for an order of eviction of respondent No. 2 who was the tenant of the property under section 21(1)(a) of the aforesaid Act on the allegation that at present the petitioner was residing in a shop No. 751 begamhagh, Meerut which did not have the facilities of a bath room and it latrine etc. view the result that the petitioner could not carry on his studies property and the shop was far too small for accommodating the petitioner and his mother and sister. He did not have any other accommodation available with him where he might shift. The tenant on the other hand could shift to some other accommodation if he so desired and he could even take the shop where the petitioner was at present residing. In these circumstances the petitioner bona fide needed the accommodation in dispute for his residence and he would suffer great hardship if the application was rejected. 3. The application was contested by the aforesaid respondent on a variety of grounds which it is not necessary to set out there in detail. One of the objections taken was that in the presence of testamentary guardians the petitioner's mother had no right to file the application. The application was hence incompetent in law. 3. The application was contested by the aforesaid respondent on a variety of grounds which it is not necessary to set out there in detail. One of the objections taken was that in the presence of testamentary guardians the petitioner's mother had no right to file the application. The application was hence incompetent in law. This objection, however, does not appear to have been raised before the Prescribed Authority in the course of argument for I do not find any mention of that argument in the order of the Prescribed Authority. 4. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application on merits and held that the need of the landlord was bona fide and pressing and that upon a consideration of respective hardship he was likely to suffer to a far greater extent than the tenant. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the tenant filed an appeal which, as mentioned above, has beeen allowed. The appeal has been allowed solely on the ground that the application was not maintainable in view of the fact that the same had not been filed through the testamentary guardian but through the natural guardian of the petitioner. Certain other legal pleas were also raised on behalf of the tenant but they were repelled by the appellate court. The result was that the appeal of the tenant was allowed and the application of the petitioner was rejected. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner assailing the legality of the aforesaid order contended that the view taken by the appellate court is manifestly unsustainable in law. It was urged that there was no statutory bar to the natural guardian bringing an application on behalf of a minor under section 21(l)(a) even if there are testamentary guardians. It was further contended relying on the principles of Order 32 of the Civil Procedure Code that any one could file an application tinder section 21st a next friend of a minor, more so a natural guardian. Learned counsel submitted that the principle of Order 32 ought to he applied in these circumstances. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am clearly of the opinion that the appellate court is wrong in its view that the application of the petitioner was not maintainable because the same had been tiled through his natural guardian and not through his testamentary guardians. 8. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am clearly of the opinion that the appellate court is wrong in its view that the application of the petitioner was not maintainable because the same had been tiled through his natural guardian and not through his testamentary guardians. 8. In K. Kumar v. Onkar Nath, AIR 1972 Allahabad 81 a learned single Judge of this Court had occasion to consider a somewhat identical problem. The question there was whether the mother of a minor had it right to give a notice of demand under section 3(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 on behalf of the tenant and thereafter to file a suit in the presence of the father who was the natural guardian of the minor. The learned single Judge who decided that case answered the question in the affirmative and held that the giving of a notice of demand and instituting a suit for the eJectment of the tenant does not in any way offend against any of the provision of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and was consequently valid and proper. The learned single Judge further held that giving a notice of demand and filing a suit for ejectment do not amount to either dealing with the property or disposing of the same within the meaning of section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. The said acts hence cannot be said to be acts which are prohibited under that Act. The same principle will apply in the present case. Here also the mere filing of the application under section 21(1)(a) does not in any way amount to either dealing with the property of the petitioner or disposing of the same so as to attract the prohibition contained in section II of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. The learned Judge observed thus in paragraph 6A : "The rights and restrictions of the natural guardian given under Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act do not conflict with the procedure for filing a suit by a next friend on behalf of the minor. Not only is there no express prohibition, but a reading of Order 32 would go to show that wherever the legislature thought proper to restrict the right of the next friend, it has expressly provided in Rules 6 and 8 of Order 32". 9. Not only is there no express prohibition, but a reading of Order 32 would go to show that wherever the legislature thought proper to restrict the right of the next friend, it has expressly provided in Rules 6 and 8 of Order 32". 9. The aforesaid decision has been approved recently by a Division Bench of this Court in Janardan Prasad and another v. Girja Prasad Seth, AIR 1981 Allahabad 86 The ratio of the aforesaid decision is fully applicable to the present controversy. There is nothing in U.P. Act. No, 13 of 1912 or the scheme underlying there in which may expressly or by necessary implication bar the bringing of an application on behalf of a minor under section 21 (1)(a) by his natural guardian : 10. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended relying on sections 87 and 122 of the Succession Act that the acceptance of the petitioner's submission would mount to negation of the intention of the testator. For, under the will the testator had desired that the sister and brother-in-law of the petitioner alone shall act as his guardian, while in the present-proceedings the petitioner's mother is claiming to act as a guardian on behalf of the minor. 11. I have examined the said provisions as well as the terms of the will and I find nothing therein which might support the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. The mere fact that under the will the testator had named the petitioner's sister and brother-in-law as the guardians does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the terms of the will would stand defeated by the filing of the application under section 21 by the petitioner's natural guardian. The natural guardian here has brought the present application for the benefit of the minor. The minor does not have any proper place of residence according to the allegations made in the application under section 21. By the application giving rise to this petition the mother is seeking a proper residential accommodation for the minor. It is not disputed thar the minor is residing with his mother at present. Under the circumstances I do not see how by the filing of the application by the mother on behalf of the minor the provisions of the will or the intention of the testator are in the slightest degree defeated. 12. It is not disputed thar the minor is residing with his mother at present. Under the circumstances I do not see how by the filing of the application by the mother on behalf of the minor the provisions of the will or the intention of the testator are in the slightest degree defeated. 12. The result of the aforesaid discussion therefore is that the application of the petitioner was competent. The appellate court has erred in not examining it on merits. The appellate court will now dispose of that application afresh according to law. The findings which have been given against the respondent No. 2 by the appellate court shall, however, not be open to review. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut is quashed and the said court will now dispose of the application filed by the petitioner in accordance with law having regard to the observation made in the judgment. The court below shall try and dispose of the appeal expeditiously, it possible within a period of three months from the date on which either party produces before it a certified copy of this order. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs from respondent No. 2